SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF NATHANIEL GREENE
Volume I.

William Johnson

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SKETCHES

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LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

NATHANAEL GREENE,

MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

In the War of the Revolution.

COMPILED CHIEFLY FROM ORIGINAL MATERIALS.

BY WILLIAM JOHNSON,

OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH-CAROLINA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL I.

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CHARLESTON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, BY A. E. MILLER,

NO. 4, BROAD-STREET, NEAR THE BAY.

1822.

LOAN STACK

NATHANIEL GREENE,

Major General of the Armies of the United States of America,

In the War of the Revolution.

Engraved by J. B. Longacre, from a drawing by H. Inman.

District of South-Carolina.

SEAL. BE it Remembered, that on the twentieth day of November, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, and in the forty-sixth year of the Independence of the United States of America, the Honorable WILLIAM JOHNSON, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, deposited in this Office, the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as author and proprietor, in the words following, to wit:

"Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies "of the United States, in the War of the Revolution, compiled chiefly from original materials. By "William Johnson, of Charleston, South-Carolina."

In conformity to the Act of Congress of the United States, entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned," and also, to the act entitled "An Act supplementary to an act entitled, 'An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the art of designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints."

JAMES JERVEY,
District Clerk, South-Carolina District.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

HAVING recently ascertained, from the evidence of several highly respectable characters, that I have been led into an error in naming Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania as one of the cabal opposed to General Washington; in justice to his memory and my own feelings I acknowledge the error, and express my extreme regret at having committed it.

THE AUTHOR.

TO

The Venerable Survivors

OF THE

SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTION,

These Pages are respectfully Dedicated,

By one, who, in humility, acknowledges, that exalted as had been his previous admiration of their worth and services, he had formed but a faint idea of their virtues and sufferings, until drawn to the study of their actions in the unaffected narrative and unquestionable authority of their own correspondence.

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE author who lays claim to the advantages of original materials, owes to the world some explanation of the nature and authenticity of the documents, upon which he rests this demand upon public confidence.

Some years since, I was consulted by Mrs. Shaw, the youngest daughter and administratrix of General Greene, on the manner in which she should dispose of her father's original papers. Until that time, I had never understood that they had been preserved. For the first time, I learnt that they had been carefully husbanded, and never yet submitted to the examination of any one, with a view either to add to the materials of general history, or furnish those of a biography of the great man, who had bequeathed them to posterity. Nor had I, until then, been struck with the fact, that his biography had never been attempted, nor his name even mentioned in the cyclopædias of the day. I therefore, suggested to Mrs. Shaw, that if she approved of my undertaking the biography of her father, I would take the papers under my care, and examine how far they afforded the necessary materials for such an undertaking. The proposal was readily assented to, and she soon after forwarded to me a large collection of letters, containing his private correspondence; and addressed a letter to General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, requesting him to deliver me the trunk containing the official papers of the southern department, whilst General Greene was in command. The latter were immediately delivered up to me, and I found them in the highest state of preservation and arrangement. It appears, that on disbanding the army, these papers had been committed to the care of the late Major Edward Rutledge. After the decease of Major Rutledge, the papers passed into the hands of his son and executor Henry Rutledge, Esq. at present, of the State of Tennessee, by whom, on his leaving this State, they were consigned to the care of General Pinckney. These two collections of papers consisting of several thousand, had obviously been preserved with great care, and the motive became explained in the course of examining them.

It is well known to many eminent men, that the late Governor Read of Pennsylvania, contemplated writing a history of the Revolutionary war. As he was among the most intimate and valued friends of General Greene, he had requested of the latter to preserve for him, every thing that could assist him in the undertaking. This has been gladly complied with, and at the close of the war, when General Greene had resolved to establish himself in Georgia, and General Wayne had actually seated himself down beside him, Governor Read contemplated establishing himself in their neighbourhood. Both Greene and Read were cut off in the prime of life, and thus has the world been

deprived of such a history of the Revolution, as we can no longer hope ever to have. For it cannot be denied, that there exists a considerable defect in all the histories of that period, that have been as yet written. For, although, the military and more public events may have been accurately narrated, the intrigues that agitated Congress, and a variety of events explanatory of their acts and their errors, which transpired with closed doors, or out of doors, remain in utter obscurity. Of all these, Mr. Read could have furnished the most perfect narrative, and of all military events the illustrious trio that would then have graced the banks of the Savannah River, could not have been surpassed.

With regard to that part of those events in which General Greene was himself an actor, there is the fullest evidence that it was his intention to give to the world an exposition of the causes and motives that governed his actions. In a letter to Mr. John Adams, of the 28th of January, 1781, he writes thus: "the American armies have gained some advantage; my public letters will have given you some idea of them, but the previous measures which led to important events, and my reasons for those measures must lie in the dark until a more leisure hour. The people are determined to defend themselves from age to age, rather than give up their independence."

It is not material to explain, though there is no difficulty in doing it, why these papers were never brought to public notice, after the death of General Greene. Suffice it to say, that much time was necessarily consumed, after they came into my possession, in perusing them, and making my extracts from them. But after surmounting this labour, I found that there was a considerable space yet to be filled up, and for which the materials could only be found among his early friends, and in the country in which he passed his early life, and acted during the greatest part of the Revolutionary war.

This made a trip to Rhode-Island indispensable; and during the summer of 1818, I was occupied in exploring the private cabinets of his friends, in the northern and eastern states.

It is impossible to express my sense of the polite attention, which I received from the friends and admirers of General Greene, during these researches. The intelligence had preceded me, that I was collecting materials for the Biography of General Greene, and original documents were showered upon me from all quarters, while his friends showed themselves ever ready to listen to, and satisfy all those explanatory inquiries, which the materials already in my hands suggested.

I found that the general's early correspondence had been religiously preserved, and that various small collections of historical materials had been made, which were now liberally communicated to me, to aid in a work, in the promotion of which every one manifested an individual interest. I must here express my sense of the kind attentions of General Gibbes, at present Governor Gibbes, of Rhode-Island, of his brother, Colonel Gibbes, of Long-Island, and of the surviving brothers and nephews of General Greene; also, of his two early friends, Colonel Ward and General Varnum, who had passed their youth in habits of unrestrained intimacy with the subject of these Sketches, and could furnish of him, what may be called, the delineations of the heart.

Whilst in New-York, I had several conferrences with the late Judge Pendleton, with whom, I had previously corresponded on the subject. He had himself intended to undertake the work now submitted to the public; and being among the few who were acquainted with the existence of the materials for such an undertaking, in the possession of the family, he had made application to the executrix for them. This he had communicated to me through a friend, and I readily lent my influence to obtain her consent, and offered to decline it in his favour. But there existed private reasons, which I was not then apprized of, for her declining to assent to this request.

Mr. Pendleton possessed many advantages for entering upon this undertaking. He had been in the general's family from the time of his taking command of the southern department, to the termina-

tion of the war; and having established himself in Savannah, lived on the most confidential footing with him, to the close of his life. He was among the afflicted group who surrounded him in his last moments.

Having too high a sense of honour to attempt the undertaking without the assent of the family, as well as a perfect knowledge of the impracticability of effecting it without the papers in their possession, with a liberality, which I gratefully record, he from that time made the most cordial efforts in assisting me with all the minute and interesting information which his own memory and researches could accumulate. And to him, I am indebted for many pages of original information.

As I knew from corresponding with some of my friends, that Philadelphia and Baltimore were rich in the materials that I sought for, my steps were next directed to the former place. And I was richly rewarded for the journey. From my friends Mr. Joseph Read, and the relatives of the late Colonel Petit, I was favoured with a large collection of the most interesting original documents, and among them the outlines of the Biography of Greene, sketched by Mr. Read's father. To their politeness, also, I was indebted for an introduction to the widow of General Harmar, and from her I received a document of a very curious and interesting character. General Harmar was a colonel in the Pennsylvania line, and marched with his command, under Wayne, to reinforce the southern army. This march, it will be recollected, was full of interest, as the Pennsylvania line was arrested in its progress, first to re-enforce La Fayette, (then retreating before Lord Cornwallis) and afterwards to assist in the reduction of York Town. It then joined the southern army at the Round-O, and Colonel Harmar succeeded Colonel Otho Williams, as adjutant general of the southern army; in which capacity, the former remained until near the close of the war. During all this time, General (then colonel) Harmar kept a journal, which, with a most authentic record of facts, combines innumerable remarks, emanating from an acute and luminous mind. This was liberally confided to my hands, and has often been referred to, in aid of his orderly books, which follow those of Colonel Williams, in succession, to the disbanding of the army.

Hitherto, every aid was gratuitous; every communication dictated, by a patriotic desire to aid an individual who was known to have no pecuniary motive, in an effort to do justice to the reputation of one whom all delighted to honour. But, whilst in Philadelphia, my attention was directed to a collection of papers, which were offered me for sale. A Mr. De Silver was at that time advertising a prospectus of a life of General Greene, from original materials. These materials were offered me for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, which was, I believe, afterwards reduced to one thousand. But in my bargain was to be included, the advantage of not having my pecuniary, or other views anticipated, by a rival publication. I had previously corresponded with my friends Mr. Read and Mr. John Vaughn, on the subject of these papers, and from the first moment positively declined any interference to prevent a publication, the loss of which to the world, I did not choose to assume the responsibility of; and as to purchasing materials for my Biography, I should as soon have expected to purchase air, or fire; yet, if necessary, to enable me to do justice to the undertaking I had entered upon, I had no objection to incur any incidental expense. I therefore cast my eye over a few of the papers, and soon discovered, what I had previously suspected, that they were only the vouchers of the quarter master general's department, preserved by Colonel Petit, to support him in a settlement with the treasury department of the United States. As all the private and confidential letters between General Greene and Colonel Petit were already in my possession, I could very well dispense with such as merely contained orders for a penknife or a packsaddle; but still as my friend Mr. Vaughn, the indefatigable perveyor of science and philanthrophy, expressed a wish to get them into his possession, and I was apprehensive that a book written on such materials would be no great acquisition to the republic of letters, I authorised my friends to offer Mr. De Silver a respectable number of copies of my work, merely to induce

him to deliver up the papers, to be deposited in Mr. Vaughn's hands. The offer was rejected, and I have never regretted it, notwithstanding that it was accompanied with a threat, that I should be anticipated in the book-market. If ever that collection of papers has furnished, or shall furnish to the world one page of history or biography, (unless it be a fac-simile page) I shall acknowledge my error in not possessing myself of them. Yet, it has been asserted, that it was impossible, for the Biography of Greene to be written without them.

It is proper here to observe, that the respectable descendants of Colonel Petit, are in no wise responsible for what transpired relative to those papers. They, it seems, after the trunk containing them had lumbered the garrets of three generations, had disposed of them as waste paper; from which fate, they were rescued, by the laudable zeal of Mr. De Silver.

My journey to Baltimore, consummated my collection of materials. The sons of Colonel Otho Williams, through the polite agency of Mr. John Oliver, put me in possession of their father's papers, and from these I have collected some of the most interesting facts narrated in this work, and have been enabled I hope, to shed some light upon characters, which Maryland has much reason to be proud of. Before I entered upon this undertaking, I was almost ignorant of Colonel William's character, but I have met with no one in the course of my investigations, that has interested me more. He did not survive the revolution long enough to have his merits engraven on our recollection by the association of memory. He retired not from service while the tug of war lasted, but as soon as the enemy were driven into Charleston, he obtained a furlough to attend to the care of a constitution broken down by wounds and hard service. From this time, he rather lingered than lived, until at length, he sunk under the most racking diseases. But the country he had done honour to, was grateful; and his latter days were passed in all the honours and comforts that his state of health admitted of.

To two other distinguished worthies of the revolution, I have to acknowledge the greatest obligations, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and the late General Davie. The privilege of consulting these two gentlemen, on all occasions, has been to me of the highest importance. Until the fall of Charleston, when General Pinckney was made prisoner, no one was more actively employed in the busy scenes of the revolution; and General Davie, who, just about that time had attained the age of manhood, and appeared in arms, was closely connected with the southern army, and enjoyed the highest confidence of its commander to near the close of the war. One of his last communications concludes with "I thank God that I have lived to discharge this work of duty and gratitude in contributing to the Biography of that great and good man." From General Davie I was favoured with voluminous communications, the value of which can only be appreciated by those who were acquainted with his luminous mind, and elevated character.

My personal acquaintance, also, with almost all the officers of rank, who distinguished themselves in the southern campaigns, has furnished me with many opportunities of making those inquiries which sometimes became necessary to explain and elucidate occurrences in those campaigns. And to Colonels Hampton, Taylor, Morris, Watts, Polk, and Dr. Read who had charge of the hospitals, I acknowledge myself under obligations for the civility with which they have answered my inquiries.

As to the conduct of the work, my leading motive has been to bring the reader familiary acquainted with the character of my hero: subordinate to this object, to throw light on the history of the times in which he flourished, and of my country generally. When the life of the individual becomes identified with the revolutionary history, I have endeavoured to use the latter as the frame-work in which to suspend my Sketches. In this effort, it is a matter of no small difficulty to strike the medium between giving enough, and not over-loading the work with extraneous matter. I believe I have erred in the last member of the alternative. But the reader will pardon me for observing, that I have written for my own amusement as well as his. Intrenched behind a mass of four thousand original

letters, written by the hands of all the distinguished men of a period, the events of which are destined to change the face of the world, I really felt an irresistible desire, to loiter away my time in the most brilliant assembly that I can ever again hope to be encircled by. I now find that I have written twice as much as I had supposed, and yet it was with a painful sensation that I dropped my pen at the close of the last line. I felt as if separating from the most venerable company that had ever given interest to a long journey. And in this—I hold myself pardonable; for, as all my indemnity for many a laborious hour, will probably be limited to the pleasure of the employment, it was with me "*carpe horam.*"

Nevertheless, I affect not to be insensible to the applause of the learned and the good; and, flatter myself, that this work will exhibit some attention to the duties of the citizen and the author. Popularity I have endeavoured to dismiss all thought of; to make my book saleable has never entered into my mind; it is the bane of independence and truth. Yet, while I shall thrust my book upon no one by a subscription on the basis of faith, I do not affect to be insensible to the loss or gain that may result from it. But I do most anxiously covet the reputation of having undertaken the work from motives, not at all mixed up with pecuniary reward.

To those who may be of opinion that I have wrtiten too much, I would remark, that there is a sacredness in the character of our revolution, that gives importance to the minutest incident connected with it. Like the fly that has plunged into the consecrated chalice, its insignificance gives place to a new character, communicated to it by association. Add to this, that we are at this period engaged, rather in collecting materials for the future historian, than ourselves writing the history of our country. With the mass of materials which I had before me, and which perhaps may never pass into the hands of another, I felt strongly called upon to extract and introduce into this work as much as the subject would reasonably admit of. Yet volumes might still be extracted from the same source. The select letters of General Read, the Marquis La Fayette, and Baron Steuben, with those of Generals Washington and Greene, would alone make up two interesting volumes.

There is one part of the work in which I have been very minute; this is in the occurrences in the south, subsequent to the battle of the Eutaws. I found there was no history existing of that period; and as it was the time of the occurrence of many events, interesting to the inhabitants of South Carolina and Georgia, although of a minor character, I have indulged my pen in narrating them from the official letters of the several commanders, for the gratification of those whose fore-fathers were active in the scenes they present. This part of the work, I consign to the patronage of South Carolina and Georgia. It exhibits the outlines of our partisan war, and is intended to preserve an accurate knowledge of events, which still furnish us with topics of conversation, interesting to us, however they may dwindle in the eyes of others. I have furnished detailed accounts of these occurrences in hopes that the recollection of them may serve to keep alive the sacred flame that burned while they were transpiring. And I have felt myself authorized in doing so in this work, as they were all connected with the general plan of the war at its close, and exhibit the struggles between the contending generals for the possession or control of the low country of the two states. Desultory as the events of that period appear in all the accounts ever published of them, there was a perfect connection and dependence of every one upon the general system of measures pursued by the commander of the southern department; and all influenced, in some degree, the success of that system. They will serve at least to exhibit to my young countrymen, the struggles which their fathers maintained to acquire the blessings, which they conquered, and we enjoy; and will render dear to us many a spot of ground that has been hallowed by their blood.

But, let not him who carries his researches into the regions of historical truth, receive with too much fastidiousness the narrative of minor events. While men govern the world, their passions govern men, and trifles act upon the passions, trifles will have much to do in the affairs of mankind. From the

war that desolated the kingdom of Priam, founded that of Rome, changed the face of conquering Greece, and gave two immortal poems to the world, to that which broke its rage upon the Icebergs of Russia, gave a new master to Europe, and chained its old one to a sea-girt rock, like the unhappy Andromeda, many have been the mighty conflicts that have been produced by trifles. When the quail escaped from beneath the cloak of Alcibiades, and the assembled people of Athens ran obsequiously to catch it, who would have imagined this to be the first link in the chain of incidents, that should deprive that people of liberty, and their country of the dominion of Greece? How sovereign must have been the reign of trifles, when the mistress of the world was herself governed by the pecking of a chicken, or the perching of a crow! And where was there ever a spectacle exhibited of abject subjection to trifles, more conspicuous, than when, in the plains of Pletea, the congregated armies of Greece, awaiting the issue of a battle decisive of country, family, freedom, life, crouched beneath their shields, could abide the pelting of the Persian darts, while an ignorant fanatic was slaughtering oxen to find the prophetic speck that chance might place upon their intestines. It is a subject on which either history or humour might indulge itself for a month.

As this work has grown to a bulk which I never anticipated, I plainly foresee that I shall be exposed to the imputation of having swelled it by the free use of what has flowed from the pens of others. For the insertion of Colonel Williams' narrative of Gates' defeat and its subsequent events, I will make no apology; it is an invaluable historical fragment, and would perhaps never have appeared in print had it not been inserted here—I publish it as a tribute of respect to the memory of a man, too little known to the American people. And as to the correspondence with which the work is interspersed, I pray the reader to consider its publication as a token of respect to himself. For I am very much deceived, if it does not constitute the most interesting and acceptable part of this work. I have endeavoured to select those passages only, which exhibit some trait of character—contain some useful lesson,—or cast some light upon our revolutionary history. I am not ambitious of the fame of a writer: I would rather serve mankind by an useful compilation, than fascinate them by the charms of fine writing. Yet, I have indulged myself more in these extracts, from the consciousness that the larger my book becomes, the more it may prove injurious to my own purse; and still more so, from the strong aversion I feel to that propensity of some authors, to show more of themselves than their hero; and of others, to indulge in that vague, general eulogy, which is unsupported by specimen or example, and is better adapted to a tombstone than an attempt at Biography. But I will faithfully promise, that should there be any one of these letters or extracts which *all* my readers shall agree ought to have been omitted, it shall be expunged from—*the next edition.*

There is one subject on which I must, with sincere humility, cast myself on the benevolence of my reader. In narrating facts relative to the two conspiracies, or we will call them intrigues, that disfigure our revolutionary history—the one to put down General Washington, the other to close the war in usurpation and monarchy. I have mentioned names highly respected by the American people; and individuals, closely connected with some whom I rank among my most valued friends. To make an enemy, is to incur one of the greatest misfortunes in life; and hence true history seldom commences under a century after important events have occurred. In the effort to place myself at the end of that century, and write as one would write from the same materials, who could not incur a frown from living man, I know that I have exposed myself to the painful feelings of one who gives umbrage where he would most deprecate it. But "to all whom I've offended," I must make one common apology, if I could not have sunk all individual feeling, I ought not to have entered on this undertaking; and if groundless imputations have found their way into the materials from which I write, now is the time most favourable to their detection. Joyfully shall I acknowledge every error that shall be candidly revealed to me. I have set down "nought in malice," nor any thing without written authority.

I have ventured somstimes even "to extenuate;" and I fondly hope, have been more intent on embellishing good actions, than aggravating bad ones.

There was one subject on which, in the prosecution of the work I felt very much embarrassed: This was in the use of the pronoun: it became indispensable to write frequently in the first person, and the most natural mode would have been to use it in the singular number. But to avoid *singularity* I felt compelled to adopt the fashionable use of the plural. This sacrifice to the practice of others, I beg the modern arbiters of taste, science, and politics, to accept as a tender of my respectful homage. I feel no compunction, in hastening by my example, the time when the press shall govern the world, provided, that candour, benevolence and urbanity, shall govern the press.

Should this work be productive of no other good effect, I will indulge the hope, that I shall not in vain have reminded my fellow citizens, that the monuments which their gratitude has voted to several distinguished men who have figured in these pages, remain to be erected: and that some of our greatest public benefactors have since left this transitory world, whose deeds in arms, deserve well to be commemorated by some monument of public gratitude. The bloody fields too of the Eutaws, the Cowpens, and Guilford, remain undistinguished by any expression of public reminiscence. The two former are desart wilds. But they are classic ground; and should public patronage follow this effort of my pen, the traveller shall no longer pass those hallowed spots, unheeding, that he treads upon the mould that has been moistened by the best blood of our country.

Charleston, January 10th, 1822.

NATHANAEL GREENE.

CHAPTER I.

Portrait, Parentage, and early Life.

THE order of the commander in chief, which assigned General Nathanael Greene to the command of the Southern department, bears date the 14th of October 1780. Until that period, his standing in the army was of the first order in respectability; he enjoyed the confidence of Washington and of the country, and had ever discharged the duties of the man and the soldier with fidelity and ability. But no opportunities had yet been afforded him of displaying those eminent talents which then broke upon the American people, and exhibited a splendour of military character excelled only by him whom none can equal. CHAP. I.

The subject of these memoirs was at that time in the thirty-ninth year of his age. His stature about five feet ten or eleven inches; his frame vigourous and well proportioned; his port erect and commanding; nor was his martial appearance diminished by a slight obstruction in the motion of his right leg, contracted in early life. The general character of his face was that of manly beauty. His fair and florid complexion had not entirely yielded to the exposures of five campaigns; nor was a slight blemish in the right eye observed, but to excite regret that it did not equal the benevolent expression and brilliancy of the left. Such is the portrait of the man whom

CHAP. I.

we are to follow through these pages. His manners were uniformly consonant to the gravity of his character and dignity of his station. Yet he could be cheerful even to playfulness, and his intercourse with the world was marked with that unaffected urbanity of manners which flows from the politeness of the heart. Whether grave or gay, he could accommodate himself to society, with a grace and facility which may be acquired from long and general intercourse with polite circles, but which in him is to be attributed to rapid observation, a quick perception of propriety, and a mind well stored with sound and useful information.

Advantages, in early life, he had none; born and raised in obscurity, without education and without society, he exhibited a striking instance of what good examples, sound principles, native genius, and above all, industrious habits and a careful improvement of time, can accomplish.

His first appearance on the arena of the revolution, was at the siege of Boston. He then commanded the Rhode Island contingent of troops, raised under the recommendation of the Congress of 1774. Until that time, he had scarcely emerged from the narrow limits of his native state. Yet, although in the contingents of the states, there were many men of polite and liberal education, he appeared inferior to no one. He conversed with ease and elegance; though not forward in eliciting conversation, he shrunk not under a consciousness of deficiency; and in soundness of judgement, knowledge of his profession, and neatness of diction in his correspondence, he was inferior to very few. Yet all knew that his connexions were of the religious sect of Quakers, and that his early days had been sedulously devoted to the most laborious occupations. But until then, they did not know, that his vigorous mind had risen superior to early prejudice; that from his sleep or his meals he had stolen time to acquire a considerable share of polite learning; and by denying himself the most ordinary indulgences, he had acquired a respectable library, and with its contents had stored an herculean memory, which never was known to relinquish its acquirements.

His stern integrity and devotedness to religious and political liberty he had acquired in a country planted by the victims or the exiles of persecution; or had inherited from an ancestry proverbially devoted to the assertion of equal rights, who had also cruelly felt and traditionally commemorated, the evils of oppression.

The protosire of our Hero (who, in the family, is emphatically styled *the General*) was John Greene, one of the followers of the persecuted Gorton, who, in the year 1640, fled from the fanatics of Boston, and sought an asylum on the west side of the Narraganset (then called Nanhyganset) Bay. The

land, originally purchased by him of the Indians, is still in the family; for it is consecrated by the tombs of the fathers. And the original conveyance from the headmen of the Narraganset Nation is still shown, as the indisputable evidence of the fairness of the acquirement. It is situated in the tract of country now known by the epithet of Warwick Neck, originally called Shaw-omit. It is in the township of Warwick, and near the town of that name. But the place of the General's nativity, is some miles distant from it, and on the opposite side of an arm of the Narraganset Bay. In all the biographical notices of General Greene, the town of Warwick is said to have been the place of his nativity. This is correct, in the language of the Eastern States, in which "town" means a district, or municipal division of country, synonymous with "township." The place of his nativity is, in fact, included within the township of Warwick, because the western line crosses the basin of East-Greenwich, and comprises the opposite fauces of the bay or harbour. But the town of Warwick, properly so called, is some miles distant to the north of the Potowome Mills. CHAP. I.

To the west of this bay, and on a beautiful little basin, stands the town of East-Greenwich. This basin is formed by two small streams, the principal of which still retains the Indian name of Potowome, or Potow-o-mit; the former being probably an abbreviation of the latter. On this stream, and near to where it empties itself into the basin, at the distance of about two miles south-east of East-Greenwich, stand the Patowome Mills, and this is the place of the nativity of the General. The house is a comfortable stone building, of one story, and is still occupied by his respectable and hospitable brothers. And the forge, at which for many a year he cheerfully toiled as an anchor-smith, together with the mill, which, with a book in his hand, he attended as a respite from labour, although exhibiting strong symptoms of remote antiquity, are still in active operation. Here, the curious traveller will be shown the humble spot where labour strung the nerve and the mind of a Cincinnatus; and here, too, he will behold the rude forge at which, when a mere boy, he consumed the hours in which industry may rest, in making an axe, or repairing some implements of husbandry, to acquire a pittance for purchasing some book that he had heard of, and sighed to possess.

He who views these objects without a deep sense of humiliation, must be well assured, that he has not enjoyed superior opportunities, or has not abused them. Among the most instructive and useful lessons in life, is that of a superior mind, guided by sound principles, struggling against the united disadvantages of poverty, obscurity, and prejudice, rising superior to every difficulty, and emerging to fame and to utility.

CHAP. I.

There are some incidents respecting the early history of the settlement of this family in Rhode Island, which merit attention, not only from their singularity, but from their probable effect in giving a bent to the genius, and origin to the sentiments and principles which governed the conduct of our Hero. It is true, the hereditary transmission of talents or principles is exploded every where, except when necessary to console family pride, or perpetuate political delusion; but, place a family in a situation remote from active intercourse with the world, and the examples and opinions of an ancestor may be transmitted through many generations, and give a tone and character to his posterity.

Such was the situation to which this family was consigned, and to this day there remains, at least among the elder branches, something of primeval simplicity in principles and manners which is seldom to be met with.

The State of Rhode Island was originally settled by religious sectarians, who sought in the wilderness, for that freedom of conscience, or of speculation, which was denied them in the parent colony of Massachusetts. Although the settlers of the latter colony had fled from the persecutions which disgraced England in the commencement of the seventeenth century, yet scarcely had they effected a settlement in their place of refuge, before they exhibited an additional proof that fanaticism, whether in a city or a wilderness, is still cruel, selfish, and tyrannical; or that the corrupting influence of power may taint even the purity of the Christian religion.

Roger Williams was the first who fled, and led off with him a colony to found the city of Providence. Next Mrs. Hutchinson and her followers acquired and settled the Island of Aquetnet, or Rhode Island proper, and built the town of Newport. And lastly, Samuel Gorton, and his eleven followers, descending the Narraganset Bay on the west side, settled on Warwick Neck.

This flourishing little abode of heresy and toleration soon inflamed the religious or official zeal of Governor Winthrop. And a Captain Cook, with an armed party of treble Gorton's number, was dispatched with strict orders "to bring the hereticks to Boston, dead or alive." At the head of this crusade in miniature, marched a holy man, with strict injunctions to keep his soldiers regularly to their prayers, and to explain to Gorton and his deluded followers, the whole enormity of their errors—before they were put to death. What those errors were it is immaterial to relate. Suffice it to say, they had reference to the most abstruse and speculative doctrines, and were wholly immaterial to Christian piety or a good life.

Gorton persisted sturdily in the argument against the nuncio of Winthrop; and thinking he had the best of it, refused to acknowledge himself convinced. Cook accordingly gave the word for the onset, and that Greene, the protosire of our Hero, was not then a Quaker, is proved by their having made a brave resistance against the Massachusetts men, until resistance was hopeless. They were made prisoners and conveyed to Boston. The women and children were dispersed in the woods, and as it was at a time when the ground was covered with snow, several of them actually perished—the rest of these helpless fugitives, after sustaining incredible hardships, were protected, clothed and hospitably entertained—*by Savages.* But the effect of these kind offices of the Aborigines of the country is seen at this day. The Narraganset tribe of Indians, still about five hundred strong, is the only nation, which, from Maine to Georgia, can boast of a national existence, and the least advancement to civilization. They owe their preservation to Gorton and his followers; and there is good reason to believe, more particularly to Greene.

Gorton was actually condemned to die; and his followers, after many ineffectual attempts to make them renounce their errors, were ultimately, *ex mero motu*, pardoned on condition that they should never again settle on the Narraganset Bay.

But, much to the credit of the people of Boston, popular sentiment appears to have been excited in favor of Gorton, and their fanatical Governor was at length obliged to release his victim.

The first effort of the party on their return home, was to secure the independence of the country of their choice, as the only means of future security, or justifiable retaliation.

The Massachusetts Bay colony laid claim to a jurisdiction over the whole of that country as far as the limits of New York, or to the Pacific. But they had repeatedly attacked and harassed the Indians; had sold them into slavery, set a price upon their heads, and recently had nearly extirpated the Pequots, killing the men, shipping off the boys to Bermuda, and distributing the women and female children among the colonists.* The Narragansets, therefore, feared and hated them; and Gorton's party adroitly availing themselves of this state of things, secretly prevailed upon their chiefs, to execute a deed of transfer of soil and sovereignty to the King of England. The grant is still preserved, and embraces the whole country within the limits of Rhode Island. Whether their rights were co-extensive with their cession is not to

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* Massachusetts Memorial.

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be ascertained. Generally the limits of Indian territory is but ill defined, and various nations will lay claim to the same hunting grounds.

Furnished with this important document, one of Gorton's followers was immediately dispatched to England. The grant was accepted, and the charter, which created the State, so soon followed, that it was unquestionably the result of this cession from the Narragansets.

These events are all commemorated by Gorton in a publication under the quaint title of "Simplicity's defence against seven headed tyranny," a rare, amusing, and obviously authentic narrative.

In these occurrences, Greene must have been a principal sufferer; that he lost his wife about this time is recorded in the family annals, from which circumstance it is probable she was one of those who perished in the snow. And that he was soon after in England, where he married another wife, is equally well established; from which the inference is a very reasonable one, that he was the bearer of the Narragansets' deed of cession, and a principal negociator for the independence of that nation, and of the State of Rhode Island.

The family, ever since its establishment, have clung to their little Ithaca with a singular pertinacity. They are now much ramified, very numerous, and very respectable. They are mostly substantial farmers, industrious, and judicious in the culture of a soil which possesses few natural advantages; but live in great comfort and singular harmony. Several of them have filled the highest offices in the State.

The family of General Greene were originally from Salisbury in England. His father, Nathanael, was the third in descent from the original emigrant. Nathanael, the subject of these memoirs, his second son by Mary Mott, was born May 27, 1742. The father had been previously married, and had two sons, so that Nathanael was the fourth of eight whom he raised to manhood.

Very early in life they were deprived by death of the cares of their mother; and with the aid of a motherly house keeper, the eight boys were brought up together under the eye of the father. And although nothing was further from the intention of his sire than preparing him for a military life, he literally received a Spartan education. The old gentleman was a highly respectable Quaker preacher, and for nearly forty years was in the habit of delivering himself in the meeting at East Greenwich, with a force and eloquence, it is said, which would have done honour to any pulpit. As his family increased, he regularly attended his place of worship, followed by his train of boys, all habited in the simplest costume of their sect. Temperate, frugal and laborious himself, his habits were inculcated on his children, not less by

his own example, than by the impressive lessons of a rod and a vigorous arm. Passive and prompt obedience were among his favorite doctrines; and the least undutiful hesitation was followed by a frown of authority, and a look of command that admitted of no delay. Yet he was kind and affectionate, and acted rather from dictates of duty, and a sense of propriety, than imperiousness of character. His forge, his mill, and his farm, divided his attention; and, regularly, as his children attained to a proper age, they were assigned to the plough, and gradually passed through their degrees, until honoured with a station at the anvil. Eight fine athletic boys, to a man thus circumstanced, were not only a boon from heaven, but a real accession of fortune.

His own limited education, the fanaticism of the times, and something perhaps of the peculiar opinions of his sect, had impressed him with an opinion, that the Bible was the only book worthy the study of an intellectual being. Mere human learning he held in very low estimation, and never encouraged the acquirement of it in his children beyond the simplest rudiments of education. To their moral and religious conduct, he paid the most undivided attention. Nor did he fail to inspire them with the most elevated principles of moral conduct, or to form them for the conscientious discharge of those duties, which constitute the good man and the useful citizen.

The father of biography has seldom introduced a great man to his readers without relating the concomitant omens at his birth, or some early prognostic of his future greatness. Justly as these superstitions are derided, it is probable that where the tales of these early prognostics had reached the ears of their imputed object, they have had, not unfrequently, some effect in giving a direction to his views, and a stimulus to his exertions. It is a tolerated opinion, that prophecies have preceded and probably aided to produce the conquest of kingdoms. Such are very gravely related by historians, both of Mexico before the invasion of Cortez, and of Egypt before the French invasion. Whether these observations were verified or not in the instance of Greene, it is very certain, that from the time of his birth a vague expectation prevailed, not only in his family, but in his neighbourhood, that he was one day to become an eminent personage. It is even asserted, that the church to which he belonged, looked forward to his becoming the great champion of their faith; but his family, or at least some of them, gave another direction of their ambitious hopes, and maintained that he was to become a military leader. In so many ways did this tradition reach the ears of the writer of these pages, that he could not forbear inquiring into the particulars from men

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of the greatest gravity and soundest understanding. And the tale will serve to illustrate the origin of many other similar prophecies.

To the humiliation of human pretensions, it is well known that judicial astrology once reigned over the world, even under the sanction of the rulers of nations. And the folios which still exist to elucidate its principles, attest that the world was in earnest in their belief in its reality as a science. A large proportion of the East still persist in this melancholy proof, that man may be made to believe any thing.

It is not then to be wondered at, if in the year 1742, in the vicinity of two States in which prosecutions for witchcraft had been once pursued with zeal and vigour, a remnant of judicial astrology should be found in a remote corner of the State of Rhode Island.

Among man-midwives of that day, a Dr. Spencer stood foremost in eminence. But, whatever skill or success the Doctor may have exhibited in an obstetrical case, he would hardly have been thought to have earned his fee, had he not *cast a nativity*, or uttered some grave prognostic relative to the new accession to the family. Yet it is probable, that in the present instance the Doctor, observing the correct form, healthy aspect, vigourous limbs and sonorous pipes of little Greene, meant no more than to foretell his future excellence in bodily strength—when he predicted "that he would one day become a mighty man in Israel." But the omen was greedily caught at by servants and nurses until it became a favorite gossipping tale. Certain it is that the prediction got abroad: so that, when he afterwards attained to eminence, there were many of the elderly people who would gravely declare, "It was what we always knew would happen."

But much more satisfactory prognostics appeared a few years afterwards. His agility, bodily strength, quickness of apprehension, emulation and resolution, were always above his years. It is a well attested fact, that at the age of seventeen, he exhibited proofs of bodily strength, which we cannot venture to relate. And in wrestling, running, skating, and other athletic and rural amusements, he was never satisfied as long as there was any one who excelled him.

These were the early objects of his emulation. No others had yet been presented to his mind; and even when mischief was the proposed pursuit of his companions, as is too often the case with such minds, his genius impelled him to take the lead. Children are generally very sagacious discoverers and candid acknowledgers of each others talents; and the deference paid to his genius and prowess, among the companions even of his earliest years, was a subject of general remark. Even his stern father was observed to yield to

his opinions and wishes an attention which no other of the family could ever command. CHAP. I.

Such is the ascendancy of mind; and fortunate it is for society, when a judicious direction is given to the early efforts of aspiring genius. In the present instance, the sole points of excellence presented to the view of our hero were, to become a neat ploughman or skilful mechanic; employments safe, useful, and reputable in themselves; but, to which a mind like his could only be confined by keeping from his view those which are calculated to afford more intellectual enjoyment, and a wider range to genius and ambition.

Until his fourteenth year, he had been brought up almost in a state of ignorance. In the long and severe winters of that climate, when the waters are bound in ice, and the labours of the field and of the furnace suspended, an erratic teacher had been employed to instruct the boys to read. But as yet he knew not that the bounds of human knowledge had ever reached beyond the spelling book and the bible. Contented in his ignorance, he enjoyed all that eminence which promptness in school, and activity and enterprize out of it, could impart, and never sent forth or ever felt a wish after other objects.

An accidental acquaintance formed about this time was destined to open his eyes to his own ignorance. A lad of the name of Giles happened to be on a visit at East Greenwich during the vacation of the university of Rhode Island, in which he was a student. With him, in one of his winter rambles, Greene formed an acquaintance, and to him he was indebted for the information that there were other things to be learned in the world besides reading and writing.

From this time his tranquillity fled, and a few odd volumes of the most ordinary books, picked up on the shelves of his few acquaintances, so irritated his appetite for reading, that he was literally never without a book in his hand, whilst he could obtain one, except when engaged in the most laborious occupations; and when his little stock was exhausted, and he could borrow no more, there was no toil or privation that he would not submit to in order to procure the means of acquiring them by purchase. Neither the mill nor the plough presented any facilities for making a penny on his own account; but by the rapid acquirement of the trade of a smith, which his father then carried on at the mills, in several branches, he was soon enabled to attain his wished for object. It was but little, very little, that he could thus acquire, and only in intervals of respite from his father's business; but it was all devoted to the purchase of books. No childish toy, no article of

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decoration, no idle amusement ever withdrew a penny of his earnings from the object that wholly engrossed him.

But all he could thus acquire was soon devoured. A shelf in one corner of the shop received his treasure as soon as it was brought home, and neither diversion nor sleep could withdraw him from it. It was read, and re-read whenever his care could be withdrawn from the massy anchor, until every page became familiar to him.

There are no means existing by which it is any longer possible to trace the course of his reading; nor can it be at all material to pursue it, since his resources were so scanty, that with the ravenous appetite that impelled him, it cannot be expected that he was fastidious in the choice of books. Nothing ever came amiss; while ever books could be commanded they were read. And his whole thoughts were then devoted to the means of acquiring more. His father's business alone could withhold him from his darling occupation; for, whether from a strong sense of duty, early habit, or strict discipline, that alone he would not neglect. Yet, when it came to his course to attend the mill, he uniformly seated himself beside the hopper with his book in his hand; nor were his eyes always withdrawn from it, until long after the ebbing grain had vanished from between the mill-stones. His usual seat is still shewn, and the sight of it is well calculated to call forth from the beholder, this most useful of all inquiries, "How have I appropriated *my* time?"

It will no doubt be to many, a subject of amazement, that such a disposition should not have been encouraged by a parent. But it must be recollected, that to his only parent all this appeared little less than idleness, or perhaps worse than idleness, a dangerous appropriation of time. Reared, himself, in a very retired part of the country, his intercourse had been almost exclusively with a sect who habitually and conscientiously dreaded whatever could withdraw the mind from religious contemplation, or create a rivalship in the heart between this world and the next. By the sole advantage of a strong mind, he had reared himself from indigence to independence, and from obscurity to a kind of distinction, which in his view was preferable to all others, that of "the chief seat in the synagogue." It is not then to be wondered at, if, never having himself tasted the delights of mental improvement, he could not form a correct idea of its fascinating influence; or if, from his long habit of preaching to others the infinite superiority of divine, when compared with human knowledge, it was with apprehension, rather than pleasure, he contemplated this fondness of his son for miscellaneous reading. Yet he did not check him; his assiduous discharge of his full share of the duties of the mill, the forge and plantation, left the father no grounds

to charge him with idleness or neglect of duty; and by a mutual understanding, working and reading went on together without jostling against each other. Nay, at the expiration of a year or two the beseeching looks, sometimes entreaties, but more than all, dutiful behaviour and industrious habits of a son in whom he could not conceal his pride, induced him to look out for a master for the approaching winter, who possessed acquirements much superior to those of the teachers previously employed.

Fortunately his choice fell upon a Mr. Maxwell, the father of several respectable men of that name now living, and to him Greene was indebted for the little Latin he ever acquired. But a study which brought into exercise nothing but memory was not to his taste; and after three months diligent application, the Latin books were laid aside and never afterwards resumed. New objects had opened on his mind, the nature and uses of the exact sciences had been explained to him by Mr. Maxwell, and the anvil rung until he had made himself master of an Euclid.

This was a store for a long feast; and although the master was of course dismissed for the summer, yet Euclid was not dismissed with him. With surprising facility and rapidity, he made himself master of geometry and its application to surveying and navigation. The pursuit of truth, unclouded by a doubt, and conducting him to usefulness, and, perhaps, eminence, had charms for our hero, which threw altogether in the shade, the mere *amusement* of books.

In the school of Euclid it was that he acquired those clear distinct conceptions, which, it will be seen, distinguished his pen. Nature had given him the weapons, but geometry taught him to use them with skill and effect. And the exercise to which his mind was now subjected, prepared it to master with facility, several other studies, to which his attention was soon after directed.

It was not until his sixteenth or seventeenth year, that he possessed the advantage of an acquaintance with one, competent to direct his studies or inform his judgement in the selection of books. His good fortune about this time introduced him to two men, who afterwards acquired some eminence in the literary world. These were President Stiles, of Yale College, and Lindley Murray, well known as the author of Murray's Grammar, and several other popular works.

Stiles was, at this time, established minister to one of the churches in Newport. There was a shaloupe attached to the Potowome Mills, in which the anchors were transported to Newport for sale. In this boat Greene had worked his passage to Newport, to lay out his earnings in the purchase of a

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book. It happened, that Stiles was in the bookstore when Greene entered, and informed the bookseller, "he wished to purchase a book." What book? asked the merchant. The long pause that ensued, caused Stiles to turn about, and discover a Quaker boy, in the plainest costume of his sect, with a hat and coat, bearing unequivocal marks of the mill and the forge, but a fine florid ingenuous countenance, suffused with the deepest blush. His ignorance and inability to choose, with a consciousness of his very limited capacity to gratify a choice, rushed so forcibly upon his recollection when the question, What book? was proposed to him, that his embarrassment was extreme. Stiles saw it, and benevolently resolved to relieve him. He knew human nature, and gradually insinuated himself into the confidence of the abashed boy, until he drew from him sufficient information to direct his choice. This was the commencement of a mutual confidence and esteem, which lasted through life. Greene was invited to his house, and ever after venerated him as a father. Stiles saw and encouraged his avidity for knowledge, and gave a direction to his taste and application, which relieved him from all future embarrassment on similar occasions. These are the services, which make the most indelible impression on an ingenuous heart. Unexpected and gratuitous, they are hailed as boons from heaven. And depraved as the human heart may be, it is seldom that man forgets his early benefactor. The young, with a proper degree of modesty and merit, are ever grateful for the countenance and support of the grave and the aged. The transit from the privacy of a parent's roof, to the bustle and vicissitude of actual life, is attended by a degree of apprehension and anxiety, that solicits the patronage of the veterans of society. And little, very little encouragement is often of infinite importance in facilitating the entrance of modest merit into life. The young feel that their claim is a moderate and just one; to refuse it, disgusts and dispirits them; whilst their warm and ingenuous feelings magnify the obligation, where it is cordially and spontaneously bestowed. In acknowledging obligations conferred at this period, men refer to it as the time "when they had no friend."

It was a real acquisition to Greene to have made a friend of Dr. Stiles. He was no longer at a loss where to look for information, or to whom to submit his early crude conceptions. And a visit to Newport became now a very interesting object. The means he made use for this purpose, were perfectly in character. He soon made himself a skilful boatman, and got preferred to the captaincy of the shaloupe. This gave him frequent opportunities of conversing with his friend, and of poring over the books that crowded the shelves of the bookseller. Yet it was never unattended with a sigh, drawn from the inquiry, "Shall I ever command all these?"

But labour had hitherto supplied him with the scanty reading he had enjoyed; labour might acquire wealth, and wealth would command the treasure before him. These reflections stimulated his exertions, and rendered him indefatigably laborious. It is a fact, that he has been known to grind off the calosity from his hands at the grind-stone, to render them more pliant, when small work was to be done; and such were his efforts at the heavy work of the forge, as to produce the lameness which attended him through life. The position of the right foot of the anchor-smith at the forge, is precisely that in which his right foot became permanently fixed, from no other cause than his persevering efforts at this laborious business. Yet, at this very time, he was studying Watts' Logic, Locke on the Human Understanding, and Ferguson on Civil Society; and was even attentive to, what is shamefully neglected in most of our learned institutions, writing a good hand, and acquiring a critical knowledge of arithmetic and orthography. The completion of a load of anchors to take to Newport, was always to Greene a joyful event, and it was on one of these visits, that he casually met with Lindley Murray.

Murray was of a respectable Quaker family in the city of New York. His father was a man of more than ordinary intelligence, and becoming sensible of the disadvantages their sect laboured under from want of members possessing education, he had liberally afforded his son every opportunity of instruction. Young Murray was now on an excursion to the eastward, on a visiting tour to the settlement of Friends, in that quarter of the country. Greene seized with avidity the opportunity of taking him with him to his father's; and Murray was so delighted to find a congenial soul in the young miller, that an intimacy ensued, and a mutual esteem was created that never subsided.

From Murray's funds of knowledge it may well be supposed, that Greene did not fail to draw largely. The following winter, he prevailed on his father to permit him to visit Murray in New York; and on that occasion, gave another specimen of that decisive turn of mind, which, in after life, became so conspicuous. It is well known how much the small-pox was dreaded at that time. Injudicious treatment had made it a most formidable disease; and passing through it, was considered a crisis in human life. Greene saw the importance of passing that crisis; he felt that he was not destined to spend his life in the obscurity of Potowome, and as the small-pox was then in New York, he availed himself of that opportunity to be inoculated for it. The blemish in one eye was the result of contracting that disease.

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Thus passed the days of our hero until he reached his twentieth year. It must not be supposed, notwithstanding his extraordinary application, that he partook not in common with the companions of his youth, of the sports and amusements adapted to his time of life. Before he became absorbed in study, his eminence in the sports and exercises of the country proved that he partook of them largely. And nothing of moroseness, or indifference to join in, or contribute to the enjoyment of others, followed upon the change given to the direction of his thoughts. He was of a cheerful turn of mind, and even the sprightly dance would have been a favourite amusement with him, but for the utter abhorrence entertained by his stern father for this carnal indulgence. Yet, as it led to female society, of which he was passionately fond, his sense of duty, and dread of an athletic arm, were not altogether sufficient to resist the influence of this allurement. A descent from the eves of the house was found practicable, and scandal says, that Nathanael Greene could be gay among the gayest. When the long winter evening gathered the village youth around the social hearth, and when the sprightly violin was expected to enliven the social group, he would seldom fail to risk his neck to partake of the amusement. He was too much the favourite among the village lasses, not to receive regular and authentic intelligence on these subjects. Yet the vigilance of the argus who watched over his morals, and who fondly looked forward to him as a successor on the floor of the meeting-house, could not always sleep. Actual detection soon followed suspicions, and nothing but the timely and military interposition of a rearguard, promptly thrust up his clothes under cover of night, could have protected his back from the pain of severe castigation, inflicted by an angry father.

The mind of man, even in his earliest years, revolts at unnatural and unnecessary privation. Children well know when they are justly treated; and in pursuit of the indulgences adapted to their years, exhibit a perseverance and ingenuity under opposition, which are too apt to lead to habits of obstinacy, disobedience, and deception.

In time, the Spartan discipline of the father prevailed; and aided by his own strong moral sense, and the resources for amusement which he found in books, his habits became perfectly subdued and regular. Nay, very early in life, in imitation of the frugal habits of Lacedemon, he adopted the most abstemious regimen: a single cup of tea or coffee was his breakfast, and for the rest of the day, one solid meal sufficed. This was altogether spontaneous.

Nor was he less a disciplinarian than his father. By common consent, notwithstanding he had senior brothers, he was generally viewed as second in command. And when the old gentleman was absent, which he sometimes

was, on a circular visit to the Quaker establishments, the younger boys found it no time of respite from labour. It was a common cause, and every associate must do his duty, under the same penalties which had been so forcibly inflicted at times by the commander in chief. Yet he was just in his severity, or intended to be so, and no enmity ensued. As much harmony and love prevailed, as was consistent with good government.

During this time, his reading was of necessity very miscellaneous. He read every book that came in his way, and exhibited a disposition to select, only when his little earnings were to be appropriated, and a permanent accession made to his scanty library. Swift was among his favourite authors, and he always endeavoured to imitate the strong, chaste, and lucid style of this author. Nor did he fail; for he wrote with facility, in the clear and manly style of this author, from the earliest time of which any specimens of his correspondence are preserved.

The works of Swift, and of all the most eminent writers of the English Augustan age, were added to his library, as soon as he could accumulate the means of procuring them; and he had taste to enjoy their contents, and a mind and application to make their wisdom his own. The reading of history he was particularly devoted to, and the survivors of those who personally knew him, are unanimous in expressing their surprise at the generality and minuteness of his historical knowledge. Indeed, he never spent a day, whilst a book could be procured, without reading something; and even during the most busy scenes of the war, after all the necessary business of the camp was dispatched, he commonly read till midnight.

But at the period of which we are speaking, there was a new direction given to his inquiries, and in addition to his other pursuits, he actually acquired a very tolerable stock of legal knowledge.

By the death of his two brothers by the first marriage, his father became involved in a lawsuit, on a question which elicited all the abstruse learning on contingent remainders and executory devises. The father began already to feel the superiority of the son, and he gladly delegated to him the superintendence of a business so wholly new to himself. This introduced him to courts of justice, and to an acquaintance with the gentlemen of the bar; and as he seldom failed to acquire the esteem of those who knew him, he soon formed a general acquaintance among a class of society hitherto new to him, but in whose conversation and company he soon took great delight. He became fond of attending at the sittings of the courts, and, at length, added second hand copies of Blackstone's Commentaries, and Jacob's Law Dictionary to his library. With these, he sat down seriously to the study of the law.

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Greene was in the twenty-third year of his age, when the celebrated stamp-act became the subject of general investigation. Politics had hitherto occupied very little of his attention; his ambition had scarcely ever been excited but by a hope, which his modesty still threw to a fearful distance. The religious tenets of his sect, his own humble employments, his age, and want of education, all conspired to detach him from the thoughts of entering immediately into public life. But it was not to be expected, that his ardent mind should be insensible to the general excitement produced by that threatening measure of the British ministry. He soon caught the flame that had spread over the American continent, and, as was his habit, sat down very seriously to study the subject, so as to master it maturely. The authors on politics and jurisprudence of that day, were familiarly quoted in the newspapers and public declamations; and more studied and canvassed than, perhaps, even at present. The discussions of the times of the commonwealth, were still in the recollection of all, particularly the descendants of those, who, about that time, emigrated to this country. The various revolutions of a hundred eventful years of English history, had firmly established the constitutional, or rather civil rights of the English subject. The charter of James I. to the people of Virginia, which, on this point, was considered as the Magna Charta of America, secured all those rights to the American colonists. Although, in the reign of that monarch, those rights were very weakly established, or indistinctly under-

stood, a series of important events had now fixed them on a basis which was not to be shaken. The sturdy republicans who had swarmed to the United States, understood them well, and had, moreover, very distinctly given their sovereigns to understand, that they were ready to fight to maintain them. Their principles and their knowledge, were carefully transmitted to their posterity; and, equally removed from the fascinations and impositions of royalty, the elevated sentiments of the best days of Greece, of Rome, and of England, existed in high preservation among a large proportion of the American people. In the little circle in which Greene moved, this was particularly the case. Not even the dampening effect of rigid Quakerism, could suppress the feeling of republicanism, which always exhibited itself in that quarter. They were almost to a man related to each other, and the regular descendants of Gorton's persecuted followers. To them, the feelings and opinions of their ancestors had been transmitted, in many a winter's evening's conversation, and the very name of oppression, struck upon a chord that vibrated to every heart. CHAP. I.

When it was, that a part of Greene's family became Quakers, is not known, but originally they were not so, nor were they ever all so. And of those who were, they generally must have been of that description commonly denominated fighting Quakers. The original proprietor of the Potowome Mills, had recently sold out to Greene's father, (his copartner and younger brother,) to pursue a military career as an officer in the Canadian war. And whatever may have been the severity of the father's tenets, there was no one of the sons who hesitated at braving the anathemas of the meeting, when summoned away by the sound of the drum.

In the midst of such society, it would have been wonderful, if the ardent mind and warm feelings of our hero had not become deeply interested in the discussions of the day. He soon became firmly convinced of the justness of the American cause, and as firmly resolved to take part in the opposition. But, as yet, the effects of early habit and education hung too heavily upon him to admit of his aspiring to military command.

It was not long before an event occurred, which wholly changed the direction of his thoughts, and pointed out to him the career for which heaven had destined him.

The sons were now generally well grown, and the vigour, skill, industry, and fidelity of eight such labourers, showered down wealth upon the venerable parent. He resolved to extend his business, and accordingly purchased another mill-seat at Coventry, in the same neighbourhood, eight or ten miles distant from Potowome.

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To the charge of this establishment Nathanael had been advanced, and he was admitted to a participation in the profits of the concern. This to him was a most enviable change; it gave him the command of money, and that was the command of books. In a few years, he accumulated a library of two hundred and fifty volumes; which, at that time, in that remote place, was viewed as a prodigy. It also gave him, comparatively, a command of time. And one of the uses he made of that time, decided his fate.

In the year 1773, the states had begun seriously to organize and discipline their militia; and a grand parade was announced to take place at Plainfield, in Connecticut, not far distant from the Coventry Mills.

Military parades, and assemblages leading to idleness, had always been prohibited to the sons, as sternly as cards or dancing. But the day arrived, the country was all moving towards the gala scene, and Greene could not resist the impulse. He mounted his horse, and galloped away with the rest. And here he first saw an assemblage of men, "in all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war." From that time, he could think of nothing else. It was in vain that the father reprimanded severely, and the church threatened to throw him over the wall; nothing could afterwards prevent him from devoting his thoughts to a military life.

Military books became now a necessary of life, and it was not to be expected, that his early friend and mentor, Dr. Stiles, could direct him, or would encourage him in this study; he was left to grope in the dark. Accident threw in his way Marshal Turenne's works, and Sharp's Military Guide; and under these two preceptors he entered himself a disciple of Mars. From these books his attention was directed to others on the same subject, and by the aid of his friend in New York, and occasional trips to Newport, he was enabled to make a respectable collection of military books. Plutarch now became his bosom companion; a translation of Cæsar also afforded him a treasure of amusement and information; and with a military eye he read and studied the history of all the wars of celebrity, both ancient and modern.

But the vigilant eye of the peaceful disciples of John Fox did not let the visit to Coventry pass unnoticed. He was duly summoned to answer for this breach of ecclesiastical rule, and warned, that he must discontinue such practices, or be debarred the privilege of mingling his dust with theirs. The charge against him, as it stands on the minutes of the monthly meeting, is that of "attending a place of public resort, where he had no proper business." A committee was duly appointed "to visit him on the subject," and that committee reported, "that they had treated with him, but he had not given any satisfaction as yet." Still, however, the door of repentance was kept

open to him; but, after holding the subject for several months under advisement, the meeting despaired of recalling the prodigal, and entered in their minutes the following record of his final doom: "As he has not given the meeting any satisfaction for his outgoing and misconduct, therefore this meeting doth put him from under the care of the meeting, until he make satisfaction for his misconduct."

Such satisfaction was never made, for in this conflict of duties he wisely decided to obey the calls of his country. Yet he always entertained the most pious veneration for the sect, and never let pass an opportunity of doing towards them a civil or benevolent action. He always, in fact, professed himself a Quaker, but modelled his duties as such, to the state of society in which God and nature had placed him. Yet he not unfrequently afterwards had occasion to charge some of the sect with making their peace principles subservient to their political or avaricious views. Of what sect are there not hypocrites?

He had been established but a few years in Coventry, when he was elected to represent the county in the state legislature. This was in the year 1770. And from that time, even until after he took command of the southern army, he was uniformly returned as a member from the same county. His military engagements whilst in the army, of course prevented his attendance as a member, except on extraordinary occasions; but he had, by that time, acquired a popularity in the state, and a distinction as a commander, which made his constituents unwilling to give him up.

At the Coventry Mills a genteel establishment was prepared for him; and he led, for several years, a studious and retired life. Yet order, neatness, industry, and hospitality reigned in his house; and the fame of his acquirements and of his library, was already diffused through the state. There is still living a highly respectable gentleman of that state, who has filled several conspicuous offices, who remembers to have visited him in this place, in search of some rare book which could not be procured in Providence. His object, was his only introduction; but the social converse of one evening fastened his affections on his hospitable and interesting entertainer, for the residue of his life. He is himself a man of liberal education, and at that time filled the place of a professor in the college. He was, therefore, competent to judge of the mind and acquirements of his new acquaintance, and was often afterwards heard to declare, "Mr. Greene was a very extraordinary man." Of his habits of early rising, he well remembers this particular. That being under the necessity of reaching Providence at the hour of recitation, he apologized over night to his host for the necessity he was under of leaving the house

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before the family would be up in the morning. But what was his surprize at finding in the morning the table neatly set, his breakfast ready, and Greene at the fireside poring over a book, before daybreak.

This habit of early rising had been early inculcated on him by his father. He invariably adhered to it through life, and the consequence with him, as with all early risers, was, that he was always beforehand in his affairs. Few men have prospered in the world, or enjoyed vigorous health, good appetites, well ordered houses, and unclouded tempers, who were not early risers. "The morning speeds the traveller and the plough." Greene found, or made a sufficiency of time for labour, for study, and for the society of his friends; nor was he inattentive to his duties to society. The first school ever established at Coventry, was set up under his auspices, and it was his constant habit to persuade and assist all around him to improve every opportunity of acquiring useful knowledge of every kind. Thus occupied, he advanced to his thirty-fourth year.

But there is a void in the heart of man that woman only can fill up. His circumstances now admitted of his marrying, and the object of his choice yielded to his solicitations.

In July 1774, he married Catharine Littlefield, then in her eighteenth year. A lady of respectable connexions, an agreeable person, sprightly, interesting, and intelligent, and altogether an exceedingly engaging woman. To the substantial enjoyment of life, there was now nothing wanting. But the political horizon bore a portentous aspect, and public duty was soon to claim him from the arms of his family.

As a member of the legislature, he had taken a decided part against the royal government, and the firmness, public spirit, and great good sense which he displayed on all occasions, had acquired for him a highly respectable standing in that body. He seldom spoke, for a consciousness of his want of early education hung upon him, and rendered him diffident. But when he did, his manner was bold, commanding, and unembarrassed, and he was listened to with marked attention. Yet he was often employed on important committees. And on one occasion, when envoys were to be sent to Connecticut to concert measures preparatory to arming for defence, he was one of the delegates selected. This was a delightful opportunity to Greene to visit his early and venerable friend, Stiles, then President of Yale, and he gladly embraced it. An entry on the minutes of the legislature shows, that his expenses on this mission amounted to ten pounds, about thirty-three dollars. Such were the frugal habits of the men of that day.

It was in the Kentish Guards, and in the year 1774, that Greene first assumed the panoply of the soldier. He had now thrown off the respectable dress which, with many excellent qualities and correct opinions covers a few tenets not adapted to this sublunary world. The corps that he had joined, was organized under a law of the state, in imitation of the British Guards, and their captain took the rank of colonel. It was composed of the most respectable young men of the country, the sturdy yeomenry, the companions of his youth. And never, perhaps, in the same number of men, did there exist more excellent materials for a military corps. More than thirty of them bore commissions afterwards in the revolution, and several became highly distinguished officers. Greene proposed himself as a candidate for a lieutenancy, but did not succeed. His Quaker education most probably prevented him. Yet, unabated by this defeat, his military ardour felt nothing of the dampening influence of disappointment, but displayed itself in a devoted attention to excel in all the discipline and manœuvres of a single corps. An opportunity soon presented itself of exhibiting a specimen of that daring and decisive turn of mind, tempered with proper wariness and caution, which so eminently qualified him for military command.

The year 1774 was a year of very extraordinary excitement throughout the United States. Great Britain had wholly thrown off the mask, and the necessity of open resistance was obvious. Arming and disciplining was the order of the day. It was the amusement of the young, and even the hoary head assumed the casque and plume, in a late novitiate, for the approaching contest. Good fire-arms were very scarce, and as every individual provided for himself, it became an object of soldierly pride to procure the best. The Kentish Guards, in common with other corps, felt the inconvenience, and Greene more particularly, found it impossible in the country to equip himself in a suitable manner. Nor did any place but Boston offer a prospect of supplying his wants. He soon formed his resolution, and as promptly carried it into effect. An old account due by a customer of his father was the pretext, and an old coat and hat of the true Quaker cut, well marked with the evidences of his calling, furnished the passport which introduced him into the streets of Boston.

Here a new and interesting object caught his attention. The town was full of British troops. Morning and evening they were regularly paraded, and here were lessons to be received, that could be acquired no where else in the United States. A protracted and perilous residence in Boston was the consequence; every motion and manœuvre was carefully observed and noted down; and in a few days he acquired a stock of military knowledge, that as

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On the next parade Greene made his appearance with his new musket and his drill-master, and the adventure being soon noised abroad, acquired him no small eclat among his compatriots. The musket is still in the family, after having been faithfully used, and almost superstitiously guarded for more than forty years.

Another event not long after occurred, which afforded him a new opportunity of exhibiting his spirit and zeal in the cause he had espoused.

On the 19th of April 1775, in the memorable affair of Lexington, the soil of America first drank the blood of her sons, shed by the hands of Englishmen. The combat was warmly kept up the whole day, and before night Rhode Island was alarmed with the intelligence, that the people of Massachusetts were engaged in mortal affray with the English troops. The whig corps all beat to arms, and the Kentish Guards took up the line of march for Boston. Unfortunately, Wanton, the Governor of Rhode Island at that time, was very much of a loyalist, and was not at all pleased with this exhibition of spirit in the Kentish Guards. Their rout lay through Providence, the place of his residence. He very soon dispatched a message after them, ordering them back. They received it with indignation, but the officers did not feel themselves at liberty to refuse obedience. Not so with Greene; at all hazards, he was resolved to fly to the assistance of the whigs, and having communicated his intention to three of his most trusty friends, including one of his brothers, the four immediately procured horses, and with reeking spurs, hastened on to Boston. But it was too late; the British army that night retired into Boston, and the intelligence met his gallant little band before they had passed quite half way of their intended journey.

By this time, the corps began to acknowledge that they were ignorant of the character and just claims of the man whom they had rejected as their lieutenant. His superiority and spirit became obvious to all, and the example he set of zeal and discipline as a private, convinced them, that he who knew so well how to obey, must be qualified to command. Many of them had soon an opportunity of giving a shining example of candour and disinterestedness toward him.

It was now obvious to all, that the struggle between the colonies and the mother country, must end in an appeal to the sword. Great Britain persisted in her odious assertions of power, and the means to which she had resorted to enforce its exercise, plainly avowed, that she considered the colonies as holding their lives, liberties, and fortunes at the will of a despotic parliament. Such measures could only have been intended to drive the colonies to open resistance, in order to furnish a plausible pretext for actual subjugation. Such has often been the policy of rulers. In producing the state of things which justified the attempts of the ministry to sweep away before her armies all the chartered rights of the colonists, the ministry were successful; but heaven denied to them the fruition of its expected consequences.

Immediately after the battle of Lexington, the Massachusetts legislature resolved on collecting an armed force, and confining the British under Gage to the limits of Boston. Deputies were dispatched to Rhode Island and Connecticut, demanding their co-operation. The request was promptly complied with, and Rhode Island proceeded to organize what was called her "army of observation." This consisted of sixteen hundred men, enlisted till the 31st of December 1775. In officering this army, it is a very singular circumstance, that the eyes of all should have been turned upon an humble private in the Kentish Guards. No better evidence of the degree to which Greene grew upon all who became acquainted with him can be adduced, than this highly honourable selection; his subsequent conduct proved the judgement of the men who chose him. Among those who were selected as officers under him, were several of the officers of the Kentish Guards. The captain of the Guards, who ranked as colonel, was elected a colonel in the new levies, and the celebrated Christopher Greene, the hero of Red Bank, was one of his majors. General Varnum was of the same number. Such were the virtues and self-denial of the times. Men whose after-conduct bore ample testimony to their high worth and understanding, cheerfully surrendered the sensitive feelings of military pride to the good of the country; and superior to the dazzling influence of self-love or vanity, could forego their just claims of prefer-

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The astonishing rapidity with which the Rhode Island contingent was raised, organized, and marched to the scene of action, adds infinite credit to the patriotism of the state.

Indeed, when posterity shall distribute justice with impartial hand among the states, Rhode Island, diminutive as it is in territory, will stand pre-eminent for the spirit and vigour with which she supported the revolutionary war. It was not with her the cause of Massachusetts; there was nothing to be ascribed to contiguity or consanguinity; jealousies and ill will had prevailed between these two states. Rhode Island viewed Massachusetts as the oppressor and persecutor of her forefathers, and Massachusetts, in addition to the feelings which accompany a consciousness of having done an injury, never cordially forgave the Rhode Islanders, for having eluded her claims of dominion. These early causes have left their traces so deeply engraven, that to this day there is a want of cordial feeling plainly to be discovered, at least, among the less enlightened classes in these two states. But every disagreeable recollection was magnanimously sacrificed by Rhode Island. And in the short space of forty-eight days, at the requisition of Massachusetts, she raised, officered, equipped, and marched to the rendezvous, sixteen hundred men, of as high promise, and as well disciplined and officered, as any that were assembled. Rhode Island has not yet had her historian to palliate her faults, and blazon her fame in the eyes of posterity. But when one shall arise, he will find other events beside this to relate highly to her honour. The great states of Virginia and Massachusetts are contending for the honour of having led in the revolution, but perhaps, upon inquiry it will be found, that the first daring and decisive act was done in Rhode Island. This was in taking possession of the king's artillery, as soon as the proclamation reached them prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammunition from Great Britain; and openly, by an act of the government, encouraging the importation from other quarters, of the articles necessary to equip themselves for war. And even in declaring for independence, Rhode Island took the lead of most, if not all, the states. In April '76 this bold and decisive step was taken, in the midst of internal dissention, and under the eye of a powerful British army. A tribute of respect was also paid that state by the common enemy, which no other state can boast of. Long as the British army was in possession of Newport, they made no seriour efforts to reduce the country. And very cautious were they at all times, how they ventured from the security of their insular situation and entrenchments. The more credit is due this state, also, from having both the

governor and lieutenant-governor decided loyalists, so that the secretary of state, the first whig in the descending line, was obliged to sign the commissions of the officers; and all other acts of the whigs were authenticated in the same manner.

It was in May 1775 that Greene was elected commander of the Rhode Island contingent of the army of observation; and such was the avidity with which the hardy yeomanry of that country enrolled themselves under his standard, that in a very few days his command was complete. Much of this no doubt is attributable to the popularity of the cause, but it cannot be doubted, that his own high standing in the confidence of his fellow citizens, and that of the officers selected to serve under him, contributed greatly to fill up his ranks. He was soon ready to depart in his new career; his brothers cheerfully undertook to discharge his part of the common duty, and in the true character of this primeval family, the business went on as usual for the common account.

His father was now dead, and the brothers had continued the business of the forges and mills, harmoniously participating of the proceeds as each stood in need; fully confiding in each other's integrity and moderation. No jealous distrust, no wrangling settlements ever took place among them; but when the common chest was full to overflowing, some purchase was made by common consent, or some addition to their living or accommodations. It is a very singular fact, and almost unprecedented in these times of commerce and of lust of wealth, that the two brothers, who at present own the Potowome Mills, have toiled together for sixty years, and reared and set out their families, living in common, and having never had a statement of accounts in all that time, nor ever intending to have one. Yet their business has been lucrative and extensive. Such are the benign effects of purity of heart and disinterestedness of conduct. It was in a school like this, that Greene acquired his habits of self-devotion. Accustomed from early life to consider himself only as a member of a little community, to labour for the common interest, and covet no enjoyment but what he was ready and desirous of participating in common with his fellow labourers, selfish feeling, that foul destroyer of all virtue and all happiness, was in him early subdued, or perhaps never felt. The motives that govern the hearts of men, are soon discovered by the discerning, through the veil too commonly thrown over human actions; often before the individual is himself conscious of their full effect in influencing his conduct. Nothing attaches the hearts of men, or commands their confidence so much as that dignified simplicity of conduct which results from a consciousness that we have no motive to conceal, and not a wish inconsistent with the just claims

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of others. When these qualities are blended with a strong mind, quick parts, and a cultivated understanding, they form the most happy combination for public usefulness. Hence Greene never failed to acquire not only the confidence, but the affections of all who became acquainted with him. And it may be truly said of him, that he never lost a friend, whose worth entitled him to that honourable appellation, nor public esteem, but whilst his character was obscured by calumny or misconstruction.

The most honourable proof of this observation is to be found in the fast hold he ever held in the esteem and confidence of the commander in chief. Washington soon distinguished him among the numerous military acquaintance introduced to him before Boston. There is a sympathy between talents and integrity, by which those who possess these qualities intuitively discover them in others. And in addition; there was in our hero a calmness that nothing could ruffle, a firmness that nothing could shake, and a deference of manner and inviting openness of countenance, that ever rendered him a favorite with his officers and soldiers. It will be found in the course of these pages, that he became the object both of admiration and of individual attachment to most of the celebrated men, both natives and foreigners, who figured in the American revolution; and there are living witnesses who have heard the late General Hamilton declare, that he wanted nothing but an education to have made him the first man in the United States. General Hamilton no doubt meant, with the exception of the commander in chief, and uttered himself with his characteristic warmth, not a little heightened by individual feeling; for Greene's quick eye had first marked him out for future celebrity.

CHAPTER II.

Camp before Boston. Correspondence.

LAMENTABLE was the defect of military knowledge prevailing in the states at the commencement of the revolution. The commander in chief himself, might, without disparagement, as a practical soldier, be pronounced ignorant: all the service he had ever seen was in a few desultory campaigns against the wandering tribes of our forests; but his fine combining head, comprehensive mind, and analytic turn of thought, supplied the defect of experience. Yet, he too had to learn in the school of adversity.

All the military knowledge of the country was to be found in a few soldiers of fortune, who had sought retirement in the shades of our forests, or were attracted hither by the prospect of employment, or the more honourable motive of supporting the cause. In the instance of our hero, it must be acknowledged that he was promoted to a command for which he was yet to qualify himself. The sequel proved, that it was not vain presumption which stimulated him to accept it; upon the most modest estimate, he was as well qualified as any other the state of Rhode Island could have furnished, and the "sting and goad of genius" impelled him to the effort for which nature had designed him; and in which, with an humble dependence on the God of armies, he flattered himself with the hope of serving his country, while he acquired an honest fame.

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It was on the 6th of June 1775 that Greene assumed his command before the lines of Boston. From this time, his history becomes identified with that of the country; but the reader is not to expect that under the title of Sketches of a life, the writer of these pages means to impose upon him a minute history of the American war. It is not in a general history, that delineations of character can be brought together so as to present them to the eye in a combined view. What is indispensable shall be presented, but brevity shall always be consulted. We have chosen the date of General Greene's appointment to the command of the southern army, as a resting point from which to review his progress from early life; and after tracing his course up to that event, we shall follow him through his brilliant, but short career to the grave. A succint view of the leading events of the revolutionary war becomes indispensably necessary. Through this alone can we be understood when refering to the part our hero acted in the transactions of that period. But the thrice told tale shall not arrest the reader any farther than is indispensable to the explanation of his part of the drama, or of a fair view of some of the events of the war, derived from materials not yet furnished to the historian. General Greene's conduct as a military man has been long before the world and often canvassed; but as his own correspondence has never before been submitted to historical scrutiny, it is with confidence we assert, that even his military conduct has never been fully explained, or duly appreciated. So also with his private and confidential correspondence. The cabinets of all his most intimate friends have been open to us, and to us alone. It is here alone that the private man is to be traced out. Here there is no affectation; the picture is not glossed over for public exhibition; what he was, and how he thought, and how he wrote, can be inquired into without one fear of deception. He, in common with all other men who have acted a conspicuous part in life, had at times his enemies; his conduct was misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misrepresented; nor did he escape the commission of faults. These are subjects that must claim the particular attention of his biographer. But here the writer must be indulged with one apology. The most discouraging circumstance attending his inquiries on the subject now before his readers, has been the utter impossibility of eliciting from any one who was intimate with Greene, the acknowledgement that he had a fault. That modern biography has degenerated from the dignity of history into abject, often venal eulogy, is a palpable truth. We look with more dread on the possibility of this work's incurring the same imputation, than on any other subject of criticism or censure. But, whether General Greene's faults have been lost in the high reputation to which he attained, or sunk or forgotten in the ardour of affection in which his memory is cherished

by all who knew him; certain it is that they have been sedulously, nay, importunately inquired after by the writer, but almost or altogether in vain. If he has discovered any, they are very few, and very venial, and such as would scarcely be recognized as faults in any other. Much more easy, and certainly more pleasant was the task, of discovering evidence to acquit him of the crimes which had been unjustly imputed to him in public opinion. Here, inquiry has not been restrained by that indignation which, in his lifetime, prevented him from giving to the public the proofs of his innocence.

The latter part of 1775 and beginning of 1776, were passed before Boston in a state of comparative inaction. The British were about 8,000 strong, after the arrival of Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton; and the force of the Americans at no time exceeded 15,000. The latter had neither discipline, arms, nor powder to attempt the reduction of the former; and the British remembered too well the stone walls that lined the road to Concord, and the entrenchments of earth and staw that crowned the summit of Breeds' or Bunker's Hill, to attempt any enterprize against the American lines. They had learned to respect the deadly aim of the undisciplined militiaman, when he imagines himself protected from his adversary's bayonet.

The post assigned Greene, on his arrival in camp, was Prospect Hill, an important point in the centre of the left wing, or northern extremity of the American line. And at or near the same point he continued to command, until some time after the arrival of General Washington.

On the 3d of July 1775, the commander in chief, General George Washington, arrived and assumed the command of the American army. It was the fashion of the day to welcome him by a formal address, and Greene, as the military chief of the state to which he belonged, very cordially complied with the received custom. This was the era of his introduction to an acquaintance with the commander in chief; and from this day to the close of their invaluable lives, no two men ever more cordially confided in each other. Washington's discerning eye, which never was deceived in character, however policy might impose silence; soon discovered the sound judgement, devoted zeal, and military cast of character of the Rhode Island commander. The head-quarters were at Cambridge, and Greene's post at a little distance to the left of that place. As the enemy was then posted, (being chiefly on or near Bunker's Hill,) this position was among the most important on the line, and its proximity to the residence of the commander in chief, placed the conduct of Greene particularly under the view of his commander; whilst the advanced positions assigned to the Rhode Islanders on the extreme left at Winter Hill and Lewell's farm, suggests, that previous to the general's arrival,

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both the commander and his men had acquired the confidence of their brother soldiers. We are in possession of a communication from a member of General Washington's family, whilst he lay before Boston, which contains this encomium on the Rhode Islanders and their commander: "His command consisted of three regiments, then the best disciplined and appointed in the whole American army."*

The congress of the United States, having resolved to place the troops before Boston on the continental establishment, soon after appointing the commander in chief, also appointed and commissioned four major generals and eight brigadiers. Of the latter, Greene was the eighth in rank, and although he held the rank of major general under the state commission, having now resolved to devote himself to a military life, he accepted of an inferior appointment, which promised more enlarged scope of action, and the pleasure of serving under the immediate command of Washington.

In the new arrangements of command which necessarily took place after these appointments, that of the two brigades posted on the extreme left at Winter Hill, the nearest post to the enemy, was delegated to Greene and Sullivan, the latter being also one of the newly appointed brigadiers.

In this subordinate command Greene found not enough of employment to occupy his industrious habits and ardent mind. Close application to the study of his profession, filled up his leisure hours. He was indefatigable in training his brigade, and one of his letters boasts of the proficiency of two of the regiments of his Rhode Islanders, those of Varnum and Hitchcock, both excellent officers, and afterwards distinguished men in the revolutionary war.

The change of habits, of life, and increased exposure at night, brought upon him about this time, a severe attack of the jaundice. To a man who had never in his life been sick, this was a serious occurrence; in a letter to his brother on the subject, the burthen of his complaint is not, his suffering under disease, but the necessity of taking medicine, and above all, the fear that the army would march into Boston without him.

This, it is well known, had been resolved on in a council of war, and would certainly have been attempted, had the ice in Charlestown Bay ever become hard enough to bear the army. For several days the hope was seriously entertained, that this opportunity would have been afforded, of exhibiting their spirit and zeal in the hazardous enterprize. Fortunately (probably) for the American people, the event on which it depended never occurred. And

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* Gov. Read's Heads of Biography of Greene.

notwithstanding the opportunity afforded the enemy for striking an effective blow, while Washington dismissed one army and embodied another under their very guns, the enemy lay quietly within his trenches until the 17th of March 1776, when he embarked his whole force for New York.

It is a fact, that on the day of the expiration of the term of service of the troops composing the army of observation, which was the 31st of December 1775, Washington could not have brought 5,000 men into action. But his vigilance and judicious manœuvres concealed from the enemy the dangers of his situation, and the bustle of marching and countermarching was made to present the appearance of an accession, instead of a diminution of strength. The avenues of information were carefully guarded by the much dreaded rifle, and the hearts of the people were with him, or he could not have concealed from a vigilant foe, a transaction unexampled in the history of warfare.

Whilst Greene lay before Boston, his mind was actively engaged in promoting the great cause in which he had embarked. His letters to his friends breathe a fervour for the general good, and exhibit a degree of foresight and intelligence in the choice of means to attain it, that make a selection from them worthy of a place in the memory of posterity. Mr. Samuel Ward, who had been governor of the state, was then a delegate in the continental congress, and the general's elder brother, Jacob Greene, an active and influential whig, was chairman of the committee of safety in Warwick. These were among his most intimate friends and correspondents. At this time, he had not many; for his range in life had hitherto been very limited. A few extracts from his first letters, written some time after making his debut on the revolutionary theatre, will show that he was new in life, while they furnish a few authentic incidents of the revolutionary war.

From General Greene to Jacob Greene, Esq.

"Rhode Island Camp, *June 2d*, 1775.

"I arrived in camp on Saturday last, and found it in great commotion. A few days longer in the state of excitement in which I found our troops, would have proved fatal to our campaign. The want of government, and of a certainty of supplies, had thrown every thing into disorder. Several companies had clubbed their muskets in order to march home. I have made several regulations for introducing order, and composing their murmurs; but it is very difficult to limit people who have had so much latitude, without throwing them into disorder. The commissaries had been beaten off at my arrival, and were about returning home the next day. I believe there never was a

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person more welcome who was so little deserving, as myself. I wish you would forward Colonel Varnum's regiment; he will be a welcome guest in camp. I expect much from his and his troops' example."

From the same to the same.

"RHODE ISLAND CAMP, *June 28th*, 1775.

"The hurry I have been in, and the numerous employments I am called to, have left me no opportunity to write to you.

"I regret it the less, as I am confident that you have heard every day from the camp, and almost every particular transaction here, with many that never were transacted here or any where else.

"The particulars of the late battle (of Bunker's Hill) have been differently represented. Sometimes the enemy have lost a hundred, sometimes a thousand; and now it is up to fifteen hundred. I believe, from the best accounts I can collect, that they suffered a loss nearly equal to the last accounts. Many officers fell in the action. The Welsh Fusileers, the finest regiment in the English establishment, is ruined; there are but one captain and eleven privates left in the regiment. It is said, that if some regiments on our side had done their duty as well as others did, the regulars must have suffered a total defeat, and would never have got possession of the entrenchments. Upon the whole, I think we have little reason to complain. There were but about fifty killed on our side, thirty made prisoners, and sixty wounded. I wish we could sell them another hill, at the same price.

"The regulars are now encamped on Bunker's Hill, and our people on Prospect and Winter Hills; both strongly entrenched. Our people are in good spirits, but regularity and discipline are much wanted. Our own troops are raw, irregular, and undisciplined; yet, bad as they are, they are under much better government than any troops round about Boston. There are some officers in each regiment who exert themselves to bring the camp under regulations. There are some captains, and many subaltern officers, who neglect their duty; some through fear of offending their soldiers, some through laziness, and some through obstinacy. This makes the task of the field officers very laborious. I have warned them of their negligence many times, and am determined to break every one for the future, who shall lay himself open to it.

"My task is hard, and fatigue great. I go to bed late, and rise early. The number of applications you cannot conceive of, without being present to observe the round of business. But hard as it is, if I can discharge my duty

to my own honour and my country's satisfaction, I shall go through the toil with cheerfulness. My own officers and soldiers are generally well satisfied; nay, I have not heard one complaint.

"The general officers of the neighbouring camps treat me with the greatest respect; much more than my station or consequence entitles me to. Were I to estimate my value by the attention paid to my opinions, I should have great reason to think myself some considerable personage. But fatal experience teaches me every day, that mankind are apt to pay deference to station and not to merit. Therefore, when I find myself surrounded by their flattering attentions, I consider them as due to my office, and not to me. I shall study to deserve well, but cannot but lament the great defects I find in myself to discharge with honour and justice the important trust committed to my care. You know I never made much parade, nor was ambitious of raising people's expectation higher than I had reason to hope my conduct would be answerable to. The world in general are too good judges not to learn the true merits of men, after being furnished with an opportunity to inspect them. I hope God will preserve me in the bounds of moderation, and enable me to support myself with proper dignity, neither rash nor timorous, pursuing a conduct marked with manly firmness, but never bordering on phrenzy."

It will be recollected, that in the year 1775 the hopes of accommodation with the mother country were not yet relinquished by many of the leading men in America. Short-sighted politicians thought Great Britain would yield, as in the affair of the stamp-act; and did not perceive, that she had now rested from war, and digested her plan for reducing the colonies to a state of absolute dependence on the will of parliament. The free charters of some of the states were viewed with particular jealousy. The proprietary governments had generally been bought out, or seized as forfeited, and royal charters substituted for them; and it was no doubt an interesting object to bring all parts of the colony to the same state of subjection, which existed where the king appointed to the army, the chief magistracy, and the judiciary. This, which was at first only an opinion drawn from facts, and was not avowed by the British government, was in the course of the war fully detected.*

* In a letter taken on board of one of the prizes, and published to the world. This prize was the British packet for North America, captured by the French; and the letter was published in the Amsterdam Gazette. It was dated Whitehall, March 7th, 1781, from William Knox, Esq. secretary to Lord George Germain, to James Simpson, Esq. The following is an extract.

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The eyes of many were wilfully shut against conviction; and the confidence of others in the integrity of the ministry, rendered them willing to submit to present usurpation without fearing that it would be extended farther; whilst some had selfish objects to govern their conduct. The better-informed saw, that the late encroachments of the British government were but the prelude to a gradual advancement to absolute despotism. Of this number was Greene; nor did he hesitate about the alternative, or desist from pressing upon others the necessity of a declaration of independence. And with the necessity of that measure his ready mind soon discovered the means indispensable to achieving it.

It will be recollected, that the battle of Bunker's Hill, which shed such a ray of glory round the Massachusetts' militia, produced a delusion in the public mind, which had nearly proved fatal to the American cause—a blind implicit reliance on the efficiency of undisciplined troops. In the midst of the men who had acquired such glory, in the sight of the spot that had been hallowed by their devotion, in the very height of exultation and eulogy, his mind was not to be borne away by the popular impulse. It will be found, that he even anticipated the warning voice of Washington against the danger and impolicy of the prevailing sentiment, and pressed upon his correspondents the necessity of making the war in every sense a common undertaking,—to enlist troops for the war, and enlist them at once as an act of the congress, without delegating the work to the states by assigning to each a specified quota. Unfortunately, these opinions were not the fashion of the day. Declaimers had excited an alarm at the idea of a standing army, and short enlistments, and contingents of militia, brought the country to the brink of ruin. Fortunately, heaven shielded us from the effects of our own folly, in sending us men to command whose genius was prolific in resource, and whose bravery and patriotism were proof against mortification and defeat: and public virtue enough to bear up against every misfortune.

"When I consider from the deplorable condition of the rebellious forces, and our great superiority, that the inhabitants of the revolted provinces will probably solicit for a negociation, and perhaps such a request may come from congress itself, I wish you to be present; for, knowing your perfect acquaintance with the dispositions of the inhabitants to republican principles, and their aversion to monarchy, it may be in your power to prevent making any concessions that may tend to keep up those principles among the inhabitants, and to see that no alteration be made in their constitutions, as it *is intended to establish among them distinctions of rank, and new model their government by that of Great Britain.*"—*An. Reg.* 1781, *Appendix to Chronicle* 254.

The subjoined letters will be given to the reader without apology, as they serve to show the style of writing, turn of thought, and habit of feeling of the individual whose character we are delineating. We shall frequently have occasion to copy similar letters into these pages, wherever they serve to present some trait of character, or furnish an original view of some event of the revolutionary war. This is a deviation from the design with which this undertaking was entered upon, but it has been adopted upon mature reflection. The two little volumes of official letters written by General Washington, are destined to survive the many volumes that have been written on the American war, and to present to the world the best eulogy on his character, as well as the most authentic history of his times.

General Greene to Governor Ward.

"Camp on Prospect Hill, *June 4th*, 1775.

"Dear Sir,

"Your kind favour of the 23d last is now before me. I am extremely happy to find your views so affectionately extended to the combined interests of the united colonies. Your apprehensions that George III. is determined, at all hazards to carry his plan of despotism into execution, is fully confirmed by his late gracious speech to both houses of parliament. In that, you will find, he breathes revenge, and threatens us with destruction. Indeed, it is no more than common sense must have foreseen long since, had we not been blinded by a too-fond attachment to the parent state. We have consulted our wishes, rather than our reason, in indulging the idea of accommodation. Heaven has decreed that tottering empire to irretrievable ruin, and, thanks to God, since providence has so determined it, America must raise an empire of permanent duration, supported upon the grand pillars of truth, freedom, and religion, based upon justice, and defended by her own patriotic sons.

"No doubt a large army must be raised in addition to the forces upon the present establishment. You are acquainted with my sentiments upon that head already. How they must be divided, and where stationed, is a matter at present problematical. However, one thing is certain, the grand body must be superior in number to any force the enemy can send. *All the forces in America should be under one commander, raised and appointed by the same authority, subjected to the same regulations, and ready to be detached wherever*

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occasion may require. Your observation with regard to the Canadians has often struck me; that their attachment to the one party or the other will greatly depend upon the superiority of force. To prevent which in some measure, and fix them to the common interest, let us raise one or more regiments of Canadians to serve in New England, and send an equal number into Canada from the states, in addition to what you have proposed. With regard to the scanty measure dealt out to the army upon the new establishment, we are not altogether different in sentiment. Yet I am convinced the regiments will fill to their full complement. I believe they are more, upon an average, than half full already. Undoubtedly the detaining of arms, being private property, is repugnant to many principles of civil and natural law, and hath disgusted many.* But the great law of necessity must justify the expedient, till we can be otherwise furnished. The pay of the soldiers is certainly generous, and the officers likewise, except the field officers, whose pay is much below that of any others, considering their rank and experience, and it will operate to excite an opinion derogatory to their merit.

"My dear sir, I am now to open my mind a little more freely. It hath been said that Canada, in the late war, was conquered in Germany. Who knows but that Britain may be, in the present controversy! I take it for granted, that France and Spain have made overtures to the congress. Let us embrace them as brothers. We want not their land force in America; their navy we do. Their commerce will be mutually beneficial; they will doubtless pay the expense of their fleet, as it will be employed in protecting their own trade. Their military stores we want amazingly. Those will be articles of commerce. The Elector of Hanover has ordered his German troops to relieve the garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. France will of consequence attack and subdue Hanover with little trouble. This will bring on a very severe war in Germany, and turn Great Britain's attention that way. This may prevent immense expense, and innumerable calamities in America.

"*Permit me, then, to recommend from the sincerity of my heart, ready at all times to bleed in my country's cause, a declaration of independence;* and call upon the world, and the great God who governs it, to witness the necessity, propriety, and rectitude thereof.

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* The arms of the militia were detained by General Washington when they had served out their tour of duty before Boston and were replaced by others. Most of the latter came in unarmed, and there were no other means of supplying the want.

"My worthy friend, the interests of mankind hang upon that truly worthy body of which you are a member. You stand the representative, not of America only, but of the whole world; the friends of liberty, and the supporters of the rights of human nature.

"How will posterity, millions yet unborn, bless the memory of those brave patriots who are now hastening the consummation of freedom, truth, and religion! But want of decision renders wisdom in council insignificant, as want of power hath prevented us here from destroying the mercenary troops now in Boston. Frugality, a most amiable domestic virtue, becomes a vice of the most enormous kind, when opposed to the common good. The tyrant by his last speech has convinced us, that to be free or not, depends upon ourselves. Nothing, therefore, but the most vigorous exertions on our part, can shelter us from the evils intended us. How can we, then, startle at the idea of expense, when our whole property, our dearest connexions, our liberty, nay, life itself is at stake: let us, therefore, act like men inspired with a resolution that nothing but the frowns of heaven shall conquer us. It is no time for deliberation; the hour is swiftly rolling on when the plains of America will be deluged with human blood. Resolves, declarations, and all the parade of heroism in words, will not obtain a victory. Arms and ammunition are as necessary as men, and must be had at the expense of every thing short of Britain's claims.

"An army unequipped, will ever feel the want of spirit and courage; but properly furnished, fighting in the best of causes, will bid defiance to the united force of men and devils. When, a finishing period will be put to the present dispute, God only knows. We have just experienced the inconveniences of disbanding an army within cannon-shot of the enemy, and forming a new one in its stead. An instance never before known. Had the enemy been fully acquainted with our situation, I cannot pretend to say what might have been the consequence. A large body of troops will probably be wanted for a considerable time. *It will be infinitely safer, and not more expensive in the end, for the continent to give a large bounty to any number of troops in addition to what may be ordered on the present establishment, that will engage during the war, than to enlist them from year to year without a bounty.* And should the present regiments be inclined to engage for the same term, let them receive the same encouragement. There is not the least prospect of our being able to disband and form a new army again, without the enemy's availing himself of the advantage.

"I have taken the liberty to show your last letter to General Lee, whose knowledge of Europe, and American genius and learning, enable him to give

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you the advice you want. He has written you fully on the subject; it would be mere arrogance in me to say any thing upon the subject, after he has taken up the pen.

"I this day manned the lines upon this hill, and feel a degree of pleasure that I have not felt for several days. Our situation has been critical. We have no part of the militia here, and the night after the old troops went away, I could not have mustered seven hundred men, notwithstanding the returns of the new enlisted troops amounted to nineteen hundred and upwards. I am now strong enough to defend myself against all the force in Boston. God bless you and preserve you.

"Adieu, &c."

From the same to the same.

"PROSPECT HILL, *October* 16*th*, 1775.

"It gives me great pleasure to hear that the troops from Rhode Island stand as high in public esteem as the troops of the neighbouring colonies. I have spared no pains, night or day, to teach them their duty. How far I have succeeded, I leave to his excellency to say. Colonel Varnum and Colonel Hitchcock are excellent disciplinarians. ——— knows nothing about it, and never will.

"With regard to paying the troops part of their wages, and the committee part, it will be productive of a multitude of inconveniences. The colonels can retain part of their wages for their families at home; the people may give orders to those who supply their families to receive it. This will give less dissatisfaction, and answer every salutary purpose. A man from each town or county may undertake to supply the families of those that are engaged in the army. The colonels are the best judges of the prudence and good economy of their soldiers; those who behave well, and make a prudent use of their money, want no agent; for they will receive monthly payments, and such parts as they can spare for the support of their families, can easily be conveyed home. As the troops are considered continental and not colonial, there must be some systematical plan for the payment, without any reference to any particular colonies; otherwise, they will be partly continental, and partly colonial. His excellency has a great desire to banish every idea of local attachments. It is next to impossible to unhinge the prejudices that people have for places and things which they have long been connected with. But the fewer of those local attachments which discover themselves in our plan for establishing the army, the more satisfactory it must be to the southern

people. For my part, *I feel the cause, and not the place. I would as soon go to Virginia, as stay here.* I can assure the gentlemen to the southward, that there could not be any thing more abhorrent to ————, than an union of these colonies for the purpose of conquering those of the south.

"The pay and provision of the troops cannot be lowered at present; they do not feel themselves under a necessity to enter the service for the support of themselves and families, and, therefore, would refuse to enlist again. This might produce a recess at the termination of their present enlistment, which would be dangerous to the liberties of America. At some future period, if the people are obliged to resort to the army for employment, such a measure might be prudent and practical, but by no means at present. The committee from the congress arrived last evening, and I had the honour to be introduced to that very great man, Dr. Franklin, whom I viewed with silent admiration during the whole evening. 'Attention watched his lips, and conviction closed his periods.' Colonel Harris is a very facetious, good humoured, sensible, spirited gentleman; he appears to be calculated for military employment. Mr. Lynch was much fatigued and said but little, but appeared sensible in his inquiries and observations. You may depend upon our paying the gentlemen every mark of respect and attention during their stay.

"I had the pleasure to hear from your son Samuel, the 26th of September.* He was at Fort Weston, just going to set off on their journey. All in health and good spirits. I had the same apprehensions with regard to Samuel's health and strength to endure the fatigues of such a campaign, as you had. I advised him to decline it; but the heat of youth, and the thirst of glory, surmounted every obstacle, and rendered reasoning vain and persuasion fruitless. Colonel Christopher Greene is gone with him. His going made me the more readily consent to your son's going. I gave the colonel a particular charge to lend him a helping hand in every case of difficulty, and he promised that his aid should never be wanting. By several letters from Quebec, things wear a promising appearance there. If the expedition succeeds, and we get possession of Canada, we shall effectually shut the back door against them. And I make no doubt of keeping them from entering at the front. You may depend on my influence to obtain Charles a commission in the new establishment."

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* These officers had volunteered under Arnold. A considerable proportion of these volunteers were from the Rhode Island troops. Colonel C. Greene is best known as the hero of Red Bank.

From the same to the same.

"PROSPECT HILL, *October 23d*, 1775.

"An express arrived from Casco Bay last evening, bringing an account that the enemy had been firing a day or two upon Falmouth. What has been the consequence we have not heard. The enemy had orders to burn Falmouth and Portsmouth, unless the inhabitants would deliver up their arms, and give hostages for their future good behaviour. Truly, 'their tender mercies are cruelties.' Will not this brutal conduct rouse a spirit of indignation throughout America? Such a shocking scene as was exhibited at Bristol, you cannot conceive of. The people of Newport are all moving into the country. The night after Wallace returned from Bristol* the confusion in Newport was nearly equal to what it was there. Captain Wallace has made the inhabitants the following proposition: 'If they will supply his vessels with fresh provisions, beer, &c. and remove the troops from the island, he will spare the town; but, if they do not comply with these conditions, he has positive orders to lay it in ashes, which he is determined to execute.' What will be the event, God only knows. There is a committee from Newport down here to see Governor Cook, to get an order for the removal of the troops, and liberty to furnish the ships with fresh provisions. The matter was laid before the continental committee, who advised furnishing the ships with fresh provisions, but not to remove the troops off the island, which, I suppose, will take place. But there appears a strange hobble in our gait. Here, we are at loggerheads; in other places, only sparring, and others again, are in perfect tranquillity. Here, we are cutting them off from fresh provisions, and removing the stock from the island, which amounts to a perfect depopulation; while at New York, Philadelphia, and many other parts of America, their ships are supplied with every thing they stand in need of, and live in the midst of peace and plenty. If we are to be considered as one people, and they as the common enemy, upon what principles are they so differently treated in different governments? Oh, could the congress behold the distresses and wretched condition of the poor inhabitants, driven from the seaport towns, it must, it would kindle a blaze of indignation against the commissioned pirates and licensed robbers. They would not be permitted to find rest or an abiding place in America. The fate of kingdoms depends upon the just improvement

* Bristol was sacked by Wallace.

of critical minutes. Suffer not the noble ardour to slacken for want of action, nor smother the generous flame for want of fuel. The temper and feeling of men can be wrought up to a certain pitch, and then, like all transitory things, they sicken and subside. This is the time for a wise legislator to avail himself of the advantage which the favourable disposition of the people gives him to execute, whatever sound policy dictates. It is not in the province of mortals to reduce human events in politics to a certainty. It is our duty to provide the means to obtain our ends, and leave the event to Him who is the allwise Governor and Disposer of the universe.

"The state of Rhode Island from its situation must suffer amazingly; the stock which lies exposed to the enemy's ravages would be a plentiful supply for their troops in Boston. An object so considerable will not escape their attention. Without doubt they will attempt to avail themselves of the advantage. The situation of the island affords the means, and the attempt must be successful, unless some provision be made to frustrate their measures. As their defeat is a general benefit, it is but just that it should come within the line of a general charge against the continent. Fresh provisions will be of infinite service to the troops in Boston. If they do not provide some very fine anti-scorbutics, they must suffer amazingly by the scurvy. By two captains of vessels who came out of Boston the day before yesterday, we learn that it is extremely sickly; eight or ten are buried every day. Cold weather coming on with the scurvy locked up in their blood, from eating salt provisions, must produce a prodigious mortality. Nothing can heighten their distress so much as cutting them off from fresh provisions. Therefore, I think it a subject worthy public attention, to lend a helping hand to Rhode Island to secure the stock on the island. It must be grievous to the inhabitants to be subject to such an expense themselves, and unjust, seeing the whole continent are to be benefited by its consequences.

"The committee has been closely engaged in forming a plan for regulating the army. I hope when the army is re-enlisted, and the best of the officers selected, the troops will be under better regulation. The number agreed on may be larger than may appear necessary. But when you consider how raw and undisciplined the troops are in general, and what warlike preparations are going on in England, and how necessary it is to have a good army in the spring, and the favourable prospect we shall have of making ourselves masters of Boston this winter, I doubt not you will cheerfully concur in the establishment. The general officers agreed upon 20,000. What number the committee has determined upon I have not heard, but make no doubt they will approve of the number agreed to by the generals.

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"I wish we had a large stock of powder, that we might annoy the enemy wherever they made their appearance. We could easily, in my opinion, drive them out of Boston if we had the means, but for want thereof we are obliged to remain idle spectators; for we cannot get at them, and they are determined not to come to us. However, I hope ere long fortune will favour us agreeably to our wishes.

"I hinted in my last that people began *heartily to wish a declaration of independence.* I would make it treason against the states to make any further remittances to Great Britain, and stop all supplies to their shipping. We had as well begin in earnest at first as at last, for we have no alternative but to fight it out or be slaves. We should open our ports to all who have a mind to come and trade with us. But it will be necessary to keep a check upon commerce, lest it take the lead of military pursuits. The merchants are generally a body of people whose god is gain, and their whole plan of policy is to bring public measures to square with their private interest.

"The French will never agree to furnish us with powder as long as there is the least probability of an accommodation between us and Great Britain; the alternative is a separation from Great Britain, or subjugation to her. In the latter case, Great Britain as a nation will receive little or no advantage from the colonies, for slavery is ever unfriendly to trade, and trade is the strength and sinews of Great Britain. Therefore, France, as a real enemy to Great Britain, acts upon a true plan of policy in refusing to intermeddle, until she is satisfied that there is no hope of accommodation. Then she can interpose with propriety to lend us a helping hand. Should France undertake to furnish us with powder and other articles, and the breach between Great Britain and the colonies be afterwards made up, she would incur the hostility of her rival, without reaping any solid advantage."

From the same to the same.

"Prospect Hill, *December* 10*th*, 1775.

"In my last I mentioned to you, that the troops enlisted very slowly in general. I was in hopes then that ours would not have deserted the cause of their country. But they seem to be so sick of this way of life, and so home sick, that I fear the greater part, and the best of the troops from our colony will go home. The Connecticut troops are going home in shoals this day. Five thousand of the militia, three from this province, and two from Hampshire, are called in to take their place. There is a great defection among their

(the Connecticut) troops, but from the spirit and resolution of the people of that province I make no doubt they will furnish their proportion without delay. New Hampshire behaves nobly; their troops engage cheerfully. The regiment raised in the colony of Rhode Island has hurt our recruiting amazingly; they are fond of serving in the army at home, and each feels a desire to protect his own family. CHAP. II.

"I harangued the troops yesterday; I hope it had some effect; they appear of a better disposition to-day; some have enlisted, and others discover a complying temper. I leave nothing undone or unsaid that will promote the recruiting service. But I fear the colony of Rhode Island is upon the decline. There have been, and now are some unhappy disputes subsisting between the town and country interest, and some wretches, for the sake of a present popularity, are endeavouring to widen the breach, to build up their own consequence to the prejudice and ruin of the public interest. God grant that they may meet with the disgrace they deserve!

"This province begins to exert itself; the general court has undertaken to provide for the army, wood, &c. Their troops begin now to enlist very fast. They are zealous in the country to engage in the service.

"I sent home some recruiting officers, but they got scarcely a man, and report that there are none to be had there. No public spirit prevails; I wish you and your colleague were at home a few days, to spirit up the people. Newport I believe, from the best intelligence I can get, is determined to observe a strict neutrality this winter, and in the spring join the strongest party. I feel for the honour of the colony, which I think in a fair way, from the conduct of the people at home and the troops abroad, to receive a wound. It mortifies me to death that our colony and troops should be a whit behind the neighbouring governments in private virtue or public spirit.

"I have been strengthening this hill, in order, that if the soldiery should not engage as cheerfully as we expected, I might be able to defend it with a less number."

From the same to the same.

"Prospect Hill, *December 18th*, 1775.

"The army is filling up slowly; I think the prospect is better than it has been. Recruits come in out of the country plentifully, and the soldiers in the army begin to show a better disposition, and to recruit cheerfully.

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"Your observation is exceedingly just. This is no time for disgusting the soldiery when their aid is so essential to the preservation of the rights of human nature, and the liberties of America. His excellency is a great and good man, I feel the highest degree of respect for him. I wish him immortal honour. I think myself happy in an opportunity to serve under so good a general. My happiness will be still greater, if fortune gives me an opportunity in some signal instance to contribute to his glory and my country's good.

"But his excellency, as you observe, has not had time to make himself acquainted with the genius of this people; they are naturally as brave and spirited as the peasantry of any other country, but you cannot expect veterans of a raw militia from only a few months' service. The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people is commercial from their long intercourse with trade. The sentiment of honour, the true characteristic of a soldier, has not yet got the better of interest. His excellency has been taught to believe the people here, a superior race of mortals; and finding them of the same temper and dispositions, passions and prejudices, virtues and vices of the common people of other governments, they sink in his esteem. The country round here, set no bounds to their demands for hay, wood, and teaming. It has given his excellency a great deal of uneasiness that they should take this opportunity to extort from the necessities of the army such enormous prices. The general has often expressed to me his uneasiness about the expenses; they so far exceed the expectations of congress. He is afraid they will sink under the weight of such charges. Economy is undoubtedly essential in this dispute; there should be no wanton waste of public property; but if you starve the cause, you protract the dispute. If the congress wish to put the finishing stroke to this war, they must exert their whole force at once,—give every measure an air of decision. I pray God we may not lose the critical moment. Human affairs are ever like the tide, constantly on the ebb and flow. Our preparations in all parts of the United States ought to be so great, as to leave no room to doubt our intentions to support the cause and obtain our conditions. This will draw in the weak and wavering, and give such a turn to the minds of people, that small shocks shall not be seriously felt in the general plan of operations. Your proclamation in answer to that of the king's of August last, is glorious, is noble; was it unanimous, or only the voice of a small majority? The papers announce to you the much greater part of the military operations here.

"From the best accounts we can get out of Boston, they are prodigiously distressed. It begins to be very sickly; the scurvy discovers itself, the small-pox prevails, and general Howe is inoculating all the soldiery who have never

had it. I think they cannot hold out the winter through, though we were to leave them unmolested, which God grant we may not.

"It is reported that Quebec is taken. General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold will acquire immortal honour. Oh, that we had plenty of powder; I should then hope to see something done here for the honour of America!

"Our barracks are almost completed. Blankets and clothing will be very much wanted, notwithstanding your supply from congress. The Connecticut troops are gone home; the militia from this province and New Hampshire are come in to take their places. Upon this occasion, they have discovered a zeal that does them the highest honour. New Hampshire behaves nobly."

From the same to the same.

"PROSPECT HILL, *December* 31*st*, 1775.

"You entreat the general officers to recommend to the congress the giving of a bounty. But his excellency General Washington has often assured us, that the congress would not give a bounty, and before they would give a bounty, they would give up the dispute.

"The cement between the northern and southern colonies is not very strong, if forty thousand lawful, will induce the congress to give us up. Although I do not imagine that the necessity of allowing a bounty would have broken the union, yet it was a sufficient intimation that the bare mention was disagreeable. Can you think we should hesitate a moment to recommend a bounty, if we thought ourselves at liberty to do so? We should then have an opportunity of picking the best men, filling the army soon, keeping up a proper discipline, and preserving good order and government in camp; while we are now obliged to relax the very sinews of military government, and give a latitude of indulgence to the soldiery incompatible with security of either camp or country. What reason have you to think that a proposition of that sort, if it came recommended by general officers, would be acceded to by the congress? Most of the generals belong to the northern governments; if the congress refuse to hear their delegates, I apprehend they would the generals also. The congress cannot suppose that the generals are better acquainted with the temper and genius of this people, than the delegates are from these provinces; and why they should refuse to hear you, and not us, I cannot imagine.

"A good politician will always have an eye to economy, but to form an extensive plan, and not provide the means for carrying it into execution, betrays either a defect in counsel, or want of resolution to prosecute.

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"There is nothing that will encourage our enemies, both external and internal, like the difficulties we meet in raising a new army. If we had given a good bounty and raised the troops speedily, it would have struck the ministry with astonishment to see that four colonies could raise such an army in so short a time. They could not expect to conquer a people so united, firm, and resolutely determined to defend their rights and privileges. But, from the difficulties we meet with, the confusion and disorder we are in, the large number of the soldiers who are going home, our enemies will draw a conclusion that we are like a rope of sand, and that we shall soon break to pieces. God grant it may not be the case.

"You misunderstand me, my dear sir, or I wrote what I did not mean. It was not the lower class of people that I meant to complain of, but the merchants and wealthy farmers, who, I think, do not exert themselves as they ought. This is no time for getting riches, but to secure what we have got. Every shadow of oppression or extortion ought to disappear; but instead of this, we find many articles of merchandize enhanced in price four times the first cost, and most of them cent per cent. The farmers are extortionate wherever their situation furnishes them with an opportunity. These are the people that I complain most of; they are wounding the cause. When people are distressed, it is natural for them to try every thing and every where to get relief; and to find oppression instead of relief, from these two orders of men, will go near to driving the poorer sort to desperation. It will be good policy in the united colonies to render the poorer sort of people as easy and happy under their present circumstances as possible; for they are creatures of a day, and present gain and gratification, though small, has more weight with them than much greater advantages at a distance. A good politician must and will consider the temper of the times and the prejudices of the people he has to deal with, when he takes his measures to execute any great design.

"The current sentiment in the New England colonies generally favours the opposition; but if the distresses of the people are multiplied, their opinions may change. They will naturally look back upon their former happy situation, and contrast that with their present worse condition, and conclude that the source of all their misery originates in their dispute with Great Britain.

"*If all the maritime towns throughout the united colonies had a body of troops in continual pay, it would, in a great measure, remedy this evil. Provision must be made for those who are thrown out of employ by the decay of trade.* If they are not engaged for us, necessity will oblige them to engage against us; for they cannot live upon the air. What signifies our being frightened at the expense! If we succeed, we gain all; but if we are conquered, we lose all;

not only our present possessions, but all our future labours will be appropriated to the support of a haughty, proud, insolent set of puppies, whose greatest merit with the crown will be, to render the people as completely humble as possible.

"I agree with you, that congress should embody seventy thousand men—all the troops raised in the different colonies to be upon continental pay, and where there are any stationed for the protection of any particular province, to be considered as a detachment from the grand army, and all in every province to be subject to the commander in chief, and at his disposal and discretion. A body of troops in each colony would support the spirited, confirm the weak and wavering, and awe our oppressors into submission. For there are no arguments, however well supported by truth and reason, that carry such conviction with them as those which are enforced from the muzzle of a gun, or the point of a bayonet.

"If the southern and northern troops were exchanged, it would be serviceable to the cause. It would in a great measure cure the itch for going home on furlough, and save the continent the needless expense of paying a large body of troops that are absent from camp.

"You complain and say the New England colonies are treated ill. Why are they treated so? You think there ought to have been a bounty given. The congress always had it in their power to give a bounty if they pleased. Why were not the New England delegates sent to establish the plan for the constitution of the new army? Why were strangers sent at so critical a period? History does not afford so dangerous a measure as that of disbanding an old army and forming a new one within point blank shot of the enemy. This task was rendered very difficult by the reduction of eleven regiments, and the discharge of such a number of officers who have done every thing to obstruct and retard the filling the new army, in hopes to ruin the establishment and bring themselves into place again.

"From whence originates that groundless jealousy of the New England colonies? I believe there is nothing more remote from their thoughts than designs unfavourable to the equal rights of the other colonies. For my own part, I abhor the thoughts, and cannot help thinking it highly injurious to the New England people, who ever have been distinguished for their justice and moderation. I mentioned this subject to Mr. Lynch and Colonel Harrison, who assured me there was no such sentiment prevailing in congress, nor among the southern inhabitants of any respectability. I am sorry to find they were mistaken. It grieves me that such jealousies should prevail. If they are nourished, they will sooner or latter sap the foundation of the union

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and dissolve the connexion. God in mercy avert so dreadful an evil! How unhappy is it for the interests of America, that such colonial prejudices should prevail, and partial motives influence her councils! The interests of one colony are no ways incompatible with the interests of another. We have all one common interest, and one common wish to be free from parliamentary jurisdiction and taxation. The different climates and produce of the colonies will ever preserve a harmony amongst them by an active trade and commerce. Each colony will have the benefit of its *own* staples, whether they are independent or connected with Great Britain.

"Governor Franklin [of New Jersey] and the assembly go on with a high hand. His impudence and the congress' silence astonish all this part of the world. To suffer such presumption to go unpunished, betrays a want of spirit to resent or power to punish. The dignity of the congress ought to be held sacred, or else its authority will soon be brought into contempt. His conduct is calculated to breed a mutiny in the state; such budding mischiefs cannot be too early nipped; diseases that might have been easily remedied if seasonably attended to, have often been rendered incurable by being too long neglected. I wish this may not be the case here.

"This is the last day of the old enlisted soldiers' service. Nothing but confusion and disorder reign. We are obliged to retain their guns, whether private or public property. They are prized, and the owners paid; but as guns last spring ran very high, the committee that values them sets them much lower than the price they were purchased at. This is looked upon to be both tyrannical and unjust. I am very sorry that necessity forces his excellency to adopt any measures disagreeable to the people. But the army cannot be provided for in any other way; and those we detain are very indifferent; generally without bayonets, and of different sized bores. Twenty thousand troops with such arms, are not equal in an engagement to fifteen thousand with such arms as the king's troops are equipped with. I wish our troops were better furnished, the enemy has a great advantage over us.

"We have suffered prodigiously for want of wood. Many regiments have been obliged to eat their provisions raw for want of fuel to cook it; and notwithstanding we have burnt up all the fences and cut down all the trees for a mile round the camp, our sufferings have been inconceivable. The barracks have been greatly delayed for want of stuff. Many of the troops are yet in tents, and will be for some time, especially the officers. The fatigues of the campaign, the suffering for want of wood and clothing, have made a multitude of soldiers heartily sick of service.

"The Connecticut troops went off in spite of all that could be done to prevent it. But they met with such an unfavourable reception at home that many are returning to camp again already. The people upon the road expressed so much abhorrence at their conduct for quitting the army, that it was with difficulty they got provisions. I wish all the troops now going home may meet with the same contempt. I expect the army, notwithstanding all the difficulties we meet with, will be full in about six weeks.

"We never have been so weak as we shall be to-morrow, when we dismiss the old troops. Our growing weaker, whilst the enemy are growing stronger, renders our situation disagreeable.

"General Lee has just returned from Rhode Island. He has taken the tories in hand, and sworn them by a very solemn oath, that they would not for the future grant any supplies to the enemy, directly or indirectly, nor give them any kind of intelligence, nor suffer it to be done by others, without giving information. ——— and ———, were the principals. He gives a very favourable account of the spirit and resolution of the people.

"I beg leave to congratulate you on the recovery of your health, which may God in his providence long preserve, that you may enjoy happiness yourself, and continue a blessing to your country."

General Greene to Jacob Greene, Esq.

"Prospect Hill, *December 20th*, 1775.

"Wallace, I hear, continues a thorn in your side—burning and destroying wherever he can get an opportunity. It is to me a most astonishing thing that the committee of Newport are desirous of nourishing such a serpent in the bosom of the country. If his depredations were to cease in all parts of the country, there might be some small reason for listening to his propositions. But, for him to obtain his supplies, and grant an indemnity only to the town of Newport, is sacrificing the rest of the province to the benefit of that town only; for he will be continually committing piracies upon all the islands and shores that he can get footing upon. I think Wallace's conduct has been such, from the insults and abuses he has offered to government, that it is highly dishonourable to have any further intercourse or commerce with him. Besides, these separate treaties weaken the chain of connexion and injure the general interest of the continent. We must expect to make partial sacrifices for the public good. I love the colony of Rhode Island, and have ever had

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a very great affection for the town of Newport; but I am not so attached to either as to be willing to injure the common cause for their particular benefit.

"It is a very great unhappiness that such a division of sentiment in political matters prevails in the colony; it distracts her councils and weakens her exertions. The committee in the town of Newport, you say, seem inclined to counteract the prevailing sentiment in the government. It is astonishing that ancient prejudices and selfish motives should prevail, at a time when every thing that is dear and valuable is at stake. I hear some of the inhabitants of Newport are very jealous of the views of the town of Providence; fearing that the latter has in view the destruction of Newport, for their own private advantage. I cannot harbour a thought so derogatory to the patriotism of the people of Newport, as to suppose that such a fear can have any real existence. Can the inhabitants of Newport suppose that the legislature of the colony acts upon such absurd principles as to make a sacrifice of one town for the benefit of another?

"George III.'s last speech has shut the door of hope for a reconciliation between the colonies and Great Britain. There are great preparations going on in England to prosecute the war in the spring. We have no reason to doubt the king's intentions. We must submit unconditionally, or defend ourselves. The calamities of war are very distressing, but slavery is dreadful. I have no reason to doubt the success of the colonies, when I consider their union, strength, and resources. But we must expect to feel the common calamities which attend even a successful war. We are now driven to the necessity of making a declaration of independence. We can no longer preserve our freedom and continue the connexion with her. With safety we can appeal to heaven for the necessity, propriety, and rectitude of such a measure.

"I flatter myself the king's speech will induce the congress to raise one large continental army proportionable to the extent of our undertaking, to be under one commander, and by him directed to the security and preservation of the several united governments. This will unite and cement the whole strength of the several colonies. If this method is not adopted, some governments from their natural situation, will be subject to fourfold the expense of others for their own particular security. As we have one common interest in the opposition, and it is merely accidental and uncertain where the enemy may exert their greatest force, I think the continent ought to provide for the security of every colony.

"Letters were received this day from General Montgomery near Quebec. He says he expects to be master of the place in a very little time. He has powder and all kinds of military stores to facilitate the reduction. He and

his troops are in good health, and he speaks very highly of Colonel Arnold and his party. Many officers and a large number of the privates belong to our government. CHAP. II.

"The regiments fill up very slowly here. It is really discouraging: I fear the advantages proposed from so large an armament as our establishment was to consist of, will be defeated by the length of time it takes to fill the army. However, I still hope for better things, and pray God my expectations may not be defeated. *If the congress had given a large bounty, and engaged the soldiery during the war, the continent would be much securer, and the measures cheaper in the end.* The wisest may sometimes err. To profit rightly by past evils is the only right use that can be made of former misfortunes. God grant that our future measures may be so taken, as to render our success equal to our wishes."

The three following extracts will serve further to develope to the reader, the opinions and feelings, or, in other words, the mind and character of the subject of these pages. We hope he will not be inclined to attribute the strong language of the first of these to any remains of resentment against the inhabitants of the place in which the meeting-house is situated, from which, with all due attention to the solemnity of the occasion, he had been not long since expelled, for professing the heretical opinion, "that the rights which God has given, man may defend with the sword." Nor must the reader be permitted to rest under the impression, however just the reflections cast upon East Greenwich may have been at the time, that they are at all applicable at present. We can assure him, that he will find as kind-hearted and civil people in its now half-deserted streets, as grace the most flourishing or polished cities.

"PROSPECT HILL, *January 22d*, 1776.

"I am glad the certificate had some effect upon the tyranny of East Greenwich. An exertion of arbitrary power not paralleled in history. The policy of that town has ever been narrow and confined, and generally as dishonourable as unjust. Nature has formed it for a place of trade and commerce, but the genius of the people and their measures counteract its natural advantages. I am told the old inhabitants treat those who come in there for shelter with great incivility; and some few that have attempted to open a small trade with the country, have been prohibited in the most peremptory manner, unless they would agree to sell at certain stated prices, which rendered it impossible for them to support their business; and they have been driven off by it to Providence and other places. I wish to God their sentiments were more liberal,

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they would find great advantages in it. I am glad you did not adopt the advice of those who were for opposing the committee. You observe very justly—The populace borrow almost all their opinions. A few designing men can sometimes set the rabble foul of the best of characters, and ruin their reputations for a time. It is unsafe to oppose the current of public prejudices, but one may seem to join with the throng and swim on with the tide of public sentiment for a time, until you can slip out unobserved, without injury to yourself or your country. For, when the first heat and zeal of the populace has had a little time to cool, many things may be done with safety that would have been deemed criminal even to propose but a little before. In human affairs we have only to watch the temper of the times, and the disposition of the people, and take our measures from them. This is all the politician can do. He cannot drive mankind into measures that are even necessary to promote their own interest and happiness."

"PROSPECT HILL, *February 8th*, 1776.

"I have got the jaundice, and have been confined twelve or fourteen days. I am as yellow as saffron, my appetite all gone, and my flesh too. I am so weak that I can scarcely walk across the room. But I am in hopes I am getting something better. I am grievously mortified at my confinement, as this is a critical, and to appearance, will be an important period of the American war. Cambridge Bay is frozen over; if the weather continues a few days longer as cold as it has been some days past, it will open a passage into Boston. Sick or well, I intend to be there, if I am able to sit on horseback.

"There is nothing new in camp, only preparations making for the attack. Whether it will take place or not, God only knows. Heaven grant us success if it should be made. That will depend upon the bravery of the troops; how they will act, time and the experiment only can determine. If I am called from time to eternity, I hope you will see justice done to my family. I commit them to you and the rest of my brothers."

"PROSPECT HILL, *February 15th*, 1776.

"Your apprehensions about attacking Boston are very well founded in many respects. The troops are raw and undisciplined, and consequently unfit for an attack sword in hand. But out of an army of 20,000 men, it will be hard if we cannot find 8,000 who will fight manfully. There must be some cowards among them, as well as among us. But, however, an attack upon a town garrisoned with 8,000 regular troops, is a serious object, and ought to be well considered before attempted. I always thought an attack with 20,000

men might succeed. I still think so; and were the Bay to be frozen over, I should be glad to see the attempt made; not but that it would be horrible if it succeeded, and still more horrible if it failed. But the advantage that America would derive from making ourselves masters of that garrison at this time, would be inconceivable. It would damp the spirits of Great Britain, and give ours a new spring. In a word, it would put a finishing stroke to the war; it would heal all the divisions among ourselves; silence the tories, and work a general reformation throughout the continent. But I have little hopes now of such a happy event, as the weather is greatly moderated, and the scarcity of powder puts it out of our power to attempt any thing by cannonading or bombardment."

CHAPTER III.

American army inoculated. Boston evacuated. March to New York. General Hamilton. Capture of Fort Washington. Battle of Trenton. Battle of Brandywine. Enemy in possession of Philadelphia.

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DURING the winter of 1775–6 nothing material transpired. The two armies lay in sullen silence watching each other's movements, neither, sufficiently confident in itself to commence offensive operations. During this time, the small-pox raged in Boston. And a very general alarm prevailed lest it should break out in the American camp. Nothing in that event could have detained the militia at their posts; and the most positive information having been communicated to the commander in chief, that the enemy intended to introduce it into the American camp, he entertained the most lively apprehensions respecting the consequences. A very small proportion of either officers or men had had it, and besides the actual loss of life and temporary diminution of force to be apprehended from it, an inevitable consequence would have been, a difficulty of recruiting, and an unwillingness to furnish the camp from the country. The patriotism and promptness of Greene supplied, in part, the remedy; at his suggestion, Dr. Senter was appointed to open a hospital at the Coventry Mills, for inoculating the officers, and Greene's house was given up for the purpose, whilst his family was removed into lodgings. Here, many of them passed through the disease, and others succeeded them, as soon as the first party could return to duty.

In the last of March 1776, the enemy evacuated Boston, and sailed to pursue other operations. Their objects in this campaign were to reduce New York and Charleston. Clinton, with a very respectable land and naval force was dispatched to attempt the reduction of the latter city, but the memorable day of the battle of Fort Moultrie defeated this part of the plan. Howe succeeded in getting possession of New York. At his first sailing, the British commander's designs had been so well concealed, that in the American camp his destination rested altogether in conjecture. But Washington acted with vigour upon the opinion that New York was his object. His troops were all ordered on to that place. Greene had the third brigade consigned to his command, with orders to march through Providence to New London, and there to embark for Long Island. He arrived about the middle of April at the place of his destination, and established his head-quarters at Brooklyn. Here he soon received information of the partial consummation of one of his most ardent wishes. A letter from Governor Cook of Rhode Island enclosed an act of the state, declaring themselves independent. In a letter of May 14th, 1776, on this subject he observes, "By a letter from Governor Cook, covering a late act past last session in your government, you have declared yourselves independent. 'Tis nobly done. God prosper you, and crown your endeavours with success."

The army was encamped under the orders of Washington, partly in New York and partly on Long Island. The division, posted on Long Island, was placed under the command of Greene. With indefatigable assiduity he applied himself to the duties which this important command imposed upon him, and expecting himself, as did the commander in chief, that the principal operations of the enemy would be carried on on Long Island, he lost no time in making every preparation to meet him, and in acquiring that knowledge of the geography of the country which was necessary to meet him with advantage. But heaven had destined our hero, on this occasion, to one of the most serious disappointments of his life; or, at least, one that he appears to have felt most sensibly; it was the first of a long series to which he was destined, and the vicissitudes of military life were yet new to him.

After a very long voyage the enemy entered the Narrows towards the last of June; and by a singular coincidence, their first landing, avowedly hostile, took place at Staten Island on the very day of the declaration of independence. On the same day of the same month was established the commonwealth under Cromwell.

On Staten Island, they remained in a state of torpor no less than eight weeks, when, all their expected reinforcements being united, they crossed the

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bay, and on the 22d of August landed at Gravesend Bay, and approached within three miles of the American lines. Some time previous, after more than ordinary fatigue, General Greene had been attacked with a bilious complaint, which brought him to the brink of the grave. In a letter from General Washington to congress, dated the 23d of August, are found these lines: "I have been obliged to appoint Major General Sullivan to the command of the island, owing to General Greene's indisposition; he has been extremely ill for several days, and still continues bad."

The unhappy result of the affair on Long Island is but too well known. The attack was conducted on behalf of the enemy with skill and vigour. Whilst a strong advanced party under Lord Stirling, and another under General Sullivan, were warmly assailed in front, a column of the enemy silently moved over the plain that stretches along the south side of the island, and turning the left wing of our troops, gained their rear behind the range of hills that runs from Brooklyn to Jamaica. The American advance fought heroically until borne down by numbers, and both Stirling and Sullivan were made prisoners. Efforts were made by these officers to retreat within the lines of Brooklyn as soon as the *ruse de guerre* of the enemy was discovered, but it was too late; the stratagem had succeeded. That evening the whole army retreated over the East River, ere the movement appears to have been suspected by the enemy.

In a letter of Greene's of the 30th of August, communicating this affair, is contained the following passage:

"Providence took me out of the way; I have been very sick for near three weeks; for several days there was a hard struggle between nature and the disorder. I am now a little better, though scarcely able to sit up an hour at a time. I have no strength or appetite, and my disorder, from its operation, appears to threaten me with long confinement. Gracious God! to be confined at such a time. And the misfortune is doubly great, as there was no general officer who had made himself acquainted with the ground as perfectly as I had. I have not the vanity to think the event would have been otherwise had I been there, yet I think I could have given the commanding general a great deal of necessary information. Great events sometimes depend upon very little causes." "I think from this manœuvre the general proposes to retreat to Kingsbridge, and there make the grand stand." "If this is the determination, two to one New York is laid in ashes."

His conjectures on the subject of making a stand at Kingsbridge were realized by the event. Nor were his apprehensions for the fate of New York altogether chimerical. General Washington in a letter of September 2d, 1776, actually submits the question to congress, whether it should be destroyed or not; and one would almost be inclined to think, that the tenor of this letter solicits the sanction of congress to this measure. A similar sacrifice in modern times is said to have been the salvation of a mighty kingdom, and great and good men may be driven by the necessities of war to perform acts most repugnant to their feelings.

It was soon after Greene's arrival on Long Island, and during the time of his command at that post, that he became acquainted with the late General Hamilton, afterwards so conspicuous in the councils of this country. It was his custom when summoned to attend the commander in chief, to walk, accompanied by one or more of his aids, from the ferry landing to head-quarters. On one of these occasions, when passing by the place then called the park, now enclosed in the railing of the City-Hall, and which was then the parade ground of the militia corps, Hamilton was observed disciplining a juvenile corps of artillerists, who, like himself, aspired to future usefulness. Greene knew not who he was, but his attention was rivetted by the vivacity of his motion, the ardour of his countenance, and not less by the proficiency and precision of movement of his little corps. Halting behind the crowd until an interval of rest afforded an opportunity, an aid was dispatched to Hamilton with a compliment from General Greene upon the proficiency of his corps, and the military manner of their commander, with a request to favour him with his company to dinner on a specified day. Those who are acquainted with the ardent character and grateful feelings of Hamilton, will judge how this message was received. The attention never was forgotten, and not many years elapsed before an opportunity occurred, and was joyfully embraced by Hamilton, of exhibiting his gratitude and esteem for the man whose discerning eye had at so early a period done justice to his talents and pretensions. Greene soon made an opportunity of introducing his young acquaintance to the commander in chief, and from his first introduction Washington "marked him for his own."

As soon as his debilitated state would permit him, Greene joined the retreating army, and shared in all the misfortunes and mortifications of his beloved commander. He had now been promoted to a major general's commission. And when General Washington marched to White Plains, as there was a strong detachment of the enemy still on Staten Island, the command of the American troops in New Jersey, destined to watch the movements of that de-

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tachment of the enemy, was assigned to Greene. His head-quarters were at Bergen, at Basken Ridge, or at Fort Lee, according as the situation of affairs rendered his presence necessary. The important object was to keep open a communication with the main army on the east of the Hudson, and secure a retreat for Washington, if a retreat should become necessary.

From the last of September to the middle of November, the main army was employed in marching and countermarching, to elude the manœuvres of Howe, and to wear out the campaign so as to prevent the enemy from overrunning the Jerseys and advancing upon Philadelphia. The American army was now extremely feeble, and hourly wearing away; and the officers exposed to the severest toils and most gloomy forebodings that could result from the unpromising state of affairs, and the continued adherence of congress to the wretched system of short enlistments and militia requisitions. But Washington now plainly told them, that their country was lost, if they any longer adhered to this short-sighted and mistaken policy. His two letters of September 24th and October 4th, ought to be piously read by every American, and it is interesting to observe in what perfect concurrence the opinions o these two great men were expressed upon the same subject.

In a private letter of September 28th, 1776, Greene expresses himself thus: "I apprehend the several retreats that have lately taken place begin to make you think all is lost. Don't be frightened; our cause is not yet in a desperate state. The policy of congress has been the most absurd and ridiculous imaginable—pouring in militiamen who come and go every month. A military force established upon such principles, defeats itself. People coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life, are not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over dead men, to hear without concern the groans of the wounded—I say few men can stand such scenes, unless steeled by habit, or fortified by military pride.

"There must be a good army established; men engaged for the war; a proper corps of officers, and then, after a proper time to discipline the men, every thing is to be expected.

"The congress goes upon a penurious plan. The present pay of the officers will not support them, and it is generally determined by the best officers to quit the service, unless a more adequate provision is made for their support. The present establishment is not thought reputable.

"The congress has never furnished the number of men voted, by near one half, certainly by above a third. Had we had numbers, we need not have retreated from Long Island or New York. But the extent of ground to guard

rendered the retreat necessary; otherwise the army would have been ruined by detachments. The enemy never could have driven us from Long Island and New York, if our rear had been secured. We must have an army to meet the enemy every where; to act offensively as well as defensively. Our soldiers are as good as ever were, and were the officers half as good as the men, they would beat any army on the globe of equal numbers."

This observation relative to the officers was no doubt elicited by facts that had come to the general's knowledge relative to the officering of some of the eastern corps then in service. That most miserable of all systems, which renders the officers subordinate to the men by giving the men the election of the officers, had been adopted in some of the states. And it is a well known fact, that in some instances the commission was actually purchased by a compact to throw the pay and emoluments into a common stock and divide it equally. To see a captain with his drummer and fifer at table with him, is asserted by an eye witness to have been a familiar occurrence; and on one occasion, a colonel being seen carrying home his ration of beef slung on his finger, declared that he did it to set the officers a good example.* These were the officers to whom the general alludes in the concluding part of his letter; and not the seven times tried heroes, who afterwards fought the battles of the revolution.

In another private letter of the 3d of October 1776, he expresses himself on the same subject thus: "The congress have ordered eighty-eight regiments to be raised for the war. This looks well. For God's sake let us have good officers from Rhode Island, if you wish to preserve its reputation. We want nothing but good officers to constitute as good an army as ever marched into the field. Our men are infinitely better than the officers. I do not speak of Rhode Island officers, for they are generally good, and behaved exceedingly well in the late action. They did themselves a great deal of honour. I shall send a list to the governor of such as deserve a preference. I think you may officer your regiment as well as any on the continent, if you will consult nothing but the *merit* of the man."

There is in this letter a paragraph which is rather foreign from the subject we are upon. But it merits to be copied into these pages, as it exhibits a mind fertile in resources whatever it be applied to, and suggests a *ruse de guerre* which has actually, in later times, been successfully resorted to, within the knowledge of the writer.

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* Captain Grayden.

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The letter is addressed to a gentleman who was interested in several privateers, and who had suffered by repeated recaptures. "This fall," says the writer, "will be the last of the harvest. After this season, all the navigation of Great Britain will go armed sufficiently to manage the small cruizers of America. If your privateers should take any vessels bound to America or Great Britain, let the prize-master assume the character, and personate the original captain; if he should have the misfortune to fall in with an enemy's vessel, let him answer, 'bound to and came from the port mentioned in the ship's papers.' If the captain or prize-master does this with sufficient effrontery, nothing but personal knowledge can detect him. It would be a good method to engage the crews of the prizes by giving them an opportunity to enter on board the privateer, and to share in all the prizes made after they entered on board. This may enable the captain of the privateer to continue his cruize, and bring in a number of prizes, when he would otherwise be obliged to return home for want of men. And as to the fidelity and attachment of the sailors, you may depend upon it, they will be as faithful after becoming interested, as the generality of our own seamen.

"This fall is the golden harvest. I think the fishing ships at the eastward may be objects of attention this fall. In the spring, the East India ships may be intercepted on the coast of Africa. Were I at liberty, I think I could make a fortune for my family. But it is necessary for some to be in the field, to secure the property of others in their stores."

It was on the 16th of November in this year, that Fort Washington surrendered to the British arms. And as some writers have thought proper to censure the conduct of Greene in that affair, and, at the time it occurred, public opinion imputed the misfortune in a great measure to his not ordering the fort to be abandoned in time, it becomes necessary to give a particular account of the part which devolved upon him in that affair. He never entered into a public vindication of his conduct, but it will be found that this was a generous sacrifice to the feelings of the commander in chief, or perhaps it may be attributed to an habitual indifference to the opinions of those to whom he was not responsible for his conduct.

Fort Washington was constructed on a commanding eminence on Manhattan Island, two and a half miles below Kingsbridge, and where, by the approach of the Harlaem Creek to the North River, the island is reduced to a narrow strip of about five eighths of a mile in width. This creek communicates with the East River near Hurl Gate; and uniting with a stream that communicates with the North River, forms Manhattan Island. Fort Washington was near the bank of the North River, covered to the south-west by a

small creek and morass. Parallel, nearly, to each other, and in an easterly direction so as to strike the Harlaem Creek at the nearest point from the North River, two slight field works were thrown up about two hundred yards from each other, and comprising the fort between them. There was an open space between the extremities of these lines upon the bank of the Harlaem.

Fort Lee was on the opposite bank of the North River, on the narrow neck of land formed by the approach of the Hackensack to the North River.

The original design for which these forts were constructed was to prevent the ships of the enemy from ascending the river. A design conceived in the days of our military infancy, and which the experience of a few days showed to have been conceived in military ignorance. The vessels passed with an air of ridicule. But still, when our troops were obliged to abandon the city, these forts were found to answer two important purposes: they kept open the communication between the opposite shores of the Hudson; and that on the east served to protect the encampment on the heights of Harlaem, and gave a strength to this position which deterred the enemy from attempting to carry it. But still the forts might be passed, and could the enemy have possessed himself of Kingsbridge by his troops, and of the river by his shipping, retreat would have been impossible, and the American army must have fallen. With these objects in view, Howe ascended the East River, and landed at a place called Frog's Neck; and Washington, penetrating his design, passed over from the island and took an impenetrable position on the main, in his enemy's front. This was in the last of October, and from this time was conducted a series of the most skilful manœuvres; the enemy having for his object to find an opportunity to attack with advantage, or to turn the left of our army; whilst Washington, by the most cautious movements, manœuvred so as to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of his superiority, keeping always three objects in view; first, to prevent the enemy from cutting him off from the Hudson; second, from intercepting his retreat to the Highlands if necessary; or, third, from cutting him off from the country to the north-east of the Hudson, which furnished his supplies. This game of skill was kept up until the 13th of November, when, Washington crossed a part of his army over to the west side of the North River, and joined General Greene at Fort Lee: whilst General Lee, left in command on the east side of the river, with the enemy still near enough to strike him, retired until he threw the Croton between him and his superior foe. Howe then descended to attack Fort Washington, and thus to obtain the undivided possession of Manhattan Island.

When General Washington moved across the Harlaem to throw himself in front of Howe, he had placed Colonel M'Gaw in command at that post, with

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orders to defend it to the last extremity. The force assigned him for this purpose consisted of about thirteen hundred troops, chiefly of the Pennsylvania and Maryland contingents. The measure, his biographer asserts, was advised by a council of war. . General Washington himself says it was by advice of most of his general officers.

The capture of Fort Washington was also the achievement of a masterly manœuvre successfully practised upon the American post. Howe had occupied a position on the east of the Harlaem, opposite to where the two American lines approached that stream. Here he erected a battery, which commanded a great part of the ground stretching from Fort Washington to the banks of the Harlaem. The 16th of November was the day fixed on for the attack; and M'Gaw, attentive to his designs, had made every preparation to receive him. These designs had been developed, as far as they were intended to be obvious, by the movements of the day before. Three (some accounts say five) thousand Hessians had ascended the Harlaem, and crossed the Kingsbridge; while twice that number of British troops had fallen down the stream, and established themselves to the south of the American lines. M'Gaw being summoned to surrender, replied as usual, that he would defend the fort to the last extremity, and Greene passed over to him a reinforcement of 600 militia to support him in the effort.

Colonel Rawlins, at the head of a regiment of Marylanders, posted on a commanding eminence to the north of the fort, was opposed to General Knyphausen. Colonel Cadwallader, with 800 men, occupied the lines to the south, and had to sustain the attack of the British column commanded by Lord Percy; and Colonel Baxter, with a regiment of militia, was posted on the steep and rocky banks of the Harlaem, opposite the British fort.

The attack on Rawlins and Cadwallader was made at the same instant, about 10 o'clock in the day, and was met with rival gallantry. Rawlins' fire was particularly destructive to the Hessians. It was the first trial of the American rifle upon the enemy. Covered by the trees, the carnage made among their enemies scarcely admitted the belief that the latter counted at least six times the American numbers. Here it was that Otho Williams, then a major in the Maryland line, and whom we shall often have to name in these pages, gave the first presage of those soldierly qualities which afterwards so highly distinguished him. He was here severely wounded and made prisoner.

At the lines also, Cadwallader appears to have kept the enemy successfully at bay, until the developement of Howe's plan of attack, disconcerted the whole of the measures pursued by the Americans.

A strong column of British troops, commanded by some of Howe's best officers, had been held in reserve on the eastern bank of the Harlaem, and so completely masked from view, that when the Americans thought themselves engaged with the whole British force, to their astonishment they were apprised that a formidable and fresh enemy was descending the Harlaem, and about to effect a landing on the rocky shore which extends nothwardly from the post occupied by Colonel Baxter. Pressed before by very superior numbers, this new danger which threatened the rear of both Rawlins and Cadwallader, required immediate attention. About one hundred and fifty men dispatched from Cadwallader's command, and one hundred from the fort, in vain opposed a prompt and resolute resistance to eight hundred picked men, already landed and forcing their way up the hill. But the contest was not bloodless. A loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, acknowledged by the enemy on this day, sufficiently vindicates the valour of about thirteen hundred men, the whole American force actually engaged.

Upon the first developement of this manœuvre of Lord Howe's, intelligence of it had been transmitted across the Hudson, and the anxiety of Greene, Sullivan, Putnam, and several other general officers to determine the reality and extent of the danger, induced them to pass the river, and hasten over to the banks of the Harlaem, where the two parties were now contending for the possession of the bank. From a hill in the rear of the Americans they soon discovered the fatal success of the enemy's manœuvre, for the British detachment already appeared above the hills that skirt the river, and in fifteen minutes after was established in force on the very hill from which it had been reconnoitred.

The Americans now retreated to the fort, and by the capitulation which followed, the American cause sustained a loss of two thousand men, and a more irreparable loss of artillery, arms, and munitions of war.

The charge made against General Greene on this occasion was, that he suffered that loss to be incurred when he ought to have withdrawn the garrison and stores, and not have suffered them to fall into the enemy's hands; that he in fact increased the loss by a detachment of six hundred militia sent over to the fort. For these causes his judgment was arraigned, and his military reputation attacked. The notice which Mr. Marshall takes of this event is thus expressed:

"From too great a confidence in the strength of the post at Fort Washington, and a hope that by still further increasing the obstructions in the North River, the original object for which that place had been fortified might be obtained; from an unwillingness too, further to discourage the army by an

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evacuation of its posts, General Greene had not withdrawn the garrison under the discretionary orders he had received on that subject; but still indulged a hope that the post might be maintained; or, if its situation should become desperate, that means might be found to transport the troops across the river to the Jersey shore, which was defended by Fort Lee." *

Never were the views and motives of a military commander more entirely misunderstood. We know not upon what authority Mr. Marshall attributes to General Greene "too great confidence in the strength of the post at Fort Washington;" since General Washington in his communication to congress of the date of the 16th November, only writes that "General Greene struck with the importance of the post, and the discouragement which our evacution of posts must necessarily have given, reinforced Colonel M'Gaw with detachments from several regiments of the flying camp, but chiefly of Pennsylvania troops, so as to make the number about two thousand." Nor does the general hesitate to avow, that the preservation of that post was a favourite object of his own, or to present such a view of Greene's agency in that affair as to show that he acted precisely in the spirit of the orders communicated to him.

General Washington's words are these: "The preservation of the passage of the North River was an object of so much consequence, that I thought no pains or expense too great for that purpose. And therefore, after sending off all the valuable stores, except such as were necessary for its defence, I determined, agreeable to the advice of most of the general officers, to risk something to defend the post on the east side, called Mount Washington. When the army moved up, in consequence of General Howe's landing at Frog Point, Colonel M'Gaw was left in that command with about twelve hundred men, with orders to defend it to the last. Afterwards, *reflecting on the smallness of the garrison*, and the difficulty of their holding it if General Howe should fall down upon it with his whole force, I wrote to General Greene, *who had the command on the Jersey shore*, directing him to govern himself by circumstances, and to retain or evacuate the post as he should think best, and so far revoking the absolute order to Colonel M'Gaw to defend the post to the last extremity."†

From this letter it is obvious, that if, under existing circumstances, the post could not with prudence be abandoned, it perfectly comported with General Washington's views to add to the strength of its garrison. It is *the weakness of that garrison* which he avows to congress as the ground upon which he

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* Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, p. 512. † Letter of 16th November 1776.

wavered at this time, in his original design of defending that post at all hazards. Now, to have abandoned the fort at that time, must have exposed the main army to the most imminent peril. CHAP. III.

It will be observed, that until the receipt of the letter in which General Washington authorizes Greene to withdraw the garrison, the latter possessed no sort of control over this post. His command was limited to the Jersey shore, and Colonel M'Gaw was acting under the immediate orders of the commander in chief.

The letter communicating this authority bears date the 8th of November; two days after it had been resolved in a council of war, to retreat with the American army into the Jerseys, and after orders had been issued to Greene to cover the passage of the river at Dobbs' Ferry for that purpose. General Washington lay at this time under the eye of a superior army, commanded by veteran and able officers, and was about to venture upon an important reduction of his effective force by detaching all the eastern troops under General Lee to hold possession of the Highlands on the east of the Hudson. In the letter of the 8th which authorizes the abandonment of Fort Washington, a reason is urged for the measure, which led to a conclusion directly contrary to that which the commander in chief deduces from it. The fact alluded to is, the recent passage of several frigates up the river, in despite of the guns and booms opposed to them by the American posts. Now, had the British shipping passed up the river in sufficient force to watch the various ferries on the North River, or even Dobbs' alone, what would have been the situation of the army under Washington? He must either have retreated up the river until the whole country below him, and the two forts themselves, were left at the mercy of the enemy, or have fought at a time and place prescribed by his adversary, or, finally, have descended the river, and effected his passage under cover of the only guns that could have controlled the operations of a naval force, to wit, the guns of Fort Washington. The last alternative is certainly that to which, in such an event, the commander in chief would have resorted; and hence, to have abandoned this fort until the main army had effected the passage of the river, would have been little short of madness. These are the considerations to which General Washington must be understood to have alluded when he says that, "General Greene struck with the importance of the post, &c. reinforced Colonel M'Gaw, &c." And far from disapproving of General Greene's conduct on this occasion, it only served still further to excite the confidence and esteem of his commander.

But there existed other reasons to justify the conduct of General Greene.—

CHAP. III. The principal cause that checked Lord Howe from pressing General Washington up the east bank of the Hudson, was the possession of a post by the Americans on the Manhattan Island; it excited in him a jealousy for New York, and not only compelled him to leave a strong detachment for its defence, but made him uneasy for the possible consequences that might flow from his leaving that detachment beyond supporting distance. This uneasiness General Greene had, recently, by a measure of his, much irritated. There was at this time, as has been seen, an army of observation in the Jerseys, which General Greene had now ordered up to Fort Lee, and he seriously meditated a diversion, if not a serious attempt against New York, in the event of a forward movement of Howe's to cut off General Washington from the Highlands. General Howe saw the practicability of this, and checked his progress. But to have withdrawn the garrison, when the two armies were thus relatively situated, would have left him at liberty to press upon General Washington, and even to operate with the garrison of New York up the Hudson; for Greene was cut off from crossing, by the British shipping, every where below the pass which Fort Washington commanded.

This state of things, it will be observed, continued until the 13th of November, when the army made good its passage. And why, it will be asked, was not the garrison removed between that and the day of the attack?

To this we are not called upon, nor competent to give an answer. On that day the commander in chief arrived at Fort Lee,* and his dispatches of the 14th and 15th, dated at General Greene's head-quarters, show that he was present to direct and order such measures as he deemed advisable. The letter of the 8th, under which alone General Greene acquired any control over the commander at Fort Washington, expressly delegates that authority to him because *he was personally present*; and both expressly and impliedly, that authority ceased when the commander in chief was himself present. General Washington mentions in his letter to congress, "that on the night of the 15th, he had partly crossed the North River, on his way to Fort Washington, when he met Generals Putnam and Greene just returning from thence, who informed him that the troops were in high spirits, and would make a good defence; and it being late at night, he returned." This clearly proves his presence and agency on this occasion, and at a time when, if he had thought a retreat necessary or advisable, it was yet in his power to have effected it.

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* Washington's Letter of 14th November 1776.

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But, in the practicability of defending this fort at that time, there appears to have been little difference of opinion. The unhappy event has had the usual effect of an unfortunate issue, to elicit many severe criticisms. General Washington left the post under the protection of twelve hundred men; General Greene, on the former's expressing his apprehensions from the weakness of the garrison, increased it to two thousand. If this measure had not met with the entire approbation of General Washington, or if he had entertained any serious doubts of the adequacy of the garrison to defend the post, or of the policy of retaining it, he had abundant time from the 13th, to the morning of the 16th, to have evacuated it. The movement might have cost the service the sacrifice of one company of artillerists, left to man the guns of the fort and cover the transportation; but probably would not even have cost that loss. Whether, in fact, 2,000 men could, under any circumstances, have defended a circuit of near eight miles, accessible at many points, against a well-appointed army of 15,000, is a question on which few military men, it is presumed, will differ at the present day. Yet we find the biographer of Washington maintaining, that had all the troops in the garrison acted on this day with the bravery of the Marylanders, the enemy might have been repulsed.*

Severely as this effort to maintain these posts has been animadverted upon by General Lee and others, there is much, very much to be said in palliation of the error. The command of the North River was certainly an important object. The command of its banks was identified with a communication with the country that furnished that subsistence without which the army must have disbanded. To maintain the command of it at the lowest point possible, was an interesting object, for it checked the advance of the enemy towards the seat of government. Hence, when beaten from Forts Washington and Lee, a stand was successively made at the next defensible passes, to wit, Stoney Point, Fort Montgomery, and ascending finally to West Point. At the time when this attack was made upon Fort Washington, an additional reason pressed very heavily upon the minds of the American commanders. The wasteful and short-sighted policy of short enlistments, was about to prostrate them spiritless and sinewless at the feet of their adversary. The American army was soon to be disbanded and renewed. Every thing depended upon public opinion and public feeling, towards obtaining enlistments and drawing out the militia; and to have succeeded in making a stand at this point, would have been worth an army to the commander in chief, while the alternative

* Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, note to p. 517.

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was, disastrous and abandoned retreat. Strong wishes generate lively hopes, and the firmest heart, or most unclouded mind, is not always proof against the mistakes they generate.

The fall of Fort Washington with 2,000 troops, 1,200 of whom were enlisted men, and some of his very best troops, together with so large a stock of artillery, arms, tents, and equipage, made it necessary for Gen. Washington to hasten the evacuation of Fort Lee, before his active enemy could intercept the retreat of the garrison. Orders were issued accordingly, and preparations commenced with all the zeal and rapidity that circumstances would admit. But the quarter-master's department was in a miserable state of derangement, and the means of transportation could not be procured. The enemy were already crossing at Dobbs' Ferry, to hem the American army in between the Hackensack and Hudson, and the force of the Americans was wholly inadequate to meet them in the field. At this crisis, General Greene could only retard their approach by a show of resistance, whilst the men, ammunition, and whatever the means of transportation were adequate to, were pushed over the Hackensack. Much credit has been given to our hero by historians for his conduct on this occasion; but after making every exertion that could be made, the retreat was attended with the loss of many articles which, at that time, could not be replaced.

General Washington, in his letter of November 16th, 1776, writes, "We lost the whole of the cannon that was at the fort, (except two 12-pounders,) and a great deal of baggage, between two and three hundred tents, about a thousand barrels of flour, and other stores in the quarter-master's department. This loss was inevitable. As many of the stores had been removed, as circumstances and time would admit of. The ammunition had been happily got away."

With the "*tristes reliquæ*" of his destitute army, (scarce 3,000 strong,) the commander in chief sullenly retreated through the Jerseys, until, at length, compelled to throw the Delaware between him and his pursuing enemy. Sad and portentous, at that time, was the gloom that hung over the American people. Fatal might it have proved to the budding hopes of independence, had a proclamation of general amnesty, and the repeal of the obnoxious British laws, been announced in general orders! There were many who would have peopled the wilderness, rather than have again passed under the British government, and Washington and Greene were of this number. But it is more than probable the people generally would have submitted. A protecting providence had turned the enemy's wisdom into foolishness; for

it was decreed, that the American people should be rescued from their dominion. CHAP. III.

During all this time, our hero corresponds with his friends with a confidence and cheerfulness that nothing could subdue. He consoles himself with the consideration, that congress had at length adopted the only measures that could lead to success, to wit, lengthened enlistments, &c. and though the militia were beaten, they had shown that they could fight; and that in their very misfortunes the American army was acquiring the only thing in which they were deficient—military knowledge and experience.

It was on the morning of the 26th of December that the sun of glory rose once more upon our political horizon. The ice that impeded the passage of two detachments of the army, that were destined to cross between Trenton and Bordentown, and intercept the flying enemy, limited the success of the attack on the former place. This disappointment, still left a sufficiency of embarrassments to check the exultation of the American people, and perhaps to prevent their relapsing into the follies that had brought them to the verge of the precipice.

But the surprize of Trenton was still brilliant, and the effect decisive. About a thousand of the Hessians were captured; the blow was followed up by a masterly manœuvre against Princeton; all the hopes of the enemy were at once blasted, his chain of posts broken up, his designs against Philadelphia frustrated, and with an army infinitely superior to his adversary's, Howe was obliged to submit to be shut up and watched during the winter of 1776–77.

The most decisive victory gained by Washington in the field by the prowess of his troops, could not have operated upon the American people with half the effect of this brilliant *coup de main*. They never doubted the courage, or the worth of their commanders, but now they found them in stratagems of war, an overmatch for the boasted veterans of the mother country; and the Hessians too, who had been boasted of as the flower of the army, were the troops who had been defeated and captured. The effect pervaded the whole country with electrical velocity, and from that day the independence of America was no longer problematical.

On the night of the 25th, Greene was entrusted with the command of the left wing, accompanied by Washington in person. Sullivan, who was senior in command, led the right. The left division, it is well known, was the first which reached the town, and having seized the enemy's artillery, cut off their retreat to Princeton. The arrival of the other a few minutes after, opened their eyes to the folly of resistance, and they laid down their arms. But where every man does his duty, a military leader in a subordinate command has

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little opportunity of distinguishing himself. Suffice it to say, that through all the vicissitudes of this trying winter, Greene followed the fortunes of Washington, proving himself the able, vigilant, intelligent commander, the animated patriot, disinterested friend, and judicious counsellor.

It was plainly perceived, that whenever the just claims of others would admit of it, the commander in chief was fond of selecting Greene for particular services. And unfortunately, the envious began about this time to look with jealousy upon the obvious confidence reposed in him by Washington. Yet the most scrutinizing could not assert that this confidence was unmerited or misapplied on the one hand, or converted to improper or selfish purposes on the other.

The head-quarters of the American army during this winter was at Morristown. Here, with a body of troops that never exceeded one thousand regulars, often not half that number; and militia sufficient to make up a total of about three thousand; the whole wretchedly deficient in munitions of war; Washington, to the astonishment of the world, managed to keep in check the British force, near 25,000 men, occupying a chain of posts from Brunswick, by Amboy, down Staten Island, and thus keeping up the communication with New York.

1777 The British plan of the campaign of 1777, was to get possession of the southern states and of Philadelphia, whilst Burgoyne, descending from Canada, should reduce the country lying along Lake Champlain and the Hudson, and cut off the communication between the eastern and western states.

The glorious days of Bennington and Saratoga put an end to Burgoyne's quixotic expedition; for quixotic it most certainly merits to be denominated, since, had he succeeded in reaching New York, it would have exhibited but the trace of the keel upon the ocean. But the chances against his success were infinitely more than he had calculated. The force that he commanded must soon have been exhausted by detachments, had he occupied the posts necesary to retain possession of the country he passed over; and without occupying it, no end was to be answered by traversing it. Little also did he know of the character of the people whose firesides he was invading; circumstances, natural and moral, combine to render them the hardiest yeomanry of the United States; and perhaps a region could scarcely have been selected, in which greater unanimity prevailed in the American cause, than among the mountains of Vermont and New Hampshire. It has been conjectured, that when Burgoyne became embarrassed, Sir Henry Clinton might have relieved him. The utmost that he could possibly have done, would have been to save

him from capture; but still the expedition would have been utterly useless, nay, highly detrimental to the royal cause. A tardy, and it would seem, vindictive diversion was attempted; but it was probably wise in Clinton to attempt no more; for, with the militia swarming around them, it would have been difficult to withdraw, any number of troops that could have been brought to his aid, consistent with the security of New York. CHAP. III.

It must not be supposed that Washington was for a moment an idle spectator. He foresaw that the country from Peekskill northwardly might become the scene of interesting operations, and had early in the spring dispatched Greene and Knox to explore the passes in the Highlands, and prepare to intercept reinforcements, or embarrass a retreat. The militia of Connecticut and Massachusetts were at hand to effect this service, and his position enabled him to operate against Howe's posts, from Brunswick to New York, if weakened by detachments to the Highlands; or to throw troops across the North River, if an opportunity presented itself of rendering service in that quarter.

But his attention was soon called off to another quarter. The designs of the enemy were now developed; for the efforts of Burgoyne upon Ticonderoga were simultaneous with those of Howe to penetrate through New Jersey to Philadelphia.

After making every arrangement that his resources permitted, to enable Schuyler to meet Burgoyne, Washington's own immediate care was to counteract the movements of Sir William Howe. Notwithstanding every effort that had been made through the winter to enlist troops, the continental regiments were still miserably deficient. Sickness and discontent, or despondency, are the ordinary attendants upon new raised troops. In this instance, these casualties bore with discouraging severity upon the American levies. Sickness had thinned their ranks in a most extraordinary degree. The whole had to pass through inoculation for the small-pox, and the free habits, plentiful living, and comfortable habitations of the American, in private life, make the discipline, exposure, and restricted diet of a camp, to bear with peculiar severity upon the first months of his initiation as a soldier.

Yet, with an army still far inferior in number, although considerably reinforced; miserably equipped, and mostly undisciplined, Washington resolved to oppose his enemy, as soon as the latter manifested a design to move across the Jerseys. For this purpose, he had removed from Morristown to Middlebrook, and improved its natural advantages so as to feel secure against any attempt to carry it.

It was not until the middle of June that Howe marched out of Brunswick. He had imagined that his judicious adversary, elated with the affair of Trenton,

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would leave his fastnesses, and meet him on the plain. But it was in vain that he offered Washington battle. Though never deficient in enterprize, the American commander knew it to be the chief attribute of a good general, to fight when he pleased. He well knew that Howe would not proceed on to Philadelphia, and leave the American army in his rear. It were a folly even to gain that by battle, which could be effected without the sacrifice. He, therefore, remained quiet upon his hills; and Sir William, after strutting his hour between the Raritan and Millstone, re-entered Brunswick, and commenced a retreat to New York, by the way of Amboy. As soon as his design became manifest, Washington lost no time in preparing to annoy his retreat. But, it may have been a feint; his circumstances required a strict adherence to cautious self-command and vigilance, and his orders were given accordingly.

The command of a strong detachment was assigned to Greene, with orders to hang on the rear of the enemy, and await the arrival of reinforcements; then to embrace the first opportunity to attack him. Messengers were dispatched immediately to Sullivan and Maxwell, to march with all expedition, and co-operate with Greene against the British army in its march to Amboy. But fortune, who has ever delighted to teaze and mock the god of war, had decreed to our hero another serious disappointment. Sullivan, either from the delays of the messenger, or his distance from the scene of action, could not arrive in time, and the messenger dispatched to Maxwell, deserted or was taken. The three brigades which Greene commanded were not sufficient to cope with the rear column of the enemy, and the British army made good its retreat to Staten Island, without any material loss. Sir William Howe's portable bridge, prepared for passing the Delaware, expedited his return across the channel that divides Staten Island from the main.

To reach the place of his destination by water, was Sir William Howe's next object; and accordingly, about the middle of July, the British fleet sailed from New York, having on board a well appointed and highly disciplined army of thirty-six battalions, estimated at 18,000 strong, including a powerful artillery, a regiment of horse, and the provincial corps called the queen's rangers—a corps that often during this war disgraced the British arms by their licentiousness and barbarity. Colonel Delancy, a native of New York, commanded them.

The correspondence about this time, presents a curious scene of anxiety and perplexity about the destination of the British fleet. Washington did not doubt that it was Philadelphia, and every preparation was made for marching to its defence; but it might have been a feint, and the enemy returning sud-

denly, might find the country open to invasion, if the American troops were immediately marched away. The British commander, on this occasion, had thought próper to throw out false lights to mislead his adversary. A letter was mysteriously conveyed to General Putnam, informing him that their real destination was Boston; a rumour was industriously circulated in New York, that they aimed a blow at the south; and finally, when the fleet entered the Delaware on the 30th of July, and sailed again, all was mystery and conjecture.

The fact was, that Howe intended originally to ascend the Delaware to Philadelphia, but upon entering the bay, he found the navigation intricate, and thought from information, that the attempt to ascend in the fleet to that place would be so hazardous, that he resolved to land on the eastern shore of the Chesapeake Bay, and cross the isthmus to Philadelphia.

He accordingly put to sea again, and baffling winds detained him on his voyage such an unusual time, that Washington actually concluded he had gone against Charleston. As it was impossible to march to the defence of that place, he promptly resolved to aim a blow at New York, and had already issued orders to march to the North River, when every doubt was dissipated by the arrival of the British fleet off Elk River in the Chesapeake.

A busy scene now presented itself over the American States. Burgoyne was to be opposed, a strong and well-appointed army under Clinton in New York, to be watched, and the invasion of Howe to be repelled. The mind of Washington was every where, and all that his feeble means permitted was promptly done. Strong reinforcements were dispatched to Gates. Putnam was posted, with an army of observation, on the Hudson, and the commander in chief, with the elite of his army, marched to meet Howe.

The division that Greene commanded was composed of the Virginia brigades of Muhlenberg and Weeden. With this division Washington remained in person; and it will be found, by reference to his own letters, that he seldom separated himself from Greene in the hour when counsel was requisite. This was at the time noticed by the officers under his command, and whilst among the just and sensible it increased the confidence reposed in the latter, there were too many who were disposed to cavil at it. But as he shared the labours and enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the commander in chief, so it is no little to his honour that he participated in the envy or jealousy of the few unworthy men who were hostile to Washington. It was about this time that Conway was intriguing to undermine the public confidence in the most immaculate of public servants.

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Washington had halted on the Delaware, until he could ascertain the real design of General Howe. The position was favourable to watching his movements, and to ulterior measures, when Sir. William's real destination should be developed.

The two armies came in sight of each other on the ridge that divides Christiana Creek from the Elk River. The British estimated at 18,000 strong, and the American numbering 15,000, but really having no more than 11,000 effective men.

General Howe manœuvred with a view to turn the right of Washington, and cut him off from his communication with Philadelphia. This would have thrown him between the British army and the fleet, on a tongue of land, where he must have fallen, or fought his way out under every disadvantage.

Washington saw and eluded the artifice by retreating across the Brandywine Creek; and, throwing up some slight works at Chad's Ford, on the east bank of that creek, he resolved to meet and fight the enemy at that place. Howe, who was equally desirous of measuring swords with his adversary, approached within seven miles of the ford, and having coolly reconnoitred the American army, offered him battle on the 11th of September.

The issue of this day was also unfavourable to the American commander. The familiar artifice of amusing in front, whilst manœuvring to gain an adversary's rear, was destined a third time to baffle the valour of the American army. It happened, unfortunately, that about six miles above the ford at which the two armies were facing each other, the creek forked, and both the streams were easily fordable. The advance of the whole British army upon Chad's Ford, fixed the attention of the American commander to that pass, and an animated attack by a strong column under Knyphausen, with the skirmishing of parties thrown over the creek by the American commander, occupied the whole American army at that point, whilst the far greater part of the British army silently filed off on their left under Cornwallis, and crossed the creek above the fork. How the American general could suffer himself to be thus deceived, has hitherto been unaccounted for. And from all accounts hitherto published, it would appear, that he had not bestowed proper attention to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy, and guard the roads by which his flank might be approached. But it was not so. He had detached Colonel Bland, with his regiment of horse, across the creek for this express purpose; but by some unaccountable fatality or neglect, no intelligence of this movement of the enemy had reached him, until they were already crossing the ford above him, called Jones' Ford. He had indeed been informed, that a considerable column had filed off from the enemy's left, and had adopted the

bold resolution to cross with his whole army, and attack the force opposed to him. The vanguard, of the two columns into which his army was thrown for this purpose under the command of Sullivan and Greene, had already entered the creek, when counter intelligence was communicated to General Sullivan, and he made a halt to convey the information to the commander in chief. This produced a retrogade movement, and in the event, it would appear, that the falsehood had been communicated by some favouring deity. For had the attack been prosecuted, Knyphausen would, no doubt, have retired fighting, and the stratagem of the enemy would have been fatally successful; for the British army would securely have gained the heights in the American rear, and cut them off from their magazines and from retreat. About two o'clock intelligence was received of the enemy's having actually gained the road that turned the American right, and led directly to Philadelphia; nor was it then communicated by any of the American reconnoitring party, but by a zealous volunteer, who had very correctly concluded that the enemy had stolen a march upon the American commander, and who for this patriotic service, was actually arrested as a spy, so improbable did the intelligence appear to Sullivan.

The promptness with which Washington adapted his measures to this sudden and unexpected change of circumstances, ought to have acquired him more eclat as a military commander than has been allowed him. But the day terminated in defeat, and success is the grand criterion by which military merit is estimated.

Two great objects were now to be kept in view. The advance of Cornwallis must be arrested, and the division under Knyphausen must be kept in check, since by crossing at Chad's Ford he would gain the rear of the army when engaged with Cornwallis. All this was promptly provided for. Wayne with his brigade, was thrown into the redoubt that commanded the ford, and Greene, with the brigades of Weeden and Muhlenberg acting as a reserve, was halted in the rear of Wayne, in a situation from which he could readily fly to the relief of either of the parties engaged; whilst every other brigade of which the army consisted, was ordered off under the command of Sullivan, with instructions to form and engage, as they should respectively reach the ground on which they were to be drawn up. These orders were obeyed with alacrity, and the ground on which the army was formed, is acknowledged to have been judiciously selected. But an unfortunate occurrence happened on this occasion, which greatly influenced the fortune of the day, and which ought to be recorded as a warning to those who are too fastidious to sacrifice mere etiquette to substantial service. It so happened, that in the previous dispositions of the day, the division of Lord Stirling had been thrown into a

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position which brought him nearer to the enemy than the division of Sullivan. The honour of the right was not contested with Sullivan, but in order to reach that part of the line, it was necessary that his division should change positions with that of Lord Sterling; and in marching and countermarching to gain this empty honour, they lost perhaps the palpable and tangible honour of repelling the enemy. Cornwallis urged the attack during this change of position, and this is the reason why every historian relates that the attack was made before the American line was completely formed. No efficient opposition was made; the army was supported awhile by the artillery, but was soon thrown into confusion, and a total rout ensued.

As soon as the firing commenced, General Washington had hastened to the scene of action, leaving Greene in command at the ford. At the same signal also, Knyphausen recommenced his attack, and with great firmness advanced to force the passage at the ford. Greene was advancing to oppose him, whilst Wayne, with artillery and musketry, was dealing death through his ranks, when the former received an order from the commander in chief to hasten to the support of the main army.

Never was an order obeyed with more alacrity and dispatch. The distance was at least four miles, yet it is established on the best authority, that it was made good in forty-nine minutes; indeed, the men moved on a trot, and with an ardour that scarcely admitted of preserving order. Both the commander in chief and General Sullivan, in advancing to the ground first occupied, had noted a field in their rear, as proper for a second position in the event of their being driven from the first. On this ground Greene's command was met by an order from General Washington, delivered by his aid Colonel Pinckney, (now the venerable patriot, Major General Pinckney,) to occupy it, and cover the retreat of the main army. This was immediately complied with, and Weeden was halted here, while Muhlenberg, attended by Greene in person, passed on to Weeden's right, and met the enemy at the road. Both brigades here exhibited that firmness and precision of movement which drew forth the admiration of the enemy, whilst it checked their advance in the career of victory.

These two checks effectually stopped the progress of the enemy, and covered the retreat of the flying army. Weeden, when he could no longer sustain the attack of the whole right of the enemy, retreated in good order to the protection of the other brigade; and Greene drew off the whole in order, in the face of the enemy, and covered also the retreating brigade of Wayne, who, after a brave resistance, had been obliged to yield to the very great superiority of Knyphausen. Yet, had not the night fortunately closed in upon

this bloody and unfortunate day before Knyphausen could effect a junction with Cornwallis, it is not to be supposed that the little band which still maintained the conflict, would much longer have been kept together.

Considering the sharpness of the fighting whilst it lasted, the length of time and number of men engaged, and the general rout which ensued, the loss of the American army was surprisingly small, and all agree in attributing it to the firm and active movements of the reserve. A Virginia regiment under Stevens, and another under Stuart, had acted the most conspicuous part.

A tale has been made up, of an occurrence after this battle between Washington and Greene, in which there is no truth whatever that we can find. It is said, that something like altercation took place between Greene and his commander, because the latter had omitted to notice the good conduct of Weeden's brigade in general orders. That General Weeden and his officers were dissatisfied, is very certain; and that some of them addressed themselves to Greene on the occasion, is also true; but he declined remonstrating with the commander in chief, and correctly replied, "Our general has enough to distress him; let us not add to his perplexities. The whole army admits the services you rendered, let us rest satisfied with the consciousness of it."

It is also true, that the opinion of the army was, that the general's reason for not distinguishing Greene and his command in general orders was, that he knew he could confide in their good sense to do justice to his motives, and would submit to the sacrifice, rather than add to the mortification of their fellow soldiers from their recent defeat. How could the commander in chief have applauded the one division without obliquely, if not directly censuring the rest? And the common interest required that an effort should be made to keep up the spirits of the raw, half-disciplined troops of which the army chiefly consisted, and to spare the sensibility of as brave and respectable a body of officers, as ever were drawn together under any commander, and who were now writhing under the mortification of their recent defeat. Greene well understood the feelings and reasoning of Washington on the subject, and needed no explanation of the grounds of his conduct. The writer who could charge him with sharply remonstrating with Washington on that occasion, little understood the delicacy of his own feelings, or the respect he entertained for those of his commander and his brother officers. Nor is it by any means true, that General Weeden was dissatisfied with Greene on this occasion, for not pressing the subject on the commander in chief. His retiring, shortly after this affair, favoured this story; but it was altogether from dissatisfaction with congress on a question of rank, in which he thought his just claims had been pretermitted; and his long and affectionate correspondence with Greene, even

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to the time of his death, proves a respect and regard amounting to enthusiasm. He afterwards returned into service, under circumstances which removed the subjects of his complaint; and was in command under La Fayette when he opposed the British army in Virginia.

Neither is it true, that Greene remonstrated against the choice of the ground on which the battle was fought, at the time the army was drawn up for action. He was with his own division acting as the reserve, and could know nothing about the ground chosen by Sullivan; and as to the position generally, it is acknowledged on all hands to have been judiciously chosen. All the disadvantages under which the American army fought, and possibly the fate of the day, are to be attributed to the want of early and correct intelligence. Washington expected to meet the enemy at Chad's Ford, and had he known of their movement up the stream on the west side, he could have made a correspondent movement on the east side, and at Jones' Ford have met them under every advantage that was presented by Chad's Ford. Why proper videttes and reconnoitring parties were not sent out by Colonel Bland, on the road leading to the upper ford, and early intelligence obtained and forwarded, never has been, and probably never will be explained.

Chester had been fixed upon as the rendezvous of the army, and here the general was agreeably surprised to find his loss comparatively small, and his men in unexpected good spirits. The truth is, there were not in the army five hundred men who had ever been in battle before. And the good conduct of some of the corps had set an example, and given a specimen of what could be effected by men who were cool and firm, which inspired a hope and confidence in their own future efforts when better disciplined. The artillery had behaved admirably, and done great execution; and the high eclat acquired by some of the regiments who composed the reserve, excited a promising emulation.

Washington prepared again to give his enemy battle. But with an army inferior in number, deficient in cavalry and artillery, and dispirited by defeat, he could not venture on an engagement except under advantages which his prudent adversary was resolved not to afford him. On the 16th of September, in the neighbourhood of Goshen, the two armies again approached each other with intention to risk another battle. A deluge of rain separated them, and so damaged the arms and ammunition of the Americans, that Washington was compelled for the present to decline fighting, and to give up the hopes of defending Philadelphia.

Congress removed to Lancaster, and on the 26th of September Sir William Howe entered Philadelphia. The public stores had been previously removed, and the shipping ordered to ascend the river. Necessity had compelled the

commander in chief, with the advice of the state and general authorities, to exact a forced loan of all the blankets and the clothing that the inhabitants could well spare for the army. A supply was thus procured, which relieved the distresses of the hospitals, and covered a proportion of the troops from the cold which now began to be experienced.

There was an evil prevailing over the destinies of the American people at this time, which no author has animadverted upon with sufficient severity. Congress acted the aulic council over the conduct of the army. Hence the enormous and fruitless efforts for the defence of Philadelphia, a place of little importance in a military view, open on all sides, and not necessarily commanding any great extent of country. Whether the withdrawing of Washington, at this time, from the designs conceived against New York, was not productive of the most injurious consequences to the service, must ever remain at least problematical. Had the whole American force been directed to that object at the time of Howe's landing in Maryland, it is probable, when combined with the increasing embarrassments of Burgoyne, that he would have returned to the defence of his grand depot, the moment it was ascertained that his advance upon Philadelphia could not withdraw Washington from his designs on New York. Had that place fallen before he could relieve it, nothing would have remained for him to do but to seek safety in his fleet. But the resolves of congress and public opinion, which even Washington had not then learned to resist, drew him to the defence of Philadelphia; and in pursuit of this object, he effected little more than to exhibit new proofs of his own zeal and resources, and of his unconquerable attachment to the cause he had espoused.

CHAPTER IV.

Affair of Germantown. Impressments. Manœuvring with the enemy. Correspondence. Made quarter-master-general. Retreat of General Clinton from Philadelphia. Battle of Monmouth.

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AFTER the battle of Brandywine, General Howe hastened to move his fleet from the Chesapeake, and dispose of it so as so co-operate in an effort to force a passage up to Philadelphia. Great pains and expense had been bestowed by the Americans in erecting fortifications and other obstructions, so as to prevent the British fleet from ascending that river. The influence of Philadelphia upon the deliberations of congress had been actively and successfully exerted for that purpose, and much blood and treasure was expended on the one side in defending, and on the other, in reducing the forts called Mud Fort, and Fort Mifflin.

In the mean time, the British and American armies had encamped, the former at the village of Germantown, the latter about sixteen miles in advance of it, near a stream called Skippack Creek. This brought on the action of Germantown, an affair in which the military reputation of Washington suffered much more than he merited, and in which the most unjust and unfounded censure was cast upon the conduct of Greene.

As Howe's fleet could not pass the American forts, he was obliged to detach strong convoys to secure the transportation of stores and provisions by land to

BATTLE of GERMANTOWN.







Philadelphia. He had recently detached a force of near 3,000 men for this purpose, and Washington having been joined by about 2,500 regulars, drawn partly from Virginia and partly from Peekskill, it was resolved in a council of war, to make a dash at the British main army in its encampment. CHAP. IV.

The village of Germantown is about six miles from Philadelphia. It has extension in length only; being nothing more than a string of houses at short distances from each other, extending for near two miles on the high road, and the country for some distance on both sides, divided into small regular inclosures, each secured by strong post and rail fences.

From the post occupied by the American army, there are four roads which lead towards Philadelphia; the shortest and most westerly is called the Manatawny, or ridge road; it also takes the name of Wissahiccon, from the creek between which and the Schuylkill lies the ridge down which it leads to Philadelphia. This creek runs between Germantown and the Schuylkill, leaving Germantown to the east; and crossing the ridge road a little below the centre of the town, there empties itself into the Schuylkill. The next road to the east of the ridge road, is the main Germantown road, the course of which is generally north and south. Next to the east of the last, is the Limekiln road, which preserves nearly the same direction until it approaches the town, when it turns into it nearly at right angles with the main road, and enters at the market-place. The fouth is the York road, which falls into the main road some distance below the town, at a tavern well known by the epithet of the Rising Sun. To get into these two latter roads from the place where the Americans were encamped, you have to deviate some distance to the left or eastward, as they do not communicate directly between the village and the encampment at Skippack Creek.

The armies opposed to each other were numerically of an equal force, but in point of quality there was a fearful odds. The British and Hessians were disciplined veterans, well fed, well clothed, flushed with victory, and commanded by officers of tried skill and valour. The Americans were one third militia, and of the eight thousand continentals, there were very few who were not undisciplined recruits; besides which, in a country which ought to have yielded them abundance, they were almost destitute of every thing, even the necessaries of life. Under these circumstances, Washington had nothing to depend upon but their native valour, his many excellent officers, and the favour of a just God.

It was on the evening of the 3d of October that he marched to surprise the British encampment. His army was divided into two columns; the right, commanded by Sullivan, and consisting of Sullivan and Wayne's divisions,

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marched by the main Germantown road. It was preceded by Conway's brigade, and attended by the commander in chief in person. On this road also marched the reserve, consisting of three brigades under Lord Stirling.

The left column, consisting of Greene's and Stevens' divisions, under the command of General Greene, and supported by General M'Dougle's brigade, was ordered to proceed by the Limekiln road; whilst the militia, divided into nearly equal parties, were destined to operate upon the ridge and York roads. General Armstrong led the column which proceeded by the ridge road, and General Smallwood that which was allotted to the York road.

The encampment of the enemy stretched across the village, at right angles with it, and nearly about the centre. All the writers who have given a relation of this action assert, that the British encampment extended from the village westwardly to the Schuylkill; but we are in possession of the sketch of the battle and encampment, drawn up by the assistant engineer of the British army, and the following are the positions assigned to it. The line was divided nearly equally by the village, and from its right, strong detachments were posted at intervals as far as the ridge road. The German chasseurs were posted to watch that road, which at this place approaches very near to the bank of the Schuylkill. In advance of the village, on the Germantown road, was posted a battalion of light-infantry, and a little in the rear of them and to the eastward of the road, Colonel Musgrove was posted with the 40th regiment. A battalion of light-infantry was also advanced upon the Limekiln road, and the queen's rangers on the York road, whilst the 1st and 2d battalion of the guards watched both, from two convenient points occupied by them between those roads. Thus it appears, that the British commander had omitted no ordinary precaution in posting his troops for the purpose of guarding against the danger of surprise. Nor were his patrols neglected, and to their vigilance it will be seen, is to be attributed probably, the failure of the attempt of the American commander; whilst a corresponding vigilance in the American patrol might have rendered that of the British of no avail.

All the writers on the American war seem to have vied with each other in working up this battle to a scene of the most abject confusion. Yet, upon the simplest principles the whole of the events may be reduced to order, and every occurrence rationally accounted for. Each of the contending parties was certainly best acquainted with his own movements, whilst the obscurity of the night, and the extraordinary fog which prevailed until near the termination of the action, rendered it impossible to discover the movements of his adversary. Giving each, then, credit for correctness with regard to what was within his

own knowledge, there is no difficulty in reconciling every seeming inconsistency. CHAP. IV.

The Americans are not a little at a loss also, to account for some events, merely because they write under the erroneous impression that the surprise was complete. Yet the British assert, and on this point their assertion is not to be controverted, that their patrols had given them an hour's notice of the approaching attack. It is not to be wondered at that the Americans doubt this. upon the supposition, that the British patrol could not have approached the American army without being discovered by their own. But it is a melancholy fact of which few were informed, that the celebrated Pulaski, who commanded the patrol, was found by General Washington himself, asleep in a farm house. Policy only, and regard to the rank and misfortunes of the offender could have induced the general to suppress the fact. Yet to this circumstance, most probably, we are to attribute the success of the enemy's patrol in approaching near enough to discover the advance of the American column.

The hour's notice thus communicated, was well improved by the British commander. The troops were called to arms, and stood in readiness to receive the Americans, hoping to profit by their surprise when meeting a vigilant, instead of a supine and sleeping enemy. The British commander appears to have been at first in doubt, whether the attack in his front may not have been intended as a feint, whilst the principal attack was to be made by the ridge road, which would have infallibly turned his left and gained his rear; for his first step was to detach a strong reinforcement to support the chasseurs on that road. Why the American general did not adopt that measure, it is in vain, at this distant day, to inquire; unfortunately, the militia who marched to the attack on that road, soon left this reinforcement at liberty to join the left wing of the British, at a very critical point of time. They scarcely looked their enemy in the face, or, as the British relate it, only amused the chasseurs during the action. The few of their light troops acted better. They crossed the creek, and moved up to join the American right. The party which advanced by the York road, did little more than that under Armstrong.

On the advance of Sullivan's column, the battalion of British light infantry delivered their fire and retired before the bayonets of Conway's brigade; this was about four o'clock in the morning. Colonel Musgrove then struck into the Germantown road to support them; but feeling the pressure of Sullivan's whole column upon him, he perceived he must retire, and by one of those rapid conclusions which genius only can attain to, he adopted the bold resolution of throwing himself into a strong stone house, owned by a Mr. Chew,

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and which stood at the head of the village directly in the rout of the American army, a hundred yards eastward of the road. Six companies of his command were all that could be advantageously employed from the windows of this house, and the rest, with the light infantry, retired to join the main army. This was a gallant measure, and bravely persisted in.

The detention at this house is generally assigned, by the American writers, as the cause of the failure of this enterprize. And General Washington, who was there in person, has been ridiculed by some, and censured by many, for having halted before it. That it was a principal cause of producing an unfavourable issue, is unquestionable; but there were other causes conspiring, some of which were indistinctly known at the time and others not duly appreciated. The enemies of General Washington also, who unfortunately at that time were in the zenith of their influence, and active in their intrigues, had the art to give a turn to the affair which did not present his conduct in its proper light. Nay, it would not be unreasonable to charge one of them with treachery, for it is an established fact that General Conway had privately left his brigade in the height of the action, and refused to join it, though pressed by two of General Washington's aids to do so. That he was then intriguing against General Washington, is also established; and it may not have been consistent with his views, that the reputation of the commander in chief should be confirmed by a brilliant *coup de main* at this time. His personal courage alone was brought into suspicion, but a much more probable cause was assigned when it wa sascertained that in writing and conversation he was then actually endeavouring to undermine General Washington's reputation.

It is true, that on reaching Chew's house Sullivan's column was halted; that General Washington rode up, and paused a few minutes to observe the effect of General Knox's bullets upon its massy walls; that during this time, some very precious minutes were lost; but by no means as many as are generally supposed. It was not that he was under the antiquated error which required that a fortified enemy should not be left in the rear, but it was under the consciousness of the inestimable importance of every minute, that he thus acted. Filing off to the right and left, to avoid the murderous fire from the house, must occasion a great waste of time, whilst it divided his line and left an opening that the enemy, then actually forming under cover of the house, might take advantage of. It was the hope that the well-directed fire of Knox would speedily bring the contest to a close, that induced him to submit to the delay. And the hope was a rational one, for the impenetrable thickness of the walls could only be ascertained by experiment. Yet a very few minutes elapsed before he issued his orders to leave a regiment to observe the party in the

house, whilst the army inclined to the right and left to avoid it. But now another and more serious difficulty presented itself. The left wing of the British army had advanced as soon as the firing on the road commenced, and the whole line was drawn up, extending from the Germantown road to the Limekiln road, and crossing their line of encampment on the right, so as to meet the attack of both the American columns. This required a new disposition, and Sullivan's column was displayed, one division to the east, the other to the left of the road, while the reserve under Lord Stirling was ordered up to cover his right. This movement consumed the greatest part of the time spent in the neighbourhood of Chew's house; and when the army was moved forward to action, another very serious cause of delay presented itself. There was no moving without clearing a passage through the post and rail fences for the artillery and the horses of the officers. This was a most embarrassing circumstance, and could only be overcome by pulling up the posts and prostrating the fences. Whilst one part of the army was engaged in this work, the other was, to little effect, expending their ammunition; so that before the retreat commenced, although the army had been furnished with sixty rounds, the cartouch-boxes of this column were generally empty.

We will now pursue the progress of the other column. This was much influenced by the occurrences which happened on the right. Having reached the ground on which the British light-infantry were posted, the latter were soon obliged to retreat; but they preserved their order, notwithstanding they were vigorously pressed by the American light troops, and galled by their artillery. The day was now breaking, but no object was visible at the distance of thirty yards. During the whole action, the fire of the troops on both sides was directed by the flash of each other's guns; for the morning was so still that the smoke rested over their heads in clouds, or mingled with and darkened the fog. On arriving at the ground directly east of Chew's house, the attention of Greene was rivetted by the active firing kept up in that quarter, and as his rout was remote from the village, he very naturally concluded that the other column had met and engaged the enemy. It became then necessary to halt, to reconnoitre the enemy, and finally to display and prepare to meet him also. In the original disposition of the American force, it was contemplated that Sullivan should meet and fight that part of the enemy's force which was encamped to the west of the village, and Greene that part which lay to the east.* Which would have made it necessary that Sullivan

* Marshall.

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should display to the right of his rout, and Greene across the Limekiln road. But when an unexpected state of things, (the position in which the enemy was forming,) made it necessary to throw one half of Sullivan's column on the same side of the village with Greene's, the right of the latter was necessarily thrown into the rear of Sullivan's left; and in the obscurity of the morning, having no expectation of seeing any one but an enemy in front, the rear line, composed of Stephen's division, is said to have fired on the front, under Wayne, who commanded Sullivan's left. The front, of course, supposing itself between two fires, was thrown into confusion. Greene, whose division was on the left of the whole, and who, upon the line's being formed, commanded the American left, pressed on his men to find their enemy, who, from the direction of his line of march, was considerably in advance, and from the darkness of the morning could only be discerned by the fire, now opened upon the left wing of Sullivan's column. General Stephens' division embarrassed with the left of Sullivan's column, could render him no present assistance, and their commander was unfortunately in a situation which disabled him from restoring things to order. Such was the darkness, that orders could not be conveyed with promptness and dispatch. The aids in vain galloped about the fields at every instant arrested by the fences, for they could not see to what point to direct their course. The increasing employment of his own advancing division, and perhaps a secret interest in its reputation, detained Greene near his division, which, as second in command in the line, was his appropriate post.

Never did a body of men perform their duty with more firmness and zeal than the American left. It is a truth which defies contradiction, that it was the only part of the American army that had the good fortune to effect the service allotted it that day. For they broke the enemy's right, drove them at the point of the bayonet through their encampment into the village, and made a large number of prisoners. But finally its very zeal proved fatal to a considerable proportion of it; for, by pressing forward in the pursuit, while Stephens was embarrassed and detained, its right flank became exposed; and two regiments on the left of the British right wing, not being confronted by any part of the American force, was at liberty to wheel upon the left of Sullivan's line. This movement was conducted by General Grant. The confusion in that quarter soon became irretrievable, and General Gray, with a division from the enemy's left, was thus at liberty to hasten to the support of their right wing. By this time, the morning had cleared sufficiently to discover to Greene the danger of his exposed flank, and the general rout on his right. The order was received for a retreat, and he soon overtook Stephens' column, which had suffered but

little, and was enabled to support a countenance that covered the retreat of the American army. The officers who were at this time near the person of General Greene, concur in asserting that he pertinaciously exposed his person to the very last; so much so, that some have ventured to express an opinion that his chagrin at having victory snatched from his grasp at the very moment when, from every appearance under his immediate eye, it was all their own, was so great that he did not wish to survive it. But there was another cause to which it was more justly attributable; this was his affectionate care for every officer and every man in his immediate division. He was unwilling to move whilst one of them would be left behind, if possible to avoid it. At this time, some of the bravest of his men and officers had penetrated far into the enemy's rear, and if not immediately rescued, they must be made prisoners. It was to recover these that he lingered on the field, as long as the safety of his division would possibly admit of it. Notwithstanding every effort to withdraw them, Colonel Matthews, who commanded one of his regiments, and who had made so many prisoners as to encumber his retreat, was surrounded and captured. All the American prisoners that were made in this action, except the wounded, were made in this quarter, and on this occasion.

This was a long and sharp action; it lasted near two hours and a half. The bayonet was only used on the American left, for the enclosures kept the rest of the combatants apart. Wayne and Sullivan did every thing that men could do, but the obscurity of the morning, and the obstructions that embarrassed them baffled their efforts. Had there been sufficient light for the Americans to discover the precise manner in which the enemy had formed, and to have adapted their own movements to the occasion, the wings of the columns would not have got interlocked, and there can be little doubt of the result; for there was a spirit and emulation displayed by every regular corps in the action, from which the most happy consequences might have been expected. But had the enemy retreated, the Americans could not have pursued far, as Cornwallis, with a strong reinforcement of grenadiers and dragoons, arrived near the close of the action, and in time to join in the pursuit. But the pursuit was not pressed very long nor very vigorously, nor attended with any loss on the side of the Americans; for the artillery of the rear division often warned the enemy to maintain his distance; whilst Colonel Moylan, with three regiments of horse, steadily guarded the flanks of the retreating army.

The artillery was all saved, even to a piece belonging to Greene's column which had been dismounted. So scrupulous was he on this point, that he had it placed in a waggon and brought away; a conclusive proof both that the

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retreat was not hurried, and that he retained his self-possession in the midst of the greatest dangers.

But a more striking proof was exhibited on this occasion in a ludicrous incident that occurred to one of his aids. His station was in the rear; cues and curls were at that time the fashion in the army. Major Burnet, who was riding beside him, had turned his head to observe some occurrence behind him, when a musket-ball cut away his cue, and it fell to the ground. Greene observing it called out, "Burnet, if you can spare time, get down and pick up your cue." Burnet, who had just then put up his hand to observe what had happened in that quarter, in turning round to join in the laugh, saw that one of the general's curls had fallen a sacrifice to a similar casualty. He coolly replied, "And your curl at the same time, if you please, general." Greene laughed and moved on, but without mending his pace.

In this action many brave men fell on both sides. The loss in killed and wounded was about equal, probably seven or eight hundred; but by the fall of Matthew's regiment, the British acquired 400 prisoners, and among them some very valuable offices. General Agnew on the British, and General Nash on the American side, were among the slain; both officers in high estimation, and greatly regretted.

General Washington, in his letter to congress three days after the battle, writes thus: "It is with much chagrin and mortification I add, that every account confirms the opinion I at first entertained, that our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring in our favour. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which it is said had taken place in the British army, were scarcely paralleled." And General Greene was always of the same opinion. For, the reserve of three brigades under Lord Sterling had been brought up into action on the American right, and the left flank of the enemy lay entirely open to them. Had the reserve been pressed forward, the enemy's left wing must have retired, and this would have given time for the broken divisions to rally, whilst it found employment for General Grey, whic would have prevented his restoring the fortune of the day on the enemy's right. In that quarter the work of ic ry had so far advanced, that nothing was wanting but to save the assailants from the attack of a new and unexpected adversary. Had the fog cleared away but a few minutes sooner, it is to be presumed this would have been done. But such was its extreme density, until a few minutes before the retreat became general, that the army was broken and scattered, before General Washington knew that they ha! paused. The hurrying of a field-piece by him, with the horses in limber, was the first notice he had of the extent of his misfortunes. Colonel Pinckney, who was near his person, was

ordered to make an effort to halt and rally the men, who now began to hurry by in groups; but all the zeal and ardour with which he endeavoured to effect it were in vain. The men showed their empty cartouche-boxes and ran on. CHAP. IV.

Several of the writers on the American war present a scene almost ludicrous as having occurred before Chew's house. One would suppose, that General Washington stood almost stupified on the occasion, listening with deference to every babbler who chose to obtrude his opinions. Even field officers are supposed to have forced their way into the circle of his legitimate counsellors; and the opinion of some stand recorded in commemoration of *their* correctness and *his* folly. These gentlemen may have expressed their opinions, but General Washington was listening to the counsels of his own mind and of his general officers. And as has been before observed, an anxiety to avoid the necessity of taking a large circuit to attack his enemy, then but a little distance in front and actively forming under cover of the house, was the real cause of the halt, whilst Knox tried the weight of his metal upon it. But the active faction then in the height of action, in a great measure succeeded in fastening on the general the loss of the battle, whilst he carried on, what they were pleased to call this wind-mill attack upon Chew's house. Some of the adherents of that faction may be still in existence, and will deny this; but all his aids have not yet joined him in another world, nor are there wanting those who will be ready to render his memory justice, not in mercy, but in love. The writer of these pages will again venture to boast, that all the enemies Greene had, at this time, were among those, who could be hostile even to the greatest and best of men.

Will it be believed that they could have found any thing in Greene's conduct in the affair just related to charge him, not only with neglect of duty, but even with cowardice? Yes, and the name of Washington was cited for authority.

In a letter to congress, written the day after the battle, 5th of October 1777, are contained these words: "I cannot enter into particulars of what happened in that quarter, [speaking of the left wing,] as I am not yet informed of them with sufficient certainty and precision." This passage, which is accompanied by one passing high encomiums on the conduct of his right wing, has been tortured by malice into an indirect censure on the conduct of the left. But the passage admits of another most obvious explanation; whether we refer to facts contained in the letter, or to others that are extraneous. That passage of the letter must have been written as soon as he had regained his camp, and, as the letter declares, he had not then received Greene's report of the occurrences on his left. That he was not informed of those occurrences during the

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action is obviously accounted for by the obscurity which disabled the aids from finding the station of the commander in chief, the innumerable fences which almost precluded communication, and the monopoly of their attention to the important object of endeavouring to extricate Stephens' brigade, and bring it up to its place in the line. The erroneous impression relative to Greene's conduct was not a little promoted by the known fact that two regiments of the enemy under Grant had been brought to act on the left flank of Sullivan's command; and the general ignorance with regard to the real cause. It was known that they ought to have been engaged by the right of Greene's command; and until inquiry was made, the fault was thrown upon the commander of the left column. But upon a fair estimate of circumstances, how stands the question with regard to the embarrassments in which Stephens' division was involved? In displaying so as to extend his line from the Limekiln road to the village, the left column was pursuing the original order of attack. But in displaying Wayne's brigade of the right column, from the village towards the Limekiln road, a change from the original plan of attack had been forced on the commander in chief, by the movements of the enemy in advancing to the head of the village and forming on the east side of it. Of this change in the order of attack sufficient notice had not been given, to arrest the execution of the original order, in time to prevent the two columns from getting embarrassed with each other. Yet, had the commander of the division which became thus embarrassed with the left of Sullivan's command, not unfortunately indulged himself that morning too freely with his canteen, there was still a hope that he might have extricated himself from this situation, and filled the space left in the American line by the absence of his division. To censure the absent, the dead, or the unfortunate, is among the most painful of all necessities; nor should the writer of these pages have suffered his pen to revive the recollection of it, had it not been established by the decision of a court-martial, which has never been complained of. It is also ordinarily mentioned as among the principal causes of the misfortunes of that day, since it was his line that was charged with firing on Wayne's, in the rear of which it was thrown in moving to the right.

Another cause which favoured the propagation of an opinion unfavourable to Greene, in the affair of Germantown, was his not entering into action from a half to three quarters of an hour later than the column on the right. General Washington, in his letter to congress, says three quarters of an hour, Mr. Marshall, half an hour, and some others, some minutes over half an hour. But no one has paused to remark that, all things considered, at the highest computation, it was much less time than ought to have been expected. And yet it

was obviously so. For it must be recollected, that Greene had a route of a mile at least longer to perform than the other column, to reach opposite to the head of the village, where the right column had engaged the enemy; and then had to proceed near a mile further to reach the centre of the village, where the enemy was drawn up which he had to engage. Nor was the progress of his own division a little impeded by short halts, in hopes of being joined in line by that under Stephens. All these facts considered, he must have proceeded with more than ordinary expedition to have engaged as soon as he did.

We have before observed, that General Stephen's conduct was submitted to the investigation of a court-martial. In Marshall's Life of Washington we find this notice of that fact: "Major General Stephens, who commanded the right of the left wing, was cashiered for misconduct on the retreat, and for intoxication. No inquiries appear to have been made into the conduct of other general officers."

The known candour and established character of that author will not for a moment admit the supposition, that he intended by this passage obliquely to intimate, that had there been such inquiries made, others might have shared the same fate. His intention in the remark must certainly have been, that during the investigation into Stephens' conduct, so severe a scrutiny must have been made into the conduct of the commanders of every other corps, that no one could have escaped had there been room left for censure or suspicion. One thing is very certain, that Greene could not have suffered by the investigation, since he not only maintained his previous standing in the confidence of his commander, but actually rose in estimation. And one of his particular friends having felt some uneasiness on the publication of General Washington's letter, and begged of him to say whether he was at all dissatisfied with the conduct of Greene, he magnanimously replied, "No, it was our fault."* Yet so successful were his enemies in propagating their construction of that letter, that one of the British writers, in his account of this affair, has put that construction upon it. Yet no one who is acquainted with the invariable delicacy of sentiment and conduct of the commander in chief towards his officers, would have hesitated at assigning as the leading cause of his declining in that letter to remark on the conduct of the left wing, the very serious charges which had been made against General Stephens, and on which he was unwilling to animadvert, whilst it was uncertain whether he was in fault or not.

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* Governor Read.

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Finally, it appears that Stephens was acquitted altogether of misconduct in the affair of the embarrassment produced between the extremities of the two lines, and his sentence was alone founded on his being intoxicated, and misbehaving on the *retreat*.

It will not be unacceptable to the American reader to peruse the following compliment bestowed by a British pen, upon the American army in the affair of Germantown. "In this action, the Americans acted on the offensive, and though repulsed with loss, showed themselves a formidable adversary, capable of charging with resolution, and retreating with order. The hope, therefore, entertained from the effect of any fair action with them as decisive, and likely to put a speedy termination to the war, was exceedingly abated."

The enemy did not remain long, after this affair, in their encampment at Germantown. They had felt too sensibly the danger of being near to their vigilant and enterprizing enemy. Retiring into Philadelphia, Sir William Howe ordered reinforcements from New York, and directed all his efforts to opening the communication with his fleet; whilst Washington with his army lay at Whitemarsh, watching the movements of the enemy at the distance of fifteen miles, and ready to pounce upon him, should he lay himself open to attack.

At length, an opportunity presented itself which he thought favourable for enterprize, and he hastened to embrace it. Cornwallis was detached with a command of 3,000 men, to make a descent upon the Jerseys, by crossing from Chester to Billingsport; with the combined object of collecting supplies for the army, and of opening the navigation of the Delaware by reducing Fort Mercer. That place, better known as Red Bank, was important in commanding the channel of the Delaware, and had become identified with American glory by the gallantry of Colonel Christopher Greene, and the death of Colonel Donop and repulse of the Hessians. An effort was thought advisable to protect it, and it was no inconsiderable object to keep up in the British army the state of distress for want of fuel and provisions, to which the vigilance and advantageous position of Washington had reduced them.

It was determined in council, to send a force into the Jerseys to meet and engage the British detachment, and Greene was selected for the command. But to use Washington's own words, "they were so rapid in their advances, that our troops could not form a junction and arrive in time to succour the garrison." It was still an important object to restrain Cornwallis from collecting supplies. And, as soon as Greene could form a junction with the brigades of Huntingdon and Varnum, then in the Jerseys, he marched down the left bank of the river with an intention to give battle to the enemy. Unfortu-

nately, a large reinforcement had arrived from New York; which, added to the force detached from Philadelphia, gave Cornwallis a superiority even in number. In quality of troops it was very great, for a large proportion of Greene's command was militia.

However, he cautiously hung on the left wing of his superior enemy, until positive orders were received from the commander in chief to retire and join him. His conduct on this occasion has acquired for him the following just eulogium from the biographer of Washington: "That judicious officer feared less the reproach of avoiding an action, than the just censure of sacrificing the real interest of his country."

Indeed, the struggle he had to undergo was, one of the most trying kind. The Jersey militia under his command looked with the most restless impatience upon the marauding parties of the enemy, plundering their granaries, and driving off their cattle; and the strongest expressions of the wishes of the members of Congress that he should engage the enemy, daily assailed him. Could he indeed have cut off the party under Cornwallis, the best consequences might have been augured from it; for it would have reduced the garrison of Philadelphia to inertness, if not to absolute distress. But on the other hand, Greene well knew how fatal the destruction of his command might have proved to the safety of the grand army. It is well known, that his inclinations commonly led him to fighting, and he had under him several officers who were celebrated for the same propensity. But a sense of duty, and a just construction of his orders, prevailed, and he acted the part that prudence and firmness, not his inclinations, dictated.

It has been said that, "General Greene's instructions, though not peremptory, indicated the expectations of the commander in chief that he would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis." *

Let the commander in chief speak for himself.

In a letter to congress of the 23d November 1777, he says, "General Greene is still in Jersey, and *when Glover's brigade* joins him, if an attack can be made on Lord Cornwallis with a prospect of success, I am persuaded it will be done." But before Glover's brigade had effected a junction, Cornwallis crossed over his baggage and stores to Gloucester Point, and indicated an intention to rejoin Sir William Howe in Philadelphia. Their united force would have put it in the power of Howe to attack the commander in chief at White-

* See Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 3, p. 219.

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marsh, and the force under Greene having become necessary to the security of the main army, he was recalled.

On this expedition Greene was accompanied by the Marquis La Fayette, and a mutual esteem conceived at the battle of Brandywine, and increased by a subsequent participation of toils and dangers, became now cemented into an union of friendship and affection, which lasted with the one to his death, and with the other exists to this day.

Thus ended the campaign of 1777. Washington being considerably reinforced from the northern and eastern armies, went into winter quarters at the Valley Forge, on the west bank of the Schuylkill, about sixteen miles from Philadelphia; whilst Sir William Howe, after gaining two considerable victories, and acquiring possession of the defences of the passage of the Delaware, sat down in Philadelphia—having conquered no more American territory than would have sufficed for his men to spread their blankets on.

This was an important winter to the American cause. The capture of Burgoyne, and the force under Washington, which was now becoming very respectable, brought forth the European powers to join in the contest; whilst the commander in chief, having his men and officers collected under his eye, had for the first time a fair opportunity of reducing them to discipline. Nor was it the least important circumstance, that he had now acquired some one who was capable of disciplining them. Very small, indeed, was the number of his officers, even in high rank, who were fully competent to discharge this duty. Their knowledge wanted the finish of example and actual service. But the talents of Stuben were now brought into requisition, and aided by the zeal and aptness of the American officers, great advances were made in the course of the winter, to give the army the consistency and power which discipline alone can communicate. Yet, afflicting were the discouragements under which Washington had to labour, and such as had nearly marred all these advantages. Tents he had none; earth-covered huts and the habits of the American people, supplied that deficiency. But clothing, blankets, and provisions could not be obtained. The quarter-master's, commissary's and clothier's departments were in sad confusion. Severe as the winter had been before the campaign terminated, many of his men were actually without shoes, or blankets; and it was no exaggeration when it was declared, that the frozen ground was marked with the blood from their lacerated feet. But the opening spring was destined to dispel the gloom of this winter.

It was the last of November when Greene joined Washington at Whitemarsh. Some movements of the enemy indicating an attack, detained the

army on this ground until the night of the 12th, when they crossed the Schuylkill and proceeded to the Valley Forge. CHAP. IV.

The soldier looks forward to winter quarters as the place of rest and comfort, if not of enjoyment. But sad were the disappointments which the American troops were destined to encounter here.

Exposure, want of clothes and blankets, deficiency of food, and other causes, operated to produce despondency and disease; whilst defects in the hospital establishment consigned thousands to the grave. The sickness and loss of life was truly astonishing. And the returns of the first of February exhibit a total of near four thousand unfit for duty for want of clothes. The clothier-general wanted money, the commissary-general could find nothing to purchase, and the quarter-master-general had not been in camp since the middle of the summer. Finally, the army was on the point of disbanding for want of provision, when Washington was driven to an expedient which he abominated, that of ordering out Greene to forage as in an enemy's country, and bring in whatever could be found. This was the first instance in which General Greene had an opportunity of experiencing the activity and intelligence of the late General Henry Lee, who afterwards served under him with so much eclat in his southern campaign. By exploring the woods and meadows it was found, that cattle were in abundance, but were concealed. And it was not to have been expected otherwise. The American commissary had nothing to offer in payment, but a depreciated currency, or promissory certificates of an unestablished government; whilst British gold flowed in streams through the market-place of Philadelphia. On the score of patriotism, the majority of the inhabitants of the country they were in, felt their consciences completely at rest. Most of them were Quakers, who considered themselves as neutrals in the war; and a sense of natural justice suggested to all, that while they bore their due proportion of the common burden, there was no just reason why their property should be seized by violence, or sold for a compensation that was a mere mockery in value. Hence, strong individual feelings conspired to withdraw supplies from the American army, whilst the evil was consummated by a resolve of congress, empowering, nay, requiring the commander in chief to impress whatever he wanted, within seventy miles of his camp. Of course, every thing that could be removed beyond that distance, was removed to a place of safety; or concealed, until it could clandestinely be conveyed to the Philadelphia market, where every necessary of life bore a most tempting price.

Painful as it was to the commander in chief to issue this order, it was still more painful for Greene to execute it; but he consoled himself with the con-

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sciousness that it was unavoidable, and it was executed with as much order, and attention to individual feeling and interest as the nature of the case would admit of.

Plenty once more flowed into the American camp, and to keep it up by the the same means, Wayne was detached into the Jerseys for the same purpose. This was the origin of the *jeu d'esprit* of the celebrated Major Andrè, written on Wayne, concluding with four lines said to have been prophetic of his own fate:

> "But now I end my lyric strain,
> I tremble whilst I show it,
> Lest this same warrio-drover Wayne
> Should ever catch the poet."

The unfortunate poet was indeed caught, and delivered to Wayne; and suffered death.

The following letters written by General Greene, in moments snatched from the busy scenes of this active campaign, present incidents, feelings, and opinions, a view of which will, we hope, not be unacceptable to the reader.

"MORRISTOWN, *April 20th*, 1777.

"On Sunday last, Lord Cornwallis from Brunswick, made an attempt to surprize General Lincoln at Bounbrook. They in part effected it, owing to the valorous conduct of the militia, who were posted at a fording place on the Rariton. They deserted their post, without giving the general the least notice. The enemy were at the general's quarters before he had any knowledge of their approach. We lost three pieces of cannon, and about thirty men; they had about as many killed and wounded. The enemy had five generals, and four thousand troops; our General Lincoln had but about four hundred. Lord Cornwallis and General Grant breakfasted at the house at which I dined. The enemy halted but an hour and a half. I marched from Baskenridge upon the first intelligence, but the distance was twelve miles, and the enemy had retreated before I got down. The next night we surprized one of their pickets, killed one officer and seven privates, and took sixteen prisoners. Pray, how goes on recruiting with you? *I am sure the continent must come to drafting at last, the sooner the better.* Very late news from Europe mentions that a French and Spanish war is inevitable, and that but few recruits can be got for the reinforcement of the British army in America. Our strength now is trifling. It is to be regretted, that the cause of freedom rests upon the

shoulders of so few. General Howe is preparing with all imaginable diligence to take the field. His bridge to cross the Delaware, so much talked of, is arrived at Brunswick, as I am informed by a spy who left that place last night. I would thank the British myrmidons to protract the opening of the campaign for about three weeks, but that is not to be expected. Our army will appear like Gideon and his pitchers. God grant us the same success; the cause is equally righteous, and claims his heavenly protection." CHAP. IV.

"CAMP AT MIDDLEBROOK, *June 4th*, 1777.

"I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from you, delivered me by Lieutenant Littlefield. I suppose you are a little out of temper at the ingratitude of the people in turning you out of your political chair. The state of Rhode Island is too democratic for the happiness of the people; there is very little or no executive force in its government. Passion and prejudice have too much influence in administration to preserve the best and happiest line of conduct.

"I think you mention a division of our interests. If you think it best I am content. Set me off such parts of the estate as you may judge equal; let it be valued, and I will either give or take. I had no thought of a division of our interests at present, but if it is necessary, I am content; every thing for the good of the whole.

"God knows how long this war may last—the want of union and virtue among the Americans may protract it for some time. We have now a very respectable force in the field from the southward, though not large. The eastern troops are very backward in coming on. The state of Pennsylvania is in great confusion. The Quakers are poisoning every body; foolish people! The congress and I do not agree in politics; they are introducing a great many foreigners. I think it dangerous to trust so large a part of the American army to the command of strangers. British gold is of a poisonous quality, and the human heart treacherous to the last degree. There are no less than four general officers of the ———— nation now in the American service. There is a French gentleman sent over by Mr. Dean to have the command of all the artillery in America. If his appointment is confirmed, it will rob us of one of the best, or at least, as good an officer as we have in the service—General Knox. I tremble for the consequences, as I fear it will ruin the whole corps, and it is now upon a very respectable footing and increasing in perfection daily. Wisdom and prudence sometimes forsake the wisest bodies. I am exceedingly distressed at the state of things in the great national council."

"Pompton Plains, New Jersey, *July 13th*, 1777.

"General St. Clair, who commanded at Ticonderoga, has evacuated that important post. His garrison consisted of between four and five thousand men, in good health and high spirits. With such a garrison, strongly entrenched and well armed, fully supplied with provisions and ammunition, and the works defended by 170 pieces of cannon, it was evacuated without firing a gun. General Schuyler had 2,000 men with him at Fort Edward. General Nixon was on his march from Albany with upwards of 1,000 continental troops—the militia of the country coming in from all quarters to the aid of the garrison—and the commanding officer, fully acquainted with all these circumstances, has abandoned the post. What could induce him to take such a measure God only knows. Burgoyne's whole force only consisted of 5,500 men; the whole is a mystery to all the army. Charity obliges me to suspend all ill-natured reflections, but I fear there has been some misconduct somewhere. Our affairs never were in so prosperous a train as they were before this. This affair will give us a severe wound. But by the blessing of God, I hope to recover the shock. What has become of the garrison, whether they are prisoners, or gone down to No. 4, I cannot learn. I think it is probable I shall be sent to the north.

"General Howe and almost all his troops are embarked, their destination unknown. I have had some fears for Providence, but Philadelphia or the North River are objects of much greater importance; we are on our march to join General Putnam on the North River."

"Camp Cross Roads, 11*th August* 1777.

"Your favours of the 12th and 19th of July I have received. I am exceedingly alarmed at the ill state of health you appear to be in.

"The calamities of the war, the late misfortunes and the common depression of spirits that accompanies every species of indisposition, generally prey upon the imagination, and perhaps may have taken an ungenerous advantage of you in the present case. However, I would recommend great attention to your diet and exercise. Nothing contributes more to health than seasonable and light diet, accompanied with moderate exercise. You must learn to be the philosopher—to behold misfortunes without repining, limit the passions, the appetites and desires to the state of the body, and the necessity of the times. However unfortunate things may appear, let us console ourselves with

reflecting that the greatest good often springs out of what we consider as the worst of evils. *General Burgoyne's triumphs and little advantages may serve to bait his vanity and lead him on to his total ruin.* This is not improbable when we consult the temper of the human heart, the history of mankind, and the dispensations of divine providence upon the rise and fall of men and kingdoms. The campaign opened with a very fortunate train of circumstances. General Howe was foiled in all his manœuvres, and disgraced in every movement. Our success was equal to our utmost wishes. The northern department has brought disgrace upon the American arms, and a cloud over New England. But even all *these misfortunes may be a necessary prelude to General Burgoyne's final overthrow.* I agree with you that there is something very mysterious in conducting the military operations to the northward. There must have been a want of judgment in the choice of the posts and extent of the works, or some great negligence in fairly representing the true state of things. We were all led to believe the situation of the place so strong by nature and so improved by art, that the garrison was sufficient to defend itself against any number that might be brought against it. Whatever may be the source of the misfortune, it is not owing to cowardice. I have been with General St. Clair in two actions, and know him to be a man of bravery; and it is agreed on all hands, that the garrison was in high health and full of spirits, and left the place with great reluctance. Charity obliges me to suspend my opinion until there is a fair and candid inquiry made into the cause of the evacuation of Ticonderoga, and if it was necessary to evacuate it, why it had not been done earlier. If the stores and garrison had been saved, the loss of the place would have been inconsiderable.

"We have been in and about the city of Philadelphia for near a fortnight past, ignorant of General Howe's destination. I hope it will not be against New England, but I have my fears. We were marching towards Coryel's Ferry from the city, expecting the fleet was gone eastwardly, when, by an express from the president of congress last night, we learned that the fleet are bound westwardly. I wish it may be true. It was said that two hundred sail were seen off the coast, between Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, but I doubt the intelligence; for I cannot persuade myself *that General Burgoyne would dare to push with such rapidity towards Albany, if he did not expect support from General Howe.*

"You lament the ruin of trade, the depreciation of money, and the discontent of the people as so many sure marks of the downfall of our cause. It is true, our trade is greatly injured, but remember whilst it rains upon us, the sun does not shine upon them. Our trade is perhaps not more injured than theirs;

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we must balance accounts in national suffering. If the diminution of their force and resources equal our misfortunes and losses, then we are not sufferers on the great scale of national gain. The depreciation of money is rather a temporary, and in some respects, a local evil. The increase of trade and a proper attention to taxation will soon correct the evil. The army are the greatest sufferers. All the other parts of the community regulate their conduct and prices by one another. But the wages of the army are fixed and unchangeable. There is a fund of hard money now establishing in Europe, sufficient to pay the interest of all our loans. This cannot fail of establishing the credit of the money abroad and at home. This is a good piece of policy. The discontent of the people is not greater than is to be expected in every revolution, when robbed of the blessings of peace and plenty, and forced into a long and distressing war to obtain some future advantage that they have but an indistinct conception of. *I have no doubt of a happy issue, although we may experience many calamities in the course of the dispute.*

"You distress me exceedingly in committing to my charge the care of your family. God grant you may long live to discharge the duty yourself. I feel the force of brotherly affection equally strong with yourself. I have been equally happy in our mutual good understanding. The sweet pleasures of social fellowship have ever been one of the greatest sources of my happiness. Few misfortunes in life, however tender my other connexions may be, could equal the loss. Although I should esteem this charge one of my greatest misfortunes, yet I trust I should discharge my duty to the survivors of the family with such a brotherly affection as to leave no cause of a blush when we meet in another world. But heaven avert so great an evil to them and to me, and grant you long life and better health shall be my constant prayer."

We will not restore this letter to our files without giving the reader a further extract from it, to show how deep and durable are the impressions of nursery tales even upon the strongest minds. Speaking of his youngest child, an infant, he says, "Mrs. Greene tells me she is marked with port wine. Be pleased to send some to the nurse, and direct her to wash the part and give the child a little. This, however simple it may appear, has been often known to remove the marks."

During this winter Washington strained every nerve to place his army on a respectable footing for operating in the ensuing campaign; and as the quarter-master-general's department is vitally important to every movement of an army, Washington pressed Greene to accept of the appointment.

It was with extreme reluctance that he yielded to the solicitations of the commander in chief. He was above all things apprehensive of undertaking an office which required the expenditure of public money. He well knew how few men undertake such offices without being chargeable with a view to private emolument, and he knew also the morbid jealousy felt by lookers on, at the conduct of those to whom such trusts are confided. He was aware, too, of the murmurs which the party of Conway would industriously excite against his administration, whatever should be the purity of his conduct. Congress also, in that spirit of mistaken economy which governed too many of their acts, had increased the objections to undertaking this office by heaping upon it duties only remotely connected with it. For a length of time it was impossible to get any competent person to undertake the office, and it was only when General Washington was compelled to exclaim, "Some one must make the sacrifice," that Greene submitted to undertake it. But he subjoined two conditions; first, that he should not lose his right of command in action; secondly, that he should have two assistants that would be agreeable to him. These conditions the commander in chief readily complied with, and the choice of assistants fell upon two men, than whom, none better could have been selected —his two friends, Colonels Coxe and Petit.

To those who are unacquainted with the duties of a quarter-master-general, it may still appear surprising that the subject of these sketches should quit a station that he was fond of, and the duties of which were familiar to him, to enter upon the untried career of an office, which, notwithstanding its vital importance, is still, like the useful arts, considered as inferior in gradation. But military men are competent to appreciate the importance of the duties of a quarter-master-general. The fact is, it gives life and motion to an army. The commissary-general must purchase, but the quarter-master-general must transport every article of the first necessity to camp. The army may be ordered to move, but he only can furnish the indispensable means of setting it in motion. And it may be ordered to halt, but he must provide for its halting in comfort. In fact, although he does not move the automaton, he prepares the whole machinery and winds it up for motion.

There was one consideration which was not without its influence in inducing him to accept of this appointment. Hitherto he had almost always acted in a subordinate station. This appointment furnished an opportunity for discovering that he was competent to any other. The office requires an arranging and combining mind, habits of industry and business, and an ubiquity of talent that will leave nothing unattended to.

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Such, he soon gave the most satisfactory proofs of his possessing, in a degree that justified the commander in chief in this appointment.

Washington no longer suffered the vexatious delays which had resulted from the previous defects in this department. Although often driven to the most disagreeable of all means for supplying an army—impressment, and always embarrassed by the scarcity and depreciation of money, within a few weeks after this appointment, which was 2d March 1778, order was introduced every where, and at the opening of the campaign of that year, the commander in chief was enabled to follow up the movements of the enemy, with an activity hitherto unexampled. A change which we have the express avowal of General Washington, was attributable altogether to the measures of the new quarter-master-general.

Howe had now been superceded by Clinton, and on the 18th June 1778 Philadelphia was evacuated. This measure was produced by intelligence that a French fleet had sailed to intercept the British army in the Delaware. Unfortunately, adverse winds had greatly protracted the voyage of this fleet across the Atlantic, or the Count D'Estaing, who commanded it, might have signalized the commencement of the war between France and Great Britain by many important captures, and perhaps by the fall of the whole British army; for the British force was now greatly reduced. Philadelphia had proved a Capua to Howe's army. He had landed certainly 15,000 (it is confidently believed 18,000) men at the head of Elk River, and been since largely reinforced from New York. Yet not more than 11,000 effective men marched out of Philadelphia. About a thousand had fallen in battle or been made prisoners, and their loss by sickness could not have been very great; for comfortable quarters had kept their army comparatively healthy. But great numbers had deserted. Their intercourse with the women of that place, with whom many intermarried, and with the Europeans settlers, particularly the Germans, induced many to wish to remain in the country. Among the Hessians, the spirit of desertion was universal. Their countrymen who had been captured at Trenton, were comfortably disposed of in a part of Pennsylvania inhabited by Germans, and possessing every thing that could tempt men to return to it; and on being exchanged, few of them missed an opportunity to escape, or to carry off with them some of their companions in arms. On their retreat through the Jerseys, it is thought that not less than one thousand more effected their escape.

Washington's force was about equal to his adversary's, and on the same day that the enemy crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia, he took up his line of March for Coryel's Ferry, about forty miles above that city, and crossed his

army over into the Jerseys. Two detachments were at the same time thrown across the river, the one at, the other below the city, with orders to hang upon the rear and right of the enemy, whilst the main army pursued the direct route towards New York on his left. The importance of the occasion rendered it proper, in the opinion of the commander in chief, to call a council of war to deliberate on the question, what course ought to be pursued with regard to the enemy.

At this board there was a great diversity of opinion. General Lee, as well as most of the foreign officers, and a large majority of the whole board, were decidedly against fighting. Wayne and Cadwallader, "such in that moment as in all the past," were warmly for battle. Only two members of the board expressed the opinion which appeared afterwards to have governed the conduct of the commander in chief. These were Greene and La Fayette, who declared that the country ought to be protected, and if necessary to fight the enemy for that purpose, or if a favourable opportunity presented itself of attacking him with effect, it ought not to be avoided. In other words, that it was impossible to anticipate a decision.

With a guarded but firm step Washington approached his enemy, and when in the vicinity of Monmouth, he thought the opportunity of fighting, which he really coveted, had arrived.

He had detached a strong force under La Fayette to approach the enemy's rear, with orders to act as circumstances should suggest; and bodies of riflemen and militia were in advance of him and on his flanks. Clinton thought his enormous train of baggage waggons, containing his provisions, and the establishments matrimonial or otherwise, made by his officers in Philadelphia, was the object aimed at, and placing them under a very strong escort commanded by Knyphausen, he united the rest of his force in his rear, to check the advance of the parties that hung upon him.

The troops under Knyphausen were too far advanced to reinforce Clinton had it been necessary, and it was probable that Knyphausen's orders were such as would not admit of his abandoning the particular object of his care. And as the enemy were still in a champaign country, presenting no extraordinary defensive advantages, General Washington thought it advisable to hasten an attack, before the enemy should reach the high grounds of Middletown, about twelve miles in advance, and where he would be utterly unassailable.

The commander in chief accordingly dispatched a strong reinforcement under Lee to join La Fayette, with orders to engage and detain the enemy, whilst he in person brought up the rest of his forces.

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Upon Lee's junction with the marquis the command devolved upon the former, and in pursuance of his orders, he advanced upon and engaged the enemy. But soon commenced a retreat, and whilst in the act of retreating was joined by Washington with the main army. The latter, in a moment of chagrin at a supposed disobedience of orders, threw something either into his words or manner which was retorted with less respect than was consistent with their relative stations; and General Lee followed up the affair after the battle with letters, which certainly were not written in the spirit of proper decorum. The issue is well known; Lee was suspended from command; but whilst impartial posterity shall condemn the insubordination of his letters to the commander in chief, they will probably decide strongly in favour of the propriety of his conduct in retreating when he did. It was calculated to draw his enemy further from his baggage, and to involve him amidst morasses that would have greatly favoured his final overthrow. Perhaps it was the real cause of the partial success which ensued. But our province is to enter no further into this discussion than to show the part which it fell to the lot of our hero to act on the occasion.

He commanded, in pursuance of the stipulation under which he undertook the duties of quarter-master-general, the right wing of the second line. And the most fastidious unite in acknowledging the signal services rendered by him on this occasion. Greene was ordered to a particular position, in the rear of the enemy's left; but a change of circumstances which soon ensued, determined him to occupy another, and the signal service rendered from that position, in checking and repelling the enemy, drew from the magnanimity of the commander an acknowledgment of its correctness.

The occurrence is thus related.

On meeting with the retreating detachment under Lee, with the enemy close at their heels, Washington ordered him to face about and engage them, whilst he brought up his troops and formed them for battle. Aided by a check given the enemy from the artillery of the first line, Lee obeyed these orders with spirit, and after a sharp action retreated in good order.

During this action, on a movement made by the enemy which threatened the right of Washington's line, Greene was ordered to file off about two miles from Englishtown, which is on the road to Monmouth, and to fall into the Monmouth road a small distance in the rear of the court-house, while the residue of the army proceeded directly forward. This movement would have brought him into the rear of the position in which the armies were now engaged. He had already advanced some distance, but hearing of the retreat of the party under Lee, and foreseeing that it would expose the troops imme-

diately under Washington to the whole weight of the enemy's attack, he immediately changed his route and took an advantageous position near to the enemy's left. As he had foreseen, this movement withdrew the enemy from his designs against the left or first line of the American army, and drew on a most furious attack upon his own division. General Knox, who commanded the artillery of this division, poured in a most destructive fire upon the advancing line, and being seconded by the infantry with the greatest firmness and a steady fire, the enemy were soon driven with great loss back to the position they occupied when Lee first advanced upon them in the morning. It was now that the whole army had an opportunity of perceiving the strength of this position, and the difficulties of assailing him whilst he continued in it. After carefully reconnoitring it, the American army was withdrawn, and lay for the night upon their arms, ready to renew the attack in the morning.

Rolled up in his cloak, Greene reposed at the foot of a tree on the field of battle, whilst the commander in chief shared no better accommodation. Yet it is affectionately related of him by the soldiers who fought under him, that he sought not his pillow until due care was taken of the wounded; and the humble fare of the common soldier sated an appetite rendered keen by a day's fasting. Nor was he at liberty to retire after this fatiguing day, until innumerable orders were dispatched relative to the affairs of the department over which he presided.

It will be some gratification to the American reader to peruse the British account of this occurrence. It is extracted from the Annual Register of 1778, and is quoted with more confidence, as the subject of these sketches used to speak with respect of the candour with which that history was written. "The British grenadiers, with their left to the village of Freehold and the guards on their right, began the attack with such spirit that the enemy soon gave way. But their second line preserved a better countenance, and resisted a fierce and eager attack with great obstinacy. They were, however, completely routed, but in this exigency, with a very unusual degree of recollection as well as resolution, took a third position with so much judgment, that their front was covered by a marshy hollow which scarcely admitted of an attack by that way."

The first line here spoken of obviously means the command under Lee, and the second, both the bodies of troops which the enemy successively engaged after his retreat. The account is incorrect in asserting that they were routed, for they never receded from the positions at which they repulsed the enemy's successive attacks. And the position, covered by a morass, on which they pass

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an encomium, was that taken by Greene on changing his route and coming up to the relief of Washington and the main army.

The oppressive heat of this day will long be a subject of painful recollection. Several of the Americans dropped dead without a wound, and of the British, full fifty-nine shared the same fate.

It was in this battle that the Americans first felt the incalculable advantages of mature discipline, and complete organization. It was fought with order and science, and except a little irregularity committed by a small portion of Lee's command in their first retrogade movement, there was no instance of confusion. Nothing of the waywardness of unsubdued minds, or of the panic fears which invade an army not connected by the bonds of discipline.

Yet, had not Greene risked his reputation by deviating from his commander's orders, the event might have been truly disastrous. Lee had retired from the field, and was ordered to a new position at least three miles distant from the scene of action, on the enemy's right. Greene was ordered, and on his march, to a point not much nearer, on his left, and military men will judge whether there was not the most serious danger that the several corps of the American army would have been cut up in detail, for no one alone was sufficient to resist the concentrated force of the enemy. Such are the vicissitudes of human fame! Lee in the morning had ventured on the same thing, perhaps with equal judgment and effect, and was ultimately ruined. Greene, not deterred by the offence, which Lee had given on the occasion, on the same day ventured on disobedience, and perhaps saved the army, certainly much increased his own reputation.

The enemy halted, merely long enough in the night to rest and refresh his men, and then silently moved on and rejoined Knyphausen. This movement was not discovered until it was too late to pursue, and Clinton crossed in security to New York, whilst Washington inclined to the left to defend the Jerseys and secure the passes of the Highlands.

CHAPTER V.

French fleet arrives. Attempt on Rhode Island. Embarrassments in the quarter-master-general's department. Views of policy suggested. Conway's intrigues. Greene resigns his appointment in the staff.

THE American forces were now at leisure to turn their attention towards offensive operations.

Ever since the fall of the year 1776, the enemy had remained in possession of the town of Newport in Rhode Island. It was a position well chosen, and recommended by many important considerations. The port and bar are perhaps the best on the whole Atlantic coast, and whilst it served to distract the attention of the eastern states from the grand operations under Burgoyne and Howe, it in a great measure excluded the American privateers and their prizes from an invaluable place of rendezvous and retreat. It was also remarkable for the salubrity of its climate, and served for the retreat of convalescents, whilst it contributed to give countenance to, and draw supplies from the disaffected in that section of country.

At this time the number of troops at Newport was about six thousand, under the command of Major General Pigot. And there were in the harbour, six frigates and various vessels of minor force. Clinton, on his retreat from Philadelphia, apprehensive that a blow would be aimed at this point, had reinforced it, and abundantly supplied it with all the munitions of war. Works

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had been constructed across the island at convenient distances, and the whole placed in as complete a state of defence as circumstances would admit of; and while the British fleet commanded the coast, all hopes of success in an attack on it were abandoned by the Americans. On the other hand, the enemy never dared penetrate into the country, for they feared the spirit and patriotism of the militia. The hardy and valorous mountaineers of New Hampshire and Vermont were not far distant. The populous states of Massachusetts and Connecticut looked to the head of Narraganset Bay as their point of concentration, whilst a spirit of independence animated the state of Rhode Island far beyond her strength or her resources. Early recollections still gave a tone and character to the conduct of this little state, which caused their enemy to dread approaching the shores of the bay; and such respect was paid to the spirit of the people, that their privateers could still run in and out of the bay, and lie in safety under protection of the small arms of the inhabitants on its banks.

At length the long looked for French fleet arrived. It was decidedly superior to that of the enemy, and had been expedited under the advice of our commissioners at Paris. But all the ill omens of the heavens must have been in conjuction at the birth of this expedition. Never had finer prospects been held out to man, of rendering efficient and gallant services than now presented themselves to D'Estaign the commander of this fleet. But every opportunity appeared to glide from his grasp just at the moment when it ought to have been embraced.

First, he was eighty-five days on a passage that generally requires but half that time. Ten days sooner would have put him in possession of his enemy's fleet and army in the Delaware. As it was, had he steered for New York instead of the capes of Virginia, he might have intercepted the transports and the army, or entered with them pell mell and obtained possession of New York. Again, from the capes of the Delaware he proceeded to New York, and such was the weak state of the naval defence of that place on his arrival, that it was the English opinion that his force was even then adequate to have forced his way into the harbour. But, after loitering twelve days before that place, he sailed for Rhode Island just when a day's further delay would have put him in possession, by detail, of Admiral Byron's whole fleet, which had been sent out to reinforce Lord Howe, and now arrived singly and crippled at New York. Nor did his evil fortune desert him here; or rather, the subsequent events are more properly attributable to evil conduct.

When arrived before Newport, Lord Howe being reinforced by Byron's squadron, followed him from New York with a resolution to relieve Newport.

He found the French admiral securely anchored in the bay, in a situation which it was impossible to force, and he had not a thought of making the attempt. Could he by any means draw off the garrison from the east side of the island, it was the utmost he could hope to effect; for Sullivan then lay at the heights near Newport, having landed on the island with eleven thousand men, one half of them disciplined troops. The fate of the British garrison was certain; and the French admiral, after one brilliant achievement, would have been at liberty to attack the fleet with men inspirited by recent victory, and disembarrassed of the large and useless body of land forces which he had on board. The assault was actually destined for the next day, on a plan which could not have failed of succeeding; and it would have taken place but for the sensitive feelings of the chivalrous count, on a stupid affair of etiquette, which no great and good man will ever hesitate to pretermit to views of substantial service. But, under the influence of the same morbid sensibility to the honour of his royal master, he could not brook to be insulted by an offer of battle from the British fleet, and gallantly abandoned an original and concerted enterprize, now matured for certain success, to chase "the bubble reputation" on the inconstant ocean. CHAP. V.

His experienced adversary saw into his character, and the improvement to be made of this movement; and promptly availed himself of the advantages they held out. It was his intention to give battle; but with the chance of victory he could now combine the certain advantage of withdrawing the French fleet from Newport, whilst Clinton, by the way of Long Island and the Sound, advanced to its relief. Manœuvring with his adversary, ostensibly to get the weather gage, a "*sine qua non*" of that day among nautical men, he drew him out to sea several days' sail, and at last, when the proper time arrived for action and the fleets approached to end the contest, a furious gale separated, damaged, and scattered them over the ocean.

Howe, made for New York, D'Estaing, for Newport, and even then the golden opportunity was not lost had he been disposed to improve it. For, his fleet, crippled as two of his principal ships were, would still have been secure within the fauces of the Bay of Narraganset, against every effort that could have been made against it; and long before the British fleet could have returned to relieve Newport, the place must have fallen. But he pertinaciously refused to return to the attack, and without entering the bay sailed away to Boston to refit.

As soon as the intelligence from Europe rendered it probable that a French fleet would be on the coast in the spring, General Washington had dispatched Sullivan to Rhode Island to take command of a small army of observation

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formed near Providence, with instructions to make a requisition on the neighbouring states for militia, and acquire all the information necessary for an attempt on Newport. Upon the arrival of the expected fleet, the Marquis La Fayette was dispatched with a reinforcement to join Sullivan, and a request communicated to General Greene to make such arrangements in his department as would admit of his absence for the time necessary for joining Sullivan to act against Newport. His local knowledge, numerous connexions, and great popularity in that country rendered this appointment peculiarly proper. Accordingly, as soon as D'Estaing sailed from New York to co-operate with Sullivan, Greene proceeded to Rhode Island and took command of the left of the troops, then posted in advance on the heights of Tiverton. This position is separated from Aquetnet, or Rhode Island proper, by a narrow channel, and presents the greatest facilities for throwing troops across into the island, while it is in itself perfectly secure and commanding.

Volunteers soon crowded to his standard, from all quarters, and a zeal and confidence prevailed through the camp which augured the most happy consequences.

On the 8th of August the French fleet entered the bay and anchored above the reach of the British batteries; and a plan of attack was arranged for the next day. In the conferences for this purpose it soon appeared that the confederates were likely to be much embarrassed about points of etiquette. D'Estaing held a commission of lieutenant general in the land service, as well as admiral of the fleet. He was therefore entitled to the command of the whole combined force, should he land with his troops; and much importance was attached to the honour of landing first when entering on the attack. The first difficulty was obviated by the admiral's declining to land, and requesting that the command of the French troops should be assigned to La Fayette; and the second obviated, by an agreement that both columns for attack should land simultaneously.

The plan of the attack was, that one division of the American army, under cover of a frigate, should be thrown across below Tiverton, on the east side of the island, within the enemy's outer lines; while the French, and another division of Americans landed from their fleet on the west side of the island, also within the enemy's outer line, and the whole to proceed immediately against the lines constructed near the town. If the American account of the conduct of D'Estaing on this occasion be correctly given, he certainly is chargeable with having been captious and assuming. The command of the combined forces was tendered to him, and he ought to have accepted it, or ought not to have insisted on dictating respecting the command of the right

wing. This he did, and although the high standing, unbounded popularity and real merit of the Marquis La Fayette made every one willing to concede what he could with honour, yet the punctilious pretensions of the count himself ought to have made him respect the rights and feelings of others on this occasion. The propriety of delegating the command of the French troops to La Fayette was conceded by all; but when D'Estaing insisted that an entire division of the American troops should act with them, and the command of the whole be delegated to La Fayette, he certainly carried his pretensions too far for one who had declined the chief command.

The delicate and magnified point, concerning the party which should land first, probably in the end proved the destruction of the whole expedition. A party of Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia who were expected on the 8th, not having arrived, Sullivan declined acting on that day, and dispatched a message with an apology on the subject to D'Estaing, appointing the next for the assault.

In the night of the 8th, General Pigot perceiving the preparations for a descent, withdrew the troops that occupied his outer line, within the lines which defended the town. And in the morning, as soon as Sullivan perceived this movement, he crossed his whole force over into the island, and occupied the lines thus abandoned by the enemy. This was done without previously consulting the French admiral, but was early communicated to him by letter, urging as excuse, an apprehension that the enemy might return and re-occupy the lines, before Sullivan could move in force to prevent it. But the admiral was seriously offended, and refused to answer Sullivan's letter. That day, which ought to have been appropriated to action, was consumed in discussion, and the next, Lord Howe arrived to terminate the dispute, and with it, the expedition.

Whatever apologies may be made for Sullivan, it must be acknowledged that he acted unadvisedly. He had seen enough of his noble colleague to know that he was to be treated with wise precaution; and although, under any circumstances, an immediate necessity for action must have excused him for acting without communicating with D'Estaing, it was impossible to prove that the case actually existing was one of that description. There was but a remote, if any, probability that the enemy would re-occupy the lines they had abandoned, and if he did, the case was but the same concerning which the previous arrangements had been made, and was one which ought rather to have been desired than prevented, as it withdrew a part of the force of the enemy from the main point of attack to a situation where they might have been easily amused with a false attack whilst the principal one was in pro-

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gress; or at least, would have exposed their flanks to the allies. It was in fact an important change of circumstances, and the American general's movement was one of magnitude, on which the French commander had a right to be consulted before the Americans proceeded to act.

Whatever may have been the grounds of conduct assigned by the French admiral for his subsequent measure in sailing out of the bay to meet the British fleet, those who are acquainted with the workings of the human mind, will ever suspect that the great disgust expressed by him at Sullivan's conduct was not without its influence in instigating him to act, in his turn, independently of the wishes and advice of his associate in the expedition. Such feelings cannot be acknowledged in explaining our motives for action, and often maintain an influence over our conduct, the full force of which we are ourselves unconscious of.

The occurrence of this misunderstanding gave the most sensible uneasiness to the commander in chief. He had previously cautioned Sullivan on the subject, and pressed on him the necessity of being very guarded in his conduct.

By the departure of the fleet on the appearance of that of the enemy, the situation of the American army had become embarrassing, nay, dangerous. Fortunately, the British shipping in the bay were all destroyed on the approach of the French, or Sullivan's retreat would have been impossible. But reinforcements might arrive from New-York by the Sound, in twenty-four hours, and involve him in difficulties from which he could not extricate himself. To carry Newport by storm, was impossible. He had but 8,000 men fit for duty, more than half of them militia, and the enemy were six thousand strong and well defended by every work of art, as well as many natural advantages. And to carry on a siege with a body of troops, one half of whom were only fit for desultory operations, would have been a folly. Yet the return of the fleet might hourly be expected, and to abandon the island whilst that expectation remained was what he could not resolve on.

Under every disadvantage he resolved to remain; and during ten days of painful suspense he continued before the town, making dispositions for a siege, and anxiously looking out for the return of the French. At length, they made their appearance; but what was the chagrin of the troops when the French commander intimated, that he must immediately proceed to Boston to refit.

Greene and La Fayette were immediately dispatched to the fleet to confer with D'Estaing, and to strain every nerve to persuade him to resume the attack on Newport. Only two days' co-operation was solicited, and Greene pledged himself, under protection of the guns of the fleet, to lodge his troops

within the lines of the enemy. But D'Estaing finally declined, and insisted that he must depart for Boston. CHAP. V.

It was but a few hours that Greene remained on board the fleet, but the admiral had called his officers together, and Greene had an opportunity to discover, that D'Estaing was not as blameable in this affair as he at first appeared to be. From some source of information (what, his prudence would never permit him to communicate) he was able to ascertain, that a party had been formed by the sea captains against their admiral, who was not popular among them. Sailors have generally a mortal aversion to be commanded by landsmen, whom they really esteem an inferior order of beings. D'Estaing, it was said, had been advanced by court favour to a command for which he had not been qualified by service or education. And it was thought that this party were resolved to thwart, and if possible, disgrace their commander. It was the opinion of both Greene and La Fayette, that but for this cause the admiral would not have remained deaf to their arguments, or inexorable to their solicitations.

The indignation and dismay which overspread the camp on the return of Greene and La Fayette, and their report on the subject of their mission, can only be imagined by those who have encountered defeat and disgrace, in the moment when they merited and expected victory and glory. Another fruitless attempt was made to stay the fleet, or at least the land forces on board of it; but disappointment, aggravated by reproach, increased the chagrin of the Americans.

D'Estaing pursued his voyage to Boston, and to heighten apprehension, information was received that Clinton was rapidly approaching from New York. The militia could no longer be detained; that night they deserted with such precipitance, that in the morning Sullivan found his force reduced to barely five thousand men.

In the night of the 28th of August the camp of the American army was broken up, and with the utmost silence and order, the whole army retreated to seek the protection of two redoubts which had been prudently constructed on the north end of the island. In the morning, as soon as the enemy discovered this movement of the Americans, they commenced a pursuit, in two columns. Greene covered the retreat of the American army; under the gallant conduct of Colonels Livingston and Laurens, whose regiments composed his rear guard, the whole army reached their point of destination, and drew up in order of battle. Greene commanded on the right, and from a redoubt in his front a cannonading was kept up upon the enemy throughout the day, whilst

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it was warmly returned from a hill called Quaker Hill, on which the enemy were drawn up in front of the Americans.

From Newport towards the north end of the island, there are two roads which communicate with each other near the north end. The two redoubts constructed by the Americans, commanded the junction of these roads, and the communication with the main. By these two roads the two armies had marched in column, the one in retreat, the other in pursuit.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy advanced upon the westernmost of these roads, and indicated a design to turn the American right. Reinforcements were ordered up to the support of that wing, and the action soon became warm and bloody. About one half of the American army sustained the whole pressure of the attack. The numbers actually engaged were nearly two to one against the Americans. But they sustained it with the coolness and recollection of experienced veterans. Greene had under him a number of most gallant officers; and most of the men had partaken of the discipline of the Valley Forge. It would be superfluous to say any thing of the conduct of their commander. He was in sight of the place of his nativity, and of thousands of his countrymen and friends, who anxiously lined the surrounding eminences.

The enemy were repulsed with slaughter. But they, too, were disciplined soldiers, and retreated in order, to the hill from which they had descended to the attack. Partial as this engagement was, and comparatively small as were the numbers engaged, the loss was equal to that of the hard-fought day at Monmouth. Greene appears to have been scarcely able to find language to express his sense of the conduct of his men and officers, and their enemies bestow on them a justly merited encomium. "Though he was most vigorously pursued and repeatedly attacked," say they, "in every quarter wherever an opening was made, yet he took his measures so well, and had chosen his posts so judiciously, that although much honour was claimed and deserved on both sides, he gained the north end of the island without sustaining any considerable loss."

Baggage, stores, ammunition, artillery, every thing was conveyed over that night from the island, and the next day Sir Henry Clinton arrived, with a force that would have baffled all the bravery and self-devotion of a much superiour corps. One day more, and they could not have escaped from the island.

Being now once more encamped in security, they had time to brood over the conduct of their allies; and it was plainly perceivable, that mutual irritation had risen to a most alarming height. Sullivan, goaded by chagrin and

disappointment, of a temperament rather warm, and under the influence of a deep and just sense of injury, had, in general orders of the 28th, expressed a hope, "that the event would prove America able to procure that by her own arms, *which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining;*" and, together with every officer under his command, excepting La Fayette, (and we believe Greene,) had unwisely dispatched to the admiral, a protest against his conduct, in language but little calculated to soothe the feelings of that officer,—piqued as he had been by Sullivan's invasion of the island, and irritated by the disasters that followed upon his abandoning the army at the most interesting crisis. CHAP. V.

General Washington, congress, and every thinking man in the country foresaw the fatal consequences that would ensue upon an irreparable breach with our new ally; and the most judicious and unremitted efforts were pursued, to allay the ferment and restore confidence and harmony.

The part which our hero was called upon to act, on this occasion, will appear from the following extract of a letter written to him by General Washington, on this subject: "I have not now time to take notice of the several arguments that were made use of for and against the count's quitting the harbour of Newport and sailing to Boston; right or wrong, it will probably disappoint our sanguine expectations of success; and what I deem a still worse consequence, I fear it will sow the seeds of disunion and distrust between us and our new allies, unless the most prudent measures are taken to suppress the feuds and jealousies that have already risen. *I depend much on your temper and influence to conciliate that animosity* which I plainly perceive, by a letter from the marquis, subsists between the American and French officers in our service. This, you may be assured, will extend itself to the count and the officers and men of his whole fleet, should they return to Rhode Island, unless a reconciliation should have taken place. The marquis speaks kindly of a letter from you to him, on this subject. He will, therefore, take any advice from you in a friendly way, and if he can be pacified, the other French gentlemen will, of course, be satisfied; since they look up to him as their head. The marquis grounds his complaint on a general order of the 28th of August, and upon the universal clamour that prevailed against the French nation.

"I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered into by the general officers from being made public. Congress, sensible of the ill consequences that will flow from our differences being known to the world, have passed a resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, *you can conceive my meaning better than I can express it;* and I therefore, fully depend on your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities between our principal

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officers and the French, and to prevent all illiberal expressions and reflections that may fall from the army at large."

Nor was this confidence misplaced. His personal influence with the marquis was great, and could be exerted with more of the freedom and familiarity of a friend than that of Washington, though certainly not with the same parental weight. And the dignified, dispassionate, yet respectful deportment that he had exhibited to D'Estaing, in the personal conference between them, had given him a standing with that gentleman, which successfully promoted his efforts at conciliation. With the American officers, after the first ebullitions of passion, the task was not difficult; for theirs was a system of sacrifices to the country's good. And with congress, a signal opportunity not long afterwards was presented to him of showing his prudence and promptness in promoting the views of the man whom he respected above all others; and his own, as previously exhibited in his letter to the marquis alluded to in that of Washington.

The endearments of a wife whom he loved, and who had now presented him with two fine children, the pleasant places of his early youth, and caresses of relations and friends who idolized him, were ineffectual to detain him from the pressing duties that called him to head quarters. His presence was no longer necessary in the army under Sullivan; it was only when battle approached that his stipulation with Washington admitted of his absence from the connecting point of his operations as quarter-master-general; and he soon joined the commander in chief at his camp near the White Plains.

The murmurs in congress relative to the failure of the expedition against Rhode Island, at this time, were low, but portentous. An inquiry seemed to be required by public opinion, and a resolution to that effect was brought into congress, but wisely waved by the previous question. Yet it was privately much desired, that means of information of an unofficial nature could be afforded; and as Greene's commission of quarter-master-general furnished the most plausible grounds for his visiting the seat of government, he repaired to that place at Washington's request, and his arrival was reported to congress. Immediately an unanimous vote was passed, that he should be invited to a seat on the floor, and in pursuance of it, he was shown to a chair beside the president.

Colonel Henry Laurens then filled that chair; and but a few minutes elapsed after Greene had taken his seat, before the arrival of a communication from the Governor of Rhode Island was announced, and an order passed that it be read. Whilst the clerk was preparing to open and read this communication aloud, Greene, who had a suspicion of its contents from some previous

intimation, wrote on a scrap of paper which he handed up to the president, "For God's sake, do not read that paper aloud, until you have looked it over." A whisper from the president to the clerk arrested his progress, and another whisper passed round to the members, an explanation which produced a call for the order of the day. Thus a remonstrance against the conduct of D'Estaing, which could not have failed to give the greatest umbrage to that officer, and to several others of the first respectability who chanced then to be present in the gallery and lobby; to the minister of France then residing in Philadelphia, and perhaps to their sovereign and the nation at large, was most judiciously suppressed.

But Greene's zeal in the public service did not permit him to return to head quarters, until he had accompanied the Marquis De La Fayette on a visit to D'Estaing at Boston, to promote the interesting work of national reconciliation. The following letter to General Greene from the count will show that the effort was crowned with success, while it exhibits that officer's idea of the causes of umbrage that had been afforded by the conduct of General Sullivan.

"Boston Road, *October* 1*st*, 1778.

"Sir,

"The letter which your excellency did me the honour of writing to me when you were leaving Boston, was of a nature to console me for the little irregularities which you perceived in General Sullivan's letter, which I took the liberty of communicating to you, upon receiving it. It is from you, and what you are, that it is doubtless suitable and flattering to judge of the respectable and amiable qualities of the American general officers whom I have not the honour of knowing by correspondence or personally: it is with cordial warmth that I render homage to truth in assuring you, that on every occasion, I have had reason to admire their zeal and talents, and to feel personal satisfaction for their behaviour with regard to me; and to add to the motives of duty those of inclination and attachment, which I shall always profess to have for them. I shall be enchanted if the assurance and the homage of these sentiments appear to you of any value.

"With respect to the conduct more or less moderate, that General Sullivan seems to have adopted in his literary commerce with me; as a zeal and devotion for the common cause which I glory in, had engaged me to style him my general, he avails himself of the privileges which this title gives; beginning, as you saw in his letter, by scolding me unjustly, and finishing by telling me in confidence, that he has rivals whom he supposes his enemies. This mixture

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of chagrin and confidence being confined personally to me, did not offend me; there is another more important article, and which I am not at liberty to pass in silence—I mean the obstinacy which General Sullivan exhibits in national imputation, and the abuse of his place in filling incessantly the public papers which are under his direction, with things which might, at length, create ill blood between the individuals of two nations who are and ought to be united. It is wounding their interests in a capital manner to dare, by indiscretion or passion, to foment what ought to be extinguished, if it exist. I have been obliged lately to entreat General Sullivan to reflect on this subject. In doing it, I observed all the deference that was due to him; but my quality as a public person, and that of his well wisher, equally imposed this law on me.

"I hope that your excellency and your respectable colleagues will not disapprove my conduct. To merit that it should please them, will ever be one of my desires, as well as to prove to you particularly, all the consideration which I have for you and them, and the respect with which I have the honour of being,

"Sir, your excellency's

"Most humble and most obedient servant."

Upon the retreat of Sullivan from Rhode Island, there were many, and among them some men of high standing, who loudly expressed their disapprobation of his conduct. Among these, was the late Mr. John Browne, whose influence in that community as a man of wealth, intelligence, and public spirit, and one who had filled many high offices, was very great. The following generous vindication of the conduct of his commander, from the pen of Greene, will not be unacceptable to the reader.

"Coventry, *September* 11*th*, 1778.

"Sir,

"In all republican governments, every person that acts in a public capacity must naturally expect to have observations and strictures upon his conduct. This is a tax generally laid by all free governments upon their officers, either civil or military, however meritorious. I am not surprised, therefore, to hear the late unsuccessful expedition against Newport, fall under some degree of censure; but I must confess I am not a little astonished to hear such a principal character in society as you, throw out such illiberal sentiments against a gentleman's conduct, merely because he took his measures different from your opinion.

"This expedition was planned upon no other consideration than that of the French fleet's co-operating with the American troops. The strength of the garrison was considered, and a force ordered to be levied accordingly, that might be sufficient to complete its reduction. In forming the estimate, there was the aid of the fleet and the assistance of 3,500 French forces that were on board the fleet, taken into consideration.

"The loss of this force with that of the aid of the French fleet, was a sufficient reason for abandoning the expedition. You say, you think the expedition was ill planned and worse conducted. In the first place, that the forces were drawn together at an improper place. I must beg leave to dissent from you in opinion. Was there any time lost by the continental troops coming to Providence? There was not; for all got together some days before the militia. Would it not have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have brought the forces to have acted in concert with each other, one body at Tiverton, and the other at Boston Neck?* And divided as they were, both parties would have been unequal to the descent. If either party was sufficient of itself, then the other part was superfluous. Besides the objection of a division of forces, and the distance they would be apart, there are two other objections against the measure. One is, the difficulty of embarking troops from that rugged shore; the delays that storms and high winds might produce; the accidents that might happen in crossing where there is such a large swell going; and the languor that a sea-sickness might produce among the men. The other is, there were no stores or magazines of any kind at South Kingston to equip and furnish the troops for the attempt; besides which, it was necessary for the general to have all his troops together, that he might select such officers and men as were most suitable for the enterprize.

"If the troops had been collected at South Kingston, it would have too fully explained our intention, and put the enemy on their guard; whereas landing on the north end of the island, led the enemy into the belief, that we intended to carry the garrison by regular approaches, which would have given us an opportunity of re-embarking the troops and landing upon the south part of the island, without being mistrusted. This was the plan of attack, and it must have succeeded had our strength been sufficient, and the disembarkation countenanced by the fleet.

"You cannot suppose that General Sullivan wants spirit or ambition to attempt any thing that reason or common sense can justify. It is the business

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* A measure, it seems, pressed by Mr. Browne.

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of every general officer that is desirous of distinguishing himself, to court all opportunities to engage with the enemy, when the situation and condition of his own forces, and that of theirs, will admit of it. But the safety of our country is a greater object with every man of principle than personal glory.

"Before a general officer engages in any hazardous enterprize, he should well consider the consequences of success and failure; whether the circumstances of the community will not render one infinitely more prejudicial, than the other can be beneficial; the strength and quality of the troops should be considered that you are about to attack—how they can be approached, and by what means you can secure a retreat. Then you have to take into consideration the number and quality of your own troops—how they are found—what temper they are of—whether they are regular or irregular, and how they are officered; even the wind and weather are sometimes necessary considerations, and not to be neglected.

"I have heard some people foolish enough to suppose, that it was only necessary for a general to lead on his forces, in order to secure success, without regard to the strength or situation of the enemy, or the number or goodness of his own troops. Those that have often been in action can only judge what is to be expected of good, bad, and indifferent troops. Men are often struck with panics, and they are generally subject to that passion in a greater or less degree, according as the force of discipline has formed the mind by habit to meet danger and death. I dare say that many a man has gone from home with a determined resolution to meet the enemy, that has shamefully quitted the field for the want of habitual fortitude. Men often feel courageous at a distance from danger, who faint through fear when they come to be exposed. Pride and sentiment support the officer, habit and enthusiasm the soldier; without these, there is no safe reliance upon men.

"I remember you recommended an attempt to effect a landing upon the south part of the island, the night we returned from the fleet. But I could not possibly suppose you to be serious, because we could not possibly get the boats round, draw out the men and officers proper for the descent, and effect a landing before day. It was, therefore, impracticable, if it had been ever so eligible. But I am far from thinking, under our circumstances, the measure would have been justifiable by reason or common sense, in a common view, much less by military maxims. The day after the fleet sailed, such a great change took place in the two armies, particularly in ours, whose spirits all sunk upon the departure of the fleet, (except the few regular troops, and it had its effect upon them,) that nothing could be attempted with the hopes of success. The garri-

son at Newport that before gave themselves up for lost, now collected new courage, and would have defended themselves with double obstinacy. CHAP. V.

"Suppose General Sullivan had attempted a landing and actually effected it, and the garrison had defeated his troops, what would have been the consequence? The whole would have been made prisoners, and not only the party that landed, but all those who remained in camp, with all our stores of every kind. Was the object important enough for such a risk? Was the chance equal of our succeeding? Every one who will suffer himself to reflect a moment will readily agree, that neither the importance of the object, nor the chance of succeeding, would have warranted the attempt. It must be confessed, that the loss of such a garrison would have given the British army a deadly wound, but the capture of our army would have put our cause in jeopardy. Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of Fort Washington had: there were men enough to have defended themselves against all the army had they not been struck with a panic; but being most of them irregular troops, they lost all their confidence when the danger began to grow pressing; and so fell a prey to their own fears.

"But when you take into consideration the little prospect of our effecting a landing where there were batteries almost all around the shores, and cutters to intercept any attempt, with guard-boats to make discoveries, the measure would look more like madness, than rational conduct.

"There was another objection to the measure; that was, our force was unequal to the attempt—the party detached to make the landing should have been superior to the whole garrison; the remaining part left in camp to cover the stores, and co-operate occasionally with the detachment after they had effected a landing, should have been equally strong. For, both being so circumstanced as to render it necessary to be able, independent of each other, to resist the whole British garrison; if either had been deficient, it might have proved the ruin of all. If the party that was landed had not been superior to the garrison, they would have been defeated, and not having any ships to cover their retreat, all would have been lost. Or if, during the embarkation the garrison had sallied, the troops left in camp would have been put to the rout, and nearly the whole have been made prisoners, and all our cannon and stores would have fallen into the enemy's hands.

"These are common and probable events in war, and to be guarded against accordingly. The garrison at Newport was generally thought to be 6,000 strong, including sailors; our force amounted to 9,000 at most; indeed, the field returns made it but 8,174, and the much greater part of these, militia; but I would swell it to the utmost extent, and still you will see it will fall far

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short of the necessary number to warrant the measure, even supposing ours to have been all regular troops.

"Here I cannot help remarking, that some people seem desirous of deceiving themselves with regard to our strength. They rather incline to credit the votes of assembly, and the resolves of councils of war with regard to numbers, than returns actually taken on the ground. Would not a general officer be a fool to take a measure from numbers voted him for an expedition, without examining them, to see how they agreed with his actual force fit for duty? Some, I hear, assert that our strength must have been much greater than our returns, from the number of rations that were drawn. I remember very well last winter at Valley Forge, our army drew 32,000 rations, when the most we could muster fit for duty was about 7,500. In all irregular armies there will be generally one third more rations drawn, than in a well appointed one, to have the same strength on the ground. Therefore, there can be no safe conclusion drawn from the circumstance of the rations; their being either greater or less, is no certain evidence of the real strength of an army.

"I am further informed, you think this expedition has been the worst concerted, and most disgracefully executed, of any one during the war. I must confess I differ widely from you in opinion. I think it prudently concerted, and honourably, as well as faithfully executed. If the general had attempted to storm the lines in common form, he would have met with a disgraceful defeat. Some people are foolish enough to think that because the northern army carried Burgoyne's lines, that these might have been attempted with equal success, not adverting to the difference of circumstances. These lines were ten times as strong as those of Burgoyne's; besides which, the enemy came out of their works there, and our people drove them back again, and entered *pell mell* with them. Burgoyne's force was much less than this garrison, his troops much dispirited, the army that surrounded him more than as strong again in regular troops as ours.

"Remember the loss of the British army before Ticonderoga, last war, in attempting to storm lines, inconsiderable when compared to the fortifications at Newport, and defended with a less number of men in the works than were here. Recollect the fate of the British army at Bunker's hill, attacking slight works defended by new levied troops. Consider the disgrace and defeat that happened to the Hessians upon the attack of the inconsiderable redoubt at Red Bank, and then form a judgment what prospect General Sullivan had of success in making an attack with an army composed chiefly of militia, upon a garrison as strong as that at Newport, consisting almost wholly of regular troops, and fortified so securely as they were. There was but one possible

mode of attack—by storm, which was proposed to the general; but the men necessary for the attempt could not be found, and, consequently, the attack could not be made.

"I am told you censure General Sullivan for not bringing on a general action, and urge my opinion as a proof of the propriety. I remember you asked me, why there had not been a general action, when you were on the island, the evening of the day of the battle. I told you, I had advised one in the morning, but that I believed the general had taken the more prudent measure. He had fought them by detachment, defeated and disgraced them, without running any great risk.

"Our numbers, at the time we left the enemy's lines, were not much superior to the garrison; we know they expected a reinforcement hourly. Had any considerable force arrived the night we retreated, landed, and marched out with the old garrison, we should have met with a defeat. The smallness of our numbers, the dispirited state all troops are in on a retreat, together with the probability of the enemy's having received a reinforcement, determined the general not to risk a general action, when he was sure of an advantage in a partial one, and by risking a general one, he exposed the whole of his troops to certain ruin on a defeat. He thought the other measure most advisable, and I think so too, upon cool reflection, although I thought otherwise at the time.

"I have seen as much service almost, as any man in the American army: and have been in as many, or more engagements than any one. I know the character of all our general officers as well as any one, and if I am any judge, the expedition has been prudently and well conducted, and I am confident there is not a general officer, from the commander in chief to the youngest in the field, who would have gone greater lengths to have given success to the expedition than General Sullivan. He is sensible, active, ambitious, brave and persevering in his temper, and the object was sufficiently important to make him despise every difficulty opposed to his success, as far as he was at liberty to consult his reputation; but the public good is of higher importance than personal glory; and the one is not to be gratified at the risk and expense of the other.

"I recollect your observations to me on board the fleet—that the reputation of the principal officers depended upon the success of the expedition. I have long since learned to despise vulgar prejudices, and to regulate my conduct by maxims more noble than popular sentiment. I have an honest ambition of meriting the approbation of the public, but I will never go contrary to my judgment, or violate my honour or conscience for a temporary salute.

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"If congress, or any particular state, who entrusts their troops under my command, thinks proper to give orders to run all risks and hazards to carry a point, I would cheerfully lead on the men; but when it is left discretionary, I must act agreeably to the dictates of my own judgment.

"People, from consulting their wishes rather than their reason, and by forming a character of the spirit and firmness of irregular troops more from general orders sounding their praise, than from any particular knowledge of their conduct, are led to expect more from such troops, than is in the power of any person to effect with them.

"I would just remark one thing further to you, that an attack with militia, in an open country where they could get off upon a defeat, might be very prudent, which would be very rash and unwarrantable upon an island.

"I have written thus much in justification of a person's character whom I esteem a good officer, and who, I think, is much more deserving your thanks than reproach, and that of the public also. With regard to myself, it was unnecessary for me to say any thing in justification of the measure of collecting the troops at Providence, because I had no voice in it; neither was I opposed to a storm, providing a proper number of men of a suitable quality could be found for the attempt. My advice for a general action, I think was wrong; and the retreat that followed, every body must allow was necessary, and that it was well conducted.

"I have been told that your brother Nicholas let fall some ungenerous insinuations with regard to me, a few days before the action upon the island.

"These are the rewards and gracious returns I am to expect, for years of hard and dangerous service, where every sacrifice of interest, ease, and domestic pleasure, has been given up to the service of my country. But I flatter myself I am not dependent on the state of Rhode Island for either my character or consequence in life. However, I cannot help feeling mortified, that those who have been at home making their fortunes, and living in the lap of luxury and enjoying all the pleasures of a domestic life, should be the first to sport with the feelings of officers who have stood as a barrier between them and ruin.

"I am," &c.

The year 1778 terminated without any other event to call the talents or patriotism of Greene into requisition. The British army under Clinton had returned to New York, after the retreat of Sullivan; and from this time to the close of the war, the enemy appear to have relinquished all hopes of effecting a conquest of the states, north of the Chesapeake. But the hope was relin-

quished with evidences of disappointment and irritation that did but little honour to the British arms. The predatory expeditions occasionally undertaken from this time, were distinguished only by rapine, conflagrations and murders. Until the arrival of the French to the aid of America, or perhaps until the recall of Howe and substitution of Clinton, the war had been conducted in a style honourable to the British nation. With the exception of the burning of Esopus, and some other irregularities committed on the same expedition, the enemy had not been charged with inhumanity, or a deviation from the practices of civilized warfare, in any other particular than the treatment of prisoners on board their prison ships. This was, indeed, horrible, from the American account; but the enemy urged many circumstances in extenuation of the charge. From this time, wherever they advanced they were to be tracked by blood unnecessarily shed, or followed by the light of wanton conflagrations. Witness the massacre of Bayler's troop of dragoons at Tappan, by Major General Gray; and of a party of American militia surprised by Ferguson, near Egg-Haabour. Witness the burning of private dwellings at Bedford, and near the Vineyard. The descent made by Collyer and Mathews on Virginia; that of Tryon and General Garth on Connecticut; and to these may be added the invasion of South Carolina under Prevost, in which the enemy on their retreat, justly merited the epithet of a plundering banditti. CHAP. V.

During the year 1779 the British government appear to have been too busily employed upon the ocean and abroad, to have meditated any important operations on the American continent. When they did resume active operations on the land, those operations were principally directed against the southern states. 1779

It has been before repeatedly mentioned, that it was only in the hour of battle that Greene had stipulated for the right to advance from the curtain behind which he silently conducted the indispensable, though less dignified, duties of his department.

The whole of the year 1779 passed away without presenting any opportunity for a general action. The British army, about sixteen thousand strong, were distributed between New York and Newport—in the former six, in the latter ten thousand men. Washington's whole force from north to south, did not exceed that number. With about five thousand under himself at Middlebrook, and the same number divided between M'Dougal and Putnam, in the Highlands, he could do nothing more than watch and counteract the movements of his enemy; and, excepting a few affairs of posts, and an expedition, under Sullivan, against the northern Indians, this whole campaign passed away in a state of inactivity in the northern states. In the southern, there

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were a few occurrences, which we will have occasion, hereafter, briefly to notice.

Forts Montgomery and Clinton, which were first held by the Americans to command the North River, had fallen into the hands of the enemy; and the next passes above, called Stoney and Verplank's Points, were then fixed upon for the same purpose; but these again, after various vicissitudes, and the gallant action of Wayne in storming the former, remained also finally in the hands of the enemy. The attention of the American engineers was then fixed by the singular combination of advantages possessed by West Point, and great efforts were made to render it impregnable. Here Washington established his head quarters, and here he remained until it was necessary to go into winter quarters. He then hutted one half of his army under General Heath, at this place, and with the other half established himself, in the same mode, near Morristown in New Jersey. In the mean time, D'Estaing having repaired his ships at Boston, had sailed to the West Indies, had been strongly reinforced and returned to the American coast. Admiral Howe also had been reinforced, but Clinton thought it prudent to withdraw his troops from Rhode Island; and occupied himself in strongly fortifying New York Island, whilst he prepared to make an attack upon Charleston in South Carolina.

In the winter of 1779–80, Washington's army was reduced even to abject distress. Hunger, cold, and nakedness, combined to render their situation truly deplorable. Congress were without credit and without money. To tender to the farmer or merchant their depreciated paper, in payment for the articles wrested from them, was to add mockery to oppression. And to take without compensation, was to render the cause of independence odious. Death and desertion thinned the ranks of the American army, and the miserable plan of depending upon the states to keep up quotas, instead of enlisting, as Washington and Greene had early recommended, on the credit, and in the immediate service of congress, prevented the numbers voted, from ever being, one half, in the field.

As difficulties thickened, Washington remonstrated, his officers complained, the army murmured, and the quarter-master and commissary-generals became importunate for money. Unfortunately, at that time, congress had become distracted by party. The dignified unanimity with which they had hitherto proceeded, had forsaken them; Jefferson, Franklin, Adams, Laurens, the Rutledges, and several others of their great leaders, were absent, at home or abroad, promoting the common cause by many successful efforts. Party always renders a legislative body fretful, and the members naturally became discontented with every body, because not content with themselves. Com-

plaints the most unfounded began to circulate against the quarter-master and commissary departments. And congress imagined that they could remedy evils flowing really from the want of money in themselves, by correcting the administration or organization of those two departments. CHAP. V.

The commander in chief, confident in the integrity and ability with which the two departments had been conducted, and dreading the consequences of the want of practical knowledge in congress, and not less of the temper which occasionally gleamed through their proceedings, summoned to his aid the talents and experience of Greene and Schuyler, and digested a system adapted to the actual state of the country and the army, which, with his characteristic modesty, he brought to the notice of congress. Accompanying this communication was an offer from Greene to administer it gratuitously, "for the country needed the system, and it was practical and easy."

Hard is the lot of man in public life where the expenditure of money constitutes a part of his duty. The most exalted virtue there, exposes him to the most jealous suspicion. A selfish, sordid world cannot admit of the possibility of disinterestedness in the individual who offers to discharge such offices gratuitously. A purer, more unsullied character than Greene had from infancy sustained, is seldom to be met with. Had the public formed but a just estimate of the purity and judgment of Washington, his selection of Greene for the department he presided over, and his unabated, nay, increasing confidence in that officer, ought to have satisfied them that no sinister motive dictated this offer. Yet was it resorted to as "confirmation strong" of the original and malevolent insinuations thrown out against his administration.

It is, indeed, fortunate for the support of human virtue, that the good man can, with confidence, look forward to the time, "when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed." Were it not for the reality of another, this life would but too often disgust those who add most to its ornament and happiness. Calumny is the great evil of the human state; the most wary cannot wholly escape from it, and those who least merit imputation, are too commonly the least guarded against its attacks. They apprehend it not, and, of course, are indifferent about collecting or preserving the evidence necessary to avert it. Eminence is the favourite target for its shafts; for little souls are ever intent to draw down the more elevated to their own miserable level. "I cannot bear that he should be called just," is a reason oftener acted upon than owned. It has, indeed, been correctly said, that a good life is the unfailing remedy against this evil. But the poison circulates with rapidity, whilst the antidote operates but slowly. Far and wide does calumny often circulate before it reaches the ears of its victim. As a mere topic of conversation, it passes rapidly among

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the indifferent, whilst envy and malevolence urge its speed through too large a portion of the world. And the unwillingness of friends to disturb the tranquillity of its object, by communicating what they disbelieve and despise, produces a backwardness on their part, to make the communication.

In the present instance, however, it was productive of a curious and characteristic incident between Greene and one of his brothers. That such a report prevailed, was communicated to the latter at his residence in Rhode Island. Mounting his horse, he sought the general at the distance of one hundred and fifty miles, at his quarters near Morristown. Greene's cordial salutation was met with rather a dignified reserve, for the brother had still to ascertain whether he was addressing himself to an honest man. A private conference was immediately requested, and as promptly granted. "I have come, brother," in a voice half choked by emotion, "to inform you, that you are charged with improper conduct in your office; are you innocent?" With an affectionate smile, and a hand firmly placed on the heart, the reply was, "I am." The brother, after rendering thanks to the Almighty, and giving vent to the feelings that had impeded his utterance, had nothing more to detain him. But the information sunk deep into the general's recollection, and he resolved to quit the office, as soon as he could resign it with honour and without prejudicing the service.

It is with a feeling of disgust that the writer of these pages enters upon the task of vindicating the subject of them from a charge which nothing could for a moment support, but malevolence, and an ignorance of his intrinsic worth and simplicity of character. It would be enough to allege a fact that is known to all who knew him, *that he left the office poorer than he entered upon it*, although his habits were frugal, and his style of living scarcely equal to what his station required. But there is other evidence in existence of a nature above suspicion, and which it may be satisfactory to the reader to peruse. It is drawn from his private and confidential correspondence, which spoke from the heart, and could not have been intended for the public eye.

Among the earliest attachments of the general's life, was one formed with a cousin of the name of Griffin Greene. And to the close of their lives, the affectionate regard in which they held each other, was nearly proverbial. It does not appear that Griffin possessed any brilliancy of talent. But the qualities of the heart were what rivetted the general's affections to him. Of a temper irritable to a fault, his companions viewed him almost with apprehension; but Greene, who had nothing to fear from his impetuosity, had distinguished in him a noble ingenuousness and disinterested devotion where his affections fastened, on which he knew how to set its proper value. Nor was

it perhaps, among the least of the causes that wedded him to this early friend, that he had himself been greatly instrumental in correcting the faultiness of his temper. Gratitude from the one followed the effort, while the other, under an influence wisely grafted into the nature of man, contemplated in his friend, a being improved by his own exertions. Their correspondence shows the warmth of their mutual attachment, and the unbounded confidence of their private communications. Of the truth of this, let the following serve as a specimen. On the 17th of August 1780, General Greene writes to his friend from camp in the following terms: CHAP. V.

"Nothing could have been more welcome than your letter of the 30th ult. It has relieved me from the greatest anxiety, being apprehensive that you had taken offence at some part of my conduct; although, upon the strictest examination, I could find nothing in it that could have wounded your feelings." "Our long and happy connexion has been such a source of happiness to me, that I tremble when any occurrence happens which threatens an interruption." "I should esteem it one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall me, to find myself sinking in the friendship and esteem of those whom I value." "I am not much afraid of any thing of this kind taking place between you and me; but the best way to avoid the evil is, to guard the heart against all impressions urged by envy and malevolence, which often mingle in the affairs of mankind."

And in another letter of the 29th of August 1779, we have the following expressions: "I hope you do not think me negligent for not writing to you oftener; depend upon it, it is not for want of affection, for my heart feels an unceasing regard for you, and I hope ever will. You are to me as a brother, nay, nearer than a brother; as Jonathan loved David, so do I love you."

In the confidential intercourse of men who feel thus towards each other, there is no room for disguise, and those who are acquainted with the language of the heart, will recognize in the following extract, the genuine expressions of indignant integrity.

It is contained in a letter of the 29th of June 1780. "I beg you to write to me by every opportunity, as nothing is more agreeable than domestic matters in this bustle of life. You cannot imagine what pleasure letters from our friends afford. You are at home among all your connexions, and think less of us who are absent, than we of you. You are happy in your circle, we are not

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so, and, therefore, want something to entertain us. No pleasure is equal to domestic happiness. This mode of life is living for ourselves, every other is living for other people. I wish the war was over, that I might return to my dear fireside. I can say with Solomon, 'all is vanity and vexation of spirit.' The world is full of folly, superstition, and ignorance, and overrun with malice, prejudices and detraction. Good intentions are no security against abuse, especially when ambition is to be gratified by prostituting honour and justice. Little did I think when I first engaged in the public service, it was such a slippery, thorny path. My heart was honestly devoted to the public interest, and I expected to feel myself rewarded according to the merit of my actions. But what a novice did I find myself. The black passion of jealousy, and the cankering spirit of envy, had well nigh worked my overthrow, before I had the least idea that I had an enemy in the world. I was an enemy to no man, and could not see why they should be to me. But so it was, and so it will be to the end of the world, in political life."

Our reader is already partially acquainted with the correspondence between the general and his elder brother. He will have occasion to become more so, when we come to consider our hero in his domestic relations. As early as April 1779, he writes to this brother in the following words: "You mention the envious dispositions of Mr. —— and Mr. ——. I expected nothing better from the first of these gentlemen; the last, I thought had more principle than to be wholly under the influence of a spirit of detraction; but it is as impossible for a person to be appointed to a place of either honour or profit, and not be subject to the attacks of the malevolent and envious, as it is for the sun to shine and vegetation not to spring.

"I feel the attacks of such people daily, but as I am conscious of having faithfully discharged my duty, I regard them the less. There have been great pains taken of late to draw a cloud over my department, from the amazing disbursements that have taken place. But as that has been owing to the depreciation of money, and not to want of economy, I regard it the less. However, it is a popular subject, and the people in general seem to be better pleased at finding their servants rascals, than at finding them honest and faithful to their trust. I have just returned from Philadelphia, where I have been to make a representation of the growing clamours. I have told the congress I will not serve them at the risk of my reputation, and if they think my reward greater than my merit, I wish to quit the business; or if my past services are not satisfactory, it is my desire to leave the department, as I have no hopes to conduct the business more to their satisfaction. This representation I have

made in writing, to which they have given no answer. But they give me all the assurances in their individual capacity that I can wish or desire, 'that they have the most perfect confidence in my justice and integrity, as well as ability and attention.' However, these assurances did not satisfy me, as I knew they might vanish like smoke, at a future day, and would not serve as vouchers to the public for my justification." CHAP. V.

At that time, however, calumny was not able to prevail over the unquestionable evidence in favour of the quarter-master-general's department; and on the 7th of June following, the congress passed a resolve, that they "had full confidence in the integrity and abilities of the quarter-master-general and commissary-general; [Colonel Wadsworth;] and although there is reason to believe, that abuses have been committed by inferior officers in their respective departments, yet congress are persuaded that many of them deserve well of their country, and that measures will speedily be taken to distinguish such of them as have been faithful from such as have been otherwise, and thereby cause justice to be done to all."

Greene was sufficiently soothed by this resolve to listen to the solicitations of the commander in chief and of the army, not to relinquish the quarter-master's department. But calumny when once set in circulation, seldom ceases to extend and diffuse itself until it no longer continues to be a subject of curiosity, malevolence, or conversation. And unfortunately the improvidence and folly of some of the minor agents of the department, gave too much countenance to the report, that all who were employed in administering it, were acquiring immense fortunes by fraud and peculation. In the annals of that time, we have an anecdote of a Colonel John Mitchell, an agent in this department, and an honest, but ostentatious man, who gave an entertainment to the French ambassador at which the confectionary alone cost £800. Unfortunately, also, the attack and defence of the general staff became a party object, and the unhappy dissentions at that time prevailing in congress, soon blew up the phantom to an alarming magnitude.

The commissary-general, in some measure, escaped the persecution, for he was not followed by the envy which necessarily attended the favourite. There happened also again to be a remnant of the faction commonly called Conway's faction, in congress, and they uniformly fastened on Greene as a favourite object. This affair requires the more attention from his biographer, as its malevolence was particularly directed against himself and General Knox, as the known inseparable adherents of the commander in chief. And at last, was worked up to such a state as to eventuate in a serious design, conceived

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by some of the members of congress, and actually moved and debated, to deprive Greene of his command in the line.

The general clamour was, "the officers in that department are all acquiring the estates of nabobs, and the expenses of the army are enormous." Unfortunately for poor Greene, the first member of this notable syllogism which led to the conclusion of his guilt, was not true. And of this, we are in possession of evidence that would have put to shame his most hardy persecutor.

Among the many inestimable friends who attached themselves to him during his military career, there was no one whom General Greene prized more, or more justly, than the late Governor Read of Pennsylvania. It was before this gentleman had immortalized himself by his celebrated reply to the agent of corruption, that these two distinguished patriots had begun to feel for each other the sympathies of congenial souls. Mr. Read had accompanied General Washington to Boston, when he first took command of the American army; there he became acquainted with Greene, and, as was almost invariably the case with those who became acquainted with him, and had hearts to acknowledge his worth, a friendship ensued which lasted with their lives. Had that of Governor Read been sufficiently prolonged, he would have discharged in a manner worthy of the subject, the debt of national gratitude to which the humble efforts of the writer of these pages are now dedicated. We are in possession of the outlines of a sketch of the life of Greene in the handwriting of this friend.

Many letters are in our possession expressive of sentiments on both sides equally warm and animated, and it may well be asserted, that the evil of misrepresentation had arisen to an alarming height when such a friend could, in a letter to our hero, address him in the following language: "*Your situation in the main army was a delicate one, and I verily believe, a good man in it thought himself bound to treat you with less friendship than you deserved, or he felt, lest his own character should be lessened.*"

The clamours of the day did not vent themselves alone upon the head of the quarter-master-general's department. His two assistants, Mr. Petit and Colonel Coxe, bore their proportionate share of the malicious attack. It is a fact but little known, but of which there exists the most incontestible proofs, that the appointment of those two gentlemen was a condition upon which Greene accepted the appointment that he held in the staff, and the arrangement was made under the friendly auspices of Governor Read.

The duties imposed on that department comprised the whole extent of the United States. To have waded through the immense details incident to that office, and extending to every part of the union, and every expedition that

might have been going on it, was beyond human power. Greene felt full confidence in his own talents to combine and direct the whole, but to hope to be competent to superintend immediately, the receipt and application of money, and the multifarious mercantile transactions which unavoidably must result from the undertaking, would have been an instance of weak confidence of which he was incapable. The talents, integrity, zeal, and capacity for business of those two gentlemen, were well known, and Governor Read's individual influence over them secured their consent to act. But such was the disinterestedness with which Greene entered upon the undertaking, that he voluntarily relinquished to them an equal participation in all the pay and emoluments incident to the office. CHAP. V.

Their conduct was such as merited the sacrifice, and ought to have vindicated his motives and judgment in securing their services for the country. But unfortunately, this arrangement which, in the integrity of their hearts, none of the parties ever concealed, but rather felt that it ought to be viewed as a subject of public commendation, was basely perverted into evidence of an artful copartnership, and a league to cover and promote peculation. Let the private correspondence of these gentlemen develope the principles upon which they acted, and the opinions they entertained of each other.

In a letter of March 9th, 1778, General Greene writes to Governor Read thus: "I will share the profits equally with Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit; or, in other words, I will leave two thirds to be divided as they can agree; but I would wish, for the satisfaction of the whole, that all were equally interested, there could then be no complaints. Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit cannot wish or expect any thing more generous and equal than this—I am appointed principal in the department, made responsible for all the branches, I am taken out of the line of distinction, I shall be subject to as much fatigue as any one, and more expense. I only agreed to accept the department upon Colonel Coxe's being joined. I would gladly relinquish it to him if practicable, but if not, I am ready to act, provided the Colonel undertakes to act. But I cannot engage upon the conditions of the present appointment, upon any other terms than the foregoing. I wish Mr. Petit to engage in it, because I have a great opinion of his integrity. I am persuaded Colonel Coxe will agree that Mr. Petit shall share equally with him."

In another letter to the same gentleman he observes, "Mr. Petit is every way to my liking, there is a most happy assemblage of good qualities in him, necessary to constitue the man of business and the confidental friend." And

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in this opinion the reader would fully coincide, were it consistent with the object of this work, to fill our pages with the luminous, patriotic, and well written letters of this gentleman. From one only shall we extract a passage, as elucidating the subject which immediately engages our attention. It is dated September 24th, 1779. "But after all, it appears to me very doubtful whether we can with propriety continue in our stations another year. The emoluments we receive on the present footing, we do not esteem more than bare compensation for our trouble, and at the same time we have the reputation of amassing the fortunes of nabobs, and, of course, are held up as objects of envy, and other invidious passions. These are reasons that affect us both alike; but we have each our separate objections. Yours you have mentioned. Military fame is not only out of my reach, but out of my view, and, of course, holds out no temptation to me; neither am I thirsty for fame in any of the public walks of life; my desires, in this respect, grow fainter every day: my pursuit now, is ease and retirement, which I would gladly seize as soon as I find it in my power, consistently with the duties of a parent; and as to this, I do not extend my views farther than giving my children a good education, and securing to my family the means of living in a decent mediocrity. How far this is now in my reach depends on the winding up of our political affairs, and therefore it appears to me necessary to remain in the busy world till the time and manner of closing these affairs can be better discerned. At the same time, I doubt whether in point of profit we should wish to continue in office. Clamours, however ill founded, run so high, that some sacrifice must be made, and at least some considerable changes to appease the people. These changes may probably place us in a situation far from profitable or desirable, unless we should *choose to justify the suspicions of the multitude by deriving profits in a way we both despise, however commonly it may have been practised in like cases.* But, however this may be, the consideration that by attempting a much longer continuance, we may lose the opportunity of retiring with fair reputations, deserves no small weight. Before we take any decided step in the matter, I think we ought to come to a full understanding with congress, and learn their mind on several points; for there may be as much danger in attempting to withdraw abruptly, or against their will, as in continuing too long."

Nothing had been omitted, on the part of General Greene, to conciliate the confidence of congress, and afford every opportunity for investigating his conduct. As it was possible that the murmurs abroad, and the invidious hints which were occasionally thrown out in the newspapers, may have infected the minds of the members, even as early as April 1779 he repaired to Philadelphia,

and solicited a conference with a committee of that body, on subjects relative to the duties and situation of his department. CHAP. V.

A committee was accordingly appointed, and an ample and luminous view of the state of that department was laid before them. On a previous day, he had addressed to the president, Mr. Jay, a letter, in which he pointed out many improvements that he thought indispensably necessary to the perfect organization of that department; and in it, it is remarkable that he recommends strongly the increase of the pay of all concerned in it except himself. He now took occasion to renew the same subject, but that it might not be thought that this conference was solicited with any private views, he cautiously avoided whatever related to himself individually. Yet, knowing the importance in a popular government of enjoying the support of opinion, and seriously wishing to quit a station in which all the disinterestedness with which he had undertaken it, and the ability and integrity with which he had discharged it, had not been sufficient to protect him from suspicion, the day after this conference he addressed to the president of congress the following letter:

"PHILADELPHIA, 27*th April* 1779.

"SIR,

"When I had the honour to meet a committee of congress on Friday last, I took occasion to mention to them my apprehensions that some reports which were spread abroad concerning the quarter-master's department, would have a tendency injurious to public service, by souring the minds of the people, and rendering it difficult to obtain the necessary supplies for the army. But as that part of the conference was not committed to writing, and may not have been considered in so serious a light as I intended, I take the liberty of communicating it more fully to your excellency by letter.

"The gentlemen appointed by congress to assist me, as well as myself, begin to be alarmed at the murmurings and complaints which have of late been spread abroad to the prejudice of the system and management of our department. It is scarcely possible to govern a department so extensive, and which requires the employment of so many persons in different places, without giving opportunities to dishonest men, in the detail of the business, to take undue advantages; but from the care taken in the choice of our agents, and the attention which has been paid to the economy of the business, we have reason to believe there have been as few of these abuses as could reasonably have been expected. We, therefore, believe, that these growing clamours are founded on general suspicions, rather than on facts, and propagated from improper mo-

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tives; and though we are conscious of having faithfully discharged our duty to the best of our abilities, we are nevertheless apprehensive that injurious imputations, however unjust, may reach our reputations, and that unless those evil reports are speedily corrected, jealousies and discontents may grow among the people to injury of the public service.

"I cannot but consider the department in a critical situation, and should the prejudices of the people throw new difficulties in the way of our business, it cannot fail of producing some disagreeable consequences. We, therefore, request the favour of congress to signify their sense of our conduct.

"If the present system on which our agents are employed, is thought to be prejudicial to the public interest, and that a new one ought to be adopted, we have already declared our willingness to give aid to such a measure.

"Our highest ambition has been to give satisfaction to the army, and to merit the approbation of congress. These ends we have assiduously endeavoured to obtain, but if our past services have no claim to this honour, we have no hopes of succeeding in future, and would wish to give place to abler hands. We pretend not to be regardless of the pecuniary reward we derive from the public, but a fair reputation and the esteem of our fellow-citizens, we value at a much higher rate. No pecuniary consideration would, therefore, induce us to continue longer in the present employment, than is consistent with their preservation. We did not solicit our appointment, neither have we a wish to hold it, if our merit is less than our reward.

"I have the honour to be," &c.

Every word of this letter is given to the reader, that he may the better judge of the temper that must, at that time, have swayed the judgment of congress, when it could have given umbrage, and drawn upon him the imputation of writing it under the influence of passion. Yet so it was; and instead of exciting their admiration for the purity and manliness of the sentiments that it breathes, it was the origin of that personal feeling which afterwards exhibited its full force against him.

In a letter of the 13th of January following, written at New Windsor, and which was drawn forth by a communication from his friend Mr. Petit, who resided at the seat of government, he thus expresses himself on this subject:

"The congress are mistaken if they suppose I wrote either under the influence of passion or prejudice. I wrote what I thought, and I think what I wrote. It is no small misfortune, that that body are too little acquainted with the nature of the business of the staff, to distinguish between evils incident and

inseparable from it, and those which originate from neglect or any other improper cause. Designing men, who dislike the system or the agents employed in it, have nothing more to do, to ruin the one or destroy the other, than to employ a few secret emissaries to instil poison and jealousies into the people. This being worked up into a ferment, and the congress ignorant of the cause, they fall upon measures to remedy the evil that only serve to add new difficulties. They who do not support measures from their usefulness, will ever be the sport of designing men. It is astonishing, how easily the honest and well-meaning, are duped too, into the most destructive measures, by the secret artifices of a few. In a government like ours, how cautious ought legislators to be in crediting evil reports to the prejudice of their servants; and how careful to examine their actions before a judgment is formed, or a decision takes place! How much the reverse of this has been the policy of congress in several instances!

"I will venture to pronounce, we shall ever be in confusion and distress while popular frenzy takes the lead in administration, instead of just measures founded in maxims of sound policy.

"Have not the tories a power to render us odious to one another? Cannot they create jealousies concerning the designs of the army? How easily can they brand the fairest characters as violators of public trust! Nothing is easier than to set such measures in operation; and distrust and deep-rooted prejudices, with perhaps violent measures against the suspected, are the consequences.

"*A bad system* and *abuse of trust* are popular subjects. Change your system and remove delinquents, is their cry. This must be done to satisfy the people, whether any more useful system can be substituted, or better men be found to serve in the department or not. The object of administration seems to be, not whether business be well done, but whether individuals gain by it; not whether better men or better systems can be adopted, but whether a change is a popular measure. Unfortunate people! to be the sport of every wind and tide of passion and prejudice. I have said very little to any body in support of the system, or in justification of those employed in the department. But I am confident, fatal experience will soon convince the world that there can be no change for the better. The constitution of the department, or the extent of its business, appears to be little known to congress. Therefore, the monies expended in it, are in amount both alarming and inexplicable to them. It is evident they know nothing of the nature of the business from their manner of inquiry. Neither have they any idea of the difficulties incident to it. I enclose you a copy of what I wrote to congress, by which you

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will see I shall consider myself a volunteer after your resignation, and determine to get out of the business as soon as possible, without giving my enemies an advantage over me from the manner in which I leave the department. This precaution may be necessary for you to attend to. I entered this department upon the express condition of your acting with me; the moment you quit, I shall think myself at liberty also. There are few men with whom I would be concerned in business like this. Men are difficult to be found whose capacity, knowledge of business, temper and integrity can be relied on. And to be connected with men deficient in either, or to form connexions at haphazard, is a risk that I will not run. I am willing to make any reasonable sacrifice, but I will not expose my character and fortune to certain ruin. As soon as you announce your resignation formally to me, I shall send in mine. But at the same time, I mean to offer my services as a volunteer, but will not be answerable for monies spent in the department, or for the supplies that may be wanted. I have found it very difficult to support myself with our united exertions. What is to be expected, therefore, when two principal branches are lopped off?

"I like you address to congress, and would cheerfully have signed it, if it had been only to awaken their attention to the state of the department. I am far from being displeased with your resignation. I think you have just cause, and would be wanting to yourself were you to continue in office. This circumstance will open a door through which I can escape out of the department, which both my wishes and interest lead to. It is now in a tolerable state. I am not certain it would be in my power to continue it so with our whole exertions; and, therefore, it may be a happy circumstance in the end, that we have an opportunity of quitting it when in a tolerable condition."

As a prospect of being able to resign with reputation, he thought now presented itself, he deemed it expedient to draw up an exposé of the circumstances under which he had at first undertaken, and ever continued to discharge the duties of that department, and for that purpose addressed a letter to the late Mr. Duane, who was then a representative in congress from the state of New York, and had ever been distinguished for his excellence of heart and gravity of character. This letter furnishes the fullest, and certainly the most authentic history of this period of General Greene's life.

"I have had frequent conversations with you upon the quarter-master's department. Your being at the head of the treasury board, president of the committee for conferring with the general, and perfectly acquainted with the

secrets of congress, as well as their opinions and sentiments respecting men and measures, I wish to explain myself to you upon the subject more fully than I hitherto have done. CHAP. V.

"It has been hinted to me, that some members of congress think I am too griping in my demands, and am making a fortune too rapidly. As this is an insinuation of a personal nature, and implies a charge of taking an ungenerous advantage of the public necessities, I feel myself not a little hurt at it.

"There is not a man in the army who has been a greater slave to public business from the infancy of the war, than I have; and I flatter myself no one more useful in the humble station in which I have served. I have been in every action that has taken place with the grand army since the commencement of the war, except those upon Long Island and at the White Plains. And although I have never derived any great military merit, yet no one has been more exposed, or more intent upon doing his duty. I think, therefore, I may claim some merit, as I make very great sacrifices in leaving the honours of the line, at a season when I had the fairest prospects of reaping personal advantages by my military services.

"I have never spent a single moment in attending to my own private affairs since I entered the army, nor have I been at my own home above an hour, and that on the march from Boston to New York, except when I went on the Rhode Island expedition last summer, and then I was near home but about a fortnight. I trust, therefore, it will not be thought that I am not unreasonably attentive to my own private interest, especially when it is known that I had a considerable interest in trade, which I have been obliged to leave to the direction of others, with a transfer of a great proportion of the profits to transact the business.

"The emolument expected from the quarter-master's department I freely confess, are flattering to my fortune, but not less humiliating to my military pride. I have as fair pretensions to an honourable command as those who hold them, and while I am drudging in an office from which I shall receive no honour, and very few thanks, I am losing an opportunity of doing justice to my military character. And what adds to my mortification is, that my present humiliating employment is improved to pave the way for others' glory. There is a great difference between being *raised* to an office and *descending* to one. Had I been an inferior officer, I might have thought myself honoured by the appointment. But as I was high in rank in the army, I have ever considered it as derogatory to serve in this office. It was with the greatest difficulty that I could prevail on myself to engage in the business. Nothing but the wretched state that the department was in, and the consequent ruin

CHAP. V. that must follow, added to the general's and the committee of congress' solicitations, could have procured my consent. It was not with a view to profit; for the general and the committee of congress well remember, that I offered to serve a year, (unconnected with the accounts of the department,) in the military line, without any additional pay to that which I had as major general. But as this plan did not comport with their views, I told them that I would serve upon the same conditions that Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit could be engaged upon; and I have no more now than they have—notwithstanding my situation subjects me to a double share of fatigue, and holds me responsible for every failure. My emoluments are far less than the commissary-general, while the duties of my office are infinitely more perplexing and troublesome.

"However high you may consider the late proposition which I made to congress as a reward for my services, it was far short of what the other gentlemen concerned in it thought themselves entitled to; and I believe they could not have been brought to engage upon such terms as were offered, had I not told them it was what the president of congress and the gentlemen of the general's own family advised.

"I did not solicit the appointment in the first instance, neither am I solicitous to hold it. I wish but to know the inclinations of congress in that respect, to gratify their wishes. I undertook the business with a flattering expectation of meeting with their approbation; but I can have no hopes of succeeding if they think my reward higher than my merit. I will appeal to facts for my fidelity.

"The distress of the army and the confusion of the department at the time I entered upon it, are notorious. I wish but to have the state of the department at the two periods, this and the last spring, fairly contrasted. I wish the general to be called upon, and every other officer in whatever department, to know whether they have not had every assistance that they had a right to demand of the office, or that the state of the country would admit of. And also whether the business has not been conducted with as much economy and order, as could be expected in the confused state in which I found it, and from the complexity of its nature.

"I found the line of the army and the staff almost at open war. The differences subsisting between them I have been happy enough to reconcile, and to restore a mutual good understanding; in a word, I have had a very laborious task. The business of the department has been very expensive. The decline of the currency, the avarice of the people, and the plan of the war, have rendered it unavoidably so. I have studied economy as much as was in my power, and am persuaded there has been little wanton waste of public property. I cannot add more industry or attention to the business than I have

done. If my conduct is not satisfactory, it is my wish to quit a business wherein I cannot please. CHAP. V.

"I have been in expectation ever since I left Philadelphia of a new system. I gave you all the assurances in my power of seconding your measures, in any plan you should think proper to adopt. I have given in the conditions upon which I would act under it; which, by the by, are far from being thought unreasonable. On the contrary, the terms are considered moderate and equitable. How it got abroad into the world, I know not, but it seems it has, and such are people's sentiments respecting it. It is to be remembered, that the quarter-master-general in all armies is always liberally rewarded, as he receives no honour or laurels for all his toils. From the nature of the duty and the importance of the trust, the time and qualifications necessary to execute the office in all its branches, it cannot be thought that my proposition was the child of avarice, or a creature of extortion. So perfectly satisfied am I with the rectitude of my own actions, that I have not the least objection to the whole world being made acquainted with every circumstance and transaction. I have always written and spoken my mind truly to congress, and the committees acting under them, whenever I have thought it necessary for the public good. In doing this, I trust I have always preserved that decorum and respect which is due to so honourable a body. But if plain truth and matters of fact give offence, it is the matter, and not the manner that is faulty.

"I find difficulties enough that are incident to, and inseparable from, the office. If these are multiplied by prejudices and discontent, the task will be rendered intolerable.

"Previous to my engaging in the business, the committee of congress and the general promised me all the assistance that congress, or the different states could render, in aid of the business committed to my care. From some states I have had it, whilst in others I have met with almost every embarrassment. I only mention this circumstance to show on what a broad bottom I undertook the business, and to afford an opportunity of observing, that if my means be restricted, I cannot be responsible for the consequences.

"Having thus, sir, presented you an honest view of my present standing, may I solicit your advice as to the part I ought to act as most consistent with my own honour and the public wishes?"

This letter is an original historical document, comprising in itself both the fact and the evidence, and presenting a modest, yet manly narrative of services unquestionably rendered, sacrifices actually made, and feelings unaffectedly sincere. The circumstances under which it was written, the person to whom

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addressed, and the references it makes, all conspire to challenge investigation, and defy contradiction; whilst the sentiments it expresses are such as the soldier ought to breathe, and the man connected with society, is justified in avowing.

Although Greene did not resign at this time, it was perfectly understood that in continuing to hold the office, he had made a sacrifice of his wishes and interests to the solicitations of the commander in chief, the comforts of the army, and the general interests of a cause in which his zeal and ardour were unabated. Influenced by these motives also, Colonel Coxe and Mr. Petit still continued to act as his assistants, and patiently, they awaited the fulfilment of the soothing promises of congress to adopt such measures as would secure them against future embarrassments in their office.

A committee was accordingly appointed to report a new system for his department, and another to devise the means of checking the depreciation of the paper currency.

The former committee never reported until the month of March in the ensuing year; but pressing necessity drew forth from the latter, a system from which great things were expected, but which proved in the end a mere piece of quackery in finance.

The means devised to restore public credit were, to redeem the continental bills in circulation at the rate of forty for one, and that too, by a new emission from the same body that had promised *to pay the former in Spanish milled dollars at par*. But the states were individually to pledge themselves for the new emission. Unfortunately, the credit of the endorser was no better than that of the drawer, and the project resulted in very little more than one of those fluctuations in the value of a circulating medium, which serve to fatten the speculator at the expense of the ignorant or the credulous.

The other measure was, to supply the necessities of the army by chaining opinion to the car of legislation, and subjecting individual avarice to public exigency. The prices of articles of prime necessity were to be regulated by law.

All the states came readily into these measures, with the exception of Virginia; she at first rejected them by a large majority; and excited a degree of consternation in the breast of every whig, whilst the exultation of the enemy knew no bounds. "The rope of sand is at length broken," was their exclamation. By dint of extraordinary exertions, the Virginia legislature was prevailed upon to reconsider this vote, and the measures were finally adopted by a majority of two.

It will excite in our readers no small opinion of the political foresight of our hero, when it is shown that these occurrences drew forth from him a prediction of the result of these measures, and of the necessity of adopting a constitution independent of, and possessing some control over, the authority of the states. We have already secured to him the praise of having been, if not the first, at least among the first, who boldly espoused a declaration of independence; and are not a little gratified in having it in our power to prove, that he was at least among the first who suggested the necessity of our present constitution.

In a letter to a friend, dated August 15th, 1779, he writes thus: "I see by the eastern papers, they are making great exertions to give new credit to our money. The spirit is laudable, but the attempt will fail, without the aid of heavy taxes and a stop to emissions of paper. If the public are convinced that the congress and the states are in earnest about redeeming their money, it will rise in value, but there is the rub. One circumstance leads me to think they are really in earnest. Colonel Dyer, who was against redeeming the money at its full value formerly, is now supporting the necessity of the measure with all his influence. This, and some other circumstances, lead me to think there will be a serious attempt to redeem the money. If there is a trial, it will succeed."

In another letter of the 29th October of the same year, he observes, "The late regulations have had just the effect I at first expected. This kind of measures will always terminate in this way, that is, in adding to the evil they are meant to remedy. The great bodies of men who entered upon this plan to give support to the money, rather staggered my opinion in some stages of the business; although it was clearly opposed to the principles of commerce and the experience of mankind. Noise and bluster very often dupe our reason, and betray men into measures which their better judgment is unwilling to assent to. I wish to my soul the measure had been practicable, both for private and public reasons. I have been growing poorer every day for some time past, although nominally getting richer. The public business gets more and more difficult to manage, for want of some steady and uniform representative of property. Therefore, in every point of view it was clearly my interest to wish a regulation; but I was, and am still persuaded, the thing is impracticable. We may try the same thing over and over again, and it will always terminate in vexation and disappointment."

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And in another letter of June 29th, 1780, he observes, "The money has been in a most wretched train for a long time; the last plan of finance is far from being agreeable to every body. The state of Virginia has rejected it. This injudicious measure will give it a staggering blow, and I wish it may not give it a deadly wound. *The congress have lost their influence. No state in the union would have dared to counteract what they had recommended, three years ago.* But they have trifled so much with national faith and national honour, that their mandates begin to have no more force than the doings of a town-meeting. *I have for a long time seen the necessity for some new plan of civil constitution. I am more and more convinced of the necessity for it every day of my life. Unless there is some control over the states by the congress, and unless they are in some way more independent of the states than they have been, we shall soon be like a broken band.*"

We will detain the reader with two more short specimens of that foresight and judgment which constituted the true basis of Greene's influence over the minds of those who knew him.

The first is from a letter dated June 9th, 1779: "The state of the money is alarming; the depreciation grows more and more rapid with you, I find. Nothing but heavy taxes, and a considerable loan, properly applied, can save its declining credit. The congress seem to have got awake a little, with respect to the state of the money. They have ordered the states to raise sixty million of dollars this year. If the states will second their measures, the circumstances of the currency may change, but on that alone it depends. My observations in my former letter were founded on this supposition, that neither congress, nor the states, would take any adequate measures to restore credit and vigour to the declining currency. There are some of the first characters on the continent who think there is a party in congress, who wish to destroy the paper money altogether. Whether this suspicion is well, or ill founded, I cannot say; but there are many circumstances which give credit to such an opinion. The attempt is abominable; but party faction, and private views, are capable of almost any thing. I agree with you in sentiment, that if our currency fails, the congress will fail with it. You have seen their address to the states, and in addition to those it is said, a plan for negociating a loan is on foot, but what foundation there is for this opinion, I am a stranger to. It is impossible to tell, in their present situation, what turn affairs will take. The prospects of peace, and neglect of money, have brought us into a most disagreeable state. The most able politicians, and greatest financiers we have.

are at a loss to tell what turn our currency will take. I still hope its credit will be supported. I would rather give two thirds of my little fortune than have it sunk; it will be an everlasting disgrace upon us. I am not personally interested in the support of it, having no money in the loan, and very little by me or due to me." CHAP. V.

And in a letter of the 31st January 1780, he observes, "There never was a more difficult time to determine what is best to be done; some have great expectation of a peace. Some think one thing, and some another, concerning the money. I am of opinion, upon the whole, there will be some settled depreciation fixed at stated periods, and the money finally redeemed in this way. But how and what will be its fate, is unknown to me, and I believe to mortal man."

The winter of 1779–80 set in with unusual severity. It is still remembered emphatically, as "the cold winter." The British army, comfortably housed as they were in the cities, suffered greatly under the privations imposed upon them by being cut off from a free communication with the country.

But their sufferings were nothing when compared with what the Americans had to sustain. The country adjacent to New York, having been so long the seat of war, was nearly exhausted, and most of their supplies were necessarily brought from a great distance. The North River was frozen up at a very early day, and transportation by land supplied all their wants. When the roads had become in a state adapted to the use of sleds, this difficulty, in some measure was obviated, but until then, their camp was precariously supplied with the necessaries of life; for although the country afforded it, the miserable means by which it was to be procured, caused it either to be concealed, withdrawn, or withheld. The consequence was, that it was impossible ever to have in camp any quantity in depot, and when the transportation was interrupted by bad weather, the rations of the soldiers were reduced. On one occasion, after a succession of snow storms, they actually were so straitened for provision, that there was not in camp enough for a single regiment. Famine stared them in the face; for the roads were impassable, and naked and barefoot as they were, the soldiers could do little towards breaking the roads, (as it is termed,) and serious apprehensions were entertained, that they would disband and range at large in search of subsistence.

The hurried manner and strong language of the subjoined letter will show, either that a very serious alarm was excited in camp, or that the quarter-mas-

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ter-general knew how, when necessary, to excite it in others. It is addressed to the colonel of the Morristown militia.

"The army is upon the point of disbanding for want of provisions; the poor soldiers having been several days without any, and there not being more than a sufficiency to serve one regiment in the magazine. Provisions are scarce at best; but the late terrible storm, the depth of the snow and the drifts in the roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which is in readiness at the distant magazines. This is, therefore, to request you to call upon the militia officers and men of your battalion, to turn out their teams and break the roads between this and Hatchetstown, there being a small quantity of provisions there that cannot come on until that is done. The roads must be kept open by the inhabitants, or the army cannot be subsisted. And unless the good people immediately lend their assistance to forward supplies, the army must disband. The dreadful consequences of such an event I will not torture your feelings with a description of; but remember, the surrounding inhabitants will experience the first melancholy effects of such a raging evil. We would give you assistance were it in our power, but the army is stripped as naked of teams as possible to lessen the consumption of forage, which has reduced us to such straits as render us unable, with the teams we have, to do the duty called for in camp.

"You will call to your aid the overseers of highways, and every other order of men who can give dispatch and success to the business.

"P. S. Give no copies of this for fear it should get to the enemy."

Let this serve as a specimen of the arduous duties that Greene's office imposed upon him. For the manner in which those duties were discharged, there exist voluminous proofs of his guileless integrity, and even scrupulous attention to economy. The fair gains of his subordinate agents he felt no disposition to curtail, nor would he readily lend an ear to complaints against them. Yet wherever retrenchments were practicable, they were sternly insisted on, and where complaints appeared founded in probable causes, the faulty could not escape. Were we disposed to encumber these pages with letters not essential to display the opinions, character, talents, and worth of their subject, volumes might be compiled of the evidence in his vindication. But the following letter from the commander in chief supercedes the necessity of all others, on this subject; and though out of its chronological order, it becomes proper to introduce it under this head.

"HEAD QUARTERS, ORANGETOWN, *August 15th*, 1780.

"SIR,

"As you are retiring from the office of quarter-master-general, and have requested my sense of your conduct and services while you acted in it, I shall give it to you with the greatest cheerfulness and pleasure.

"You conducted the various and important duties of it with capacity and diligence, entirely to my satisfaction, and, as far as I had an opportunity of knowing, with the strictest integrity.

"When you were prevailed on to undertake the office in March 1778, it was in great disorder and confusion, and by extraordinary exertions, you so arranged it as to enable the army to take the field the moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity after the enemy when they left Philadelphia.

"From that period to the present time, your exertions have been equally great; have appeared to me to be the result of system, and to have been well calculated to promote the interest and honour of your country; and, in fine, I cannot but add, that the states have had in you, in my opinion, an able, upright, and diligent servant."

General Greene's resignation as quarter-master-general, did not take place until the month of August 1780, and he voluntarily continued to act for some time after that day, until his successor, Colonel Pickering, had been duly initiated. Several interesting occurrences in his military life, are of a prior date to his resignation, but we will, for the present, follow him to that event, and then return to those of his military history.

From the time of the commencement of the discussions in congress relative to his department, the office was to General Greene an irksome and disagreeable post. He had himself been considerably soured by the facility with which members of that body gave themselves up to jealousy and suspicion, and, as he declares in one of his letters, found it exceedingly difficult to communicate with them in that temper, which both his station and theirs exacted of him.

They, on their part, were under the influence of very many causes to render them irritable—even fretful. Feebly supported by the states in keeping up the army, disappointed in their hopes of peace, chagrined at receiving so little, where they expected so much aid from their ally, they were but ill prepared for the additional mortification of waking to disappointment from all the

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dreams of financial prosperity with which they had been flattered in their new system.

Unhappy is the condition of the public officer, who has to importune such a body, under such circumstances, for supplies of money. And yet the most pressing necessity amidst the distresses of this cold winter, obliged Greene to be more than ordinarily importunate with congress to obtain indispensable advances.

Had he been suffering alone, the evil might have been borne; but tortured by witnessing the distresses of the army, and less affected by their clamours than by the example of patient suffering that they exhibited, his temper, although remarkably equable in its ordinary movements, was scarcely proof against the trials to which it was subjected.

The following brief sketch is from his pen, and bears date the 11th of January 1780.

"Such weather as we have had, never did I feel. For six or eight days it has been so extremely cold, that there was no living abroad; the snow is also very deep, and much drifted; it is so much so, that we drive over the tops of the fences. In the midst of snow and surrounded on every side by its banks, the army has been cut off from its magazines, and been obliged to fast for several days together. We have been alternately out of meat and bread for eight or nine days past, and without either for three or four. The distress of the army has been exceedingly great from the weather, want of clothing and provisions. But the soldiers have borne it with great patience and fortitude. They have displayed a degree of magnanimity under their sufferings which does them the highest honour." "Provisions are scarce indeed, not from any scarcity in the country, but from want of money to purchase it."

It will be remembered, that at this time the United States was under the pressure of the "full tide of unsuccessful experiment," flowing from their celebrated regulating act. Every department of the army was consequently sustaining the extra-embarrassment of an artificial scarcity. On this subject, in the same letter Greene remarks, "The states are coming very fast into the *regulating act.* Many expect great things from it; for my part, I do not. It will have its usual operation and conclusion. It was never successful, even under the most arbitrary governments."

And in a letter to Governor Greene of the 8th October 1779, after dilating on his increasing embarrassments, he expresses the following correct and

practical sentiments on the operation of this law: "There have been great pains taken, from east to west, to regulate the produce and commerce of the country. I viewed the thing as impracticable from the beginning. It was rather to be wished for, than expected; how it will terminate is yet uncertain. But from what I see and hear from almost every quarter, I think the measure will fail. The attempt has been made again and again, in Europe and America, but to no purpose. The commerce of mankind must be free, or almost all kind of intercourse will cease. Regulation stagnates industry and creates an universal discontent. Men value themselves not less upon the privilege of exercising their industry in trade, than on the gains they derive from it. Even the market people would be very unhappy to be cut off from the opportunity of making the most of their commodities. There is a pride in every class of people in displaying their ingenuity in their transactions; to be deprived of this, makes them restless and uneasy. Give men even more than they ask for a thing, and they will not be satisfied without the liberty of still trying to make more of it." CHAP. V.

It happened also, unfortunately, that at this time there was a subject under discussion, which, of all others, was least likely to be satisfactorily adjusted between a public body and a man of delicate feelings. It was that of Greene's compensation in the quarter-master-general's department. When he first entered upon that office, the compensation affixed by law was a commission on the sums expended. But when those sums arose to a great nominal amount, Greene saw clearly that, though no one should be hardy enough directly to impeach his integrity, many would secretly suspect his fidelity, whilst there existed a temptation to favour the increase of expense. He therefore, at a very early period, signified his wish that the compensation should be changed to a fixed salary, and the amount of that salary was the subject of several consultations. To present a just view of his wishes and conduct in this delicate affair, we will give an extract of a letter from his friend Mr. Petit, addressed to a member of congress, who consulted him upon the subject. "With respect to the sum that would be satisfactory to General Greene as quarter-master-general, I cannot pretend to ascertain it. Were he looking to this office as one he would wish to continue in, I have reason to believe that he would not accept of less than £3,000 currency per annum, and perhaps he might demand £3,000 sterling. But as I am confident he continues in from other motives than a view of gain, and wishes to leave it whenever he can, consistently with the public good and his own honour, I believe he will neither demand nor accept more than an indemnification for his expenses. I ground this opinion,

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as well on what I have heard him say on the subject, as on my own feelings, being actuated by the same motives as to a continuance in office as I suppose him to be."

For more than twelve months was this tantalizing discussion protracted, and even when he left the office it had not been closed. To him, this state of things was peculiarly irksome; habituated as he appears to have been to graduate his expenses by his income, and never to be guilty of the folly of living beyond it, he remained all this time uncertain how to govern himself in this particular; and, feelingly alive to every thing that could even bring on him the indignity of a suspicion, he felt it painful to act under circumstances which exposed him to imputations which his soul abhorred. Yet the wishes of the commander in chief, the good of the service, the affectionate importunities of his brother officers, and the comforts of the soldiers required the sacrifice, and he made it.

As early as the 7th June 1779, a committee of congress had been appointed to look into the transactions of the quarter-master and commissary-generals. It consisted of the Hon. John Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and John Scudder. These gentlemen immediately repaired to the camp to prosecute their inquiries. The language in which the resolution appointing these gentlemen was expressed, was rather grating to ears that coveted and claimed to be, not only innocent but unsuspected. It was "to make *strict* inquiry into the establishment and contingent expenses of the quarter-master's department," &c. However, with a slight murmur, Greene made every effort by means of circulars to his agents, and a developement of all his personal transactions, to give those gentlemen all the information and satisfaction that could be afforded them; and they returned perfectly satisfied with his conduct, and henceforth enlisted among his particular friends.

On the 7th May in the following year, another appointment took place of a committee constituted for the same purpose. Mr. John Mathews of South Carolina, was a member of that committee, and to those who were acquainted with his excellent character it will be enough to say, that, (in an apologetic letter he acknowledges) "he entered upon the task of investigation with the strongest prejudices against Greene, and closed, in common with his colleagues, under a perfect conviction of his fidelity, ability, and zeal." That a mutual esteem was contracted between them, on this occasion, which lasted through life, is evidenced by the remains of a most friendly and confidential correspondence still extant.

It would seem that congress ought now to have been satisfied. To attribute the enormous increase of expense to a want of economy or arrangement, was little short of ridiculous, after the public acknowledgment that, in their own biassed estimation, their money had sunk to forty for one, and that too, when compared with the value of an emission of bills of credit by a body whose credit had been blasted by the failure of the very money now to be redeemed. But the rumour had gone forth, and the congress was surrounded by the whisperers of a faction who sought Greene's ruin. The report still prevailed, that he was acquiring an unbounded fortune, and envy fastened her fangs upon him. Alas! had his country but known the lank state of his purse as well as it was known to his intimate friends; instead of being persecuted by suspicions, he would have been followed by that admiration which is the merited meed of patriotism and integrity.—Fighting, watching, toiling, for ungrateful employers, while the approaching tread of poverty alarmed him for the fate of an increasing family.

We are resolved to risk nothing upon general assertion; our hero shall not be the creature of a partial imagination. Let his own words depict his situation.

To his early friend he writes, "Many people have propagated a report that I have made a fortune in the quarter-master-general's department. Some have done it from one view, some from another, but most of them to excite a jealousy and distrust among the people. Was the fact so, I should feel less uneasiness on the occasion; but to be thought rich, and at the same time to be poor, is the most disagreeable situation in the world. The greater part of my dependence is with you, and the funds in your hands. These, you advertize me in your last, are nothing very considerable. If they are not, I am poor indeed." And to add facts to the evidence of words, when in the year 1780, Mrs. Greene proposed to make her usual visit to him, when the army was stationary in winter quarters, he writes to a friend in these words: "I shall be exceedingly obliged to you to furnish Mrs. Greene with cash to pay her expenses to camp; this article is running low with me."

Nor was this state of his finances the consequence of improvidence on his part; it was the result of a combination of circumstances which he could not control, and which grew chiefly out of the nature of the service in which he was engaged.

It will be recollected, that he was acting in the army in the united capacities of quarter-master-general and major-general. The former drew to his quarters

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a multitude of people, while the latter obliged him to entertain them in a style consonant to his elevated rank. Although far from being inclined to ostentatious parade, he well knew the necessity of maintaining the dignity of rank by a proper display of liberality. The expenses of the rich are the inheritance of the poor, and with the materials which compose an army more especially, the sense of inferiority must be kept up by maintaining the distance between the soldier and the officer.

To maintain a proper style in life was, at that time, exceedingly expensive. In the midst of all the privations of war, an extravagant style of living had been gradually growing on the habits of Philadelphia, and to this place, his communications with congress and his assistants, frequently called him.

To the propagation of these habits several causes contributed. It has always been the result of an extraordinary circulation of a representative of property, although it be of a factitious value. Men are but slow calculators, and easily seduced to the enjoyment of pleasures, and the gratification of vanity. Fortunes suddenly acquired, are generally foolishly expended. The rage for speculation which followed the fluctuations of the paper currency, gave many opportunities to speculate successfully; and the success of some individuals in privateering, was another fruitful source of a sudden increase of riches. These causes, added to the great influx of foreign gentlemen of wealth and distinction, and of men of fortune connected with the government from all parts of the union, produced an extravagance of living, not easily to be borne by those who had slender private fortunes. On the officers of the army it fell with peculiar weight; their compensation was fixed by law, and even that irregularly paid. And when the money had sunk almost to nothing, still the obligation remained, under every disadvantage, to live according to their rank.

In times of depreciation, those who have it in their power to anticipate funds, must realize a profit; but to those who have to wait the gradual accumulation of their resources, the receipts of yesterday are to-day reduced to half their value.

Greene had but a slender private fortune when he entered the service. In fact, he had nothing distinct from the general stock of the family, vested in the business of the Potowome and Coventry Mills. In 1777 this concern was dissolved, and a division of the property made among the several branches of the family. To him was assigned a small unproductive property near Charlestown, on the north side of the state; and a dividend of the stock and money which had been employed in the business of the concern. These funds

he had left in the hands of his brother Jacob, and his friend Griffin Greene, to be employed by them in any way they thought proper for joint benefit, compensating themselves by an allowance for the trouble of conducting the business. Unfortunately, these funds were principally employed in the purchase of shares in various privateers, and before the close of the war, it appears to have been all lost. The following brief, but pathetic passage, is extracted from a letter to his friend, General Henry Lee, written near the close of the war: "My circumstances are far from being easy, and my family have not where to put their heads. It is men in my situation, in the progress of this war, who have had feelings which exceed description. Alas! few know what I have felt. My fondness for my family has increased my distress. Men of affluence have been in quite different circumstances. Public virtue is best proved by private sacrifices. But enough of this; your letter has thrown me into these disagreeable reflections." CHAP. V.

In the spring of the year 1780, congress resolved to constitute a board of commissioners to superintend the administration of the staff. Disagreeable and embarrassing as such an appointment must have been to Greene's department under any circumstances, it was rendered intolerable to him by the appointment of General Mifflin at the head of it. He felt it as an indignity offered not only to himself, but to the commander in chief. An enemy to the fame of General Washington could not have wished for a station better calculated to thwart and embarrass him, than one that would cramp and embarrass the operations of the quarter-master's department. General Mifflin was well known to be personally hostile to General Washington. General Greene had much reason to believe General Mifflin his own personal enemy. True or false, it is not now possible to determine, but we are in possession of various communications made to General Greene calculated to support this opinion. Indeed, Greene always considered the persecution he had sustained as having originated among the adherents of Conway and Gates, and it was well known, that all the army viewed General Mifflin as the secret head of that faction.

We know not if there exists, or ever was published, a detailed account of that mysterious affair, and at this late day it may be an object of curiosity with our readers to know what were the received opinions on the subject, of the best informed persons of that day. This we shall present from original papers in our possession.

When General Washington was hesitating what course to pursue on the embarkation of Sir William Howe from New York in the year 1777, General Mifflin, then quarter-master-general, was exceedingly importunate with him to

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Immediately upon this disappointment Mifflin hastened away to Philadelphia, and complaining bitterly that Washington had given himself up to the influence of Greene, and sacrificed Philadelphia to the security of the eastern section of the union, excited a distrust and hostility against the former which often manifested itself during the war. Afterwards, when the starving condition of the army at Valley Forge obliged him to resort to the strong means of collecting provisions by foraging parties as if he had been in an enemy's country, and the execution of this measure was given to Greene, a confirmed enmity appeared to have been excited against both, which discovered itself whenever occasions presented themselves.

In the midst of the excitement that had been produced by General Mifflin's complaints, the news arrived of the surrender of Burgoyne. The battle of Brandywine had then been lost, Howe was in possession of Philadelphia, and congress had fled to Yorktown.

The honours of Washington appeared to have been cast into the shade by the brilliant successes of Gates. Impartial history will one day decide whether the latter did not reap the laurels that ought to have graced the brows of Schuyler, of Starke, and of Arnold. It is certain, that invidious comparisons, unfavourable to Washington, were at that time too much the fashion of the day. But the nation and the army knew well his worth, and frowned his enemies into silence. Yet certain it is, that at that time he had enemies, and among them were ranked Samuel Adams, the Lees of Virginia, Wilson of Pennsylvania, and some minor characters. Whether the design was to substitute Gates or Lee, appeared to have been unsettled among the party, but certainly to substitute one or the other.

Whether General Mifflin ever entered deeply into the views of the party, cannot now be ascertained. It is, however, very certain, that but for the clamour which he had so successfully excited against the commander in chief,

Conway never would have dared to prosecute his machinations. The conformity of their views fastened upon them, in the public estimation, a co-operation in design. CHAP. V.

An opinion was entertained, on some evidence against Gates and Conway, which was probably not unfounded in truth, that Samuel Adams, R. H. Lee, and Mifflin, had it in contemplation to substitute General Lee for Washington, but that Gates and Conway thought it a favourable opportunity to make use of the discontents of that party to supplant him themselves.

We know not if there exist any evidence to prove that General Lee had embarked with either party. On the contrary, from the intercourse kept up between Generals Greene and Lee during their lives, we are induced to think he had not; or, at least, that Greene entertained a favourable opinion of his principles and conduct. Lee was a warm man, and too apt to speak and act with indiscreet freedom. But all the world acknowledged him to be a man of honour, and of soldierly frankness. He had censured some of the measures of General Washington with a degree of freedom that approached to insubordination. In the council of war which preceded the battle of Monmouth, he had opposed the avowed sentiment of Washington to fight the enemy, and Washington certainly attributed his retreat, in that battle, to an obstinate adherence to his own opinion in violation of orders. These circumstances, combined with the known wish of some of the malecontents in congress to substitute him for Washington, gave rise to the opinion that he had taken part in the intrigues against the commander in chief. That he would have accepted the command and been gratified in it, there can be no doubt; but there exists no evidence of his having actively engaged in the effort to sink General Washington in the estimation of the public; unless his conduct during and after the battle of Monmouth, and his severe animadversions on the affair of Fort Washington, receive a construction of which, it must be acknowledged, they were too fairly susceptible. A subordinate officer is not at liberty to raise his own reputation on the ruins of a superior in command.

With respect to Gates and Conway, the evidence was such as left not a doubt upon the public mind. It is well known that the first developement of the intrigue was made at the table of Lord Stirling, by a gentleman attached to Gates' family. The indiscretion of youth and the unguarded freedoms of a convivial hour, heightened by exultation in the recent triumphs of the American arms, palliated, but did not excuse the unwary communication. Yet, pleasure at the early developement of an intrigue involving the interests and affections of the American people, closed the lips of censure, and the communication was received with gratitude, rather than with the feeling which,

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under other circumstances, it might have excited. The present Major General Wilkinson has, in his Memoirs, given a detailed account of the circumstances attending the communication. Until that was published, it was supposed to have been designedly made under the influence of patriotic feelings, but it is now candidly acknowledged to have been an indiscretion. General Washington at first thought that it had been made under the instructions of Gates, as the means of evading an injunction of secrecy; but this favourable view of the subject was soon removed by the very singular letter addressed to him by the latter, and disrespectfully conveyed through the president of congress. In addition to this information, we have the evidence of General Morgan, who was then serving under Gates, and who, being tampered with, as he considered it, by Gates upon this subject, incurred his lasting hatred by repulsing him with indignation.*

As to Conway, General Washington has pronounced him "an active and malignant partizan." The freedoms which he took with General Washington's conduct involved him in a duel with General Cadwallader. When he supposed the hour of retributive justice was approaching, (for he was wounded and his life was in serious danger,) General Conway wrote a penitent letter to General Washington, which put down his resentment for ever.

The offensive passage in Conway's letter to Gates was this: "Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it." And it is remarkable, that in the anonymous letters written and circulated at the time, were the following passages: "The northern army has shown us what Americans can do with *a general* at their head. The spirit of the southern army is no ways inferior to the spirit of the northern; a Gates, a Lee, or a Conway would, in a few weeks, render them an irresistible body of men. The last of the above officers has accepted of the new office of inspector-general of the army, in order to reform abuses, but the remedy is only a palliative one." In one of his (Conway's) letters to a friend he says, "A great and good God hath decreed America to be free, or the commander in chief and weak counsellors would have ruined her long ago." "You may rest assured of each of the facts related in this letter. The author of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by the handwriting, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Even the letter must be thrown in the fire."

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* Lee's Memoirs.

The copy of this letter, addressed to Patrick Henry was not thrown in the fire, but communicated immediately, as it ought to have been, to the commander in chief. And he on the comparison of hands, had no doubt to which of his "*Philadelphia friends*" he was indebted for it. In General Washington's answer to Governor Henry, he attributes it to the late Dr. Benjamin Rush. Both letters are said to be still in existence in Richmond, Va. and the correctness of the opinion of General Washington may still be tested. But, if it be true that this amiable and excellent man was thus made the dupe and secret agent of this faction, it is but another cause for public indignation, while it affords a melancholy proof of the errors into which the purest of men may be precipitated.

We are in possession of various communications to prove that the "weak counsellors" of this best of men, who had incurred the envenomed hatred of the party, were Generals Greene and Knox, who were supposed to possess his private ear, and were known to be his faithful and affectionate adherents. As to the former, he had been involved in a variety of occurrences which had rendered Mifflin, Gates, and Conway individually hostile to him.

The first of these gentlemen had been at the head of the quarter-master-general's department before Greene took charge of it; and the just complaints against that department had first excited a disgust against the commander in chief. As to Greene, when could man tolerate a comparison that resulted to his disadvantage? Where is the predecessor in a public office who can hear the praises of his successor sounded, without one disagreeable sensation? There is a natural rivalship in the heart of man between those who have stood in that relationship to each other, which the wisest can with difficulty restrain.

That the reader may himself be enabled to draw a comparison, we will refer him to the letter of General Washington of the 15th August 1780, in a preceding page, and then to the following extracts from the report of a committee of congress appointed to inspect the state of the army, when it lay at Valley Forge, at which time General Mifflin acted in that department: "We had flattered ourselves that before this time the pleasure of congress would be made known to us, respecting the quarter-master's department. We fear our letter on this subject has miscarried, or the consideration of it yielded to other business. You will pardon us, sir, when we again solicit your attention to it as an object of the last importance, on which not only the future success of our arms, but the present existence of our army immediately depends. The influence of this office is so diffusive through every part of our military system, that neither the wisdom of arrangement, the spirit of enterprize, or favourable opportunity will be of any avail, if this great wheel in the machine stops, or

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moves heavily. We find ourselves embarrassed in entering on this subject, lest a bare recital of facts should carry an imputation (which we do not intend) on those gentlemen who have lately conducted it. We are sensible, great and just allowances are to be made for the peculiarity of their situation, and we are perhaps, not fully acquainted with all their difficulties. It is our duty, sir, to inform you, it is not our intention to censure. We find, sir, the property of the continent dispersed over the whole country. Not an encampment, route of the army, or considerable road, but abounds with waggons left to the mercy of the weather, and the will of the inhabitants. Large quantities of entrenching tools have likewise been left in various hands under no other security that we can learn, than the honesty of those who have them in possession. No less than three thousand spades and shovels, and the like number of tomahawks have lately been discovered and collected in the vicinity of the camp, by an order from one of the general officers. In the same way a quantity of tents and tent-cloth, after laying a whole summer in a farmer's barn, was lately discovered and brought to camp, by a special order from the commander in chief." And thus the report goes on to state, that the soldiers were sickening and dying for want of straw, and waiting to be inoculated until they could be supplied with an article which could not be procured merely because there were not waggons to transport it, and that all the service of that kind performed in camp, was done by the men, who yoked themselves to the vehicle for that purpose; and, "finally, that nothing can equal the sufferings of the soldiers, but the patience and fortitude with which the faithful part of the army endured it. Those of a different character deserted in great numbers. At present, sir, there is not one gentleman of any rank in this department in camp, [nor had there been since July,] though the duties of the office require constant and unremitting attention. In whatever view, therefore, the subject presents itself, we trust that you will discern that the most essential interests are connected with it. The season of preparation for the next campaign is passing swiftly away. Be assured, sir, that its operation will be ineffectual either for offence or protection, if an arrangement is not immediately made, and the most vigorous exertions used to procure the necessary supplies. Permit us to say, that a moment's time is not to be lost *in placing a man of approved abilities and extensive capacity* at the head of the department; *who will restore it* to some degree of order and regularity; whose provident care will immediately relieve the present wants of the army, and extend itself to those which must be satisfied before we can expect vigour, enterprize, and success."

It is not to be wondered at that General Mifflin should look with an evil eye upon the man who was appointed to the quarter-master-general's department

under the influence of this report, and at the pressing instance of the committee who made it. His irritation vented itself occasionally in disrespectful expressions, which were communicated to General Greene, and the result was, that there existed much coolness, if not actual enmity between them.

As to General Gates, it will be recollected how much Washington exhausted himself to support the operations against Burgoyne, and what tardy obedience Gates paid to his pressing order to march to the support of the grand army, after he had triumphed over his enemy. Greene entered warmly on this occasion, into the feelings of the commander in chief, as he participated largely in all the embarrassments which pressed upon him at the time. And afterwards, when, upon the failure of the expedition against Rhode Island and the recall of Sullivan, Gates was put in command of the army which held in check the British force at Newport, that officer appears to have indulged himself in much latitude of censure upon the manner in which that expedition was conducted. We are in possession of some very angry letters of Greene on this subject, from which it is obvious that the latter felt himself seriously injured. Nor did the evil rest here. When it was deemed necessary that an officer should be despatched to the south to relieve Charleston when besiged, or cover the country in the event of its fall, General Washington wished to nominate General Greene to that command. But congress took the appointment out of the hands of the commander in chief, and nominated Gates—to the equal mortification of both Washington and Greene.

As to Conway, Greene had been instrumental in bringing upon him a mortification which could never be forgiven. In a subjoined letter we will present the reader with a view of the intrigue by which Conway obtained the appointment of inspector-general of the army. This appointment affected the rank of the brigadiers in the army, and they immediately addressed to congress a strong and animated remonstrance, in which they evinced that they were as ready and able to defend their own rights by the pen, as those of their country by the sword. Greene as well as Washington, took a decided part against him, and Conway, who had thought himself securely seated on the first stage of his military ascent, was obliged to retire; and the congress were not a little chagrined at being convinced that they had acted unjustly towards the remonstrants, and unwisely towards the interests of the country at large. This event inclined too many of them, afterwards, to lend a willing ear to the malicious suggestions of Conway and his associates against Washington and Greene. Besides this, Greene entertained a very contemptible opinion of Conway, and in his deportment towards him was never studious to conceal it.

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Pursuing our resolution of furnishing every opportunity to our reader to form his own opinion of the character, talents, and turn of thinking of our hero, we will subjoin two letters, written on the subjects which have last occupied our attention.

They are both dated at Camp Valley Forge 1778. The first is on the 3d of January.

"Our army are tenting themselves at this place; they are almost worn out with fatigue and greatly distressed for want of clothing, particularly the articles of shoes and stockings. The present mode of clothing the army will always leave us without a sufficient supply. The change in the commissary department has been a very distressing circumstance; the army has been fed from hand to mouth ever since Mr. Trumbull left it. Our operations have been greatly retarded from the situation of the commissary department. The quarter-master-general's department also has been in a most wretched condition. General Mifflin, who ought to have been at the head of the business, has never been with the army since it came into the state. He was unwell the early part of the season, but it is said he is disgusted with the general for not paying such mighty deference to him as his vanity leads him to think himself entitled to. I am credibly informed, he has been endeavouring to wound the general's reputation, in order to bring in General Gates at the head of the army; and for fear I should be an obstacle to his measures, he has thrown out some insinuations to my prejudice. I am but little afraid of his insinuations. He may possibly poison the public mind for a time, but he cannot injure me in the army, where my conduct is best known.

"The congress have lately appointed Colonel Wilkinson to the rank of a brigadier and Brigadier General Conway to the rank of major general. Both these appointments are exceedingly disgusting to the army; the first to the colonels, the last to the brigadiers. The army is exceedingly convulsed by these appointments, and God knows what will be the issue. Almost all the colonels in the army will resign in consequence of Wilkinson's appointment. General Gates is exceedingly blamed for recommending the measure.

"General Conway is a man of much intrigue and little judgment. He is a great incendiary, of a restless spirit, and always contriving to puff himself off to the public as an officer of great consequence. He left the army under pretence of going to France, alleging for reason that there was the greatest probability of a French war, and that he should injure his interests by staying here. Every body in the army thought he was gone. But he stole away to congress, announced his intention of going to France, got in with some of the

court faction to trumpet his consequence to the congress, and they hastily appointed him a major general, to the prejudice of the brigadiers, who to a man will resign their commissions if he holds his rank and remains in the army. This appointment appears to have been obtained by such low artifices that every body in the army despises him for it. The Marquis La Fayette, and all the other French gentlemen, will scarcely speak to him. He is the greatest novice in war, in every thing but disciplining a regiment, that ever I saw. He is by no means of an enterprizing military turn of mind, and of very little activity. This is the true character of the man, and yet he is palmed off upon the public by little arts, as the first military man upon the continent. CHAP. V.

"Our cause is sure, if we do not get divided among ourselves. But there is great danger that we shall. Men of great ambition, and without principle or virtue, will sacrifice every thing to their private views. The army in general has been very well united; but I am afraid the injudicious appointments made in congress will ruin it.

"You mention my letter to Governor Cook, in which I pronounce the division of the British force as a fortunate circumstance for America. The events of the campaign have verified it. And had our force been equal to General Howe's, or at least as much superior as the northern army was to Burgoyne's, he must have shared the same fate. But alas! we have fought with vastly superior numbers, and although twice defeated, have kept the field. History affords but few examples of the kind. The people may think there has not been enough done, but our utmost endeavours have not been wanting. Our army with inferior numbers, badly found, badly clothed, worse fed, and newly levied, must have required good generalship to triumph over superior numbers well found, well clothed, well fed and veteran soldiers. We cannot conquer the British force at once, but they cannot conquer us at all. The limits of the British government in America are their out-sentinels.

"Reports prevail very strongly again of a French war. I honestly confess to you I do not believe it; for France can have no pretext for declaring war, and certainly it is not the interest of Great Britain to do it. But nevertheless it may happen. I wish congress may not be lulled into security from their late successes to the north, and their hopes of a French explosion. It is our business to levy a new army as soon as possible; each state to furnish its proportion by a draft. There is no such thing as filling the army by voluntary enlistments as speedily as will be necessary to open the campaign to advantage. Each state will be compelled hereafter to furnish clothing for their own troops. The present mode of clothing the army is ruinous. We have had

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3,000 soldiers unfit for duty for want of clothing, this fall and winter. The Rhode Island troops have done themselves great honour this campaign. Col. Greene's character is in high estimation. Major Thayer distinguished himself at Fort Mifflin, and has acquired universal applause. Your troops are generally exceedingly well officered from the northward this year. General Gates is a child of fortune, the successes to the northward are all-glorious. General Arnold and General Lincoln are in high esteem; and it is said General Burgoyne gives Arnold the credit for the successes obtained over him.

"I am happy that the work is but done; I do not care who does it. But I should like to have a hand in the mischief.

"I have no hope of coming home this winter; the general will not grant me permission. Mrs. Greene is coming to camp. We are all going into log huts—a sweet life after a most fatiguing campaign."

The other letter bears date the 7th of February following. The following is an extract from it: "Governor Cook wrote me a few days since a most alarming letter respecting the situation of Rhode Island. Mr. Ellery proposed to me to take the command there, provided it was agreeable to his excellency; but he is totally averse to the measure. General Spencer has resigned; who will take the command I know not; I wish General Sullivan may, as I can think of no person who will do it more justice. I am in hopes to prevail on the general to let the Rhode Island troops return home, and there continue until the enemy leaves the state. I flatter myself they will fill up their ranks very soon if they go home with that understanding.

"A horrid faction has been forming to ruin his excellency and others. Ambition, how boundless! Ingratitude, how prevalent! But the faction are universally condemned. General Mifflin is said to be at the head of it. And it is strongly suspected that General Gates favours it. Mifflin has quarrelled with the general, because he would not draw the force off to the southward last summer and leave the New England states to themselves, before the enemy's object was ascertained. It was uncertain whether he intended to go up the North River, to Newport, or to the southward. The general thought it his duty to take a position to give the earliest support to either. Mifflin thought Philadelphia was exposed by it, and went there and raised a prodigious clamour against the measure, and against me for advising it. But the general, like the common father of all, steadily pursued the great continental interest, without regard to partial objects, and the discontents of individuals. This faction has been the offspring of that measure. See upon what a monstrous principle the general is persecuted. To injure his reputation, and prejudice

the country and army against me, General Mifflin has been endeavouring to persuade them that I governed the general in all things." "I hope my little children are well. Money becomes more and more the Americans' object. You must get rich, or you will be of no consequence." CHAP. V.

We will furnish the reader with but one more extract on this subject. It is from a book not long since published, but the authority of which is very respectable, since it carries on the face of it abundant circumstances of identification to be pronounced the work of Captain Graydon, of the Pennsylvania line. It is entitled, "*Memoirs of a Life chiefly passed in Pennsylvania the last sixty years.*" The passage is this: "Besides the families established in this place, [Reading,] it was seldom without a number of visiters, gentlemen of the army and others. General Mifflin, at this era, was at home, a chief out of war, complaining, though not ill, considerably malecontent, and apparently not in high favour at head quarters. According to him, the ear of the commander in chief was exclusively possessed by Greene, who was represented to be neither the most wise, the most brave, nor the most patriotic of counsellors. In short, the campaign in this quarter was stigmatized, as a series of blunders, and the incapacity of those who had conducted it, unsparingly reprobated. The better fortune of the northern army was ascribed to the superior talents of its leader, and it began to be whispered that Gates was the man who should of right have the station so incompetently sustained by Washington. There was, to all appearance, a cabal forming for his deposition, in which it is not improbable that Gates, Mifflin, and Conway were already engaged, and in which the congenial spirit of Lee, on his exchange, immediately took share. The well known apostrophe of Conway to America, importing that heaven had passed a decree in her favour, or her ruin must long before have ensued from the imbecility of her military councils, was at this time familiar at Reading; and I heard him myself when he was afterwards on a visit to that place, express himself to this effect: 'That no man was more a gentleman than Washington, or appeared to more advantage at his table, or in the usual intercourse of life, but as to his talents for the command of an army, (with a French shrug,) *they were miserable indeed.*' Observations of this kind continually repeated, could not fail to make an impression within the sphere of their circulation, and it may be said that the popularity of the commander in chief was a good deal impaired at Reading."*

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* Page 278.

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When all these circumstances are added to the embarrassment brought on the army during the campaign of 1777 and the winter following, from the defective administration of the quarter-master's department, over which General Mifflin presided, it was impossible for both Greene and Washington to view his appointment as chairman of the commissioners for superintending the staff of the army otherwise than personally offensive. And it was soon after followed up by a succession of acts of a nature too unequivocal not to furnish Greene with the occasion he had long wished for, to resign without committing his honour or his patriotism.

All the money that had been drawn by the department, had passed through the hands of Colonel Petit. That gentleman thinking that he was often unreasonably delayed and embarrassed by the treasury board, some warm altercation had ensued between them. On the 3d of May that board passed a resolve, "that the accounts and vouchers in the quarter-master's department be delivered in for settlement on the first of June following, (twenty-seven days;) and that whosoever should fail so to do, should be published and prosecuted." A copy of this resolve was transmitted to Greene, and offensive as it was, he made every effort to obtain a compliance with it. In a circular, which was immediately forwarded to all the agents of the department he observes, "For this and many other reasons it is necessary that our accounts be brought to a close. Many improper suspicions of abuse prevail respecting the expenditure of public money. I hope our accounts will sufficiently prove that the plan of the war and the nature of the service entail the expense, and that it is not owing to any misapplication of the public money. However, persons are not wanting who propagate such reports, and even some who are high in political life, and whose duty it should be to silence improper suspicions. As I have the highest confidence in the integrity and ability of the agents acting under me, I hope they will one and all be able to prove themselves honest and faithful trustees for the public."

But to collect not only accounts but vouchers from Georgia to Maine, the board well knew was impossible, and the hostility of the measure was too glaring for them to adhere to it in opposition to the indignant remonstrances of the gentlemen at the head of the quarter-master's department.

With an ill grace and a strong compliment to their own generosity, they graciously conceded to him another month; for a purpose which all the world must have known, if due allowances be made for the extent of the sphere of action, the number of expeditions that had been carried on, and the limited means of correspondence then existing, ought to have required as many years. The early periodical settlement of accounts had never been neglected since.

Greene took charge of the department; for a standing order existed that monthly returns should be made, and this had been partially complied with; but defaults innumerable had been made, and such was the difficulty of getting proper men to act for the trifling compensation allowed, that the department did not dare to be rigid. Yet, as if not satisfied with the attacks already made on the feelings of Greene, the commissioners consummated the persecution by dispersing the following very delicate circular: CHAP. V.

"TREASURY OFFICE, 13*th June* 1780.

"*Ordered*, That the several persons following, viz. Nathanael Greene, quarter-master-general, &c. render their respective accounts of receipts and expenditures, with the requisite vouchers as aforesaid, on or before the first day of August next ensuing; and that whoever shall fail so to do, be published and prosecuted agreeably to the order of the board of the 3d May last, without further indulgence.

"CHARLES LEE, *Secretary*."

And in addition to being thus pressed and threatened, Greene was very fairly given to understand that he must consider himself liable for any failure or defalcations of all the host of agents who were necessarily employed by a military officer obliged to act by agents or deputies, and to act at the same time in every part of the union.

He now addressed a letter to congress, stating the injustice of such a principle, and the ruinous effects upon his private fortune, of not having formally declared, at an early period, their understanding on this subject.

But to his astonishment, congress would not recede. In their resolves in reply to his letter, they assert their right, and reserve to themselves to judge when it shall be enforced.

He now no longer hesitated about the course to be pursued, but intimated to the commander in chief his resolution to resign. Washington was still unwilling to part with him, and in his answer, which bears date the 6th of August, entreats him to wait a little longer. The committee who had been despatched to the army to inspect the transactions of the staff departments, as well as General Washington, had written to congress on the subject of his claims and complaints, and Washington expresses a hope that the result will be favourable. The system also drawn up by Washington, Greene and Schuyler, was still before congress, and it was possible it might be adopted.

In this the commander in chief was disappointed. It is a fact, that at that time there existed a jealousy between the army and congress. The former

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complained loudly of the injustice of congress towards them, of inattention to their wants, and the hardship of receiving their pay in a depreciated medium, at a rate fixed without a view to depreciation. And the latter suspected, or pretended to suspect in the army a spirit of military domination, a desire to dictate to congress, and control them in their measures.

There is strong reason to believe that at this time, the party that had been formed against General Washington had rather gained ground. The ascendancy of such men as Samuel Adams and Richard H. Lee could not but be felt; and Mifflin and Wilson, leading men in Pennsylvania, were both avowedly hostile to him. The state of Pennsylvania had adopted their prejudices, and had for some time manifested a resolution to mingle in, if not to control the proceedings of congress.

Philadelphia, of course, lent its powerful aid, and those who have mingled much in public life, will know the secret but powerful influence of the opinions of the society in which the members mingle, upon the acts of a deliberative assembly. Indeed, the censorious do contend that hospitable entertainers, fascinating women, and even assiduous landlords and landladies are not without their influence in regulating the affairs of some nations. That the fair sex have ever piqued themselves in rising above the state of political nonentity to which the lords of the creation have reduced them, is the opinion of many; and that they delight to mock the fancied soverignty of man, by skilfully touching the master-spring of his actions, is an idea not altogether destitute of historical facts to support it. Where is the human heart that takes no pleasure in contemplating its own ascendancy? and where the female heart that does not claim that ascendancy over the will of man as its natural sphere of action?

That General Mifflin's star was in the ascendant, at this time, was proved by his activity in congress, his being first nominated chairman of the commissioners to superintend the staff, and afterwards president of congress.

Indeed, there had been about this time a report circulated and credited by some, that a proposition had been made to General Washington to assume dictatorial powers, and as the pure ermine of innocence is soiled even by the breath of solicitation, this circumstance for awhile affected his standing in public opinion. That it was at the time treated seriously, will appear from the following correspondence.

Governor Read, on the 2d September 1780, writes to General Greene thus: "The change of sentiment which has taken place in the army respecting civil government, has for the first time given me apprehension. I am told that some officers of considerable rank have pressed the general to assume dictato-

rial power. Is it so? Necessity may perhaps plead for such a measure, but certainly the power ought to be received from other hands. He, it is said, treated the proposition in a suitable manner. But necessity has ever been the tyrant's plea, and I prize his judgment and virtue too highly to believe he will contaminate a glorious and honourable life by such a mistake; for, however congress may be depreciated, as well as their money, they are still the supreme power of the country."

In reply to this letter on 8th September, General Greene writes, "I have made inquiry at head quarters whether there was such a proposition made to the general, either by an officer or officers of any rank, to assume dictatorial powers, and am assured by Colonel Hamilton that no such thing ever took place. And you may depend upon it, that the principal officers of the army are far from proposing any such thing to the general. Nor can I see what he could effect by dictatorial powers, without the helping hand of civil government."

It happened, most unfortunately, that the discussions which arose in congress in deliberating upon the new system for the quarter-master-general's department, took a turn exactly calculated to foster this jealousy entertained of the general and the army.

Under the existing regulations, impressment for transportation could only take place under the sanction of state authority. The difficulty of obtaining orders for this purpose, had sometimes greatly embarrassed the movements of the department. And the plan drawn up under the eye of the commander in chief, had principally in view to confer this power on himself, and thus obviate one principal obstacle to military operation. This did not suit the palate of congress, and the system was rejected. The one substituted for it, imposed the check of civil authority upon military power. But although to those who had experienced the embarrassments of the existing system, and who thought that more confidence was due to the commander in chief than was exhibited in this restriction, it was by no means agreeable; yet Greene's objections to acting under it were principally founded on another ground. The new system destroyed the office of assistant, and thus deprived him of the two able coadjutors, without whom he had always declared he would not act a moment. It is true, Colonel Petit was afterwards brought into the department in the capacity of assistant quarter-master-general, but it was because congress plainly foresaw that no successor to Greene could dispense with Petit's experience and intelligence; and because, notwithstanding prevailing reports,

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they wished to soothe Greene into a further continuance into office. But his resolution was instantly taken, and as he was not of a temper to sustain injuries without feeling them, smarting as he did under what he considered as reiterated acts of persecution, he sent in his resignation.

As the letter which accompanied it, was the subject of much animadversion in congress, we regret that it has not been in our power to procure it. We have, however, sufficient evidence of his not being sensible of having deservedly drawn upon himself the irritation that it produced, or willingly departed from that deference and respect which nothing can excuse an individual, more especially a public officer, from exhibiting to a representative body. Whatever may be the correctness of the delegates of the people, there is a reverence due to those who constitute them, which is of absolute and indispensable obligation. If, in this respect, General Greene deviated from the due observance of this duty, we do not wish to vindicate him; but impartial truth will require of us to present the reader with his own vindication, in various letters addressed to his friends on the occasion.

Such was the excitement produced in congress, that immediately on the reading of the general's letter a member rose and proposed that he be dismissed from the service. He had many excellent and warm friends on the floor, who heard the letter read with regret, and the utmost they could do, at that time, was to obtain a reference of it to a committee. But that committee reported a resolve, that "the resignation of Nathanael Greene be accepted, and that he be informed that congress have no further use for his services." For ten days this report was under consideration; six days it was called up and debated, and the minds of his friends anxiously, most anxiously employed to obtain a negative vote from congress, or a concession from the offender. But Greene thought he was right and would not yield, and the army (who had espoused his cause) looked gloomy and threatening. Thus, in a moment of mutual irritation, was the country on the verge of losing the services of one who was destined, in a few months, to cover the American arms with glory; to rescue three states from the dominion of the enemy, and, under the smiles of benign providence, to do more than any other, with one exception, to the fortunate termination of the war.

The latter part of the report was finally stricken out, and that only which related to his resignation as quarter-master-general carried. Colonel Pickering was elected to succeed him, and Greene anxiously awaited the moment when he should be relieved from the heavy burthen that had now been pressing on him for near three years. Yet near two months did he patiently continue to discharge the duties of the station, while his successor was prudently inform-

ing himself of its details, and endeavouring to obtain money to enter upon it with eclat. CHAP. V.

Immediately as Colonel Pickering's appointment was announced to him, Greene addressed letters to all his agents, informing them of his own resignation and the appointment of his successor; thanking them for their faithful services, pressing them to close their accounts, and earnestly requesting them to lend every assistance to his successor that could contribute to facilitate the discharge of his duties.

Notwithstanding all the irritation that had previously prevailed, there was not an individual in the administration who did not confess that he retired from the office in a manner highly dignified and patriotic.

In his communications to his subordinate officers, Greene places his resignation on his resolution not to assume the extent of pecuniary liability, to which the late resolution of congress had subjected him; and the fear that in the middle of a campaign it would be found impracticable to substitute the one system for the other. Indeed, it is very obvious that this latter objection was too forcible to be obviated, from the delays which attended the assumption of the office by his successor; which, not much to the credit of the candid dealing of the congress, threw upon Greene the discharge of the duties upon the old plan, until near the close of the campaign of 1780.

In his correspondence with his intimate friends it will be seen, that he places his conduct on other, but consistent grounds; but there was one ground known only to himself and the commander in chief; and with a very commendable discretion, communicated to no one else. It was this. Greene could not have expected cordial support, either from the treasury board, after their late hostile proceedings; or from the commissioners for superintending the staff with General Mifflin at their head; or from the congress, whilst the party hostile to himself and Washington retained their influence; and it became necessary to throw upon that body the appointment of some one, in whose success, as well as in the success of their new system, they would feel their own responsibility implicated.

The choice made, on the occasion, was a judicious one. Colonel Pickering had some time acted as adjutant-general. His reputation stood high as a man of honour. The work of combination and arrangement was done to his hand, and such were his invincible habits of application, and his stern integrity; that indolence and peculation, had they existed in the department, must have fled at his frown. If the most rigid economy could have reduced the expenses of the department, no man was better qualified to effect it. But no economy could obviate the effects of the total dearth of money and of credit

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which then prevailed. And the persecutors of Greene must have blushed, when this truth burst upon them with all its mortifying results.

The following sketch of the army is from the pen of Washington, written 1st May 1781—the spring of the year following the appointment of Colonel Pickering, and after he had been acting about six months—sufficient time for a fair experiment.

"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. Instead of having the various articles of field-equipage in readiness to deliver, the quarter-master-general is but now applying to the several states (as a *dernier resort*) to provide these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system of transportation established on credit, or funds in the quarter-master's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it, we have neither the one nor the other: and all that business, or a greater part of it, being done by military impressment, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers and alienating their affections."

From the voluminous correspondence carried on between General Greene and his friends, from the spring of the year 1780, when these discussions first commenced to their terminating in his resignation, we will select a few passages for the amusement of the reader.

In a letter to his friend Governor Read, dated Morristown, February 9th, 1780, we find this passage: "I suppose you have seen the late extraordinary appointment of General Mifflin as commissioner to superintend the staff department. This is the more extrordinary, as * * * * * * * † If the institution be proper, some of the characters to act under it are not. It has, therefore, the appearance of a design to embarrass rather than facilitate the public business. I cannot help thinking that the commander in chief will feel himself hurt at this step, and consider it as a new clog to embarrass his military operations."

"MORRISTOWN, *April* 25, 1780.

"My situation is peculiarly disagreeable, and I have a most delicate and critical part to act. If I force myself out of the department, and any great

† Erased from the original.

misfortune happens, no matter from what cause, it will be chargeable to my account. If I stay in it and things go wrong, or any failure happens, I stand responsible. What to do or how to act, I am at a loss. I think, upon the whole, your advice is prudent and on the safe side of the question, and, therefore, I determine to embrace the first opportunity to get out of the business. I feel myself so soured and hurt at the ungenerous, as well as illiberal treatment of congress and the different boards, that it will be impossible for me to do business with them with proper temper; and besides I have lost all confidence in the justice and rectitude of their intentions. The board of treasury have written me one of the most insulting letters I have ever received either from a public or private hand. I shall write them as tart an answer, and as I expect it will bring on a quarrel, I shall have occasion to call upon you and others to certify the manner of my engaging in the business, the circumstances it was under, and all other attendant matters that may be necessary to give the public a proper idea of the part I have acted, should I be obliged to publish any thing in my own justification. Nothing will be more disagreeable to me, but necessity may drive me to it." CHAP. V.

On the 29th he writes to the same friend: "It was my intention, at the time you left camp, to have been in Philadelphia before this; but Colonel Coxe, on his arrival there, wrote to me that a new system was certainly fixed upon, and new agents to fill it. This was all I wished for, as that would give me a fair opening to retire without censure; and should I go to Philadelphia, might be suspected of coming with a view of soliciting a continuance. As nothing was further from my thoughts, I was unwilling to give ground for the suspicion.

"You are perfectly right in the opinion that I have nothing to expect from public gratitude. And I am the more convinced of this from what I have seen in camp; for if individuals can so easily forget their former distress and personal obligations, it is no wonder that changeable bodies, ignorant of all the circumstances, should be ungrateful. I am sensible I am placed in a delicate situation, and must move with circumspection. Honest intentions and faithful services are but a poor shield against the secret machinations of men without principle, honour, or honesty. And, therefore, I have but little consolation from having served the public with fidelity, or little security from persecution in the same consideration. But I will ever have an approving conscience, if I am not blessed with an applauding country. The one depends upon my own conduct, the other upon accident. The advice of a friend in an hour of difficulty is worth a kingdom. I am the more obliged to you,

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therefore, for your information and sentiments of the course I ought to pursue. But from Colonel Coxe's positive manner of writing, I thought I should rather expose myself than save the department, if I went to Philadelphia. However, from letters I have since received from members of congress who would not deceive me, I am inclined to think your advice was salutary. I shall wait a few days longer, and if nothing occurs that forbids my coming forward I am rather inclined to think I shall set out for the city.

"I have been expecting the commissioners for superintending the staff, for a fortnight past. This was one objection to leaving camp, lest I should be suspected of avoiding an inquiry. General Schuyler is expected in town this week. Perhaps the other commissioners intend to meet him here. I have had little conversation with the commander in chief upon General Mifflin's appointment, but sufficient to convince me he is not pleased with the compliment.

"Colonel Butler wrote to me a few days since from Carlisle, that it was currently reported there, that I had refused to serve in the quarter-master's department any longer, unless the congress would give me 3,000 guineas a year. This I suppose is the beginning of General M.'s superintendence. And I dare say the whole of his conduct will lead to embarrass the service and * * * * * * † The king's speech and the debates in parliament have arrived, and seem to confirm what you conjectured, that there would be another campaign. How are we to carry it on? We are without money, credit, or means to obtain the one or the other. Never was a nation in such a situation, and yet, I am told, congress think all things are going smoothly on. It is astonishing how they can be so indifferent to the approaching crisis.

"We have opened an assembly in camp. From this apparent ease, I suppose, it must be thought we are in happy circumstances. I wish it was so; but alas! it is not. Our provisions are in a manner gone. We have not a ton of hay at command, nor magazines to draw from. The people who have the public horses to winter, demand immediate payment for the time past, and refuse to keep them any longer without it. If they persist, I see no resource but to sell the public cattle to keep them from starving. The people will not trust as they have done, while depreciation continues to rage.

"Money is extremely scarce, and worth little when we get it. We have been so poor in camp for a fortnight, that we could not forward the public

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† Erased in the original.

dispatches for want of cash to defray the expenses. Has this the appearance of a vigorous campaign? CHAP. V.

"The new system* recommended by congress, I fear, will not be productive of all the good expected from it. On the contrary, I fear it will introduce much disorder and numerous complaints."

The following is an extract from the letter from Governor Read, the receipt of which is acknowledged in the preceding.

"Your favour of the 9th instant is now before me. I had neither forgot nor neglected my promise made to you, but was prevented by two reasons. First, that I really could not find out what was doing at the civil head quarters with sufficient certainty. And, secondly, that I expected you daily in town. I am almost afraid to commit to paper my full and undisguised sentiments on the present state of affairs, with which you are specially connected. So many accidents have, in the course of the war, happened from epistolary freedoms, that I have grown very fearful of trusting any thing in so hazardous a channel. However, I will venture to tell you, that I think you have nothing to expect from public gratitude, or personal attention, and that you will do well to prepare yourself at all points for events. General Mifflin's appointment to his present office without including the heads of departments, is a sufficient comment on my text, and by your letter I find you understand it as I do. I have had some experience of that body with whom your principal concerns lie, and am clearly of opinion there is more to be done by resolution and firmness than temporizing. All public bodies seem to me to act in a manner which, if they were individuals, they would be kicked out of company for; and the higher they are, the greater liberties they take. In my opinion, you ought not to delay an explanation on your affairs: if a tub is wanted for the whale, you are as likely to be it as any one. A torrent of abuse was poured out against Wadsworth, but that has all died away, as all unjust and ill grounded calumny ever will. I think he was a valuable officer, and wish they may not feel his loss. Your particular situation will enable you to leave the department not only without discredit, but your station in the line will preserve a certain respect which, in other circumstances might be wanting. Whoever is quarter-master-general this year, must work, if not miracles, at least something very near it; for I verily believe there will not be shillings where pounds are

* Of specified supplies in kind from the states.

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wanted. In all my acquaintance with public affairs I never saw so complete a mystery—a vigorous campaign to be undertaken, 35,000 men to be raised, fed, &c. and not a step taken that I can learn, to raise our drooping credit, gratify the people, or conciliate a common confidence. A new arrangement of the army and reduction of officers is now talked of with as much composure as if it were a common business—little do they know the delicacy and difficulty of such a work. Nothing can rouse us from this lethargy, but some signal stroke from the enemy, and I shall not be sorry to see them set about it, as I am persuaded, we are sliding into ruin much faster than ever we rose from its borders. Whatever you do or resolve, must be done soon, or you will be plunged into another campaign, without a possibility of retreat, and though the circumstance I have above alluded to is a favourable one, it is impossible to envy your situation; for whether you move on, or stand still, it may be improved to your disadvantage. If you quit, they will say, that having made a fortune you leave the department in distress when you could have been of most service to your country. If you stand fast, you become responsible for measures and events morally impracticable. If an honourable retreat can be effected, it is beyond doubt your wisest and safest course; but I am not certain that this can be done even now, and every hour adds to the difficulty. Your department, as I have ever told Mr. Petit, must bear some censure for the appointments in this state, and they are now used, as I expected they some day would be, to its prejudice. When such men as * * * * * * and * * * * * * † &c. make such display of fortune, it is impossible to help looking back, and equally impossible for a people, soured by taxes and the continuance of the war, to help fretting, and the general ill temper gives latitude to thought and speech. When things go wrong, no matter where the wrong bias is given, every one concerned finds a pleasure in shifting the blame on his neighbour, or at least making him share it. It would never surprize me, therefore, to see the quarter-master or commissary general made the political scape-goat, and carry off the sins, if not of the people, of those who represent them. Upon the whole, I retain my opinion of the propriety of your being here as soon as possible, and in the mean time can only inform you of two things with certainty. 1st. The plan of the department will be altered with regard to commissions. 2d. That nothing but necessity will induce them to continue the present department, for although it may have a great deal of the *utile*, it has little of the *dulce* on the palate of the present congress. But

† Erased from the original.

you will be drilled on till the campaign opens, and if they can do no better they will keep you. In this, as well as every thing else, much will be left to the chapter of accidents. But it is time to relieve you from this tedious letter, in which my pen has run away with me. I intended to have been very prudent and reserved, but I find I have, as we poor mortals are apt to do, made good resolutions and broken them every one." CHAP. V.

It was the 1st of August 1780 that Greene sent in his resignation as quarter-master-general. We again express our regret that we have not been able to procure a copy of it that our readers might themselves judge if it merited the reception it met with. Some little idea of the grounds of offence that it furnished may be gathered from the following extracts.

On the 7th of August Colonel Coxe writes: "I am informed that the word *administration* in your letter of resignation, was so highly offensive to congress that some of the worthy members immediately on the letter's being read, moved the house instantly to disrobe you of all military rank, at the same time that they accepted of your resignation as quarter-master-general. Others more moderate, (though not at bottom more friendly,) objected to a measure so violent, but at the same time proposed that congress should immediately desire the commander in chief to signify to you that your future services in the line would be dispensed with until your accounts in the quarter-master's department were settled. Neither of which propositions, though warmly urged by your enemies, was carried into resolves. Nor do I believe they dare, great as they are, seriously to attempt any thing of the kind, though some of your friends have been not a little alarmed on the occasion." He further writes, ——— "is in strict alliance with a quondam major general, who has been long since suspected of being hostile to the commander in chief; and who, it is well known, had a principal hand in forming the present system. A system, in my opinion, as well calculated to effect a dissolution of the army, and of course the ruin of its commander, as could possibly be devised by the art of man."

Mr. Petit on the 11th of August, writes more moderately: "I have already intimated to you that I did not entirely agree with you in opinion respecting the new plan, nor respecting your letter to congress; but I could make large allowances for these differences from the various circumstances which placed the matter in different points of light to one and to the other of us. The general causes of complaint arising from a series of disagreeable treatment,

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were, in a measure, common to both of us; but we had not conceived exactly alike as to the secret spring and motives of these transactions. You had supposed them to arise from a seated malevolence of disposition against you in many members of a certain house, who lost no opportunity of playing them off to your disadvantage, until at length they had tinctured the whole body, except a few of your particular friends, with strong prejudices against you; and that their measures had been designedly affronting to you. You seemed also to suppose a prevailing disposition in the house to cramp and confine the supplies and provisions for the army lest they should become formidable, and seem to be more independent than certain persons wished to see them. And I apprehend your opinions were not a little strengthened and confirmed by the conduct of certain persons, with whom you have had many conferences for some months past, and who might be supposed to be capable of judging of the secret motives of action in their colleagues. From these opinions thus formed, it was by no means strange that you were induced to take the step you did. My opinions on the same points were somewhat different; and I believe I have pretty fully described them in some of my late letters. Hence you will in turn make allowances for me that I did not so fully approve your measures as might have been expected. But at the same time I must, in justice to you say, that I did not conceive your manner of doing it ought to have been considered as so offensive as they have taken it. The torrent has been too great, as well out doors as within, for your friends to appease it with any success. I have used emollients wherever I could find an opportunity to apply them, but in many instances I found the patients in a disposition to be rather inflamed than softened by them. At length, however, I found the fever abating, and they were applied with more success, till the letter arrived from the committee, which raised the rage still higher than ever, and seemed to leave no room for conciliation. I have not seen that letter, and can, therefore, only judge of it by its effects, and from select expressions that have been retailed to me, and in which you are charged with dictating terms and conditions which they deem highly offensive. The violence is again abating, but it will settle into a solid dislike in the minds of most of the present members of congress. What was said by some heated members respecting the major general did not, I believe, gain much ground, and is laid aside. Your character as a military officer is too well established to be easily assailed. The component parts of congress are continually changing, and it may not be long before you may regain a respectable standing with the main body, though there never will be wanting some, who will open the old wound and try to keep it from entirely healing. The opinions without doors have

not, at present, a fair chance. They are governed, as you may suppose, by representations from the hot-bed, and not one in a thousand have either opportunity or inclination to inquire into the real situation of things, or to view both sides of the question fairly. The reason of quitting stumbles many who would otherwise willingly give it a favourable turn. CHAP. V.

"I have written to you on this subject with a freedom which nothing but friendship would warrant, and yet short of what I would use in the open air, where there would be no other record than your own mind. I fear the coals have been blown up on both sides by the same instruments, but I cannot now explain myself on this point. Your sagacity will lead you to a meaning.

"Divers overtures were made to me for advice, and at length to accept the head office myself. This I discouraged in its first dawnings. I had always insisted on the propriety of the choice falling on a general officer. An overture was again made to me on a supposition of suitable rank annexed. This I rejected with equal promptness. My reasons for which you will easily conceive, knowing the disposition of the army on such an acquisition of rank."

It was not to be expected that Governor Read would remain an unconcerned spectator of the agitation excited in congress by the affair of Greene's letter. His affections were too much interested, and his knowledge of Greene's merit in that department too full and minute to admit of his looking to the result without the most anxious solicitude.

In a letter of the 19th August he writes: "This is the fourth time I have sat down to write to you, but the multiplicity of business and the nature of the subjects on which I write have constantly prevented it; for before I could finish one letter some new event respecting you and your department occurred, so as to change the whole complexion of the affair. There have been some unhappy misunderstandings and misapprehensions of each other's views and intentions between you and congress, which artful spirits have inflamed. I have felt great concern on the occasion, as our public affairs never required better councils or more valuable men to conduct them. Mr. Petit has communicated to me most of your letters, as he has those to you, and in general we have agreed upon the line to be pursued. You have undoubtedly great reason to complain of the public gratitude, so have the best men in all ages. But it is not of the present men who compose congress, or at least a majority of them, of whom you have most reason to complain. You perhaps will be surprized when I assure you that, in my opinion, you never had fewer enemies in congress than at present. A keen and a just sense of its treatment has drawn

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from you expressions which would have been properly applied to some members now gone, and perhaps to a few that remain; but not being applicable to many, they have kindled that resentment which we are all subject to under reproach, the grounds of which we are ignorant of, and the desert of which we are not conscious of. I observe in a letter to Mr. Coxe this morning you mention, the design of superceding you in command is not laid aside. I assure you it never was seriously entertained by a great majority of congress. One hot member dropped it in a speech, another afterwards moved it with some more formality; but it was soon scouted, and respect paid to your military character, at the same time that your freedom as quarter-master-general gave umbrage.

"I hope to see you shortly. I know no hardships, dangers, or distress I am not willing to share with you."

The following extract is the answer to the foregoing letter.

"*August 29th*, 1780.

"Your obliging letter of the 19th I have had the pleasure to receive. I should have been happy in having your advice and opinion before I sent in my resignation. But I thought then, and cannot help thinking now, that the measures pursued in congress were calculated to compel me to quit the department. This might not have been the design of the greater part, but I am persuaded it was the plan of a few, who influenced others to adopt their measures upon different principles from those which governed themselves.

"You know I had got sick of the department long since, and was desirous of resigning. But I should not have ventured upon the measure this campaign, if I could possibly have got through the business upon the new system. It appeared to me that congress intended to tie up my hands in such a way, that I should either fail in the undertaking, or depart from the plan. In either case, I should have been ruined. If I had not answered the demands of the service, I should have fallen into disgrace with the army; and if, to answer the demands of the service, I had departed from the system, I made myself liable for the consequences. Which, to be judged of hereafter by persons altogether strangers to the circumstances under which I acted, could not help drawing upon me censure, if it did not subject me to heavy losses. Upon the whole, I consider myself as cruelly and oppressively treated. I did not wish to desert the office at a critical hour, nor did I wish to get into a quarrel with congress. My letter of resignation may have more tartness in it than was prudent, but I am far from thinking it merited the severity with which they were about to

treat it. For I am well informed it was seven days in agitation to dismiss me the service altogether. This they may do when they please. I am not anxious to continue a moment longer than I am thought useful to the community. CHAP. V.

"If I have many friends in congress at this time, my enemies have the art of moulding them to their views. Leaving out Mr. Coxe and Mr. Petit, served to convince me that the measure was more personal than political.

"What served to fix my determination for quitting the department was, just about the time I received the new system, I received a resolution of congress that the principal of the department which handled public money, however diffuse his services, should be held responsible for all the subordinate agents. This appeared to me so unreasonable, as well as unjust, the whole complexion of the business had something so cruel and at the same time so personal in it, that I was determined to leave it, be the consequences what they might.

"As to public gratitude, I expected none, especially in so changeable a body as that of congress; for the members this year cannot know the merits of their servants the last, and are, therefore, not very likely to reward them for past services. All things considered, I am very glad I am out of the department, though I have run some risk in getting out, and perhaps lost some friends by it."

Yet Greene duly estimated the importance of the good opinion of those with whom we are connected in society, to the enjoyment of life, as well as to our utility in a public station, and took some pains upon his resignation to collect and diffuse correct information on the subject of his conduct in that affair.

The letter from General Washington on that occasion has already been presented to the reader. And the following is the letter to which that is an answer.

"Camp Verplank's Point, *August 5th*, 1780.

"Sir,

"The time for which I engaged to act in the quarter-master's department at the request of the committee, is almost expired; and as I cannot exercise the office any longer consistently with my own safety, I have to request that your excellency will take measures for relieving me as soon as possible from the disagreeable predicament in which I am placed. In the mean time, I shall be exceedingly obliged to your excellency for the sense you entertain of my conduct and services since I have been in the department, as you alone are the best judge of the merit of one, or propriety of the other. The business is

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truly disagreeable and distressing, and has been so for a long time. Notwithstanding, if it had been possible for me to have gotten through this campaign, consistently with my own safety and the public good, upon the plan proposed by congress, I would readily have done it. But, from the knowledge I have of the department, I know it is utterly impossible to follow the system and answer the demands of the service, and to attempt it at this critical season, will most assuredly defeat our plan of operations, and bring the army into the greatest distress.

"It would be a folly in me to attempt to combat the prejudices of public bodies with hopes of success. Time alone can convince them that their measures are destructive of their true interests, as well as highly injurious to some of their most faithful servants.

"I am sensible my conduct has been viewed by many in a very improper light. And I am persuaded many think the business can be done with more method and at less expense than it has been. I wish it may be the case; but am much mistaken if the nature of the business is capable of more system, or will admit of less expense, if the plan of the war continues on its present scale, and the army on its present footing.

"I have endeavoured to the utmost of my power to enter into the spirit of your excellency's measures, and if my conduct has not been satisfactory to government and to yourself, it has been owing to a want of abilities, and not of inclination."

To Governor Greene of Rhode Island, in which state he always manifested the strongest desire to sustain his reputation, he writes thus:

"The late change in the quarter-master-general's department has no doubt been a matter of some speculation with you. *The true reasons and causes that led to this measure are not known, and probably never will be;* but those which have been held up to public view were to introduce economy and order into the department.

"At the close of last campaign, I represented to congress the necessity of making some alteration in the quarter-master-general's department; as the pay allowed the officers serving upon salary was so incompetent to their trouble and expense that it would be impossible either to get or continue in office suitable men to conduct the business. And this I pressed upon them in several letters during the winter, arguing strongly the necessity of having it done before the campaign must open. They took no notice of these letters until April, and then only requested that I would continue to make the best prepa-

ration I could. In the same letters in which I represented the necessity of making these alterations in the department, I requested leave to quit it. This they absolutely refused me. CHAP. V.

"The commander in chief sent me to Philadelphia, the last of April or the first of May, to represent in person the difficulties attending the business. On my arrival there, I was presented with a new plan formed by General Mifflin, Colonel Pickering and others, for conducting the affairs of the department, which, I told them, could never be reduced to practice, however pleasing it may be in theory. Speculative projectors in matter of business, are like metaphysical reasoners in affairs of religion. Experience is the great school of human life, and the only sure guide. They who take up other principles as a rule of conduct, generally plunge themselves into new and endless difficulties.

"My remarks upon the plan proposed, induced congress to listen to a proposition to send a committee of their own body to camp, to consult with the commander in chief and the heads of the great departments of the army, and to concert with them a plan which might be reduced to practice. The committee was appointed, a plan formed and approved by the commander in chief, and recommended to congress to be carried into execution. This they mutilated and altered in so many essential points, that when it came out I found it impossible for me to introduce it, with the least hopes of answering the demands of the service. Besides, to attempt to carry it fully into execution in the most critical part of the campaign, I thought would be sporting with experiments at too hazardous a rate; and as the order was positive to carry it into immediate execution, without any latitude of discretion to be accommodated to circumstances, I was reduced to the disagreeable alternative of sending in my resignation, with a positive refusal to act under the new arrangement.

"I had been long sensible there had been many political and vulgar prejudices respecting the commission that had been allowed in the department, and had taken care long before this to make an offer to congress that I would serve during the campaign without fee or reward, paying only my family expenses in camp, which the business necessarily subjected me to. I also told the committee that there should be no commission allowed to any of the deputies. I made these offers to remove every shadow of suspicion that might induce a belief that I was actuated by interested motives in the advice and opinion I might give. But all this had no influence. I always considered the prejudices that prevailed, respecting the commission having an ill effect as to the public expense, an idle thing. But be that as it may, I did not introduce it. General Mifflin and the board of war were both before me in the business, and

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gave a much higher commission than I would agree to, after I had charge of the department.

"Doubtless you have heard many things respecting my letter of resignation; that you may judge for yourself I have sent you a copy of it, and a copy of the commander in chief's letter upon my being about to leave the department.

"Many people, to answer party purposes, have insinuated that I had made a fortune. If I had, it is nothing more than was promised me by the committee of congress, at the time I accepted the office; but I can assure you it is no such thing. *I am poor, and find it difficult to support myself agreeably to the rank and standing I hold in the army;* for you will give me leave to assure you, that no man can preserve himself from contempt unless he keeps up those appearances which are expected in the rank he holds. There are few or none who have been hardy enough to impeach my integrity, and of this I will leave you to judge from your former acquaintance with me in private life—the best rule, in my opinion, to judge of actions and principles. *He that is not virtuous in his private walks, never will be so in his public.*

"To prevent the confusion which I foretold from great and sudden changes in the department, at this interesting and critical season, I have continued to conduct the business a month since my appointment ceased, otherwise we should have been all in confusion, and perhaps disbanded before this. Had the second division of the French fleet arrived, and called upon the general to co-operate with them against New York, congress would have had reason to repent of the measures they have taken. They must have delayed, if not defeated the whole plan of operations for which the northern states have been put to such amazing expense.

"*I wish that America could see her true interest, and raise an army for the war. These short enlistments are ruinous in every point of view. We are always dreaming of peace, and for ever adopting temporary expedients. The country is oppressed and discouraged, and the army distressed and disgusted.*"

Thus have we waded through this perplexing period of our hero's life, and profess to have established that he never sought the office of quarter-master-general; that as he entered upon it, so he continued in it, solely from patriotic motives; that holding it was altogether an instance of self-denial, a sacrifice to the good of the service, and the wishes and interests of the commander in chief; that instead of acquiring wealth in the exercise of it, as calumny had established in the opinion of thousands, it reduced him even to poverty; that he suffered the most cruel and unjust persecution in the discharge of it; that the persecution originated with the party who considered every friend of

Washington as the enemy of themselves; and that, finally, under the influence of some of the party, he was forced to abandon it. CHAP. V.

If it be asked, what could have been the motives for this persecution? the answer is obvious.

His fidelity to the commander in chief, they well knew, could never be shaken. The aid to be derived from him was cordial, candid, and zealous. And if it be admitted that the misfortunes of the campaign of 1777 were, in a great measure, attributable to the wretched administration of the quarter-master-general's department, (and the committee of congress so reported it,) never was the man to be forgiven who had snatched the destined victim of the party from impending ruin. But there was, in the minds of many, another cause. The duties of the quarter-master-general detained Greene near the person of the commander in chief; his presence at head quarters was generally indispensable, and here the manifest deference of Washington for his integrity and judgment, was a continual cause of spleen and envy. To discredit the favourite also, was to wound the friend who confided in him; and to bring his conduct into suspicion, was to discredit the judgment of the man who had selected him.

One circumstance contributed greatly to exacerbate the enmity of those who were looking to the place of chief in command. It was generally understood about that time, that Washington had intimated that in case of his fall, Greene was the man who ought to fill his place. It is very possible that there may have been some ground for the report, for Washington had looked into his heart, and knew that it was not every man whose integrity could withstand the temptations which that post held out to the ambitious. Others might equal, perhaps excel him in military talents, as many certainly did in literary acquirements; but of that unassailable political honesty which could be influenced by no occurrences to turn his sword against his country, and erect a throne on the ruins of a republic, the conformity of their sentiments, habits, and principles of action afforded the best guarantee. The sequel will show that he was destined to undergo this very trial.

We know not, however, that there exists any positive proof that such a communication from the commander in chief in favour of Greene was ever made. We are in possession of a letter written from Yorktown, when congress sat at that place, mentioning that it was so reported and believed there. This letter was probably not without authority.

In looking into the transactions of Greene in a station which involved him in so much calumny and suspicion, the bureaus of all his most intimate friends have been open to us, and we solemnly aver, that they do not afford one letter

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from which even a surmise might be drawn unfavourable to his disinterestedness and integrity.

Yet it must be acknowledged that he was guilty of some errors, which, probably, were not without their influence in involving him in suspicion.

As the first of these we will notice his appointing his brother Jacob, and his particular friend Griffin Greene, as deputies to act under him. Nepotism, as it is called, always has been, and always will be viewed by the public with considerable jealousy. It has the appearance of family monopoly of public office, and offends the selfishness of mankind—who always assert a right to participate, and are seldom inclined to give credit for impartiality where the judgment is liable to be warped by the ties of blood. Yet why should the just claims of a relative be sunk in the advancement of his kinsman to the office from which appointments flow? And why should a public officer be restricted from calling to his aid, talents excited to action by zeal and affection?

It is difficult to draw the line with precision, but in general it may be laid down as a rule of conduct, that wherever the support of public opinion is necessary to a public officer, it is dangerous to advance his relatives to posts under him, more especially if the office admits of the suspicion of connivance and mutual concealment of each other's offences. Greene had occasion very soon to feel the dangerous consequences of such appointments; not only in the slanders which prevailed against him, but in seeing his example followed by an agent who did not use it with all the precautions of his employer. In a letter which he was obliged to address to him upon the reiterated complaints that were made, he is reduced to the mortifying acknowledgment that it was true, he had in two instances done the same, but he was resolved immediately to remove the relations whom he had so appointed.

Yet they were men of honour, and established respectability and integrity, and at a time when good agents could scarcely be procured, their consenting to act was an obligation conferred on their employer.

That he was rigidly scrupulous in his conduct towards them, their voluminous correspondence sufficiently establishes. Almost every letter presses them to be particular in their accounts, and to leave not a speck on their conduct to excite suspicion. In the letter in which he announces to his early friend his resignation of the quarter-master's department, he says, "I wish you and my brother Jacob to have your accounts and vouchers forwarded for settlement, as they will be sought for first. I think you had better get Mr. Bowen to overlook them, as he is a pretty good judge of what forms and vouchers are necessary. You cannot preserve too much regularity in the business, as the commissioners are very critical, and no doubt will be more so with yours than

common. These people appear to pay little or no attention to the integrity of the party and the uprightness of his conduct, but altogether to the form and method observed in transacting the business. As I am sure you have discharged your duty in one, so I wish you to put it out of their power to injure you in the other. The sooner your accounts are forwarded the better."

Among the errors of his administration may also be noted his failing to dismiss those agents whose sumptuous living involved the department in popular suspicion. The support of opinion was indispensably necessary to all the operations of the feeble government under which the war was conducted. When a public officer, without any private means of sustaining it, will live in habits of expense, which the fair profits of his office cannot support, suspicions necessarily follow, and jealousy, envy, malice, and popular excitement soon convert those suspicions into proof.* He was not unconscious of the unfortunate impressions resulting from these causes, and they constituted, frequently, the subject of correspondence with his assistants; but finding not the least cause to suspect the integrity, and having experienced the good effects of the industry and zeal of those agents, he resolved not to sacrifice them to popular clamour. Yet upon their not listening to his remonstrances, he ought, perhaps, to have acted otherwise; for it was necessary that his agents should not only be innocent, but unsuspected.

It was certainly an error in General Greene to accept compensation by way of commission on the sums expended in his office. This he appears to have done under the influence of an ignorance of the world, and of that indiscreet fearlessness of imputation which conscious purity of heart too often carries with it into the world. In the ordinary mercantile transactions of men, where the chance of imposition is reciprocal, where the competition for business, and the scrutinizing spirit of individual interest are supposed to interpose a competent check on the transactions of an agent, the same suspicions are not apt to arise. But with a public officer it is different; his office gives him a monopoly of profit, his means of evasion are supposed to be great, and he is, in public opinion, exposed to a more than ordinary temptation to deceive. For, such is the casuistry with which men examine their own actions, that the moral turpitude of defrauding the public seldom weighs as heavily on the human conscience as in the case of friends or individuals. Besides, every one asserts the

* Poor Mitchel who expended £800 in pastry at one entertainment, was actually thought sufficiently dignified by his munificence to be made the subject of a formal impeachment by a great state.

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right to censure, and in proportion as individuals are excluded from the right of personal scrutiny, are the public apt to indulge in loose and general charges and suspicions. It was not very long before Greene discovered this error, and he endeavoured very earnestly to correct it by proposing to have a fixed salary substituted, or to be allowed only the expenses necessarily incident to his family in camp. But this proposition was held long under discussion, and in the mean time, being unwilling to draw his commissions, and unauthorized to receive any other compensation, he was obliged to consume his patrimony; and then finally, to draw his commissions, when depreciated to nothing.

Much, probably, of Greene's embarrassments in his negociations with congress was the result of his military cast of manners. The frankness of the soldier is but ill adapted to practise the conciliating suppleness of the man of the world. He was never loquacious, nor ever guilty of the weakness of indiscriminate communicativeness. But in his intercourse with the members of that body he was strong, pointed, and decisive, in his requisitions; and while he was ever ready to render every service, and make every sacrifice for the good of the country, he never sunk below his just claims on the confidence and gratitude of his employers. But they were preferred as claims, and not solicited as gratuities.

In his communications with his particular friends also, he exhibits a freedom in his remarks which no man, in his station, could indulge in, without danger. Men in public life would do well always to remember the aphorism, that "Walls have ears." His friends were well chosen, and it is literally true, that he never lost a friend whom he had once acquired. But there are few men proof against the temptation of indulging their vanity in boasting of an *eminent* correspondent, or their partiality in boasting of the correct information, or wise remark of a *beloved* correspondent. If no other effect is produced, it gives a turn and point to the conversation and opinions, which will be attributed to the hints of him with whom one corresponds. We will give the reader one specimen of the remarks to which these observations are intended to apply. It is dated 15th July 1779.

"The designs of the congress it is difficult to interpret, but the state of the money remains much the same as when I wrote you before. Upon the whole, I think it is rather gaining ground. It gains ground much faster to the eastward than to the westward. The congress have it now in their power to put a check upon depreciation, if they had but resolution to improve the opportunity. But they are always perplexing themselves with expedients, until the enthusiasm of the people cools and abates, and then, like old maids who have

refused good offers in the bloom of youth, are obliged to accept of inferior objects. CHAP. V.

"There is a parcel of little politicians at the head of the treasury board. Their plans have led our currency to death's door. They are so ignorant of the principles of financiering that they mistake effects for causes, and causes for effects. It is not likely that a physician can prescribe successfully for a disease which he does not understand. This is their situation. They are distracting the community with imaginary evils, and spreading the spirit of jealousy far and wide. This will prove the loss of confidence in one another, and we shall be like a rope of sand, without strength or cement. In a word, I believe them to be the worst politicians that ever had the management of so important an affair. I write to you freely, because I write in confidence.

"The empire is tortured to death with factions and mutual distrusts. The parties, instead of aiding each other with their counsels, are opposing each other's measures. They are more intent upon strengthening their own interests, than promoting the common good. Thus the money has been left to expire without a helping hand, and the army to dissolve without regard to the distress it was in."

After all, perhaps Greene's great misfortune was "*that he had made an enemy.*" Experience only can show the baneful consequences of such a misfortune. It is truly the leaven that leaveneth a great mass. "Beware how you despise an enemy," is a favourite military maxim, and, in civil life, may justly be added, "Beware how you make one." There is, perhaps, no human being so insignificant as not to be able, if constantly under the wakeful influence of vindictiveness, to find some means of doing us an injury. But when possessing the advantages of personal respectability, and an extended intercourse with society, his means of annoyance are truly formidable. The venomous spider does not extend his snares for his victim with more assiduity, or more fatal consequences, than vindictiveness.

CHAPTER VI.

Military movements. Battle of Springfield. Major Andrè. Reflections. Greene in command at West Point. Appointed to the command of the southern department.

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IT was obvious that from the time of Greene's resignation, the current of prejudice began to set from him. Indeed, his enemies had given him so decided an advantage in the advances made to get Colonel Petit into his place, that every pretext was lost for doubting his integrity or economy. It was well known that they equally shared the profits, and that no important step was ever taken with regard to the application of money without Colonel Petit's knowledge. All the money transactions passed through his hands, and peculation in the quarter-master-general must have been winked at by him, or it could not have prevailed. The offer made to him, therefore, and even his appointment as assistant quarter-master-general, was at once relinquishing every charge unfavourable to integrity, nay, to economy likewise.

We had pursued the military career of General Greene up to the time of Sir Henry Clinton's withdrawing his troops from Rhode Island. This was in the autumn of 1779, and the cause of the movement was the expectation of D'Estaing with a powerful fleet and a considerable body of troops, who had arrived on the coast, and was then employed in an attempt on the town of Savannah. A joint attack on New York had been concerted between the

French and American commanders, as soon as the former should have completed the destruction of Savannah. This was thought to be the work of a day, and the fullest confidence entertained in the result of the attack. Unfortunately, disappointment in his first attempt deterred D'Estaing from making the second. Defeated, disgraced, and mortified, he sailed away from Savannah to the West Indies, while the arrival of a strong British fleet under Arbuthnot, enabled Clinton to prosecute his designs against Charleston and the southern states—still leaving a sufficient force under Generals Pattison and Knyphausen to keep at bay the feeble, starving, dispirited army under Washington. Had the American army been at this time in a condition to act, the fall of New York was certain. No rivers any longer interposed a barrier against an attack; every stream was bound in ice that would have afforded a passage to an army. Tantalizing in the extreme was the view to the American commander. But his men were fewer in number than the garrison of the town, and they were half starved, half naked, sick, dispirited, and deserting. CHAP. VI.

The British commander in New York was exceedingly alarmed at his situation; and is entitled to the highest praise for his efforts to avert the impending danger. The ships were stripped of their seamen, and nearly the whole population of the city pressed into the service. At this time it was that "*the honourable board of associated loyalists*" was formed, and formed to disgrace the king whom they professed to serve. At least, it is upon their implacable hatred and revenge that the British writers throw off from themselves the enormities that were committed by the marauding parties, (for they merit that contemptuous epithet,) which issued from New York in various directions. In a civil contest, every citizen has a right to choose his party, but not to dispense with the sacred rights of humanity. Some of the expeditions in which the loyalists took an active part have been mentioned. They have still other trophies to boast of. The murder of Mrs. Caldwell with her infant at her breast, the burning of the Connecticut Farms, and the wanton sacking of Springfield, two beautiful, thriving, and pacific villages; as they could produce no possible benefit to the royal cause, must be reprobated by the voice of posterity.

The last of these events only, are we at liberty particularly to notice; as it is connected with an event in which the subject of these pages acted a conspicuous part.

It was in December 1779 that Sir Henry Clinton sailed from New York on his expedition against Charleston. In May 1780 the town surrendered, and in June he returned to New York.

During the winter, so feeble had been the exertions made by the states to re-establish the American army, that Washington found himself, on the return

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of Clinton, in command of an army of 5,558 regular troops, and not above 3,000 of those really effective. His adversary had double that number, besides the advantage of perfect concentration, while the American troops were stationed in the sweep of a semicircle of many miles, in order to protect at the same time Philadelphia, the banks of the North River, and the eastern states from invasion.

The incursion in which Mrs. Caldwell was killed and the Connecticut Farms consumed, took place shortly before the return of General Clinton, and terminated every way disreputably to the British arms. No object could be assigned to it, but that which it effected, partial plunder and conflagration. The force detached was not sufficient to make a serious impression on the country, and, that fighting was not the object of Knyphausen, Roberson, and Tryon, who commanded, is sufficiently evinced from their stealing back in the night. Yet the enemy retired from a more serious danger than he was aware of. Washington's whole regular force in that neighbourhood was but 2,500; these were posted in advance of Morristown under Greene. As soon as the advance of the enemy was communicated, a night attack had been resolved on, and Greene's forces were actually in motion, when the enemy moved off. Knyphausen escaped but by two hours.

The ravages committed on this occasion may have been the immediate act of the loyalists, who formed a part of the British detachment; but the commanders themselves were not all loyalists; and whether or not, they are all responsible to posterity for the authorized acts of their forces.

As soon as General Clinton arrived, he began to make dispositions which manifested some serious design. Having now the complete command of the islands and waters about New York, it was in his power to move with force and rapidity to many points. General Washington, whose head quarters were then at Morristown, felt alarmed for the safety of his garrisons on the North River, and leaving Greene in command in the Jerseys, he moved off with intention to take the command at West Point.

He could spare but one thousand* regular troops to perform the important task of occupying the passes of the range of hills that stretch along between the rivers Rahway and Pasaic, and to cover the country about Morristown, and the magazines which had been collected in that neighbourhood. To these were added a body of perhaps 300 New Jersey militia, who, about this time, conducted themselves with a decision and spirit which proved, that they

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* Marshall. Private letters say 700.

never wanted any thing but the support of a regular army to induce them uniformly to act with equal fidelity to the cause of the revolution. CHAP. VI.

Things were thus circumstanced when, on the 23d of June, the enemy suddenly made his appearance in great force at Elizabethtown Point, and moving with great rapidity, advanced upon Greene's post in two columns of 2,500* men each, well provided with cavalry and artillery, and commanded by Sir Henry Clinton in person.

The village of Springfield is situate on the west side of the little river Rahway, and at the foot of the hills occupied by the American army. It is distant about eight miles in a north-west direction from Elizabethtown Point. Two roads lead from Elizabethtown to Morristown, the one passing through the village of Springfield, the other to the northward of it. This latter is called the Vauxhall road, and crosses above the point of confluence of two small streams, which unite to form the Rahway. These roads, after passing the hills at the back of the village, unite. Over each of these three streams there is a bridge constructed where the road crosses the stream.

Long as Greene had been in service, so continually had he been employed under the immediate command and near the person of the commander in chief, that this was the first opportunity he had ever had of exhibiting his capacity in an independent command. And his conduct was such as manifested resources which his commander and his immediate friends had always been satisfied of, but no opportunity had yet been afforded him of exhibiting; uninfluenced by the counsels, command, or movements of a superior.

None of the usual means of information had been neglected, and he had the earliest possible notice of the enemy's landing and marching. So many were the passes that he had to guard, that his men were unavoidably posted in dispersed stations. To draw them together was the first thing necessary, and to gain time for that purpose no effort was to be omitted. To forward intelligence to General Washington, to hasten the remote detachments to a point of rendezvous, and to order the several detachments immmediately about his person to advance, skirmish with, and delay the enemy, were the work of the same instant. Every order was issued with coolness and precision, and executed with promptness and zeal.

Colonel Dayton was advanced to meet and skirmish with the left column of the enemy, whilst Major Lee, afterwards the celebrated partizan Colonel Lee, with his dragoons and some infantry, performed the same service against

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* Marshall.

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their right. Both these corps executed the duty assigned them with great spirit, and made all the opposition to the enemy's advance that their inferior force and the circumstances of the country would admit. But scarcely had Greene collected and drawn up his troops on the right bank of the Rahway, than the heads of the enemy's columns, which had united on the main road, made their appearance.

Greene's artillery was posted behind the bridge that crosses the principal stream, and the artillery of the enemy was in advance of his columns. The action commenced by a brisk cannonading, which was kept up with great spirit for near two hours. In the mean time, the enemy manifested, by his manœuvring, an intention to get into the rear of the American army by turning their left. This Greene knew was practicable; for the streams that formed the Rahway were both passable, not only by the bridges on the Vauxhall road, but by fording; and for the enemy to possess himself of the hills in his rear, would be decisive against him. He resolved, therefore, to take a new position; and having posted Major Lee, with the pickets under Captain Walker, in advance at the bridge over the southern branch of the Rahway, and Colonel Shrive, with his regiment of 200 men, at the upper bridge over the principal branch; he left Colonel Angel, with about 170 men and one field-piece, to defend the lower bridge, or that over the main stream; and moved off to a very strong pass on the range of hills in the rear of the town, extending from one road to the other where they approach to their junction. Shrive's position was in the route from both the other bridges to the point where the main army was drawn up; and Lee and Angel were ordered, when Greene had gained and occupied his ground, to retreat under protection of Colonel Shrive's command.

Never were orders more gallantly executed. As soon as the main body began to move off, the enemy made a most furious assault with intent to force the bridge where Angel was posted, but met with a reception that made them recoil in confusion. Angel has not received the rank among the officers of the revolution to which the defence of this pass entitles him. For forty-nine minutes, with a handful of men, did he maintain it against a formidable column, with ten pieces of artillery, flushed with conquest, and animated by the most gallant and experienced officers. And as soon as his commander had reached his destined position, after one fourth of his numbers were killed or wounded, he, with the utmost coolness, retreated to the other bridge, where Shrive was posted, bringing off his artillery and his wounded.

Great gallantry was also displayed by Lee at the pass confided to his protection. Supported by Colonel Ogden, he maintained his post with obstinate

firmness, until a superior force had forded the creek above him, and gained a hill which commanded his flank and rear. He then retired as commanded, under the protection of Shrive. This officer also distinguished himself on this occasion. Coolly and without the least confusion he retired to the main body, baffling every attempt of the enemy to retard or alarm him. With his regular force drawn up in a single line, flanked by the militia and dragoons, Greene now waited for the general attack. But the enemy had received a check from the few who had been engaged, which made them respect the firm countenance with which the American army awaited the assault; and enraged at the serious loss they had sustained, they vented their fury on the defenceless village now occupied by their troops. Immediately as the design to set fire to the village was developed, parties were ordered out in all directions to prevent the spread of the fire to those buildings which were not under cover of the enemy's artillery. And many an English soldier bled that day by the light of the flame. The enraged militia creeping within gun-shot, revenged themselves by the deliberate selection of particular objects. As soon as the village was in flames, (for only four houses out of fifty escaped,) the enemy began their retreat; and as soon as their intention was fully ascertained, small parties were pushed forward to hang on their wings and harrass them, while Starke's brigade was put in motion for pursuit. CHAP. VI.

But being disencumbered of baggage, the celerity of their retreat, and a powerful rear guard, preserved them from any essential injury. By two o'clock they reached the point at which they had landed, and at twelve at night recrossed to the city.

This was, upon the whole, a disgraceful day to the British army. If the burning of Springfield was their sole object, it was one which stamps indelible infamy upon them. If the burning of a beautiful and defenceless village was not their object, then were they repulsed by a very inferior foe.

As soon as General Washington received intelligence of the advance of the enemy, he dispatched a reinforcement of 300 men to Greene's assistance, and rapidly returned himself some miles on the route to Springfield. But he was too far off to afford any aid in the action. The party detached did not reach the scene of action until long after the retreat of the enemy; and the main body had not proceeded on their return above five or six miles before the intelligence was communicated that the retreat had commenced.*

* Greene's letter to Gordon.

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The conduct of the American army on that day has drawn forth the following eulogium from a British pen: "These ineffectual attempts by a force which would have been deemed capable of sweeping the whole continent before it, sufficiently manifested that the practical habits of service and danger, without any thing near absolute perfection in discipline, will place all troops nearly upon an equality. It was now evident that the British forces had an enemy little less respectable in the field than themselves to encounter; and that any difference which yet remained in their favour, would be daily lessened. In a word, it was now obvious, that all that superiority in arms which produced such effects in the beginning of the contest, was, in a great measure, at an end; and that the events of the war must, in future, depend upon fortune, and upon the abilities of the respective commanders."*

We are in possession of the original rough draught of Greene's official account of this battle. It is a specimen of clear natural description, and modest good sense. For the manner in which he made communications to his private correspondents, we will give the following extract of a letter from a very particular friend: "Were it to any other person I am indebted for an account of the enemy's late excursion to Springfield and their expulsion from Jersey, I should think the obligation a small one; but relations of this kind come so sparingly from you, especially where your own part in the business gives you the best information, that I am thankful for so small a portion of so rich a subject as that '*We have had a small fight with the enemy at Springfield; they have since evacuated Jersey, and gone up the North River.*'

"How am I by this, better informed than the crowd at the coffee-house, save that I have better evidence of a few points in the transaction, which are too conspicuous to be unknown even to the vulgar? But, of circumstances, most entertaining, instructive, and interesting to private feelings, I learn not so much as those who take common fame for their informer. Is it to avoid egotism that you are thus shy and reserved? And does this arise from mere modesty, or from that conscious pride which disdains to open the mouth of fame by any other mode than extortion? One general is so enraptured with the sound of the trumpet that, like youth in the height of excited passion, he loses sight of every other object in the energy of a particular pursuit. Another, to avoid the ridicule deservedly excited by folly, like a mendicant friar, denies himself

* Annual Register, 1781, p. 18.

the common rights of humanity, and seeks present mortification in hopes of future reward. But I like not the extremes of either libertinism or stoicism." CHAP. VI.

Little more was done by the northern army during this campaign; the scene had shifted to the south, and both armies to the north were anxiously looking for the promised and long expected aid from France.

It arrived on the 11th July. But arrived to repose six months in the luxurious enjoyment of the comforts and elegancies of Newport.

The fleet of De Tierney was superior to that of the British; and the 6,000 well-disciplined troops that it transported, ought to have secured to the allies a superiority by land and sea; but the opportunity for enterprize was soon lost by the arrival of Admiral Graves, with a force which gave preponderance to the opposite scale. Clinton immediately prepared for action, and marched a strong force to the eastern extremity of Long Island, with intent to make an attempt on Newport. His watchful adversary, the American commander, was also on the alert, and immediately directed his views to the long meditated attempt on New York. This he was enabled to do, by the alacrity with which the militia crowded to his standard, immediately on the arrival of the French army. With all the salutary jealousies entertained of standing armies, the militia are generally willing to shelter themselves, in time of real action, under the cover of regular forces.

Greene, it will be recollected, was, at this time, acting in the quarter-master-general's department. And it was during the vexations attending the immense efforts he had to make to give activity by land and water to 12,000 troops, that many of those expressions of disgust were extorted which he has vented in his letters. The good of the service and the honour of his commander, now to be supported under the eye of their allies, were near to his heart; and not to have command of the resources indispensable to his purposes, or to have them advanced with reluctance and expressions of distrust, had drawn clouds over a temper generally all sunshine, but still susceptible of strong excitement.

Indeed, the situation of an American officer at that time, without the additional causes that acted upon Greene, was one of the most trying that can be imagined. Amidst all their sufferings, privations, and dangers, to be obliged moreover to exhaust their little patrimony to support themselves in camp, and yet not to be confided in, but regarded with real or affected jealousy by the government they were serving with so much zeal and fidelity, was more than every temper could tolerate, or every mind bear without the deepest disgust.

Many of the best officers had resigned; during the distresses of the Valley Forge the spirit of resignation had become so prevalent, particularly in the

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Virginia line, that the most serious and alarming consequences were apprehended. Since that time, from the restoration of comparative order and plenty in camp, and the vote of half pay for life, it had in a measure subsided; but now again, such were the distresses and mortification produced by the total failure of the paper currency; and such the apprehension excited by the recent discussions in congress, on the adoption of a new system in the economy of the army, that nothing but patriotic devotion to their country and their chief, kept most of them in the service. The men who passed through these trials and rose superior to them, merit statues.

Hear this from the pen of Washington. After complaining that his troops were generally destitute of shirts, and many of them of a more indispensable article of clothing, he proceeds: "It is also most sincerely to be wished, that there could be some supplies of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose condition is still miserable. This is in some instances the case with the whole line of the states. It will be well for their own sakes and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will not be able when our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on a common routine of duty; and if they should, they must, from their appearance, be held in low estimation."

After this, the reader will not be surprized to learn that scandal whispered, it was not unusual to fit out the officer of the day by contributory loans for the honour of a regiment, or even a state; and that, in one instance, there was but one suit of parade clothes in a whole regiment. And from whence did relief arrive at last? From the heart where patriotism erects her favourite shrine, and from the hand which seldom is closed or withdrawn when the soldier solicits.

The ladies of Philadelphia immortalized themselves by commencing the generous work, and it was a work too grateful to the feelings of the American fair, not to be followed up with zeal and alacrity. The profane pen of a Rivington may have sneeringly written, that the linen of the fair-one was converted into a corresponding garment to decorate the person, or add to the comforts of a lover; but the fear of ridicule shrunk away from the more interesting reflection, that soon it might be tinged with the heart's blood of the wearer.

By the greatest efforts, the means of transportation and of a joint attack by land and water on New York, were prepared; and with renovated hope, the American army marched to brave the assault, under a full knowledge of its accumulated dangers.

Clinton soon discovered his danger, and although the British writers attribute his retrograde movement to the prevalence of dissensions between the army and the navy, it is more just to his military reputation to attribute it to the movement of the American army. He soon regained the fortresses that defended his strong hold, and it was once more in a state of safety.

Such also would probably have been the effect upon the conduct of General Howe, had the same measures been adopted to counteract his expedition against Philadelphia. And such, had Washington felt himself at liberty to act untramelled by an Aulic Council, and possessing his present experience, would probably have been the course pursued. His conduct manifested a strong disposition to pursue it.

Upon the return of General Clinton, Washington's militia were dismissed; for he could not subsist them; and his army, though now reduced very low, he soon after recrossed into Jersey, and encamped at Orangetown.

It was when Washington was on his march to Kingsbridge, with a view to the attempt on New York, and when he had mustered under him every man who could carry a musket, that he placed Arnold in command of a corps of invalids at West Point. The commander in chief had offered him a command suitable to his rank and reputation in the army; but he made the unhealed state of his wounds, and some other causes, the pretext for declining it; for his negociations for the surrender of West Point, had already commenced, or been consummated; and he made interest to obtain that appointment.

Greene was in command of the American army, at the time Arnold's treachery was detected. Soon after the relinquishment of the enterprize against New York, a meeting was concerted to take place between the American commander in chief, and the French military and naval commanders. Hartford, on the Connecticut River, was the place assigned for their meeting, and its object was to consult on their future joint operations.

Upon the departure of Washington, Greene was placed in command of the main army. This was on the 17th of September. On the 18th, Admiral Rodney arrived with such an overwhelming reinforcement to the British navy, as must have set the consultations at Hartford all at nought. From that time Greene's communications to the president of congress are full of the hurried preparations going on at New-York for some important enterprize. Little did he or any other suspect to what point that enterprize was directed. It appears that he had established a regular communication for obtaining intelligence from the city by spies; and his correspondents in that place were at a loss whether the expedition was intended against Rhode Island or Virginia. To one or the other of those places the enemy had been careful to throw out hints,

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or exhibit appearances that the expedition was directed. Yet Greene was not deceived; for in a letter of the 21st to General Washington, he writes, "Colonel ——— communicated the last intelligence we have from New York; since that I have not been able to obtain the least information of what is going on there, though we have people in from three different quarters. None of them returning makes me suspect some secret expedition is in contemplation, the success of which depends altogether upon its being kept a secret."

This letter is dated at Tappan, for to that place he had been directed by General Washington, on his departure for Hartford, to remove a division of the army.

On the 23d, the whole mystery was developed by the capture of Major Andrè. He had ascended the river in the Vulture sloop of war to hold a personal conference with General Arnold. The British commander had become sensible that no time was to be lost; as most probably, on the return of Washington from Hartford, he would assume the command in person at West Point, or confide it to Greene. The present, therefore, was the most favourable time that would ever present itself; the recent movement of the army nearer that place, excited to dispatch; and the arrival of Rodney gave the enemy the command of such abundant means of water transportation, without exposing the city to a *coup de main* from the French and American forces, that the British commander would have been culpably negligent, not to have embraced it. Andrè was accordingly dispatched to make the final arrangement for consummating the treachery of Arnold.

The well known object of Arnold's negociation was to put Clinton in possession of the post at West Point. This is a beautiful little plane, lying on the west bank of the Hudson, a little below where it breaks through the chain of mountains called the Highlands. Its form is nearly circular; in one half of its circumference defended by a precipice of great height, rising abruptly from the river; and on the other, by a chain of rugged, impassable mountains. It is accessible by one pass only from the river, and that is narrow and easily defended; while, on the land side, it can be approached only at two points, by roads that wind through the mountains, and enter it at the river bank, on the north and south.

Great importance had always been attached to this post by the Americans, and great labour and expense bestowed upon fortifying it; whether judiciously or to good effect, has never been tested. But the place is naturally, scarcely assailable, very healthy, and commands the river, throughout a long circuit that it stretches round the point, and where it is deep and very narrow.

The North River had long been the great vein that supplied life to the American army; and had the enemy obtained possession of this post, besides the actual loss in men and stores, the American army would have been cut off from their principal resources in the ensuing winter, or been obliged to fall back above the Highlands, and leave all the country below open to conquest; while the communication between the eastern and western states would have been seriously interrupted, if not wholly occluded.

Arnold well knew the bearing of this post upon all the operations of the American army, and afterwards avowed his confident expectation, that had the enemy got possession of it, the contest must have ceased, and America been subdued. Clinton, it appears, also well understood the value of this place; and it is probable, that the purchase of it had been arranged with Arnold some months prior to the detection of the plot. It was well remembered, afterwards, that he had intrigued for some time to get appointed to the command, not only in person, but through the agency of his friends in congress and the army; and the activity which he displayed in making his escape, and afterwards, as a commander under Clinton, support the belief that the pain and weakness from his wounded legs, on which he founded his claims to a command suited to an invalid, were in a great degree affected. Indeed, in one of his publications he acknowledges, that he had long retained his commission only to find some opportunity to inflict such a blow.

The eventful career of this unhappy man exhibits a melancholy specimen, either of the fearful instability of human virtue, or of the singular combinations to be met with, of the greatest and vilest qualities in the same character. He was unquestionably one of the bravest soldiers of the age; nor did he only excel in the mere animal and subordinate quality of personal courage; he had a head to plan, and genius and conduct to execute the boldest and most complicate undertakings. There was in him a spirit of adventure almost romantic; yet it did not exhibit itself in mere ebullitions, or desultory efforts; for he was capable of the most enviable perseverance. This was strikingly exemplified in his expedition through the wilderness against Quebec. Yet he was a villain, or became one. If the latter, perhaps his case presents an instance of the demoralizing effects of persecution, even upon sound principles. The most timid animal becomes terrible under the influence of despair. He affected to think that in the prosecutions instituted in Philadelphia against him, for his conduct in Canada as well as Philadelphia, he had been treated with harshness, if not injustice; with indignity, he certainly had been, and to a proud spirit, elevated by glory and command, this is the least tolerable of all injuries.

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Yet we are in possession of too many reasons for believing that he was in constitution a villain; and had only added to the most depraved principles, the finish of hypocrisy.

There is not a more impudent instance on record of an attempt to palliate crime and justify treachery, than his letter of the 25th September, written to General Washington from on board of the Vulture; or that of the 1st October, addressed to the people of the United States from New York.

The first begins with "The heart which is conscious of its own rectitude, cannot attempt to palliate a step which the world may censure as wrong. I have ever acted from a principle of love to my country, since the commencement of the present unhappy contest between Great Britain and her colonies: the same principle of love to my country actuates my present conduct, however it may appear inconsistent to the world, who very seldom judge rightly of any man's actions," &c.

Twice in the course of the letter addressed to the people, has he the hardihood to invoke the sacred name of the Almighty: "You have felt the torture in which we have raised our arms against a brother. *God incline the guilty protractors* of these unnatural dissensions to resign their ambition and cease from their delusions, in compassion to kindred blood. In behalf of the candid among the latter, some of whom I believe, serve blindly, but honestly in the bands I have left, I *pray God* to give them all the light requisite to their own safety before it is too late; and with respect to that herd of censurers whose enmity to me originated in their hatred to the principles by which I am led to devote my life to the re-union of the British empire as the best and only means to dry up the streams of misery that have deluged this country, they may be assured that, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, I shall treat their malice and calumny with contempt and neglect."

The reasons which, in this address, he assigns for his justification are, the refusal of congress to listen to the overtures made by Great Britain, and the alliance entered into with France. But it happened, most unfortunately for the candour of this pious and virtuous man, that on board a packet, captured on her passage from England to New York in January following, was found a letter from a London banker, addressed to General Arnold, which contained these words:

"PARLIAMENT-STREET, 30*th January*, 1781. CHAP. VI.

"SIR,

"I have received the honour of your different letters, enclosing bills of exchange upon Harley and Drummond, *bankers to the court*, of £5,000, sterling," &c.*

How many of these sets of bills for £5,000 each, were drawn in favour of the immaculate general, is not known. Report at that time stated, in addition to a commission of brigadier, he stipulated for £20,000 as the price of West Point; but on the failure of the principal part of the contract, he compounded for £10,000 sterling. For this he had sacrificed the respect of mankind, and the calm of an approving conscience.

Indeed, discoveries were made shortly after Arnold's defection, to which a proper publicity was promptly given, and which set his character in a very unfavourable point of view. A few extracts from original letters will furnish the most satisfactory information of these facts.

From Colonel Petit to General Greene.

"PHILADELPHIA, *October 6th*, 1780.

"I arrived in town yesterday, and found the inhabitants had been much roused by the discovery of General Arnold's plot. The whigs are now more exasperated at Mrs. Arnold, from a number of letters that have been found, which had passed between her and General Arnold. A number of commercial connexions of a very offensive nature are discovered; but I don't hear of any with him in his diabolical scheme of betraying the fort. Mr. ——— has been obliged to leave the town from an agreement being found between him and Arnold, to share the profits of the goods taken from the inhabitants, when the enemy left the city."

From Colonel Coxe.

"*22d October* 1780.

"Among the papers of Arnold there was found an agreement, signed Arnold, ——— and ———, dated a few days after he entered the city; set-

* Annual Register.

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ting forth, that as there were large quantities of goods in the city not wanted for the army, said ——— and ——— were to purchase all in their power, at the joint risk and profit of the three. What purchases were made remain a secret as yet. ——— is proscribed by the state, and ——— has thought it prudent to leave the city for awhile. The inhabitants, I am told, are much enraged at his conduct. And many suits have been commenced against him by those from whom the goods were taken."

To explain these two letters it is proper to mention; when General Washington left his camp near Philadelphia, to enter on the pursuit of General Clinton, he left Arnold in command at that place. It was this opportunity that Arnold had embraced to plunder the merchants in the manner mentioned, by pretending to draw upon them for goods for the use of the army. But he had been accused of a similar piece of conduct at Montreal; and the following passage of a letter from General Alexander Hamilton will show that he had pursued similar practices when in command at West Point.

"This man Arnold is in every sense despicable. In addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his command in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded, the history of his command at West Point is a history of little, as well as great villainies. He practised every dirty act of peculation, and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers of the garrison, to defraud the public."

But Arnold was a hypocrite,—a description of men who are capable of the vilest actions, and incapable of reformation; because, their distinguishing vice is founded in meanness and practical falsehood.

In a letter written to General Greene so short a time prior to his detection as the 11th of the same month, he speaks of public delinquency to the prejudice of the army, as a crime which ought to be punished capitally.

"Yours of the 8th, by Captain Vanderhorst and Lieutenant M'Call, were delivered me by those gentlemen. I have endeavoured to render their situation pleasing to them during their short stay with me; which respect I shall always be happy to pay to any gentleman who entitles himself to your introduction and recommendation.

"It is a matter much to be lamented, that our army is permitted to starve in a land of plenty. There is a fault somewhere; it ought to be traced up to its authors, and if it was *prepense, they ought to be capitally punished.* This is, in

my opinion, the only means left to procure a regular supply to the army in future. CHAP. VI.

"With sentiments of the most sincere regard and affection, I am," &c.

Yet Arnold was far from being penurious. On the contrary, all his meannesses were committed to enable him to maintain a style in living very far above his known resources. And when did poverty with expensive habits, ever fail to attract the eye of seduction? It was observed, not long after the evacuation of Philadelphia, that he had purchased a sumptuous establishment, and lived in a style which few, (at least of the whigs,) could emulate. Indeed, notwithstanding his hatred afterwards expressed to the French nation, when he found it convenient to assign that as one cause of his defection; on the arrival of the French minister, Arnold had entertained him at his house in a manner, which no other man connected with the government, could then pretend to. Not knowing of the scheme of plunder which had been played off by him upon the merchants of the city, public suspicion attributed his apparent wealth to frauds practised in his accounts; and at the instance of the whigs of Philadelphia, he underwent a very severe scrutiny, and had his charges reduced at a most ruinous rate. There were many who doubted the correctness of this act, and with the army his reputation had not suffered materially; for they were not satisfied with the justice or liberality of the board who investigated his accounts.

The consequence was, an enormous balance against him, which drove him, perhaps, from the elegance and comforts of Philadelphia to those of New York. Yet there is reason to suspect, that even at that time, he was basking in the sunshine of royal favour, through the medium of Messrs. Harley & Drummond, court bankers. For all his intimacies were remarked to exist among the disaffected families of Philadelphia. Many of those had remained in Philadelphia during the time that it was in the hands of the enemy. And that they lived on the best terms of friendly intercourse with Sir William Howe and his officers, is recorded in the printed account of the celebrated Mischianza, given by his officers to their general, on his being superceded in the command by Sir Henry Clinton. Among the fair ladies who, on this occasion, condescended to grace the tournament with their presence, and in the voluptuous elegance of Turkish dresses, to bestow what, in chivalry, are called favours on their gallant British knights, will be found the names of some of the most opulent and fashionable families of Philadelphia. These became the favourite society of Arnold; and as they had enjoyed "the glorious mountain tops," while the poor whigs had been "battening on the moor," it may very well be supposed, that it was not without some disagreeable sensations that the

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latter found themselves outdone by the liberal living of the former; and perhaps they were somewhat uneasy at the corrupting influence which polished society, embellished by beauty and wealth, might exert over the political tenets of their officers. Certain it is, that Arnold gave great umbrage by devoting himself, and attaching his brother officers to this description of society, and even at that time, was suspected by many to be disaffected.

The developement of Arnold's plot was communicated to Greene by a letter from Colonel Hamilton, dated Verplank's Point. It was received the evening of the 25th. The object of the preparations in New York immediately became palpable; and without delay, he made every disposition for marching to the defence of West Point; so that when General Washington's order reached him, at a quarter past three, on the morning of the 26th, the whole army had already been put under marching orders. The first Pensylvania brigade under Wayne had been first put in motion; so that it actually fell to the lot of Andrè to find the "warrio-drover Wayne" in command, when he was delivered a prisoner at the village of Tappan. But Wayne did not sit in the board of officers who tried him; perhaps from considerations of delicacy; there may have remained something of personal irritation; the wounds of the pen last longer than those of the sword.

It is very well known, that Major Andrè was taken near a place called Tarrytown, on the east side of the Hudson, where it forms Haverstraw Bay. Ten years afterwards, the large sycamore near which he was taken, was shown to the traveller; and the incidents at his capture were familiarly known to, and related by every inhabitant of the village. Paulding, Williams, and Vanvert, who captured him, were poor, but reputable men, and exhibited a striking instance of disinterestedness and fidelity. Andrè offered them large bribes, but they were not to be corrupted, and conducted him a prisoner to Colonel Jamieson, who commanded a scouting party on that side of the river.*

The circumstances attending the capture of Andrè are differently related by the different authors who have written on the American war. They are all

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* There occurred, about this time, two signal instances of extraordinary integrity among the American soldiery, which did great honour to the national character, and contributed not a little to convince the enemy that the hearts of the people were interested in the revolution. Arnold's proclamation, calculated to seduce the American soldiers to desert, is said, by the English writers, not to have produced a solitary instance of desertion; and when the Pennsylvania line mutinied, the emissaries who were sent by General Clinton, with the most liberal offers of pay and protection, with liberty to dispose of themselves as they pleased, were seized by the soldiers, and delivered up to execution.

correct as far as they go; but being deficient in a few particulars, excited surprise at the supposed want of self-possession in so brave a man as Andrè. The British army in New York was, at that time, supplied with beef, principally through the aid of a class of men, who obtained the appellation of Cowboys. They were a species of suttlers, or dealers in live stock, who, being well acquainted with the roads and passes, penetrated into the country, and either stole or purchased cattle, which they secretly drove into the enemy's lines. Besides watching the movements of the enemy, one principal object for detaching Jameison to that quarter was, to check the prosecution of this trade or practice. For this purpose, small scouting parties were occasionally pushed beyond the American posts, to reconnoitre the interjacent country between their posts and those of the enemy. And as the cattle taken from the Cowboys, unless stolen, were held to be prize of war; and it was an object with the well-affected to suppress a practice which exposed their stock to depredations, small volunteer parties occasionally waylaid the roads for that purpose. Of this description were the captors of Andrè; who, after the fatigue of prosecuting their enterprize, had seated themselves under this tree, in a situation retired from the view of travellers approaching along the road. It is said, they were engaged in a game at cards, when the tread of Andrè's horse attracted their notice. The station they had taken was in view of a point where several roads unite near the village, and Andrè, who was visible to the party before they were visible to him, was engaged in examining a sketch of the route, no doubt to determine which of the roads in his view he ought to follow. At the first rustling of the leaves made by the motion of the party in ambush, he precipitately thrust the paper he was examining into his boot, on the opposite side of his horse from that on which the party appeared. This was noticed by one of the party, and led to the examination which produced the detection. On being stopped, he resumed his composure, and exhibited the pass from Arnold, on which he had thus far succeeded in clearing the American posts and patrols; and the party had already released his bridle, when one of them inquired what he had done with the paper he was reading? An indistinct view of the dangerous dilemma in which the question involved him, produced in Andrè a momentary hesitation; his embarrassment was noticed by the party, and made them resolve again to detain him. Knowing that the pass from Arnold would not avail him after the discovery of the contents of his boot, Andrè then desired them to tell him truly, whether they were "from above or below?" and on their answering "the latter," which was consistent with the truth in fact, though not in the sense he meant it, which was whether they were whigs or tories; he acknowledged himself to be a

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British officer on urgent business, and begged them not to detain him. On their persisting to detain him, the whole extent of his danger burst upon him, and he liberally tried the persuasive voice of gold. But though he had just witnessed, that one in a much more elevated rank had lent a propitious ear to similar arguments, he found these honest yeomen were not to be corrupted. Until then, he had learned, that it is at last in the integrity of the well-informed yeomanry of a country that the strength and security of every free government is to be found. Wo to that government which ever suffers this class of men to remain in ignorance, or be exposed to corruption!

Upon searching the boot into which the paper had been thrust, a plan of West Point, the strength and disposition of the garrison, and other suspicious papers, were discovered; and Andrè was immediately conveyed to the head quarters of Colonel Jamieson. By this time it appears, that Andrè had completely recovered his self-possession, if, indeed, he had ever lost it; and he had the ingenuity to play off on Jamieson a *ruse de guerre*, to which the partiality of his friends, and the feelings of his admirers have managed to give a character which it by no means merits.

He prevailed on Jamieson to dispatch a note to Arnold, informing him that John Anderson (this was Andrè's assumed name) was taken. This has been construed into a magnanimous effort to save Arnold; whereas it was obviously an ingenious artifice to save himself. And it must have succeeded, had not the former, instead of taking the hint as it was intended, verifyed by his conduct the trite adage, "there is no faith among the dishonest," by immediately transferring all his attention to his own escape. Arnold could easily have dispatched an order to Jamieson to release Andrè, or have adopted some fiction or plan for getting him into his own hands, for the purpose of giving him his liberty, and thus have escaped with him. Jamieson, obviously entertained no suspicion of Arnold, by sending him this message: and by the time that elapsed before he forwarded to General Washington the papers found upon Andrè, it is clear that he waited for some communication from Arnold with regard to the future fate of John Anderson.

It is curious to contemplate the good fortune of this interesting young man, in the favourable views which writers of both nations, indeed all who have ever noticed him have taken of his conduct. But such is the effect of excited feeling upon the judgment of mankind, or perhaps, such the proclivity of man to follow a popular leader, and to avoid the perplexity of reflection. The breathing pen of Colonel Hamilton was generously employed in describing the magnanimity with which Andrè met death; the direction once given to public opinion has been followed, "nothing loth," and every subsequent writer has vied

with his predecessor in representing Andrè's conduct in the most favourable coulours. The stern moralist, who, knowing that first to pity, then to palliate, then to imitate, is too often the course through which vice and error steal on society, presumes, in such a case as this, to exclaim, "Pause and reflect;" will be more apt to incur the frowns, than the plaudits of his cotemporaries. But there is a time of life when a writer may no longer feel the undue influence of popular applause.

Andrè has also been greatly extolled for his magnanimity in communicating to General Washington his real name and character, by the express which conveyed to the commander in chief the papers found upon him. But what else remained for him to do? His life was clearly forfeited; and in the character of John Anderson, he must have suffered, "unpitied and unwept," the summary and ignominious death of a spy, or been detected as Major Andrè, with a falsehood on his lips. His only chance of escape was to declare his real character, and place himself under the protection of the circumstances under which he alleges that he came within the American posts; or perhaps, to interest the feelings or the fears of the American commander in his behalf. His letter contains one passage which serves as a plain developement of his motives in writing it.—*It was to save his own life by exciting fear for that of others.* The passage alluded to is the following: "I take the liberty to mention the condition of some gentlemen at Charlestown, who, being either on parole or under protection, *were engaged in a conspiracy against us;* though their situation is not similar, they are objects who may be sent in exchange for me, or persons whom the treatment I received might affect."

It is truly astonishing, that the ungenerous character of this paragraph has never been properly animadverted upon. Who these "gentlemen at Charlestown" were, is afterwards more explicitly declared, in Arnold's letter to General Washington, of the 1st October: "I have farther to observe, that forty of the principal inhabitants of South Carolina have justly forfeited their lives, which have hitherto been spared by the clemency of his excellency Sir Henry Clinton, who cannot in justice extend his mercy to them any longer, if Major Andrè suffers, which in all probability will open a scene of blood at which humanity will revolt."

Thus it appears that Andrè's hint was greedily caught at by Arnold; and Sir Henry Clinton himself in his communications, very plainly hints at the same thing.

Yet nothing could have been more base and dishonourable than the attempt to save his forfeited life by drawing down ruin upon a number of innocent men, who, after bravely resisting the enemy, had surrendered on terms that

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had been most dishonourably evaded. The assertion also contained in Andrè's letter, that the prisoners alluded to had engaged in a conspiracy, was absolutely destitute of truth; as it was well known, that every individual of those prisoners had, from the first, courted and defied investigation; and there existed no cause for their confinement at St. Augustine, to which place they had been removed, but the prevalence of an opinion that their influence kept others from accepting of the king's protection, the illiberal suggestions of some of the loyalists who could not bear the reproachful looks of those whom they had deserted, and above all, the convenience of retaining such respectable hostages to cover such men as Arnold and Andrè.

The introductory paragraph also to Andrè's letter, cannot be dismissed without a remark. It is in these words.

"What I have as yet said concerning myself, was in the justifiable attempt to be extricated. I am too little accustomed to duplicity to have succeeded." (That is to say, I have hitherto been doing what no man who sufficiently valnes the obligation of truth would do, or at least, expose himself to the danger of being obliged to do, even for "the justifiable attempt to be extricated,") I have hitherto dealt out nothing but falsehoods; but for want of practice, my firmness fails me."

In the first place, this paragraph is uncandid; for if his disguise could any longer have availed him, he would have retained it; and in the next place, there is no small cause to believe, that this was not the first time in which Major Andrè had played off the practical falsehood of assuming a disguise, and acting the spy.

It is believed by many, that in the character of a spy he had been greatly instrumental in involving in captivity, the very men whom he now wished to involve in the horrors of retaliation.*

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* The following facts may be relied upon. Let them weigh with the reader for what they are worth.

It was an universal belief, as well in the British army as in the city of Charleston after its fall, that Andrè had been in the city in the character of a spy, during the siege. There is now living in the place a respectable citizen, who acted in the commissary department in the British army, during and after the siege; and another of equal respectability, and whose means of information were much greater, who was in Charleston during the siege, and remained in it until the evacuation, who will testify to the truth of this assertion. And this opinion is corroborated by the following fact. There were two brothers of the name of S. S. and E. S. both well

Let political expediency disguise it as it may, still the character of a soldier cannot be blended with that of a spy, without soiling the pure ermine of the former. And, however his sovereign may applaud and reward the officer who tempts his enemy to treachery, there is something so foul in the constitution of the crime, that we cannot look upon him who seduces another to the commission of it, but as the instigator or propagator of crime. The breath of treachery gives a taint to the reputation of the man who but holds converse with it.

Indeed, there appear to have been a combined attack upon morals made by all the *particepes criminis* in this black transaction. One can hardly read with patience the letters of Clinton, Robertson, and Arnold, boldly insisting that Andrè was not punishable as a spy, because he came within the garrison under the sanction of a flag, or under the protection of the commander; although in fact, with that commander he was concerting measures to get possession of the post where that officer commanded; that he was himself innocent, because he had prostituted the usual protection of innocent and honourable purposes to the perpetration of the basest treachery. And to complete the ridicule of the scene, the chief-justice of the state is brought upon the carpet to support this holy doctrine.

This was at a conference which was held by appointment at King's Ferry, between General Robertson and General Greene on the subject of Andrè's treatment. Robertson brought with him from New York, Chief Justice Smith and the lieutenant governor to support him in the argument; but whether it was that the man of the sword was afraid to encounter the man of the gown in argument; Greene would not suffer Smith to land, and the conference resulted in nothing but mutual confirmation in pre-existing opinions. On the

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known as men of property and respectable standing in society. The former was, to the last, faithfully devoted to the cause of the country, the other was disaffected. During the siege, S. S. being taken sick, was permitted to go to his brother's house to be better attended. There, he was introduced to, and repeatedly saw a young man, in a homespun dress, who was introduced to him by his brother as a Virginian, connected with the line of that state then in the city. After the fall of Charleston, S. S. was introduced to Major Andrè, at his brother's house, and in him recognized the person of the Virginian whom he had seen during the siege. This he remarked to his brother, who acknowledged that he was the same, asserting his own ignorance of it at the time. S. S. related these facts to many persons in his lifetime, and his veracity was unquestionable. Another citizen, Mr. W. J., at the time of Andrè's capture, a prisoner at St. Augustine, also saw the supposed Virginian at the house of E. S. while S. S. lay sick, and his recollection of the fact was revived by S. S. soon after he had made the discovery of his real character. It is also known that the life of E. S. was afterwards assiduously sought after by Marion's men, on the charge of his treachery.

CHAP. VI. 2d October, Andrè was executed as a spy on a gibbet, at the village of Tappan, where the principal part of the army was then encamped.

As his case was one of many novel features, and threats of retaliation had loudly resounded, General Washington did not order his execution summarily, as by the laws of war he would have been justified to do, but commanded a board of general officers to be convened, and submitted the case to their consideration.

Greene was appointed to preside, and Colonel John Laurens was present in the capacity of judge advocate general, which station he held in the army. La Fayette and Stuben were members of the court; and if dignity, worth, and service can give weight to the decision of a court, never was one constituted more worthy to be respected. There were in it six major generals and seven brigadiers. They were unanimously of opinion, that Andrè must suffer as a spy. But such was the imposing appearance of this interesting young man, that amidst all the trials these great men had undergone, none bore so heavily on their sensibility as this. And it is related of Greene, that, so excited were his feelings when the report was drawn up by Laurens and handed to him to sign, the pen shook in the hand of the veteran, and in vain was his head bent low over the paper to hide "the starting tear." The sheet that bore the death warrant of Andrè, bore also the evidence that it had not been dictated by insensible hearts. Indeed, it is said, that this sensibility was so contagious, the whole court shed tears on signing the report.

Andrè died like a brave man, but expressed much regret at the mode in which the laws of war prescribed that he should suffer. He addressed a very pathetic letter to the commander in chief, soliciting the consolation of dying in a more soldierly manner; but, with a painful effort, though commendable firmness, it was resisted.

It has been said, that General Greene's opposition alone prevented General Washington from complying, and a speech has been made for him on the occasion; but we can find no evidence of such a fact; and General Washington's firmness is too known to admit the belief, that he acted from any other influence than his own sense of propriety.

The hour was now approaching which was to remove General Greene from the scenes in which he has hitherto been acting, to a command which gave to his genius and talents a more adequate scope for employment. On the 6th of October, General Washington addressed a letter to him, to know if it would be agreeable to him to take command of the detachment at West Point, and of the military operations on the east side of the river. He did not hesitate to comply, and on the 8th we find him in command at that post. Of the state in

which he found things at West Point, the following brief extract of a letter to a friend, dated the 11th, will show both the fact, the cause, and his feelings with regard to it: "Was there ever such a devil as General Arnold? What confufusion he has thrown every thing into! This post has been shamefully neglected; but the mystery is now all out." And of the efforts which he made to put it in a state of defence, commensurate to its importance and the detected views of the enemy against it, the best evidence lies in the many letters instantly written to summon to his aid all the means necessary to hasten the indispensable works.

Nor did this object occupy his undivided attention. It appears that not a day passed, in which he had not to answer the letters of General Washington, on some weighty and important subject. Their present separation drew forth that communication by letter which usually had taken place in personal conferences. And this correspondence contains the most unequivocal proof of the unlimited confidence reposed in General Greene by the commander in chief; of the respect in which he held Greene's judgment and talents, and the various purposes to which he applied them.

Thus at one time he is called upon to make a full estimate of all the expenses for a year attendant upon an establishment of 32,000 men. At another, to sum up the whole annual expense incident to the war, to give a view of the sums paid by each state towards it, and their capacity to continue or increase their present contributions. At another, to consider the expediency of prosecuting the plans of the campaign hitherto pursued, or what changes shall be adopted upon the various contingencies which might occur. They are the communications of a great and good man to a zealous, faithful premier, whose integrity and disinterestedness he has proved, and whose candour and judgment he has the highest respect for.

The answers to these various communications present a most appalling view of the embarrassment which then pressed upon the commander in chief. It is truly wonderful that he, and every officer of merit in the army, had not thrown up their commissions in disgust and despair. But a vow to save their country was upon them, and every selfish feeling had long since been expelled or subdued.

Man too soon forgets the lessons that are forced upon him in adversity. His own folly has generally too great an influence in producing them, to admit of their being received with cheerfulness, or stored with a view to reformation. In our late contest with Great Britain, the grave experience of the revolution appears to have been very much forgotten or rejected. Short enlistments and military requisition brought us then, to the very brink of subjugation: and the

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same causes have, in a more recent instance, been conspiculously instrumental in involving us in debt, and threatening us with disgrace. Heaven sent us a few brave men to snatch us from impending danger; and the redeeming spirit of a people who adore their liberty, sustained the government through a war in which the experience of the revolution was, for a long time, rejected. Many difficulties pressed upon the congress of the revolution, which could palliate in them the adoption of feeble or temporizing measures; but the government, in the late war, had the command of resources which ought to have saved them from falling into the imbecile measures of the times of which we are now writing.

It is, indeed, wonderful that any administration should, at the commencement of a war, enlist for any other period than the duration of the war. To enlist for a shorter term, is to hold out an inducement to your enemy to protract the war beyond that term. And the same infatuation that might seduce the government to believe that the war will be of short duration, will tempt the soldier to enlist at its commencement for the period of its duration. It is a mistake to suppose that the men who have once become soldiers, will always afterward readily enlist. This is the case only with the most worthless. Those of a superior description, leave the service resolved afterwards rather to try any other pursuit in life. It is only when men of this description have advanced to a time of life, or length of service, which makes them incapable of succeeding in any other pursuit, that, in despir, they devote themselves to the hardships, privations and exposure of a camp. Others may be influenced by an attachment to the vices or indolence of a military life; but to fill an army with such materials, is to compose it of drunkards and deserters.

One thing experience will ever verify,—that enlisting and militia requisitions can never go on together; they are essentially rival means of forming an army, especially if substitutes be received in militia service; for to serve as substitutes then becomes a *metier*, a calling in life, and takes off every individual of that class of society which furnishes the materials for a regular army. And even where substitutes are not received, that class of men find more agreeable and more profitable employment in the service of the militiaman who is compelled to leave his home; or in the various services to which such men are requisite in the commissary, quarter-master, or other departments essential to the movements of an army, and which, with regard to the militia, are generally greatly multiplied.

To doubt the importance of militia to our national security, or to detract from its efficiency in desultory warfare, would be the height of folly. It is the rock of refuge to which all must look for defence in the last resort. But, like

the reserve of an army, it is too important to the security of all, to be exposed to the brunt of the battle; and the materials which compose it are too precious to be unnecessarily exposed to the devastations of war, and the diseases and habits of camps. Their *time* is the *wealth* of the country; the labour of the husbandman may be well employed in raising the products of the earth to supply the necessities of an army, and of the artificer, in preparing the innumerable munitions of war necessary to give efficiency to the courage and discipline of the soldier. Yet it is a truth which ought never to be forgotten, that every individual is the most trust-worthy depository of his own freedom; and the nation which has forgotten the use of arms, and habitually entrusted the care of its defence to a mercenary army, invites attack both from within and without. Hence, the militia ought to be organized, armed, and trained to military service. And for sudden emergencies, the country that does not prepare them to meet an enemy, or enforce the execution of its laws, must have recourse to a burdensome and dangerous permanent army.

But, for the more serious operations of protracted warfare, they are wholly unfit. It is impossible to bring them to submit to that severe discipline, without which an army is but a "rope of sand;" or to remain a sufficient time in camp to be inured to the hardships of a military life. Disease and discontent are the ordinary concomitants of a raw soldiery; and scarcely do they pass through the trials necessary to prepare them for service, before those who escape are withdrawn to give place to others,—among whom death and disease must recommence their ravages.

In point of economy, militia only claim preference as the substitute for a standing army; in all other respects, it is incomparably the most expensive force that can be employed.

From its known incompetency to cope with an enemy that uses regular troops, a much greater numerical force must always be called into the field; and from the frequent changes that take place on the expiration of a term of service; during the greater part of the time a double complement must be kept on foot, and half the year consumed in marching and countermarching between the place of rendezvous and the scene of military operations.

If the militia receive pay and rations, therefore, the expense is at least doubled; but the duplicate of the cost of maintaining a regular army is but a small estimate of the actual difference. Setting aside the positive loss which the community sustains in withdrawing useful men from their ordinary occupations, it has always been observed that there is an improvidence in the habits of militia which produces a waste of the provisions and munitions of war, of which regular troops may be broken, but militia never can. Besides which,

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there is a positive expense attending the movements of militia, which is incident to a regular army, only in a much less degree. Every individual is more or less supplied with the means of purchasing from his private funds, and thus raises the price of articles of necessity wherever the troops arrive or are expected. During the revolutionary war, (and partially it will always be the case,) they could seldom be brought from their homes without being provided with horses, and hence, in their advance through a country, they seldom left provision enough on the route they followed, to maintain them on their return. It was universally complained of, that after calling out the militia, the difficulty of supporting the regular army became greatly increased.

It is probable, that upon a fair estimate of every expense, the most economical measures would ever be to enlist an army for the war. Many objections to the use of militia operate with equal force against short enlistments of regular troops. And when it is recollected hereafter, that the American forces were, in the course of both our wars, often placed in the most critical circumstances, and arrested or cramped in their most important operations, by the necessity of discharging one body of men and drawing together another, the American people ought ever to bear solemnly in mind the reiterated warnings of Washington and Greene on this subject. Many causes exist to facilitate enlistments at the commencement of a war, which disappear in the course of it. Many a gay vision of glory, riches, and preferment that imagination then conjures up, vanishes before the sober realities of experience, of toils, of sufferings, and of wounds. "The pomp and circumstance of glorious war" soon loses the fascination of novelty, and the answer which inquiry draws forth from those who have served, will seldom be calculated to tempt their friends or relations into the galling restraints of military discipline. The experience of two wars will conclusively support the truth of these observations; and had those contests been much longer protracted, our ranks could only have been filled by conscription. This method would, indeed, have made our arms terrible; for in every point of view, it is unquestionably the best mode of forming an army. It is rapid, it furnishes the best of materials, and no danger is to be apprehended from it when thus composed, whether in keeping it together or in disbanding it. It would seem as if our enemy had made peace with us in both wars, just when the idea of adpting this mode began to become popular. But how far the genius, the easy life and free habits of our citizens can be reconciled to the sacrifice, is a question not easily solved.

There are also many difficulties of the most serious nature attending the blending of regular troops and militia in the same service. They never harmonize well together. The regular soldier despises the militiaman for his

his want of discipline, impatience of the hardships and privations of a camp, and inferior dependence placed in him when exposed to the tug of war. And this is repaid tenfold by the miltiaman, upon the mercenary engagement of the regular soldier, his poverty, dependence, and subjection to servile punishment and occupations. Besides which, the militiaman knows, and the general who commands, feels, that it is his duty to husband his best troops, and place the militiaman in the most exposed, though least essential stations in battle. The militiaman is placed in the van, while the regular force forms the rear line or the reserve. Disagreeable as it is to the commander, and much as it exposes him to censure thus to expose the lives of valuable citizens, the safety of the whole exacts this duty of him. Hence, both the militiaman and his commander are reluctant at serving in camp with the regulars; and in time of action, thinking themselves unreasonably and unjustly exposed, they are the less ashamed of deserting the post assigned them, and too often do nothing more than carry confusion into the ranks,—which they increase numerically, but weaken morally. In the hour of battle they have seldom been of essential benefit to an army, and perhaps never but when used in light, active, desultory service, as expert horsemen, or under cover, as destructive marksmen. At the period we are now speaking of, the service was sinking under the joint weight of both short enlistments and militia requisitions. CHAP. VI.

The Marquis La Fayette had, during the preceding summer, returned from France. That nobleman, whose ardent zeal in their cause ought ever to call forth the warmest gratitude of every American, had privately paid a visit to France, for the sole purpose of promoting the cause he had espoused. Some fear was entertained, that unfovourable results might proceed from the fracas which occurred at Rhode Island, and he had seen and felt the mortifying embarrassments which environed the active promoters of the revolution, from a combination of causes which could be best explained in personal and reiterated interviews with those who directed the policy of the French cabinet. His success was equal to the noble motives that influenced his conduct. He suddenly made his appearance in the American army, before it was even generally known that he had left the country; and brought with him the welcome tidings, that large reinforcements were immediately to be forwarded to the French army and navy. The time when they might be expected was designated, and as it was expected that the naval reinforcement would be sufficient to give the allies the command of the ocean, the states were pressingly called upon for such supplies of men and money as would enable the American army to co-operate with efficiency in the proposed attack on New York.

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In September, it will be recollected, the appalling news arrived that the French fleet was closely blocked up in port by a superior British force, and the expedition against New York was reluctantly abandoned. The militia were of course dismissed, and the term of enlistment of a large proportion of the other troops soon expired. The continent seemed exhausted by the effort that had been made: and the American army was again reduced to a handful.

When the unfortunate news of Gates' defeat arrived, its effect was not, most happily, to produce despondency, but to open the eyes of the nation to the dangers which threatened it. This was soon followed by the detection of Arnold's plot, and the continent seemed once more aroused from a lethargy. From the commencement of the war, the people and the congress had fondly indulged an expectation of peace from year to year, which had always paralized their efforts; but when France, and then Spain, and then several other European powers embarked in the contest, there had prevailed too much of a temper to resign all the cares and glories of the war to other hands. The necessity of doing still something for themselves now broke upon the public mind, and the occasion was improved by the wise and spirited part of the nation.

In this effort none were more conspicuous than the commander in chief and the subject of these pages. Many of the letters of the former are in possession of the public. Those of the latter, (and he had at this time many correspondents among the most enlightened and influential men in the United States,) breathe the same spirit, and inculcate the same doctrines with those of his exalted friend and commander. With equal skill and truth he presses the reflection, "that a decree from heaven had gone forth in our favour; for the arm of providence had been made bare in the late affair with Arnold, as well as in raising up powerful friends and allies in our behalf whenever we began to sink under difficulties. But it is not in the order of providence for man to expect more, than the smiles of heaven upon his own exertions. That it was not to be expected even of our allies, to continue, much less increase their efforts, if we relax in ours; nor was it altogether certain, that if we remained in such a state of feebleness as would impose the whole burden, and bestow the whole eclat of achieving our independence upon our ally, that the idea might not be excited of exacting, or imposing upon us terms, that were seriously to be deprecated. National honour had not always been proof against elevated notions of obligations conferred by one nation on another, especially where weakness invited encroachment. Sound policy, in every point of view, required the most active exertion on our part. The people were getting tired of

the war, the allies might get tired of it, or dissensions arise or be sown among them that would induce them to abandon us. He then presses upon them the expense, the feebleness, the embarrassments that have grown out of the means hitherto adopted for military defence; and finally concludes, that if their treasures be all exhausted, the object for which they are contending is worthy of resorting to actual conscription and contributions in kind. Whilst any means remained, the thought of abandoning the contest was unworthy of man."

The time consumed in this private correspondence, although it might be considered as employed in public service, was never detracted from public duty. General Greene's habits of early rising and close application to business were never relinquished; and hence, with facility he went through a multiplicity of business, without suffering one duty to jostle against another, or being obliged to encumber the present hour with the duties of the past. His private correspondence was the last that occupied his attention, and in one of his letters to a friend he complains that "his fingers ache, for he has just finished his thirty-second letter on business." The relief afforded him in the quarter-master-general's department was very trifling; on his aids the severity of the duty of copying principally fell, and the number of letters written, and even copied in his own hand, is truly astonishing. Yet he always found time for reading, and whatever was the lateness of the hour employed in public duty, he never failed to read for an hour before he would suffer sleep to steal upon him. Books uniformly constituted a part of his camp equipage, and though he had not a box set with diamonds to place his Homer and his Plutarch in, he was seldom without translations of those authors in his retinue. But this was rather recreation, and the indulgence of taste than serious study. Books on the art to which he had devoted himself, engaged the greatest part of his studious hours.

The appointment of General Gates to the command of the southern department was made, as has been noticed, by vote of congress. Had the appointment of a successor to General Lincoln, who was then a prisoner, been confided to General Washington, the following extract of a letter from him to General Greene will show on whom the command would have devolved: "I am sorry for the difficulties you have to encounter in the department of quarter-master, especially as I have been instrumental, in some degree, in bringing you into it. Under these circumstances I cannot undertake to give advice, or even to hazard an opinion on the measures best for you to adopt. Your judgment must direct you;—if it points to a resignation of your present office, and your inclination leads you to the southward, my wish shall accompany it; and if the appointment of a successor to General Lincoln is left to me, I shall not

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hesitate in preferring you to this command; but I have little expectation of being consulted on the occasion.

"With truth and sincerity, yours," &c.

Washington was not consulted on that occasion. Gates' star was then in the ascendant, and its brilliancy had thrown even Washington's into shade. It is impossible to avoid indulging conjecture on such an occurrence; nor would it be presumptuous to assert, that the country was made, on this occasion, to feel the effects of ungenerous distrust, and unwise encroachment, with regard to the judgment and powers of the commander in chief. Congress appears, however, to have become sensible of the impropriety committed in that instance; to have distrusted their own judgment for the future; and willing to make atonement to the feelings of Washington, when a successor to Gates was to be appointed.

The unfortunate affair of the 16th of August 1780, one of the most unalloyed calamities of the revolutionary war, had produced such an excitement in the public feeling, as to require of congress an investigation into the conduct of General Gates. A resolution for that purpose passed in congress on the 5th of October, and it was accompanied with a resolution, authorizing the commander in chief to nominate a successor to General Gates, in the southern military department. These resolutions produced the following communication from General Washington.

"Head Quarters, Pasaic Falls, *October 14th*, 1780.

"Dear Sir,

"By a letter received yesterday afternoon from his excellency the president of congress, of the 6th inst. enclosing the copy of a resolution of the preceding day, I find it has been their pleasure to direct me to order a court of inquiry to be held on the conduct of Major General Gates, as commander of the southern army; and also to direct me to appoint an officer to command it in his room, until the inquiry is made. As the congress have been pleased to leave the officer to command on this occasion, to my choice, it is my wish to appoint you; and from the pressing situation of affairs in that quarter, of which you are not unapprized, that you should arrive there as soon as circumstances will possibly admit.

"Besides my own inclinations to this choice, I have the satisfaction to inform you, that from a letter I have received, it concurs with the wishes of the delegates of the three southern ssates most immediately interested in the present

operations of the enemy. And I have no doubt it will be perfectly agreeable to the sentiments of the whole. Your ulterior instructions will be prepared when you arrive here. CHAP. VI.

"I have only to add, that I wish your earliest arrival, that there may be no circumstances to retard your proceeding to the southward, and that the command may be attended with the most interesting good consequences to the states, and the highest honour to yourself.

"With great regard and esteem, &c.

"P. S. You will bear in mind the estimates. I wish to receive them as soon as possible, as I expect the return of the minister, and would willingly have them for consideration, some time before," &c.

Various letters previously written to General Greene from his friends in Philadelphia, had prepared him for the reception of this from General Washington. Mr. John Mathews, one of the delegates from South Carolina, had intimated to him the wishes of the southern delegation, with a friendly expression of a hope that he would not decline serving; and members of congress from various quarters appear to have cast their eyes upon him as the commander to whom the country looked to restore the shattered fortunes of the southern army. We have much correspondence on this subject; but will confine ourselves to that which passed between himself and the commander in chief on the occasion, with a view to show how these great men thought and acted towards each other and their country.

General Greene to General Washington.

"West Point, *October 16th*, 1780.

"Sir,

"Your excellency's letter of the 14th, appointing me to the command of the southern army, was delivered to me last evening. I beg your excellency to be persuaded that I am fully sensible of the honour you do me, and will endeavour to manifest my gratitude by a conduct that will not disgrace the appointment. I only lament that my abilities are not more competent to the trust, and that it will not be in my power to be as extensively useful as my inclination leads me to wish. But so far as my zeal and attention can supply the defect, I flatter myself my country will have no cause to complain.

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"I foresee the command will be accompanied with innumerable embarrassments; but the generous support I expect from the partiality of the southern gentlemen, as well as the aid and assistance I flatter myself I shall receive from your excellency's advice, afford me some consolation in contemplating these difficulties.

"I will prepare myself for the command as soon as I can; but as I have been upwards of five years in service, during all which time I have paid no attention to the settlement of my domestic concerns; and many divisions of interest, and partitions of landed property have taken place in the time between me and my brothers, and now lie unfinished, I wish it was possible for me to spend a few days at home before I set out for the southward; especially as it is altogether uncertain how long my command may continue, and what deaths or accidents may happen during my absence. I beg your excellency's opinion upon the matter, and will regulate my conduct accordingly. However, it will not be possible for me to set out under five days from this place, if I put my baggage and business under the least degree of regulation; nor is my state of health in a condition to set off immediately, having had a considerable fever upon me for several days. General Heath arrived last night, and will take command this morning. I will make him fully acquainted with all the orders and steps I have taken which concerns his command. And will give him my opinion what is necessary further to be done for carrying into effect your excellency's intentions, and putting the garrison into a proper state of defence, as well as to prepare for the ensuing winter.

"I have the honour to be," &c.

General Washington to General Greene.

"Head Quarters, *October 18th*, 1780.

"Dear Sir,

"Your letter of the 16th was delivered me an hour since. I am aware that the command you are entering upon will be attended with peculiar difficulties and embarrassments; but the confidence I have in your abilities, which determined me to choose you for it, assures me you will do every thing the means in your power will permit, to surmount them, and stop the progress of the evils, which have befallen, and still menace the southern states. You may depend on all the support I can give you, from the double motives of regard to you personally, and for the public good.

"I wish circumstances could be made to correspond to your wishes to spend a little time at home previous to your setting out; but your presence with your command as soon as possible is indispensable. The embarkation at New York sailed the 16th, in all probability destined to co-operate with Cornwallis, who, by the last advices, had advanced as far as Charlotte. I hope to see you without delay, and that your health will be no obstacle to your commencing your journey.

"With the sincerest regard, I am," &c.

General Greene to General Washington.

"West Point, *October 19th*, 1780.

"Sir,

"Your excellency's favour of the 18th was delivered me this afternoon. I had given up the thought of going home, before the receipt of your letter, even if I could have been indulged with your permission. My affairs required it, but I was afraid it would take up too much time, considering the critical state of affairs to the southward. The day that I marched from Tappan, (7th) I wrote for Mrs. Greene, and expect her here every hour. When I wrote for liberty to go home, it was my intention to have stopped her on the road; but if I should set out before her arrival, the disappointment, added to the shock of my going to the southward, I fear will have some very disagreeable effect upon her health, especially as her apprehensions upon the subject were very lively, even before there was a probability of my going.

"I see the necessity for setting out, and feel the necessity for staying. I must beg your excellency's indulgence for one day longer, after which, if Mrs. Greene don't arrive, I shall immediately set out for head quarters. My baggage sets off to-morrow, if I am not disappointed in getting horses, which Colonel Hughes promises me I shall not be. Nothing shall detain me longer than a couple of days from head quarters, unless I am very unwell indeed.

"I thank your excellency for the double assurance you give me of support, and long to be upon my journey to meet Lord Cornwallis, before he advances too far into the heart of North Carolina.

"I have the honour to be," &c.

This promise was punctually complied with. Neither the fever that hung upon him, the hourly expected arrival of a beloved and long absent consort, the

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demands of his private concerns, nor, above all, the endearments of children whom he had never seen but once, and whom he tenderly loved, detained him a day longer from his duty. On the 18th he entered upon a journey of seven hundred miles, on an expedition full of dangers and difficulties, and on an indefinable absence from a home which he fondly sighed to return to, never again to be torn from it.

CHAPTER VII.

Introductory to the southern campaign. Revolutionary spirit in the south.

THE revolution which, in 1776, raised the American people to the rank of an independent nation, is to be traced up to a very remote origin in the country south of the Roanoke. It was there but the last step of a gradual and steady advance from despotism to freedom.

It was Sir Walter Raleigh who first drew the attention of the British nation to the settlement of the noble country that stretches from the Gulf of Florida to the Bay of St. Lawrence. In 1584, he set the example by an attempt to plant a colony within the present limits of the state of North Carolina. Why, with such a country before them, many parts of which they had actually visited, his colony should have fixed on one of the wretched islands at the mouth of the Roanoke River for such an establishment was a mystery, until a recent discovery in Balcarras county has developed the fascinating cause. "*There* is gold, and the gold of that land is good."*

It is a fact that some specimens of that metal were seen among the natives at an early period, and this, the great object of pursuit in that age, as it has

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* Appendix A.

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been indeed, in every age; fixed the choice of this party to a situation possessing not one other quality to recommend it, unless it was the fish that the waters afforded.

This attempt ceased to be prosecuted upon the disgrace of Raleigh; and from James River to the Floridas the numerous aborigines ranged in peace over their native forest until the era of the restoration.

It has been pertinently remarked of Charles II. of Great Britain, that there was more wit than truth in the assertion, "That he never said a foolish thing, nor ever did a wise one."

The acts of wisdom that distinguish his reign, were certainly not many in number; but he had the good sense to favour and cherish the North American colonies. He saw himself surrounded by thousands of needy dependants, and boisterous spirits, both of which descriptions of men, it was his policy to find employment for—adapted to their tempers and wants, and in a mode least calculated to end in drafts on his purse, or interruptions of his pleasures. Many causes in addition to those above alluded to, concurred at the time to impress on this measure, the stamp of mature wisdom. Before the time of Cromwell, whenever the British nation rendered itself formidable abroad, it was at the expense of prosperity at home. As a politician, few men have ever excelled that usurper; for usurper he must be named, since, whether from king or people, and however beneficially used, his power was violently acquired. His views of national policy were grand and profound, and with promptness and decision, he knew how to avail himself of times and circumstances. His victories in Scotland and Ireland secured internal tranquillity to Great Britain, whilst his splendid naval victories commanded the trembling respect of the powers on the continent. All the legitimate race who had preceded him, had never been able to give the same eclat to the British nation. The agricultural, commercial, and naval prosperity of that kingdom, were laid in his time.

When Charles came to the throne, he found the lands distributed among, and cultivated by industrious hands; commerce ready to explore the earth, fearless under the protecting ascendancy of the British navy and the British name; and the whole nation in a state of elasticity, which needed only freedom and security to lead to national prosperity. Revolutions, such as that government had recently passed through, when not protracted until excitement sinks under its own exertions, are eminently calculated to produce such a result. Individuals are impelled to enterprize, and the human mind acquires vigour, independence, and acuteness, from the reflections and discussions which are forced upon it. Awakened from that state of torpor and of habit, in which nine tenths of mankind doze away their lives, and in which it is too much the

interest of the rulers of the earth to keep them absorbed, men discover, that, however bitted and harnessed, and flayed and goaded, still the physical strength is with them, whether the car of state is to be kept in motion or overturned: and rulers become (sometimes too late) sensible that they have duties to fulfil towards the governed. Conscious security in their acquirements, the prospect of peace, and agricultural and commercial habits in England, led to colonization; and the listlessness of a state of inactivity, to many who had long lived in the whirl of politics and war; the discontents of those to whom the restoration was not agreeable, (and who well knew they must long be looked upon with suspicion;) and of others, who abominated the re-establishment of the Episcopal Hierarchy, all contributed to furnish fit subjects in abundance for such a purpose. The old colonies were rapidly filled up, and attempts to establish others became popular.

The emigrants furnished to the Carolinas, by the causes originating in the political events in England, appear always to have cherished a revolutionary spirit; or rather to have been fully sensible of the value of civil and religious rights, and ready to risk their lives in asserting them. At the same time, there always existed a royal party, cherished and nurtured under the patronage of government:--this was the necessary result of the early political institutions introduced into these colonies.

The code of laws called the Fundamental Constitutions, was the first system of government proposed for the country south of Virginia. This has generally been attributed to the celebrated John Lock. If correctly; the profound investigator of the human understanding, was placed, like Moses on Pisgah, the whole region open before him, without a hope of reaching it himself. Never did human ingenuity devise a more striking specimen of inveterate folly. It is easy to conceive, and the world has unfortunately but too much cause to know, that the profound metaphysician may be miserably deficient as a practical politician. Yet it is but justice to this great man to observe, that the evidence of his having been the author of the Fundamental Constitutions, is by no means satisfactory. A cotemporary writer attributes this truly sciolous production to the Earl of Shaftsbury, one of the proprietors.*

The most striking feature in these constitutions was, that privileged or dignified orders were to be established, and the people to be converted into serfs. A nobility, consisting of landgraves, casiques, and barons, were to be graduated by the landed estates granted them along with the dignity; and their

* Oldmixon's British Empire, vol. 1, p. 332.

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tenants, and the issue of their tenants, were to be transferred with the soil, and not at liberty to depart from it, without their lord's permission *under hand and seal.*

It is obvious, that whilst other lands were to be had, this feudal nobility would either hold their estates untenanted, or must depend on slaves, or else descend to the servile task of cultivating them with their own hands. But these institutions contemplated the introduction of Negro slaves, and vest in the owner unlimited power over them.

Little did these dreamers know of the spirit of independence generated, if not originally existing, in the adventurers of a colony in North America; where men sleep on their fire-arms, and are every hour taught their own importance in subduing both the forest, and the savages that prowl through it.

From the first moment of the settlement of the colony at Charlestown, which was in 1669,—the year that gave birth to this system, the struggle against its odious provisions commenced. And as early as 1675, parties had already assumed a marked and decided character. They were compared to the court and country parties in England; and it is obvious, from all the accounts given of the conduct and tenets of the parties, that they were the loyalist and republican parties of the mother country. The former being patronized by the lords proprietors, were exclusively in power; and the latter, resolved to oust them. The project was soon extended to ousting the proprietors themselves. The distinction of cavaliers and puritans, by which the parties were sometimes designated, sufficiently marks the leading characters of each.

At first, the republican party appear to have been viewed as malcontents; and were scoffed at and ridiculed by the cavaliers and their dignified cotemporaries; but it is evident the republicans gained ground rapidly; for, the fear of religious persecution and a popish successor, drove many of the adherents of their tenets from Great Britain. As early as 1689, we find a majority of the commons-house, as it was called, protesting against the Fundamental Constitutions, and in consequence thereof, the governor and council excluding them from their seats in that body. But their fall was that of Antœus, for at the next election the whole of that branch was decidedly in the opposition. And in the spirit of the days of King John, they sullenly and pertinaciously refused to pass any law proposed by the governor and council, notwithstanding the affairs of the province were in the utmost derangement, and its safety seriously threatened both by the Spaniards and Indians.

James Colleton, the brother of one of the proprietors, was then governor. He undertook to proclaim martial law; and in the "unquestionable exercise of his prerogative," dissolved his mutinous commons.

Just at this crisis an event occurred, which gave to the opposition, a leader calculated to answer their purposes.

Seth Sothel, an English gentleman, had purchased out Lord Clarendon's share of the proprietary grant; and a similar revolutionary spirit to that which now animated the oppositionists of the southern colony, having made its appearance in the country lying between Albemarle Sound and the Virginia line, Sothel was sent out to curb them armed with plenary power, and carrying in his person all the weight of proprietary interest. Yet he was not able to crush the hydra; and after having signally disgraced himself by the most infamous conduct, he was arrested, tried, deposed and banished by the commons of North Carolina.

From Albemarle he proceeded to Charlestown, and arriving in the height of the ferment existing there, he took upon himself to assume the office of governor, supported by the strong party of republicans, now possessing all the physical strength of the colony.

Sothel was precisely the man whom the revolutionary party now stood in need of. His proprietary character and assumed authority, would protect them from prosecution; and his want of either talents or weight of character, would remove all difficulty in deposing him, when they should no longer need his name. A plan was concerted between him and the leaders in the opposition; and to a well supported petition to issue writs for a new election, he graciously accorded his consent.

The character of the legislature thus elected, may easily be conjectured. The vaunting cavaliers began to be serious and respectful in their deportment toward their adversaries; and Colleton, although as an individual and a governor very much respected for his correct and dignified deportment, soon found himself accused and convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors, and banished from the province. With him, the Fundamental Constitutions crumbled to dust; for, the lords proprietors finding it impossible to force them upon a people who had exhibited such a spirit; had good sense enough to resolve, "that as the people have declared they would rather be governed by the powers granted by the charter, without regard to the Fundamental Constitutions, it will be for their quiet, and the protection of the well disposed, to grant their requests."*

Having now obtained their immediate purpose, the revolutionists made no difficulty in surrendering Mr. Sothel to the rage of the lords proprietors; and quietly suffered him to be recalled, and another governor to be duly substituted.

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* Chalmers' Political Annals, p. 552.

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This wise and ingenious precaution of the South Carolinians, to interpose Sothel between themselves and power, appears to have been suggested by an occurrence which attracted universal attention in the colonies at that time, inasmuch as in its progress the principle was established in Great Britain, that the colonists were amenable to the British courts of law for treasons committed in America. This occurrence will here be noticed somewhat at large, since it leads to the developement of the early origin of the contest between the colonies and the mother country; and proves the struggle to have been coeval with the producing cause. The British historian* has cited the navigation acts of Charles II., the parliamentary measures consequent upon them, and the submission of the colonies, as precedents to justify the stamp-act, the duty on tea and on other articles, and the subsequent parliamentary measures which led to the revolution of 1776; it is then a full and natural reply to the argument to show, that the attempt to establish a general parliamentary power over the colonies, was resisted in its very inception; and only submitted to, until the colonies had acquired power to resist with effect.

The great object at both periods was, to fix the limits of parliamentary power; and the great end of the people of America, to secure to themselves a sanctioned participation in the rights of Englishmen. Just one hundred years elapsed between the commencement of the colonial system, and its final oppressive extension; but at both periods it was met with the same temper, and a plain indication was given, that nothing but the want of strength prevented effectual resistance to the offensive principles which it involved. The imposition of a small tax on the consumption of tea, led to the great revolution of 1776; and a tax of a penny a pound on the consumption of tobacco in the colonies, actually produced a minor revolution one hundred years before. The very leading questions which occupied the minds of the colonists at the period of 1776, we will find convulsing the colonies in 1677. The right of throwing off an arbitrary government; the right of taxing the colonies without their consent; the right of subjecting the colonists to trial before a British jury; and even the right of cutting off the trade of Boston, will all be found involved in the miniature revolution which took place in North Carolina in the year 1677.

It is contended by Mr. Chalmers, that the arguments at that time used by the colonists, did not insist on the unconstitutionality of the measures complained of, but only on their inexpediency. But it would have been a folly in the supplicants to have outraged those who certainly possessed the *physical*

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* Chalmers.

power, by denying their *legitimate* power, at a time when the colonists could only hope to obtain from their benevolence what could not be extorted from them by force. But Mr. Chalmers is incorrect in point of fact; for it will be seen that, in South Carolina at least, the question of unconstitutionality was actually insisted on, and such a spirit of opposition exhibited, as rendered the execution of the laws complained of, for some time impracticable. CHAP. VII.

The name of John Culpepper has been handed down to posterity, loaded with unmerited odium. A British court had pronounced him guilty of high treason, and no author has ventured to criticise that decision, or examine the charges upon which it was founded. John Culpepper was an early and bold assertor of some of the very principles which produced the revolution of 1776, and had nearly fallen the victim of a premature struggle against the exercise of arbitrary power. Washington would also have been convicted of high treason had he failed of success, and the arbitrary influence of events upon opinions may have changed the voice of eulogy into censure. Culpepper's efforts were on a minor scale; but they were marked with a character of vigour and decision, and founded in a correctness of doctrine, and purity and philanthropy of design, which ought to have secured to him a more favourable notice from the authors who have dwelt on his conduct.

That the British writers should have represented him as a mere disturber of social order, is not to be wondered at; but that the historian of North Carolina,* himself an actor in the scenes of the last revolution, should, not only have adopted their views, but expressed their opinions with exasperated severity, is a subject of some surprise. In this, however, he has copied not only the facts, but the opinions of Chalmers; and Chalmers' palpable object was to exhibit the conduct of the colonists as marked with ingratitude and mutiny, through every stage of their career. Had his work advanced to a second volume, agreeably to his original design, this observation would have been more amply verified.

As a relater of facts, Chalmers is an author of the first authority; for he is the only writer who ever had access to the archives of the lords proprietors, and of the board of trade and plantations. But through his own facts, his errors in opinion may be fully detected; nor is it unimportant to notice, that in the views which he presents of those facts, he cannot be suspected of a design to palliate the conduct that his patrons disapproved of.†

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* Dr. Williamson.

† He was secretary to the board of trade.

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The ministerial documents of the day, represent Culpepper as a native of New England, and as having "some time before fled from South Carolina, where he was in danger of hanging, for endeavouring to set the poor people to plunder the rich."*

This charge (which is copied by Dr. Williamson) is easily explained by a reference to the early history of that state. A struggle existed there between the court and country parties, and this was the complexion which it suited the court party to give to the views and designs of their antagonists. From the early records of the state of South Carolina it appears, that Culpepper was in fact a member of the commons-house of assembly, first constituted under the proprietary government, or rather under what were called the Fundamental Constitutions. Immediately on the organization of a legislative body in South Carolina, it is well known that a struggle arose between the champions of prerogative, and the champions of equal rights. We have only to suppose Culpepper the active supporter of the latter party, and incurring thereby the frowns of the party in power, to account for his fleeing from the country, and being followed by the charge of encouraging "the poor to plunder the rich;" and in order to understand the origin, and judge of the truth of the character given him by the ministerial party. His subsequent conduct affords sufficient ground to form a judgment of the course he had previously pursued.

The struggle in which Culpepper incurred the charge of high treason, had its origin in a duty imposed on tobacco, a restriction on the right of exporting it, and a consequent restraint imposed on the trade of New England, and on a mercantile intercourse between the two states of Massachusetts and North Carolina. It was attended by measures exactly analogous to those pursued in the revolution of 1776, and followed by several of the identical arbitrary acts complained of in the declaration of independence. Loyalty and disloyalty are, as usual, the stalking horses made use of by the friends of the proprietors; but the disguise thrown over the real grounds of the contest, is too flimsy to conceal its real character.

The southern boundary line of Virginia, commencing a little north of Currituck, does not intersect the Roanoke until it passes Moody's Ferry; leaving an extensive and pleasant country between that line and the waters of Roanoke and Albemarle. Very soon after the settlement of Virginia, adventurers were tempted by many causes to occupy this tract of country. But every cause conspired to give to this settlement a feeling and character strongly republican.

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* Chalmers.

The demons of religious and civil persecution had made their way across the Atlantic, and many of those who had sought the wilderness as an asylum from religious tyranny, found themselves obliged to flee still farther to avoid the fangs of their persecutors. Virginia and Maryland, in common with almost every established government in America, had commenced the unhallowed career of persecution; and quakers, puritans, sectarians of various descriptions were obliged to fly, or suffer under civil or ecclesiastical despotism.* The north shores of the Albemarle Sound, presented an eligible retreat; there was there no civilized man to persecute, no legitimate government to devour them. The country was still possessed by savages, who could be soothed by just and mild treatment, and would, for a moderate compensation, surrender an adequate quantity of land, unembarrassed by reservations of quit-rents or feudal services.

The state of North Carolina was, at this time, peculiarly situated. All Sir Walter Raleigh's efforts to colonize it having failed, it was, after the unparalleled murder of that conspicuous man, granted out successively to companies, and to Sir Robert Heath, "*in pios usus.*" But no recent endeavours had been made to colonize it, and it remained nearly in a dereliet state. It was at this time that the Albemarle settlement, unaided by government or company, was commenced by men who had vigour of character sufficient to govern, defend, and provide for, themselves. But man is never suffered thus to elude "the powers that be." The grant to the lords proprietors which extended from the 29th degree of north latitude to 36 degrees 30 minutes, embraced this little settlement; and after near twenty years of tranquillity, prosperity, and self-government, the governor of Virginia,† who, no

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* Williamson, vol. 1, p. 81.

† This was Governor Berkeley, who presided near forty years over the destinies of Virginia, a period which some seem to imagine the halcyon days of that province. The concluding lines of a note of his addressed to the lords proprietors on the subject of the system the British government was entering upon, to prevent the colonies from building ships, or trading with foreigners, or even with each other, although it abounds with loyalty and devotion to legitimate government, exhibits a curious coincidence between the sentiments of the legitimates of that day and the present. These are this worthy governor's words: "We have forty-eight parishes, and our ministers are well paid, and by my consent should be better, if *they would pray oftener and preach less;* but as of all other commodities, so of this, the worst are sent us; and we have few that we can boast of, since the persecution in Cromwell's tyranny drove divers worthy men hither. Yet, I thank God, there are no *free-schools nor printing-presses*, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years. For learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divulged them and libels against the best government: God keep us from both!" William Berkeley. Chalmers, p. 328.

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doubt, had long looked with jealousy on the escape and happiness of these fugitives from the wise laws over which he presided; was gratified by the lords proprietors with power to appoint them a legislative council and governor. The next benefit conferred upon them was the code of "Fundamental Constitutions," with all their badges of aristocracy and vassalage; and lastly, a system of the most corrupt legislative regulations, exempting emigrants from the recovery of debts, and thus converting this asylum of religion into a den of iniquity. Lastly came laws prohibiting them from exporting their produce any where but to the mother country, and then, to levy a tax not imposed by themselves, and more offensive in principle, and more oppressive in operation, than the stamp-act or duty on tea which led to the revolution of 1776. This was the duty of a penny on every pound of tobacco shipped from one colony to any other. The scheme of taxing the colonies had, in fact, already been adopted, and an experiment was now to be made of the temper with which it would be submitted to. The spirit with which it was met may have postponed its prosecution for a century following.

Subsequent events in the colony of Albemarle exhibit the revolution of 1776 in miniature. Unhappily, however, for the former, the catastrophe was different.

During the time that the Albemarle settlement remained in a state of independence, it appears that the New Englanders monopolized the trade of their little colony. Nor was that trade comparatively inconsiderable; for they already sent to market a large quantity of tobacco. This was shipped at their doors, and in return they received the articles which they wanted, and which were procured from whatever country afforded the most favourable market. Here was a subject of heart-burning both to the mother country and the neighbouring colony; for, but for the convenience of this trade, their tobacco must have been transported to Jamestown, and there have paid a duty into the coffers of Virginia;—in the payment of which, it appears, the governor had a direct interest; and thus supplies of European and West India articles must have been obtained from England through the same channel, since vessels of a heavy draft of water, such as the European trade then employed, could not have had access to the waters of the Albemarle.

To break up the New England trade and restore the monopoly to the mother country, was one object of the measures now pursued by the ministerial party. But there was another of much higher importance.

The only three colonies existing in America, during the civil wars in England in the time of Oliver Cromwell, very unwisely intermeddled in the contest between the Charleses and their subjects. Virginia declared for the king,

Massachusetts for the commonwealth, and Maryland was distracted and divided by contending parties. Cromwell thought proper to reward Massachusetts and punish Virginia, by commercial regulations; and Charles, on the restoration, showed a disposition to retaliate. Thus did commercial regulations on the colonies, become an object of parlamentary attention. During the time of the commonwealth, the exclusive use of English shipping for the transportation of colonial produce, was not imposed as a duty, but reserved or purchased as the equivalent for favours conferred.* But Charles II. had scarcely mounted his throne before the celebrated navigation act of 1661 was passed, by which it is enacted, "that no merchandize shall be imported into the plantations or territories to his majesty belonging, in Asia, Africa, or America, or exported from them, but in English vessels, navigated by Englishmen; and that no sugar, tobacco, ginger, indigo, cotton, fustic, or dying woods of the growth of the English territories in America, Asia, or Africa, shall be transported thence to any other countries than those belonging to the crown of England," under penalty of forfeiture, &c. Rice, molasses, and copper-ore were afterwards in due course subjected to the same restriction.—And all this, as is expressed in an act on the same subject, passed in 1663, "to maintain a greater correspondence and kindness between the colonies and England, to keep them in firmer dependance upon it, and to make this kingdom a staple not only of the productions of the plantations, but of the merchandizes of other countries for supplying them;" a preamble which honestly, does not pretend to have any regard to the interests or wishes of the unfortunate colonists.

But still the intercourse between the colonies remained open; and there is reason to believe that very little of the tobacco shipped for Massachusetts ever reached an entrepot, or halted in its progress to its real destination—an European market. And if it did, still the colonists obtained it free from the duty of a penny per pound on the consumption of it in Great Britain.

Every session of parliament now produced some new regulation to confine the commerce of the colonies within the prescribed limits, and to prevent those evasions, which the wits of one of the shrewdest people in the world were now at work to machinate.

At length, in the year 1672, to give the *coup de grace* to this colonial trade in tobacco, at that time the only export of any value produced on the North American continent, a penny per pound was imposed on all exports of it, where bonds were not given to land it in Great Britain; and the whole busi-

* Act of 1646.

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ness was required to be managed, and the imposts levied, by officers to be appointed by the commissioners of the customs in England, under the authority of the lords of the treasury.

This law bore with peculiar hardship on the Albemarle settlement. As the large European vessels were excluded by the shallowness of their bar, the small New England sloops alone ascended to their doors, and hence all their tobacco was really or affectedly shipped for Boston. Yet the people submitted; for the idea was cherished, that after paying their penny impost, the right was acquired of transporting their tobacco to any market; and the number of shipping-places along the waters of the Albemarle, would probably have afforded great facilities for evading the duty altogether.

At length, however, a rigid tax-gatherer made his appearance; and the question being submitted to the attorney-general of England, whether the payment of the duty, dispensed with the necessity of giving a bond to land the tobacco in Great Britain—his decision was very correctly against the planters, on the construction of the two laws. And finding themselves compelled, though they paid the penny to give the bond, they appear to have become moody and intractable. As long as it bore the aspect of a regulation affecting foreign commerce, they were contented to submit. Great Britain had assumed and exercised a control over their intercourse with other nations too long, and they were too weak to admit of its being now disputed; but when an intercourse among themselves came to be thus cramped and encumbered, and the consumption of their own produce among themselves taxed, public sentiment appears to have risen strongly against the measure. It will be found by referring to the history of the colonies at this time, there were serious disturbances excited in every one of them; and though the object of the leaders in those instances is not always avowed, there can be little doubt of its identity.

But in every colony except Albemarle, there was an organized government to control or suppress these ebullitions. In this settlement, although they had passed under the lord proprietors, and been subjected to the governor of Virginia, the republican feelings generated by the early circumstances of their settlement, appear still to have predominated.

It was not until July 1677 that a collector of the royal customs for Albemarle made his appearance. His name was Miller, and he came vested at the same time with the powers of a governor, and of a deputy of the lords proprietors. The post of governor having become vacant by the death of Governor Stevens, the lords proprietors had nominated to the vacancy one Eastchurch, a prominent character of the ministerial party in the colony, and who chanced to be at that time in England.

Miller preceded Eastchurch, and was vested by the latter with power to discharge his duties in his absence, under the denomination of president.

Miller appears, immediately on his arrival, to have set about collecting the obnoxious penny with active zeal; and it is not without surprise, and a suspicion that the tobacco of Virginia must in fact have vented itself through this outlet, that we learn from unquestionable authority, that in the short space of six months, he had collected 327,068 pounds of tobacco, and £1,242 sterling in money,—from a colony represented by himself to have "consisted of a few inconsiderable plantations dispersed over the north-eastern bank of the Albemarle."

But in comparison with that of the other colonies then existing, the population of Albemarle was not so inconsiderable. It consisted of about seven thousand inhabitants, and the annual parliamentary revenue, though badly collected, was estimated at £3,000 sterling per annum,—a very considerable sum at that time, for so small a population.*

But the inhabitants resolved to resist; and that it was not the act of an obscure rabble, is proved by the fact that they had the countenance of the lower house of assembly, and were actually joined by one of the deputies of the lords proprietors. That it was not a mere ebullition of passion, or riotous tumult, is expressly avowed by the communications made to the lords proprietors, in which it is declared, that "the rebellion of the inhabitants of Albemarle was not accidental, or arose from any sudden provocation, but rather was the effect of a deliberate contrivance."†

To determine the designs with which the opposition was ventured upon by the people of Albemarle, we have the imputations of their adversaries on one hand, and their own manifesto on the other; but what they actually intended, is best evidenced by what they actually performed.

Seizing upon Miller and the refractory deputies of the lords proprietors, and putting them in prison, a new administration was constituted, with Culpepper at the head of it, and Albemarle actually enjoyed a state of revolutionary independence for several years after. The tobacco collected by Miller was appropriated to the exigencies of the new state, and New England again enjoyed for a time a monopoly of the trade. In the mean time, Eastchurch arrived in Virginia, and hearing of Miller's deposition, made application to Governor Berkeley for a force to restore him to his government. The demand was promptly acquiesced in, and the levy of troops commenced when East-

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* Chalmers, p. 558.

† Ibid. 561.

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church fell a victim, as some assert to mortification, but more probably to the climate, or to that of the West Indies, from which he had just arrived. In the mean time, the revolutionists having arrested the present evil, endeavoured to avert a greater which threatened them from Virginia; and Culpepper, attended by another deputy, hastened to England, to throw himself at the feet of his sovereign—an act indicative of great firmness and conscious purity. At first he appears to have met with a favourable reception, and was about returning in safety to America, when he was arrested in the Downs by a warrant from the privy council, charged with the crime of high treason. Culpepper insisted on his right to be sent home for trial, and the celebrated question arose and was decided in his case, upon which the life of Ethen Allen was made to depend, in the late revolution; and which furnished one of the grounds of complaint enumerated in the declaration of independence.

The British court decided that by the stat. 35 Henry VIII. c. 2. all foreign treasons are triable in England; and that to overturn the government of the lords proprietors, was treason against the king. Culpepper's fate now seemed inevitable; when he was saved by the testimony of Earl Shaftsbury, who deposed, "that there had never been any regular government permanently established in that part of the proprietary territory where this offence was committed." An assertion which flowed from his humanity, if not his ignorance.

Thus were the lives and properties of the citizens of the colonies placed, for the future, at the disposal of a British jury. Yet the decision was conformable to precedent, as is exemplified in Lord M'Guire's case, in the State Trials. And that class of offences which, of all others, ought least to be exposed to court influence, is required to be tried under the eye of the offended monarch, and where the accused will be deprived of that constitutional security held out, or intended to be held out, to every British subject charged with offences,—of being tried by a jury of his own vicinage.

The following curious extract from the records of that remote day, will discover that the cradle which rocked the infancy of the late revolution, was not then used for the first time; and North Carolina, ever modest in her pretensions amidst the jarring claims at present asserted by some of the states, will not feel outraged at the evidence of her having been an early nursery of the spirit of 1776: "Among the same papers there are several affidavits which uniformly assert, that the traders of New England were extremely active in fomenting and supporting the rebellion. A person who was known by the name of *the Boston ambassador*, was extremely active among the late regulators in North Carolina. The masters and sailors of the ships of New England, were equally instrumental in promoting the more recent disturbances in the province."

Which facts are followed up by this sage reflection: "Mankind should make a common cause against a people whose rooted principles necessarily incite them to disturb the repose of their neighbours."*

In the progress of these events, it appears that the lords proprietors furnished to the committee of foreign plantations, a memorial, which they denominate "the case of the commotions at Albemarle;" and in this, the first and only plausible charge made against the colonists is, "Encouraging the New England trade there." "The illness of the harbour," (they observe,) "was the cause that this northern part of Carolina had no other vent for their commodities, but either by Virginia, *where they paid a duty to the governor*, or to New England, who were the only immediate traders, who ventured in small vessels, and had so managed their affairs that they bought their goods at very low rates, eat out and ruined the place, defrauded the king of his customs, and yet governed the people against their own interests."

It is not a little surprising that the historian of North Carolina should have received this account, reiterated as it is by Chalmers, as an indisputable view of facts. Surely, on the subject of selling and buying to the most advantage, a people may be trusted to their own judgment; though they should be obliged on all others, to surrender their judgments to rulers, whose interests clash with those of the community, or whose minds are biassed by malevolent or interested representations.

Of the temper which prevailed in South Carolina on the subject of these colonial restrictions, there is sufficient evidence furnished from the records of the board of trade. In 1687, the officer of the crown established at Charlestown to execute the trade-laws of Great Britain, writes to the commissioners of the customs in England, "that he despaired of succeeding in enforcing the revenue laws, as the people *denied the power of parliament* to pass laws inconsistent with their charter."† The commissioners of the customs also actually complained to the lords proprietors of the mutinous temper of the people of Carolina; and they, far from disavowing it, could only profess that it received no countenance or support from themselves.

Yet in South Carolina the opposition must have been founded on principle and anticipation; since the effects of the colonial regulations must have borne at that time, very lightly upon this colony. The country had been very recently settled; all their time and labour had been consumed in felling the forests, or constructing their houses; while the daily hostilities of the Indians

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* Carolina Papers, and Chalmers, 558, 559.

† 11th April 1687.

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and the Spaniards left them little tranquillity to till their fields. Thus their exports were trifling, and their subsistence depended chiefly upon credits obtained in England.

From the year 1692 the southern colony was continually convulsed by the struggles of party. The lords proprietors asserted the right to govern, without either the power or will to protect,—at least against the encroachments of parliament; and the colonists, indignant at remaining the servants of servants, sighed after the imaginary advantages of becoming a royal province. The loss of mutual confidence was soon followed by mutual reproaches; and every thing was matured for an effort to put down the proprietary authority for ever.

In their desire to throw off the proprietary government, the colonists were encouraged at this time by the avowed inclination of the crown to bring all the colonies immediately under its own jurisdiction. As early as 1686, the proprietors had been threatened with a *quo warranto* to repeal their charter;* but James II., who was then on the throne, getting soon after embroiled both with church and state, found all his cares necessary to resist the *quo warrantos* which soon after excluded him from his throne and kingdom.

In Great Britain, the distinction into court and country party, which succeeded that of cavalier and roundhead, had now been superceded by that of tory and whig. The latter professed to be the sturdy defenders of old English rights; and the name was given them by their opponents, from a supposed analogy between their tenets and those of the conventiclers of Scotland, who were then distinguished by that epithet in ridicule. The whigs after awhile, cheerfully took the name; but fastened on their adversaries in return an epithet altogether expressive of contempt; as it is said to have been the distinguishing epithet of a very degraded class of people in Ireland, then called *popish banditti*.† It is not then surprising that the royalists, whose tenets led them to the uniform support of monarchical power, should never cordially have received a name which bore with it nothing but an expression of contempt. Names are often decisive of the fate of parties, or at least have a great influence on their destinies. There was always a disposition in the colonies to mimic the mother country—a disposition which two successive wars have not yet overcome; and the tenets, and names, and even measures of party, soon found their way across the Atlantic.

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* Chalmers, p. 565.

† Hume, vol. 8, p. 126.

In the struggle which terminated in the overthrow of the Fundamental Constitutions, we have seen the country party predominate; but it is ever the tendency of a predominant party to work its own destruction. The efforts of a minority are easily directed towards the one great object of all, viz. to produce the downfall of their adversaries; but scarcely do they find themselves in the seat of power, before their views begin to diverge; and it is too often discovered that, whatever may have been the views of the followers, their leaders were animated by other motives than mere public spirit. They get embroiled about the loaves and fishes of government. Nor is the operation of the same cause unfelt among the mass of the party; for all expect to be rewarded, and few can be; and of those that are, very few can be persuaded that their reward is apportioned to their merit. Hence, discontent, defection, dissolution. Accordingly, we soon find the country party in the southern colony put out of power; and their opponents, taught by experience, *perfas et nefas* securing to themselves that power which they could not long expect to hold from a vote of the people.

An event occurred about this time which was well calculated to deprive the country party of much of their popularity.

Henry of Bearne, almost the only monarch on record since the days of Alfred, of whom it can be truly said that he loved his people, and who had acted the hypocrite, (a character totally opposite to his real one,) the more effectually to serve them; had secured to the people of France complete religious freedom, but had not given them sufficient civil power to preserve it. This was in the year 1598. And the town of Nantz, at which the edict was issued, gave name to this magna charta of the French protestants. Lewis XIV., who has been more eulogized than any monarch in Europe, because he held half the pens of Europe in actual pay;* but who really lived only to disturb his neighbours, and exhaust the wealth, while he corrupted the morals, of his people; arbitrarily revoked this edict—at the instigation of an envious and ambitious priesthood. This was in the year 1685; and from that day, victory deserted his standard, his glory commenced its decline, and domestic misfortune clouded his court with sorrow. Yet the evil did not rest here; it was not the revocation of that edict alone which drove from his realm 500,000 of his most industrious subjects. In the secret converse with their God, his

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* "On Lewis all his bards bestow'd
Of flattery many a thousand load;
But Europe mortified his pride,
And swore the fawning rascals lied."—SWIFT.

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votaries might still have found consolation for the want of liberty to convene in his temples; but the shafts of religious persecution are as cruel as the arrows of the children of Latona. The tears of a parent cannot stay them, while there is a victim surviving. The revocation of the edict was followed up by a positive injunction, that the protestants should conform to the Roman catholic religion, under the dreadful penalties of heresy,—to be inflicted by an infuriate priesthood. Nor did the persecution stop here; permission was given to tear from them their children, in order that they might be educated good catholics.

In all directions a disposition was manifested by the protestants to fly. The Colignis and the Condés were no more; or the power of the monarch was too overwhelming to admit of an effort at insurrection. Yet the victims were not suffered to escape; for the persecution has acquired the epithet of the "dragonade," from the use that was made of dragoons to pursue the fugitives or cut off their escape out of the territories of their fanatical monarch. Yet many of them got over into the neighbouring kingdoms; and after lingering in the neighbourhood some months in order to withdraw their effects from France, and, no doubt, with the fond hope that their monarch would yield to wiser counsels, many of them followed the impulse of emigration, to the North American colonies. Some few, who appear to have been men of property, arrived in Carolina as early as 1687; and in the year 1690, a considerable colony having been transported by King William to the banks of James River, a number of these soon sought out and joined their countrymen in the southern colony. Others again who had landed in the more northern states removed southwardly; and by their union was a most respectable settlement formed along the banks of the Santee, (the original destination of Ribaut,) and between that river and the head waters of Cooper. Lands were granted them, with the free exercise of their religion; they took the oath of allegiance to the king of Great Britain, and for awhile every thing promised them rest and comfort in their new abode. But national jealousy soon arose to dash the cup of blessing from their lips. The colonists took alarm at this exercise of proprietary legislation; began to question the powers of the lords proprietors to vest aliens with the rights of natural born subjects; to qualify them to hold descendible estates, or to participate in the exercise of the sovereign rights of natural born subjects. And the unfortunate Hugonots were violently excluded from the right of suffrage, and alarmed with the suggestion that their children would not inherit from them, but that their estates must escheat.

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The state of confusion was now so great in the colony, that the lords proprietors were obliged to send over one of their number, Mr. John Archdale, with ample powers to settle all differences, and strong injunctions to admit the French protestants to a just participation in the rights of subjects. Archdale is acknowledged to have been a man of understanding, and of great liberality and personal worth, and he was, in a great measure, successful in allaying the ferment prevailing in the colony. Being a quaker by religious profession, he cannot be suspected of having been opposed to the execution of his instructions in favour of the Hugonots. Yet so strong was the current of popular prejudice, that he did not dare to oppose it; but, in issuing his writs of election for a new house of delegates, wholly omitted the county called Berkeley, in which the French settlers principally resided. The quiet acquiescence of the people in this discrimination, too plainly shows that the popular party had coincided with their antagonists in the shameful exclusion, and such a dereliction of principle was justly followed by a loss of public confidence. Accordingly we find the parties about this time nearly balanced, and obliged by mutual concessions to obtain the favourite ends of each.

Archdale remained but a short time in the colony, and on his return to England, presented a very unfavourable account of its state to the lords proprietors. Yet he did so much towards allaying party-animosities, that his successor, John Blake, who was a dissenter, was enabled to obtain of the assembly, 'at the price of making public provision for the establishment of an episcopal minister in Charleston,' "An act for making aliens free of this part of the province, and for granting liberty of conscience to all protestants."*

Here also we see another step of the colony towards a state of political freedom, notwithstanding it was exercised in such unfortunate measures. For, this compromise proves, both that they had seized or possessed the purse-strings of the province, and that they had triumphed in denying to the lords proprietors the power of conferring religious freedom without their concurrence. The inference is obvious. Their opposition had been founded on the proprietary exercise of legislative power. The emigrants might be vested with political and religious liberty, but it must be granted by the people.

But the Hugonots appear to have deeply resented the injury supposed to have been received from those on whose protection they ought to have been able to rely. For at a subsequent election the royalists triumphed; and in a representation of the dissenters, against the violence of the church party, made

* See the two acts passed on the same day.

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to the lords proprietors, it is expressly declared that they were supported by the French from Berkeley and Craven county.*

Blake's administration, which lasted from 1696 to his death in 1700, was a season of political calm. Yet it was only by a succession of calamities that the bickerings of party were suspended; the embers were covered, not extinguished. The town was first inundated by a hurricane, then consumed by fire, whilst the small-pox, now viewed without alarm, but then with horror, spread death and desolation throughout the colony. Bad treatment rendered it fatal in its effects, and more patients fell victims to medicine, than to disease. Scarcely had the colonists breathed from these evils, when a pestilential disease broke out in the city; and among numerous other victims, swept off nearly all the public officers, and one half of the legislature.

The spirit of opposition did not wholly sink under the pressure of these accumulated calamities. A new system of fundamental laws was sent out by the proprietors, and by the governor transmitted to the assembly, with his instructions to put them in execution; but that body, manifesting their firmness by their coolness, simply took no notice of the message, and the system fell "still-born" to the earth. Soon after, it became a question who should appoint to the vacancies in the public offices occasioned by the death of the late incumbents. The governor and council claimed the right as the representatives of the proprietors, and the assembly claimed it as the representatives of the people. The governor and council elected their man to the office of public receiver, and the assembly forbad any one's making him payments. The contest grew warm, and was not a little irritated by questions of dignity and precedence which now began to mingle with it. The governor and council had arrogated the name of the upper house, and the assembly of delegates was resolved to admit of no distinction that implied inferiority in them. The people sided with the assembly, and they enjoyed a temporary triumph. But all these acts were disapproved of and rescinded by the proprietors; and a jealousy of the views of the people was excited in the breasts of those gentlemen, which had great influence upon their subsequent conduct.

The year 1700 was the commencement of the reign of violence in South Carolina, and it was soon followed by that of bigotry and church usurpation. The events of it are authenticated under the signature of some of the most respectable men of the colony, and are connected with English history.

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* See Oldmixon, vol. 1. p. 355.

William III., who was bred a Calvinist, was ever the steady friend of religious freedom. One of his first efforts after being seated on the throne of England, was to mitigate the disabilities imposed on dissenters by that disgrace of British freedom, the celebrated test-act.

But this did not suit the taste or interests of the British hierarchy; and with real or affected alarm, they sounded throughout the kingdom, "that the church was in danger." To convince the nation that they were in earnest, the bishops withdrew from parliament, nor did they cease from their efforts at organizing an opposition, until they were obliged by law to submit,—or lose their participation in the goods of this world.*

William had been placed on the throne principally by the influence of the whig party, and all his measures at the commencement of his reign, exhibited a disposition to cast himself on their protection. But this could not possibly last long. Whatever affairs of posts this party may have been occasionally engaged in, their grand attack was upon royal prerogative. This may operate on the fears or policy of a monarch, but never can command his affections; much less the cordial attachment of a monarch like William, who was really haughty and ambitious, though sometimes politic; and said to have been more disposed to consult his own passions, or the interests of the Netherlands, than the inclinations or interests of the British nation. Before the end of his reign, he was completely estranged from the whigs, by their steady adherence to the system of salutary restraints; and openly espoused the opposite party.

The first act of his successor, Anne, who ascended the throne the 8th March 1701, was to throw herself unequivocally into the arms of the tories. Every office was filled with their leaders, and, respecting the first parliament that she convened, we will quote the words of the English historian. "The commons of this parliament had nothing more at heart than a bill against occasional conformists. The tories affected to distinguish themselves as the only true friends to the church and monarchy; and they hated the dissenters with a mixture of spiritual and political disgust. They looked upon these last as an intruding sect, which constituted a great part of the whig faction." "They considered them as encroaching schismatics, that disgraced and endangered the hierarchy; and those of their own communion who recommended moderation, they branded with the epithets of lukewarm christians, betrayers and apostates. They now resolved to approve themselves zealous sons of the

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* Smollet, vol. 1. b. 1. s. 7.

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church by seizing the first opportunity that was in their power to distress the dissenters," &c.*

The occasional conformists, as they were at that time called, were dissenters who, to qualify themselves for office, had complied with all the requisites of the test-act, but immediately returned to the worship of God in the mode which each one thought most consistent with his will. Against these evaders of a law, which, notwithstanding its high pretensions, was really dictated by the most sordid motives, was the wrath of the disappointed and eluded tories particularly excited; and it is further said of them, "that as the last reign began with an act in favour of the dissenters, so the commons were desirous that in the beginning of her majesty's auspicious government an act should pass in favour of the church of England."

Nor was it only among the laity, that party animosity raged. The queen summoned a convocation of the ecclesiastical clergy in the year 1702—and here the violence of party exhibited itself to the most indecent degree. All the clergy of the kingdom became, in consequence of this meeting, divided into two parties, denominated high churchmen and low churchmen, of whom an English historian furnishes us with the following account: "These contests produced divisions through the whole body of the clergy, who ranged themselves in different factions, distinguished by the names of high church and low church. The first consisted of ecclesiastical tories, the other included those who professed revolution principles, and recommended moderation towards the dissenters. The high church party reproached the other as time-servers and presbyterians in disguise, and were, in their turn, stigmatised as the friends and abettors of tyranny and persecution; at present, however, the tories both in church and state, triumphed in the favour of their sovereign."†

The effects of this triumph were soon felt in the little colony of South Carolina.

John Granville, a proprietor, and at that time palatine of Carolina, had been conspicuous in the British parliament in promoting the proposed bill against occasional conformists. His zeal as a leader of the tory faction had already procured him a seat in the privy council, and this new proof his persecuting principles procured him a peerage under the title of Baron Granville of Potheridge.‡ Under the patronage and advice of this fanatic it was, that in the year 1703, the church of England became the established church of South Carolina, and that the infamous test-act became incorporated into the laws of

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* Smollet, vol. 1. b. 1. s. 29. † Ibid. vol. 1. p. 450. ‡ Ibid. b. 1. s. 25.

that province. And, in his pious purposes, he was aided by a society which masked an attack upon religious freedom under the specious pretext of *promoting religion*. How often has that sacred name been polluted by the avarice or ambition of man! But he is no friend to religion who will tempt man to hypocricy, deprive him of the sacred right of conscience, or withdraw the oracles of the Christian religion from the severest scrutiny that the human mind can subject it to. CHAP. VII.

This society was incorporated in William's reign, at the instance of the archbishop of Canterbury, by the name of "A Society for propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts." It acquired much eclat in the early establishment of the British colonies, and has unquestionably done good enough to atone for many faults. But, if actions are to be estimated by motives, then, as far as it is justly chargeable with simply promoting a sect, and that under the terrors of temporal power, it cannot pretend to the high meed of promoting the service of God. It is the service of man and of a sect; and not of Him to whom nothing but the sacrifice of a willing heart can be acceptable; and who, having given conscience and reason to man, must see his purposes thwarted and his service profaned, whenever one sect shall, in his name, deprive another of the free exercise of those noblest attributes of beings created to serve him.

The historian Hewit says, "to prepare the province for the charitable assistance of this society, it was judged necessary to have the church of England established in it by a provincial law, and the country divided into distinct parishes." "He [the palatine] knew that the episcopal form of church government was more favourable to monarchy and the civil constitution, than the presbyterian, as, in it, a chain of dependance subsists from the highest to the lowest," &c.

The author does not favour us with the authority upon which he founds that information, but the concurrence of events supports his assertion. It has never been denied, and is repeated by Ramsay as an unquestionable fact, that the creation of that society was the first step towards the establishment of the episcopal church in South Carolina.

The instrument and the means made use of to effectuate this project were worthy of the end. Of the times in which the episcopal church was established in Carolina, it may be truly said, "the land was full of violence." The following are the facts attending it.

It took place under the administration of Sir Nathaniel Johnson, and his prime agents appear to have been James Moore, Nicholas Trott, and William Rhett. The cotemporaries of these gentlemen have handled their characters

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and conduct with great severity;* but whoever considers the demoralizing influence of party rancour, will receive with great precaution whatever issues from so impure a source. It seems, however, generally maintained, that by bribery, intoxication, intrigue, and judicial protection, (for Moore was attorney general, and Trott chief justice, and the only judge in the state,) they succeeded, in the year 1703, in obtaining a lean majority of one in the house of assembly; and by that one fastened on the country,

1st. An act entitled "An act for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy and profaneness," (but really calculated to establish an inquisitorial inquiry into religious opinions.)

2dly. "An act for the more effectual preservation of the government of the province by requiring all persons that shall hereafter be chosen members of the commons-house of assembly and sit in the same, to take the oaths and subscribe the declaration appointed by this act, and to conform to the religious worship in this province according to the church of England and receive the sacrament of the Lord's supper, according to the rights and usages of the said church." (Which is the English test-act.)

3dly. "An act for the establishment of religious worship in this province according to the church of England, and for the erecting of churches for the public worship of God, and also for the maintenance of ministers, and building convenient places for them." And,

4thly. To give the "*coup de grace*" to civil and religious liberty,) "An act for the continuing, meeting and sitting of this present assembly for the space of two years and for the term and time of eighteen months after the change of government by the death of the present governor, or the succession of another in his lifetime."

The term of service for which elections then took place was two years, and their term of service was within a few days of expiring when this last act of usurpation was passed; and its preamble contains an explicit exposition of the views and influence under which it was adopted. "Whereas the church of England has of late been so happily established among them, fearing by the succession of *a new governor* the church may be entirely undermined, or wholly subverted, to prevent that calamity befalling them, be it enacted," &c.

Thus did the church of England triumph over the liberties of Carolina;—a triumph which it continued to enjoy, with some little limitation, even down to the revolution; for as late as April 1770, we find the resources of the state,

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* Hewit and Oldmixon.

levied alike upon Jew and gentile, upon dissenter and episcopalian, diverted to the building of episcopal churches and maintenance of episcopal ministers. When did ever a sect acquire power, without blending temporal views with spiritual instruction! CHAP. VII.

Yet these zealous measures of "the sons of the church" met not with the glowing approbation from their fathers abroad, which at first view might have been expected. They unfortunately incurred the displeasure of the high church faction, by a measure which savoured too much of the low church tenets. The view given of the occurrence by a cotemporary writer is, "that Sir Nathaniel Johnson had ingeniously succeeded in converting the republican party into a low church party."*

It will be recollected that in the convocation of 1702, the lower house had manifested a strong disposition to kick against the legitimate power of their dignified superiors; until frowned into submission by sovereign disapprobation. The faction who had seized the reins of government in Carolina had, most undutifully, adopted the heterodox notion, that by establishing and supporting the clergy of the church of England, their congregations acquired a right to install and dismiss them. But this was a direct encroachment upon the power of the bishop of London, in whose diocess all the churches in North America were included; for he claimed the right to induct and to dismiss. And this usurpation, (not those upon the rights of the people of the province,) drew upon the party the frown of power; a consequence which they foresaw might follow, and might produce the dismission of the governor and deputies, and therefore vested themselves with legislative powers for eighteen months after such a change of rulers, if it should take place.

The Society for propagating the Gospel also took the alarm at this attack upon the hierarchy, and refused to favour the colony with any more missionaries, or rather ministers, until they should repeal the obnoxious law which asserted this heretical doctrine. But it was now too late; that law was a component part of the act for establishing the church of England in the province; and with all their fondness for *church*, the party who passed it were unwilling to part with *power;* or perhaps were obliged to insist on this sacrifice to the feelings of an outraged people. These laws continued in force until 1706, when the bishop of London was again permitted to resume his powers of acting by a deputy, called his commissary.

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* Oldmixon.

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Very soon after the passage of these acts, the assembly appears to have repented, or become ashamed of its subserviency to the party that carried them through; and to have passed an act to repeal those obnoxious laws:* but the governor and council possessed a veto, and prevented their repeal. The dissenters forwarded a strong memorial against these measures to the lords proprietors, but in vain. The fanatic Granville declared they were wise laws, and in reply to the moderate counsels of Archdale, avowed his resolution to support them. Finding all efforts to obtain redress from that quarter utterly hopeless, the agent of the dissenters brought the subject before the house of lords, who espoused their cause in an address to the queen. The queen, no doubt with a view to temporize, referred it to the lords of trade and plantations; and they, pursuing their system of reducing all the colonies immediately to subjection to the crown, advised their royal mistress to take the legal measures, to nullify the charter of the proprietors. But Granville was at her majesty's elbow, and the affair was soon dismissed from her thoughts.

Yet the usurpations of this period appear to have been altogether the result of religious zeal, and (gross as were the infringements upon civil liberty) to have had no other object than the secure establishment of the church of England, under influence of the alarm excited by the bishops in the preceding reign. As long as a preponderance in the council was preserved by the church party, this end was complete; for the laws passed for that purpose could not be repealed. And the preponderance soon after acquired by the whig party in the other house, could only be made use of to obtain occasional concessions from the council by laying their offerings upon the altars of the church. At length, however, on the 30th November 1706, a general compromise took place, and the repeal of the test-act was purchased by the passage of a church-act divested of some of the clauses which trenched upon the jurisdiction of the bishop of London. The minister was made eligible by the episcopal inhabitants of the parish, but not removeable by temporal authority; and in order to raise his salary, every inhabitant of a parish, of whatever religion or denomination, was made liable to an assessment, to be levied, (under the sanction of a penalty,) by a board of commissioners constituted for that purpose—whenever the public treasury should be found inadequate to pay them.† Thereby making the levying of their salaries upon the people, independent even of the legislature of the state.

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* Oldmixon, vol. 1. p. 361.

† Trott's Laws, p. 127, 129, *et seq.*

Heavily, as the act perpetuating the legislature of 1703–5, bore at the time upon the liberties of the people, it afforded an ample precedent for the assumption of legislative powers by the representatives of the people. Accordingly by refering to the legislative transactions of the colony we find, that their power was extended in time to most of the popular subjects that come within the cognizance of the legislature of a free people. In the year 1712, they passed a law declaring what British statutes shall be held of force in the country, and giving validity to the common law of Great Britain; in 1716, they passed a general law imposing a duty upon imports and exports, even so far as to demand ten per cent, upon articles imported from the mother country; and in 1721, they adopt the language of the British parliament, in the passage of a law granting a revenue to the king, "An act for granting to his majesty a duty and imposition on negroes, liquors, and other goods and merchandize imported into, and exported out of, this province." CHAP. VII.

Thus far the advance of the colony from a state of feudal subjection to that of an independent people, was rather rapid than otherwise. Fifty years had carried them through the successive changes which had required near five hundred in England. But some degrading badges still remained. All the great officers of state were appointed by, and retained at the will of the lords proprietors, and the province was held *as a property*, and the inhabitants regarded only as the cultivators of the lands of another. The conduct of the lords proprietors towards them also, was that of sordid landlords; or rather of, what they proposed originally to render themselves, the lords of a colony of serfs, or villains. Never regarding themselves as the dignified patrons of a rising state, their sole object was to create *a property*, and not to promote the interests *of a colony*. They claimed to themselves much credit for their advances to the colonists in their first emigration; but it was only the advance of a merchant to a customer; for the individual or the colony was made debtor to the proprietors. To defend the colony from attack, they never seem to have ranked among their duties; and as the crown had surrendered all right to interfere with the internal concerns of the colony, (except to levy imposts or duties, it would seem,) the people were left wholly to their own protection, by masters, who still asserted their right to govern them, and who addressed all their efforts to drawing from them an income, which it was impossible for them to pay, whilst all their resources were withdrawn to the defence of the colony, or the maintenance of the officers set over them by the proprietors.

From the earliest settlement of the province the whig party had writhed under the proprietary institutions, and were ever ready to join in an effort to overturn this offensive system. But, restrained by the power and influence of

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the government; with their wealth and their cares for ever pre-occupied by the defence of the province, or the maintenance of their families; under the pressure of poverty, or the ravages of disease; they had been able hitherto to advance only with a slow and cautious step towards the attainment of their views.

At length, about the year 1716, a variety of events occurred, to unite all parties in the state in one great, and ultimately successful effort to throw off the yoke of the proprietors. A governor was found in the person of Robert Daniel to espouse the cause of the people; as were several deputies of the proprietors, of sufficient independence to join in a remonstrance in their behalf.

Wars with the Spaniards, the French, and the Indians, had involved the colony deeply in debt; and to find an expedient for present relief, they had been driven to the measure of emitting bills of credit—resting for their value upon mere national faith. The evil of course grew upon them, for the draft only irritated the thirst it was intended to allay. At length, in the spring of the year 1715, the colony was brought to the brink of ruin by the sudden incursion of a bloody and formidable enemy. A league of the surrounding Indians, (then very numerous,) promoted by the Spaniards, and headed by the formidable tribe of the Yamasees, poured, in a torrent, upon the secure and defenceless planters, and laid the whole province in flames and ruin. In the course of three days, four hundred inhabitants were swept away, every plantation broken up or deserted, and the whole population of the province driven for security within the entrenchments of Charlestown. Their governor, Charles Craven, conducted himself with exemplary prudence and bravery; and not only repelled the invaders, but inflicted on them a chastisement from which they never recovered. But the invasion had happened at a season that was fatal to the crops of the year, and the families of the colonists must perish, or provision be procured, at whatever hazard or expense. Impoverished, and still distressed by scalping parties of their enemy, the colonists solicited relief from the proprietors; but so far were these hard task-masters from affording it, that they conducted themselves towards the petitioners with illiberality and meanness.

By the expulsion of the Yamasees, a very fine country was left open to adventurous settlers. It is that which lies in the south-western part of the state of South Carolina, and is now so justly celebrated for its productions of rice and sea-island cotton. It was then, and is now by the aged, called Indian land. Considering this as an acquisition won by their own personal valour, the colonists, with a disinterestedness and prudence greatly to their reputation, resolved to devote it to the purpose, of establishing a frontier settlement that

would defend the interior of the colony against future inroads of the savages; who, though driven beyond the Savannah River, were very numerous; and from them continual irruptions might be expected as from an enemy, recently driven from his country, exasperated by defeat, and excited by the Spaniards. CHAP. VII.

Five hundred of the brave and hardy yeomanry of Ireland immediately embraced this opportunity of improving their condition, and volunteered to encounter the dangers attending it, in consideration of the grant of moderate tracts of the conquered territory. Yet, scarcely had they seated themselves in their new acquirements, and exhausted their little stores in the first expenses of such establishments, when the proprietors resolved to expel them, and lay off the Indian land in baronies for themselves, or their creatures. The settlement was ruined, and the surviving individuals of it, cursing the faithless Carollinians and avaricious proprietors, sought an asylum in Pennsylvania; whilst the colonists, instead of deriving protection from the proprietors, saw their flanks again laid bare to a relentless enemy.

The indignation excited by this event, was deep and universal; for the colonists saw that they were ever to be sacrificed to the private views of the proprietors; whilst the conduct of the proprietors is easily to be explained, by considering how the precedent of a grant of land without their concurrence, would operate, both on their interests, and their control over the legislative powers of the colonial assembly.

The repeal of this, and several other salutary laws passed at the same time by the colonial assembly, and approved of by the governor and council, gave rise to the question upon which the revolution of 1719 was made to turn. The colony resolved to maintain, "that the lords proprietors could not repeal a law which had received the sanction of their deputies in council; that they would carry those laws into effect, notwithstanding the repeal by the proprietors."

A variety of circumstances concurred to render this a very favourable time for prosecuting the grand project of overthrowing the proprietary government. For the first time, there was a governor and council disposed to side with the popular party. They had given their assent to several highly popular acts, and united with the people in their remonstrances against the conduct of the lords proprietors. One of the acts which met the disapprobation of the proprietors, was designed to regulate the Indian trade, and draw from it a revenue to be applied to the exigences of the country: another, for laying a duty on imports for the same purpose: a third, for making a further issue of paper money; and a fourth, for conceding to the country party, the right of electing representatives at their respective parish churches, instead of balloting for the

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whole in Charlestown, as heretofore; a circumstance which had always given to the party of the royalists, an undue weight in influencing the elections.

It is impossible to imagine laws better calculated to unite popular opinion, or the rejection of which could tend more to disgust the mass of the community with their imperious rulers. But every one of these measures bore with it an assumption of legislative power, although of powers obviously necessary for the good of the community, and of course awakened the jealousy of the lords proprietors. About the same time also, the community was made to feel sensibly the degradation of being governed by officers in whose appointment they had no voice; and whose continuance in office, depended upon the arbitrary will of the proprietors, not upon the correctness of their conduct. Chief Justice Trott, had been accused and convicted of various disgraceful and oppressive acts in his office, and a strong remonstrance sent on to obtain his removal from office. But he was among the most able and active champions of proprietary power, and instead of being degraded, his conduct was gratefully eulogised; whilst the governor and every member of council who had espoused the popular cause, were dismissed from office. Affairs now approached to a crisis.

Robert Johnson, the son of Nathaniel, a man very much beloved and respected, had superceded Daniel, and arrived from England with instructions containing the repeal of all the favourite measures of the colony, and enforcing the prosecution of a plan of administration calculated to thwart the views of the popular party. All the efforts and popularity of the governor were only able to support the tottering fabric of the proprietary government for two years longer. In 1719 the explosion took place; the revolution was effected without bloodshed; with a degree of system, talent, and unanimity, highly creditable to the agents who promoted it; and in a manner most ingeniously adapted to precedents furnished by the mother country, in the revolution which put an end to the dynasty of the Stewarts, and placed the present family upon the English throne.* The proprietary officers were all dismissed, with the exception of Rhett, who, by playing a double game, ingeniously managed to retain his office, while he secured the thanks, and retained the confidence of his original masters. A governor and council were elected by the assembly in the name of the king; and on him, with the most solemn and reiterated professions of loyalty, they cast themselves for protection.

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* Hewit, vol. 1. p. 232, *et passim.*

Well they knew that they would not be rejected. The national inclination, and the views of the ministry were now strongly bent on reducing the colonies under regal government. A bill had actually been before parliament for the purpose; and would have passed, but for the opposition of the free states to the eastward, and the descendants of the proprietary grantees. It would not be uncharitable to suppose that some indirect intimation had been communicated to the leaders of the whig party in Carolina, that such a measure would not be unacceptable,—in order to remove from their minds the terrors that hung over the poor colonists from the principles established in the case of Culpepper. Yet they appear not to have been unmindful of the precedent of their ancestors in the affair of the Fundamental Constitutions, in securing to themselves a shelter against the charge of high treason; for, all the arts of flattery were exhausted to prevail on Johnson to take the government upon himself under the new order of things; but they were tried in vain. With a dignity and firmness, equalled only by his moderation and perseverance, he rejected their advances, and peaceably retired to his plantation. Though he lost his power, he lost not an atom of public esteem and confidence. A very few years elapsed before he was cordially hailed by all as the representative of his sovereign, in the same station.*

George I. was then on the throne of Great Britain. He did not hesitate long about the measures to be pursued. A governor of talents, moderation, and popular manners, was appointed. A new assembly convened, an act of amnesty passed, the regal government peaceably established, and some liberal concessions made to the trade and commerce of the colony.

Shadowy indeed was the ground upon which the crown decided to resume the grant made to the proprietors. But not more shadowy and insincere than that upon which the grant had been originally solicited and obtained. "To propagate the Christian religion among the native heathen." That they had not answered this professed object of their endowment, was most true; and the resort to that ground for dispossessing them, was most just and retaliatory. It may with confidence be asserted, that these very pious proprietors, with all the aid of the pious society for propagating religion in foreign parts, had never made a single Indian convert. Indeed, the officers of the province had always been too intent upon making Indian slaves, and the two objects were then

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* A monument near the pulpit in St. Philip's Church in Charleston, commemorates the worth of this governor. Such an acknowledgment was, at that time, a work of signal distinction. Now, the privilege is conferred on any one who will incur the expense, or endow the church.

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supposed to be incompatible. Hence we find among the laws of this colony, one declaring that a slave shall not be made free by being baptized.*

As between the proprietors and colonists, the case was widely different. If ever it was lawful to resort to revolutionary principles, it was in this case. The colony had never received from the proprietors the protection due from rulers. It had been literally regarded by them as a plantation; and the inhabitants as mere labourers in the vineyard. Necessity obliged the inhabitants to defer the effort too long. But the proprietors were regarded as the substitutes of the crown, and to resist them had been decided to be treason against the king.

Still, however, three badges of dependance remained fastened upon the colony. The parliament asserted the right of regulating the trade of the country, and the king, that of appointing to all the great offices of the state; these offices, therefore, were held by men who, though paid by the colony, acknowledged no dependance on, or responsibility to them. The third was still more humiliating. The king retained a veto upon all the colonial laws. This was exercised through the board of trade while that existed, and afterwards by the secretary of the colonial department. Before these representatives of sovereign authority, the colony was obliged to appear by counsel to solicit the passage of its acts, or the adoption of any measure of policy thought necessary for its own welfare. They had in fact to keep a standing agent, or solicitor, in London, for these purposes, and it is not easy to read with temper the humiliations to which they appear, at times, to have been subjected, by these substitutes of proprietary tyranny. The correspondence between the board appointed to conduct these solicitations on this side the water, through the aid of agents retained counsel and benevolent patrons of the colony there, is still extant.

But, for the present, the people were content. Party seems almost to have been annihilated. The common danger and common distresses that they had recently shared, and the common effort that had been successfully made in bringing about the present state of things, seem to have produced an universal good will throughout the colony, which was not a little heightened by the pleasing contemplation of their rapid progress in wealth and population; nothing puts men in better humour with themselves and all the world. In nine years afterwards, an adjustment between the proprietors and the crown, for the purchase of the interest of seven of the eight proprietors, and a designation of the eighth share in a particular region of the state of North Carolina,

* Acts 1712, June 7.

placed the minds of the colonists entirely at ease. Liberal measures were adopted for giving encouragement to settlers, the government lent its aid to their protection, and the most grateful of all sacrifices was made to the feelings of the country party, by delivering them from that odious badge of dependance, the degrading annual contribution, called quit-rents. This was but one shilling for every hundred acres; but it was imposed as a badge of dependance, and the point of honour with the emigrant was to to become lord of the soil. Hence, from the very commencement of the colony, it was ever a subject of bickering and heartburning. A condition of forfeiture was attached to the failure of payment, and the occupant of the soil could never tolerate the idea of being thus bound down to make this annual offering on the shrine of aristocracy. CHAP. VII.

The years that elapsed between 1728 and 1763, were years of unprecedented prosperity. The increase of population was immense, and in the enjoyment of unexampled happiness, the people became gay, polished and devoted to hospitality. Among those who passed the meridian of life during that period, it was always affectionately remembered by the appellation of *the good old times*. Society was, at that time, precisely in that state which is most favourable to the enjoyment of life. Sufficiently refined to gratify a cultivated taste, without being encumbered with those factitious embellishments which embarrass the intercourse of social life. The luxuries of the day were within the reach of a moderate fortune, and few could be said to be elevated above one common level. Hence social happiness was not disturbed by the workings of envy, or the haughty demeanour of upstart pride. The party in power felt and acknowledged that they had been called to the government by the voice of the people; and the people blended with a respectful deportment, the elevating consciousness of those who have conferred the power to which they submit. Indeed, with all the high and just pretensions of republicanism, it will ever be a question, whether that state of things which tempts all to ambitious pursuits, although it developes the powers of man, and expands his bosom with a conscious dignity not to be exchanged for life or happiness either, does not entrench much upon that tranquillity of mind, without which much may be possessed, but little enjoyed.

Yet even at this period, when seemingly absorbed in the enjoyments of the present hour, and actually knowing no other rivalship than in expressions of loyalty and affection to the parent state, was the colony silently preparing for the revolution which finally severed it from this object of its earliest and strongest affections. It was acquiring strength, wealth, habits of self-government, and above all, the information that was necessary to extricate it from

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that moral dependance which resulted from a conscious, or inculcated inferiority to every thing transatlantic and British.

Insurrection, rebellion, popular commotion, may be result of single and obvious occurrences; but great revolutions are secretly prepared in the alembic of time, and are the effects of causes seldom avowed by those who promote them, and not always discernible, whilst the view is confused by passing events.

The polish of an English education at this time, was deemed indispensable to every youth, whose fortune, connexions, or ambition, lifted his views to distinction, or to public usefulness. At the great schools, or in the public institutions of Great Britain established for initiation to the learned professions, the youth of Carolina learned to set a just estimate on their own talents and acquirements, and to see and feel that the inferiority of the colonist or North American, existed only in the reveries of the gownman, or the delusion of a selfish policy. Hence, at the breaking out of the revolution, the state of South Carolina was found well stocked with native citizens of talents, acquirementt and spirit, competent to conducting so great an undertaking. These men, on their return to their native country, found themselves degraded by the intrusion of a swarm of officers, whose promotion often had no other origin than the intrigues of a footman, or the blandisments of a mistress. At the breaking out of the revolution, and for some time before that event, there was scarcely a native in any of the offices in the gift of the crown, in South Carolina. Indeed, some had been removed, to make place for others, from whom more pliancy might be expected.* Thus, generally speaking, was the state of things

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* The following facts will serve to illustrate this passage of the text. They are extracted from an authentic source.

"About the year 1752 the great contest was decided for the Westminster election between Lord Trenholm, the ministerial candidate, and Sir George Vandeput, the opposition candidate; Mr. Lee was then an eminent counsellor in England, and high bailiff of Westminster, and he returned Lord Trenholm as duly elected, when Sir George Vandeput ought undoubtedly to have been returned, as the successful candidate. The opposition were so exceedingly exasperated at this return, that they began to take serious measures to indict Mr. Lee, for a false and corrupt return. To disarm them he agreed to vacate his office, and as our judges (of South Carolina) then held their offices *durante bene placeto* of the crown, Chief Justice Pinckney's office was taken from him, and conferred on Mr. Lee, who held the office to his death, and as he was a man of abilities and a good lawyer, he filled it well. On his death, a Mr. Simpson, (not a lawyer,) was temporarily appointed; and afterwards, a Mr. Shinner, (still less a lawyer than Simpson,) was made chief justice. This was through the influence of Lord Halifax's mistress, he being then first lord of the board of trade and plantations. Shinner held the office until the time of the stamp-act, when, upon his refusing to do business without stamps,

in South Carolina favourable to the success of the revolution of 1776. Harmony prevailed among the people, their circumstances were easy, and the spirit of independence, or attachment to civil liberty, which their fathers had brought over with them into the colony, had been fostered by two successive revolutions, which heaped honour upon the memory of their supporters, whilst they greatly improved the condition of the citizens. Even the establishment of the episcopal church in the province, was not as unfavourable to civil liberty as might be imagined. From its first establishment, it will be recollected, that it exhibited an attachment to the low church, or republican ecclesiastical tenets. And although most of their ministers adhered to their sovereign, and left the country when the oath of allegiance to the state was tendered them, it must be recollected that they were missionaries selected by the society for propagating Christianity. Almost all the leading whigs, in the low country, were of the episcopal church; nor was there ever exhibited any thing of dissension or party spirit between the members of that sect and the dissenters, during the war. The distinction of whig and tory had no reference to, or dependance upon that cause. The distinction of sect was totally done away by one of the first acts of the state. And the people had among them a class of men calculated to moderate and direct the public efforts, and who, beside sharing in common in the feelings and interests of the community, had an additional stimulus of their own for siding with, and sustaining a revolutionary effort. Nor can we omit the assertion, that South Carolina had always

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the assembly, in the absence of the governor, prevailed on Mr. Bull, the lieutenant governor, to appoint Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Benjamin Smith, and Mr. D'Oyley judges, and they, with Mr. Pringle, already a judge, opened the court without stamps, and did business as usual. Chief Justice Shinner died, and Mr. Smith resigned, but the rest continued in office until the year 1770, or 1771, when a secretary of state was appointed by the crown to supercede the board of trade and plantations; and, Lord Hillsborough being first nominated to that office, he vacated the existing commissions, and appointed a new set of judges, most of them Irishmen. The object was, that they might have judges on whom the could always depend."

The following list exhibits the names of most of the Carolinians, if not all, who were educated in England about this period, and those conversant with the revolutionary history of South Carolina, will recognise among them many conspicuous actors on the arena of the revolution; all of them, with a solitary exception, it is believed, were the steady and animated supporters of the American cause.

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, John Rutledge, Mr. M'Kenzie, Ralph Izard, sen. Thomas Middleton, William Henry Drayton, Charles Drayton, Dr. Charles Drayton, Mr. Stoutonborough, Hugh Rutledge, Thomas Heyward, Thomas Lynch, Paul Trapier, Mr. Harvey, Alexander Moultrie, Mr. Hume, J. F. Grimké, Ralph Izard, jun. Walter Izard, Mr. Ladson, William Heyward, Mr. Stead, Edward Rutledge, General Read, John Laurens, and Major Garden, besides a number who were educated in Scotland, whose names we are not in possession of.

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maintained a high character for military enterprize. Her wars with the pirates and Spaniards would grace the early history of any state or nation, and although some few of her conflicts with the aborigines have been narrated, a very small proportion of her just claims to celebrity for this cause have been published to the world. There exist the most authentic records to prove that she extended her conquests even to the Apalachicola; and under the conduct of Moor, her troops actually destroyed the Spanish post near where Fort Gadsden now stands; and after driving the Indians beyond that stream and the Oakafanoka, to where the *fugitives* are even now distinguished by the name of *Seminoles*, brought back a number of prisoners, and settled them under the control of Fort Moor, on the Savannah River. Hence the dignity, firmness, and effect with which the revolution was sustained in the south, until Charleston sunk under the overwhelming efforts of an enraged and baffled enemy. Until that event, a most striking unanimity had exhibited itself in the whole seacoast of the southern country; but when the possession of that post gave the enemy an influence, if not a command, from the Chesapeake to Florida, the weak, the timid, and the corrupt, separated themselves from the mass of the community, and too many manifested by their subsequent conduct, that they either wanted stamina for the contest they had engaged in, or had graduated their conduct by a selfish, time-serving policy.

In the upper country of the southern states the case was materially different. From the very origin of the contest, in various parts of that region, striking symptoms of disaffection had manifested themselves. The diversity of opinion that existed there, was the necessary result of a variety of causes. The whole of that country had been recently settled. The progress of colonization had not been gradually extending from the seacoast to the interior; but a stream of emigration, extending from the north to the milder climate of the south, had occupied that country. The conduct of the legislatures of the several states, had not been marked with liberality, or proper attention to these settlers; and very generally there prevailed a rivalship, or distrust, between the upper and lower countries in these states,—feelings which, in a mitigated degree, exist to this day. In every instance, the legislatures were tardy and reluctant in extending to the new settlers the consideration due to members of the community; instead of securing their confidence and affections by a liberal and enlightened policy. Hence many of them were disposed to consider the promoters of opposition to the encroachments of the British government, as disturbers of the public peace, and as selfish demagogues, whose only object in throwing off the royal government, was to take the reins into their own hands.

Besides this, that country had long been distracted by the most violent feuds and private animosities. CHAP. VII.

The first white inhabitants of those frontiers were a bold and adventurous race of men, often driven by their crimes, their debts, or their vices, to follow the roving life of the hunter state; and in civilization, but little, if at all advanced beyond the native savage. When the respectable agriculturalist penetrated these forests, he was sometimes obliged, for common defence, to associate with this class of people, and the association was generally fatal to the morals of the rising generations. But more frequently they formed distinct societies, and, in process of time, became deadly hostile to each other. It seldom happened that the first settlements made, were sufficiently numerous or respectable to attract the notice of the government of the province; and not unfrequently, as they were made without the sanction of a grant, did it happen, that the settlers wished not to attract the notice of government. But it was necessary to defend themselves, both against the incursions of the Indians, and the lawless race of wandering whites, who were tempted by the prospect of impunity to commit depredations on their property. Hence there were distributed over that country various small communities, who entered into associations to do that justice to themselves, and inflict that punishment upon others, which ought to have devolved upon the state, within the limits of which they were situated. This was the origin of that class of people called regulators,—a name, in the first instance, assumed by the early settlers in North Carolina when resistance to their rulers was the object of association.

It seldom happens that justice thus administered, is not oppressively administered. These associations were in the habit of inflicting the severest castigation for offences; and individuals, when pursued for imputed crimes, were not unfrequently brought down by the rifle. Nor was the vigilance of the regulators in time, limited to their own protection from the commission of crimes. When the surveyors, under legitimate warrants, approached their establishments, they were not unfrequently warned to retire, and disobedience exposed them to the penalty of a breach of regulation. It may very well be supposed that these acts of violence provoked retaliation. And such was the animosity often excited by acts done under this assumed authority, that resort was had to ambush and the deadly rifle for revenge. It was many years after the revolutionary war, before the courts of justice were able to break down this habit of inflicting punishment rather than prosecute the offender before a lawful tribunal.

When the settlements had advanced to a state of respectability, this mode of administering summary justice assumed a more respectable form. The inha-

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bitants alleged the neglect of the states to provide regular and convenient courts for the administration of justice; and large districts of country would enter into associations, to which they would communicate something of system; and at the commencement of the revolution, which ever side was espoused by such an association, all those whom they had punished or persecuted, would immediately crowd to the opposite standard in hopes of revenge. Indeed, it not unfrequently happened, that a connexion, or an associate in one band, incurred the vengeance or punishment of another, and then the whole clan became arrayed in opposition to each other.

It has been noticed by some of the writers on the American war, and seems to have excited their surprise, that any of those settlements which had been in hostility with the royal government of the colonies, should, during the revolution, have united themselves to the royal standard. But the thing was perfectly natural. Such men had no state attachments, and considered the revolutionary government as identified with the colonial governments. From these therefore, they had nothing to expect but the perpetuation of the laws and policy under which they had been vexed, and, as they contended, unjustly harassed. They naturally joined the enemies of their persecutors. From the success of the royal arms they might expect rewards, revenge, or an amelioration of their prospects, but not from the firm establishment of that order of things, and those rulers, whom they had hitherto eyed with hostility.

The effects of these feuds were severely felt in the course of the revolutionary war, and drew forth from General Greene, in several of his letters, an assertion that the parties pursued each other like wild beasts. The scene displayed was indeed awful. Other states knew nothing of the horrors of the warfare carried on in the south. Horrors which, it will be seen, were greatly aggravated by the countenance given to such acts, by officers holding British commissions.

There were still other causes of diversity of opinion operating upon the interior of the southern states. Both in North and South Carolina, there were respectable settlements of quakers, and that sect, notwithstanding the conspicuous commanders which it gave to the service, furnished no soldiers; it appears to have been nearly unanimous against the war throughout the United States. Indeed, their leading tenet admitted of no other conduct than a state of neutrality; but they have not had credit in these states for confining themselves rigidly within the limits which neutrality would prescribe. It was not expected that they should fight, and if they were partial in furnishing supplies, or intelligence, perhaps it is attributable to the difference in value between British gold and American paper. Yet it is more probable that they have

been calumniated by those who were sustaining evils from which the disciples of passive obedience were partially exempt.

In North Carolina there were also the Moravian settlements, whose tenets are unfavourable to war, or interference in political contests; and the settlement of Scots, in the neighbourhood of Cross Creek, who, to this day, are cut off from communication with the rest of the world, by obstinately confining themselves to speaking the Erse language. They of course had not risen above the habits of devotion of their ancient countrymen, when summoned to attend their chiefs to war. They were decidedly hostile to the American cause, and always the firm adherents to a few active and enterprising leaders, who greatly obstructed the progress of the revolutionary war in the country bordering on the dividing line between North and South Carolina.

CHAPTER VIII.

Progress of the war in the southern department, to the time of General Greene's taking command.

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THE writers of Great Britain are loud in their declamations against the *ingratitude* of her colonies, for engaging in what was represented by them, and recognised by one American, as an unnatural war.* But it is a fact not unworthy of notice, that the developement of the oppressive system which the mother country had resolved to pursue towards the colonies, was at a time when Great Britain had been compelled to acknowledge a *debt of gratitude* to her colonies.

She actually refunded voluntary advances made by the colonies in the war of 1756. It was at the conclusion of that war, by which the nation acquired nothing but an accession to her pride and her debt, that she commenced the prosecution of measures that drove from her arms the most promising of her colonial offspring. The pretext for passing the stamp-act of 1765, was to raise a revenue for the defence of the colonies. But the reason assigned was adding insult to injury. The protection thus to be paid for, consisted in a swarm of *guarda costas*, really intended for no other purpose than to protect the mother country from a diminution of the profits expected from the monopoly of colonial trade; or in the maintenance of troops and officers intended to keep the colonies in subjection, while the parliament were riveting the chains forged for

* Colonel Lee.

America by the premier Sir Robert Grenville. This was extending to the country the protection which the tenant of the dungeon derives from the sentinel placed at the door. Dr. Franklin's witty fable on this occasion is more remarkable for the aptness of its allusions, than the decency of its incidents. CHAP. VIII.

Whatever may have been the state of the question as to other colonies, with regard to those in the south, the principle of the stamp-act was founded in palpable usurpation. The British constitution recognizes the principle that the rights and duties of the subject are the result of compact, and that such compacts are deducible, as well from usage and acquiescence, as from written concession.

The first charter of Charles dated in 1663, reserved nothing to the crown but the sovereign dominion of the country; all legislative, executive, and judicial power was vested in the lords proprietors, with the express reservation, that these powers should be executed "with the advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen of the colony." And the right was also granted them to "enjoy customs and subsidies which they, with the consent of the freemen, should impose upon goods loaded and unloaded." From this it would result, that the king retained nothing but his royal veto upon the legislative power of the colony. Whence the parliament derived any power at all to legislate over the colonies, it is not easy to determine. But the colony, in the days of its infancy, had submitted to the parliamentary assertion of the right of regulating its foreign trade, and this was the inlet of further encroachments. The first compact of the lords proprietors with the colonists in May 1663, declared, "That all persons settling on Charles River to the southward of Cape Fear, shall have power to fortify its banks, taking the oath of allegiance to the king, and submitting to the government of the proprietaries; that the emigrants may present to them thirteen persons, in order that they may appoint a governor, and council of six, for three years; that an assembly, composed of the governor and council, and delegates of the freemen, should be called as soon as the circumstances of the colony would allow, with power to make laws, which should be neither contrary to the laws of England, nor of any validity after the publication of the dissent of the proprietaries; that the same freedom from customs which had been conferred by the royal charter, should be allowed to every one," &c.* These were the original conditions on which South Carolina was planted; and when, in the August following, the lords proprietors undertook, in their celebrated fundamental articles, to impose a govern-

* Chalmers' Politieal Annals, 517.

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ment upon the colony varying materially from their original concessions, the colonists at once resisted, and finally compelled the proprietaries to abandon this unjustifiable encroachment upon the compact on which the relation between the ruler and the ruled was first assumed. From that time the imposition of "duties and customs on goods loaded and unloaded," was uniformly exercised by the colonial legislature; and when the colony threw off the proprietary government, the right of the legislature to exercise that power, was repeatedly acquiesced in by the sanction of the crown given to laws passed upon that subject.

The flimsy ground upon which the right of parliament to impose internal taxes on the colonists was asserted, was, "that as British subjects they were liable to be governed, wherever they were, by the legislative power of Great Britain;" and it has been asserted, that the second charter of Charles II. of June 1665, reserved the power of parliament to regulate and tax the colonists.*

It is in vain that we look in that charter for any such reservation. The colonists and their children were declared to be denizens of England, who should always be considered as the same people, and possess the same privileges, as those dwelling within the realm. But it would be absurd to deduce from this concession—this grant of a boon, a conseqent liability to be reduced to a state of absolute subjection—of being governed without being represented. It is obviously a grant of a right to enjoy the privileges of a colonist, without losing the civil rights attached to his character of a British subject. All the other privileges conferred on him by the charter of 1663, are confirmed by this, and a variety of others were intended to be conferred by it—that of a voice in granting customs is particularly conferred, but not a syllable has any relation to the right of parliament to exercise this power over the colonies. Nor, in the course of near half a century that elapsed after the establishment of the royal government in the province of South Carolina, was such a power ever hinted at, except in the indirect instance of regulating the trade between the colonies.

The previous history of the southern province might have furnished the British ministry with a tolerably correct idea of the reception which the stamp-act would meet with there. The alarm was universal, the measures of the colonists prompt and decisive, their remonstrances respectful but characterized by a strength of language and boldness of thought that left no doubt to

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* Chalmers, 522.

what issue they pointed. With an ill grace the ministry receded from this first attempt; for they saw the gathering of a storm that they had not anticipated. But the repeal of the stamp-act was qualified by an assertion which rendered the boon contemptible. A preamble to the repealing law, affirmed the right of the parliament to legislate over the colonies in all cases whatsoever. Extravagant was the joy of the colonists, when the repeal of this obnoxious law was announced to them. But not so with the more grave and thinking part of the American people. The single law was nothing, the principle which it asserted alarmed them, and the avowed adherence of the parliament to that principle, left them every thing to apprehend for their posterity. CHAP. VIII.

It has been mentioned by every American historian who has written on the American war, that the people of America did not wish for a separation from Great Britain. It takes a long time, and requires great pains to bring an extensive people to think profoundly, especially on subjects which expose opinion to the restraints of authority; but it is not to be supposed that the enlightened and thinking men of the United States could have been long in deciding to maintain their claim to either independence, or the extinction of these pretensions of the British government. It is certain that there was at least one man in South Carolina who, as early as 1766, foresaw and foretold the views of the British government, and explicitly urged his adherents to the resolution to resist even to death.* A very few years showed, that although

* It is not to be expected that on a subject so highly important, there is ever to be found a perfect unanimity. On this point there is the best reason for maintaining that there were two parties in South Carolina, who entertained very opposite views as to the measure of independence. The object of both was to have their grievances redressed; but one was willing yet to confide in the justice and magnanimity of the British government, and deprecated the idea of a separation. The other saw the impossibility of preserving the connexion of the two countries without perpetuating the present badges of dependance and inferiority, and was disposed to make use of passing events as the plausible pretexts, or present motives for resistance, but really with a view to absolute independence, or a state approaching to a confederation. They were satisfied to continue in a state of firm connexion with Great Britain, if secure from every exercise of royal or parliamentary authority that could humble or degrade the colonist.

There is sufficient evidence in existence to prove that Colonel Henry Laurens was of the first class, and that General Christopher Gadsden was of the last; and these two gentlemen had much influence in giving a turn and direction to opinion, in the commencement of the revolution.

The following extract of a memorial, addressed by Colonel Laurens, when in the tower, to the speaker of the house of commons, is taken from the New Annual Register for 1781, (Public Papers, 165.) "The representation and prayer, &c. respectfully showeth, that your representer for many years at the peril of his life and fortune, evidently laboured to preserve and strengthen the ancient friendship between Great Britain and the colonies, and that in no instance he ever excited, on either side, the

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the parliament thought it advisable to retract at present, it was only retiring to prepare its measures with more art and effect.

In the opposition which ensued, the southern states were surpassed by none in zeal and energy. Georgia was at first a little checked by difficulties, greater perhaps than any other state had to encounter, but her subsequent vigour amply atoned for her delay in the commencement.

Other states have of late exhibited much sensibility on the subject of pre-eminence in supporting the revolution, but let the following facts and dates speak the just pretensions of South Carolina.

The first step towards continental union, was adopted in South Carolina before it had been agreed upon by any colony south of New England;* this was in the year 1765, immediately after the news arrived of the passage of the stamp-act.

South Carolina was the first of the united colonies that formed an independent constitution; this was in March 1776, prior to the recommendation of congress to that effect.† But an independent government in fact existed in the colony from the 6th of July 1774. On that day a large convention of the people was held, and an unanimous vote passed to support Massachusetts in the vindication of her rights. From that time, although the royal government

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dissensions which separated them. That the commencement of the present war was the subject of great grief to him, inasmuch as he foresaw and foretold in letters now extant, the distresses which both countries experience at this day."

General Gadsden, it is well known, and there are still living witnesses to prove it, always favoured the most decisive and energetic measures. He thought it a folly to temporise, and insisted that cordial reconciliation on honourable terms, was impossible. When the news of the repeal of the stamp-act arrived, and the whole community was in extacy at the event, he, on the contrary, received it with indignation. And privately convening a party of his friends beneath the celebrated Liberty-Tree, he there harangued them at considerable length on the folly of relaxing their opposition and vigilance, or indulging the fallacious hope that Great Britain would relinquish her designs or pretensions. He drew their attention to the preamble of the act, and forcibly pressed upon them the absurdity of rejoicing at an act that still asserted and maintained the absolute dominion of Great Britain over them. And then reviewing all the chances of succeeding in a struggle to break the fetters whenever again imposed on them, he pressed them to prepare their minds for the event. The address was received with silent but profound devotion, and with linked hands, the whole party pledged themselves to resist,—a pledge that was faithfully redeemed when the hour of trial arrived. The author is in possession of the names of many who were present.

It was from this event that the Liberty-Tree took its name. The first convention of South Carolina held their meeting under it.

* Ramsay's History of South Carolina, vol. 1. p. 222.

† Ibid. 267.

nominally existed, the country was actually governed by committees and voluntary associations, to whose will the most implicit obedience was paid. CHAP. VIII.

On the 5th September 1775, the exigencies of the province obliged the governor to convene an assembly; but the first and only step they took was to pass a vote approving the resolutions of the convention of July 1774; and the governor, to prevent their proceeding further, immediately dissolved them. Indeed, they had to proceed by concert and without debate, to prevent a dissolution before the vote could be entered on their minutes.

On the 11th January 1775, the first revolutionary provincial congress met, and laid the foundation for the more regular meeting of the convention of March 1776, which formed the first constitution of South Carolina.

The convention of 1775 stamped money, established a court of admiralty to condemn British vessels, issued letters of marque and reprisal, and on the 9th November 1775, authorized the commencement of hostilities against two of his majesty's ships then lying in the harbour; having previously made themselves masters of the royal forts that commanded the place of their mooring.

In April 1776, every thing was in active preparation for approaching hostilities. Intelligence had been received that Charleston would be honoured with the attention of their enemy as soon as New York, their primary object, should be disposed of. The conflict was anticipated without dread, and prepared for with wise precaution. The state had raised three regular regiments, and these, with the militia, constituted her own means of defence. In addition, the commander in chief had ordered on two regiments under Generals Howe and Armstrong, and the abilities and experience of Major General Lee were called into requisition to command the whole. The reinforcements arrived just at the moment when they were wanted. On the 1st of June the enemy appeared off the bar of Charleston, and between that and the 28th, landed his troops on Long Island, and advanced on Fort Moultrie with two heavy ships of fifty guns, four frigates rating as twenty-eights, and four other heavy vessels.

Colonel Thomson at the head of the third Carolina regiment, kept the army under Sir Henry Clinton in check, at the east end of Sullivan's Island, where they meditated an attack by crossing the channel that separates that from Long Island; whilst a dreadful conflict was maintained between Fort Moultrie and the fleet under Sir Peter Parker. Here Colonel Moultrie commanded the second Carolina regiment; and a better fought day has seldom been witnessed in the annals of warfare. Its termination is well known. The British fleet totally discomfitted, were scarcely in a condition to make their way good to New York. The army reimbarked, and the enemy retired from before

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Charleston, strongly impressed with respect for the military prowess of the new state.

This attack had been long in contemplation, and a co-operation of the Indians on the western frontier had been arranged by the infamous John Stuart, Indian agent. The providential capture of one of his agents, put the world in possession of the letters which proved the bloody transaction, and the association of the loyalists in this savage warfare was incontestibly ascertained, by the capture of several dressed and painted like Indians.

Several hundred, men, women, and children, of the helpless inhabitants of the frontier fell a sacrifice to the tomahawk and scalping knife. But it drew a much greater number of recruits to the American standard. Horror pervaded all classes of people at the early and deliberate employment of these savages by their humane ally. And many of the most respectable loyalists became ashamed of an association that identified them with the perpetrators of the barbarous cruelties that marked the progress of this enemy. Vengeance soon followed them: the whigs collected under Colonel Williamson, and inflicted on these miserable deluded beings, evils under which the nation has ever since languished. The knowledge, that this consequence unavoidably follows upon inciting this unhappy race of men to war, is not among the least reproaches that should fall upon the nation that employs them. In a few months, the broken remains of these once powerful nations were obliged to sue for peace, and of course obliged to make great sacrifices of territory to obtain it.

The result of this campaign was highly honourable and beneficial to Carolina. The British repulsed; the Indians chastised and driven over the mountains; the spirit of the whigs were greatly animated, whilst the disaffected were humbled and forced to fly to Florida, or purchase their safety by a time-serving submission. Nor was it among the least of the benefits which the whigs derived from it, that they were initiated into practical warfare, and taught to cherish confidence in themselves from the brilliant result of their maiden efforts.

Another advantage flowed from this early success; a general confidence was diffused in the security of Charleston as a place of deposit for articles of merchandize; and of retreat for privateers.

Whilst the British were occupied in their fruitless attempts in the north, and their large fleets were engaged in watching the Chesapeake, Delaware, and New York Bays, Charleston was for two years secure and tranquil, and in the enjoyment of an extensive and lucrative commerce. But sad were the miseries

that ensued. And from north to south, no state suffered as South Carolina and Georgia suffered, for the three or four last years of the war.

It was not until the close of the year 1778, that the enemy again directed their attention to the south. For two years, the two grand armies silently watched each other on the banks of the Hudson, while the war was raging on the ocean, or in the southern states.

On the 27th November 1778, an expedition sailed from New York under Colonel Campbell, destined to operate against Georgia. Some time previous to its sailing, orders had been issued to General Provost, who commanded in Florida, to penetrate with all his disposable force into the state of Georgia, and co-operate with Campbell's detachment in getting possession of Savannah. These orders were promptly obeyed, but so much delay attended the sailing of the expedition from New York, that Provost, after penetrating to Sunbury, was obliged to retire and wait its arrival. In December, Colonel Campbell arrived in the Savannah River, and with great rapidity got possession of the capital of Georgia. He then extended his line of posts as far as Augusta. He was soon joined by Provost, and their joint force, now under the command of the latter, consisted of 5,000 men, three thousand of whom were regular troops.

Upon the retreat of the British from before Charleston in 1776, General Lee relinquished the command of the southern department to General Howe, and rejoined the grand army. Upon the arrival of Campbell before Savannah, he found Howe in command, with the poor remains of an army that had been broken and dispirited by an expedition undertaken in the most sickly part of the preceding summer against Florida. Great as was the boast of the enemy of his success against Savannah, the truth is, that Howe had not, at the time of the attack, more than six hundred regular troops, and not above one thousand militia, to cope with a well-appointed army of two thousand picked troops. Yet Howe's reputation suffered greatly from the events of that day.

In the month of September preceding, Major General Lincoln had been appointed, by a resolve of congress, to supercede General Howe, and simultaneous with the arrival of the enemy in Georgia, was that of Lincoln in South Carolina. Without delay Lincoln proceeded with his whole disposable force to the support of Howe, and at Purysburg, on the South Carolina shore of the Savannah River, they formed a junction. A reinforcement under General Ash from North Carolina, had increased their force nearly to an equality in numbers with the enemy, and the post at Purysburg was so judiciously chosen, as to oblige Provost to recall Campbell from Augusta, and concentrate his

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forces near Hudson's Ferry upon the same river, a little below the mouth of Briar Creek.

General Lincoln then conceived the design of covering the interior of Georgia, by pushing a party, under General Ashe, across the river at a point above the position of the British army. This movement led to the melancholy defeat at Briar Creek, where the command of General Ashe was totally surprised and dissipated. This unfortunate event reduced Lincoln to the necessity of remaining inactive until he could collect reinforcements that would again place him in a condition for effective operations. It was not until the 19th of April 1779, that his reinforcements arrived, and he then immediately resolved, with the advice of a council of war, to move up the river, and by crossing into Georgia, to break the line of the enemy's posts, and operate upon his left or rear. This unfortunate movement brought on the attack upon Charleston of the year 1779. For immedately as General Provost had ascertained the intention of his adversary, and that he had removed so far as to leave Charleston exposed, he adopted the enterprizing resolution of penetrating to that place, which, he had the best information did not expect and was not prepared for such an attack.

On the 25th April, with 2,000 of the elite of his troops, flanked by seven hundred loyalists and Indians, he crossed the river and pressed on towards Charleston. General Moultrie had been left in command at Purysburg, with one thousand men, chiefly militia, to hold Provost in check. With this inferior force, composed of materials which a retreat always diminishes, he could do nothing more than retreat before his enemy, check him at every pass, and throw himself into the town, when he could no longer keep the field. It was some time before Lincoln could be persuaded that this movement of the British general, was any thing more than a feint, to recall him from his views of operating in Georgia. But when the real object was ascertained, the American general returned with all possible expedition, to defeat the enemy's purpose. Yet, but for the zeal of the citizens and the firmness of Moultrie, he would have arrived too late. The latter had opposed every possible obstacle to his advance. In this he was much favoured by the innumerable streams which cross the roads leading to Charleston. Although the distance does not exceed one hundred and twenty-five miles, it required the British general seventeen days to complete the march. In the mean time, every thing was in activity in Charleston. Zeal supplied the want of time, and no hand, however unused to labour, refused the spade or the axe. A breastwork was thrown up across the neck of land on which the town is situated; cannon mounted; abbatis planted; the woods that skirted the town, and would have protected the

advance of an enemy, felled; houses that impeded defence, destroyed; and, in fine, a state of preparation produced almost unexampled for the time allowed.

Yet this exemplary zeal of the citizens was near being rewarded by indelible disgrace. Some writers have slurred over this page of the history of the state, and well were it if the fidelity of history could comport with the suppression. It is too true, that when the town was summoned to surrender, a proposition was made to stipulate for a neutrality during the war. Yet this was not made by the military commander; Moultrie's sense of honour was too keen to admit of a thought so degrading, and so inconsistent with the engagements of the state to its confederates in the common struggle. The civil authority made it in violation of the rights of the military commander, and in violation of the feelings of nine tenths of the citizens. Fortunately, it was rejected by the British commander, or it is impossible to tell what would have been the consequences. The citizens would not have submitted to it without sacrificing to their rage the authors of their disgrace. Perhaps an unbridled enemy might have entered the city in the midst of civil tumult. With the loyalist and the Indian in his retinue, there can be little doubt of the scenes which this would have led to.

It is common for those who wish to palliate this occurrence to assert, that the proposition was only made with a view to spin out the negociation, until time could be afforded for the arrival of Lincoln.

Gratifying indeed would it be to the feelings of a native, if it were possible to sustain this view of the event. But would such a motive have been concealed from Moultrie, who commanded the garrison? or from the minority of the council? one of whom shed tears on the occasion that should be embalmed in the recollection of every Carolinian. We have the unvarnished tale of Moultrie himself to support the belief, that the proposition was made in earnest; and his narrative was supported by the concurrent testimony of many now no more. But the minority were not men on whom such a measure could be imposed while there was an effort that might yet prevent it. The deliberations of the governor and council were required to be kept secret; but it is a fact, although hitherto unrelated, that one of the minority* of the council communicated to some of the citizens, members of the legislature, then under arms at the hornworks, that such a measure had been decided on. And solemnly and openly was it there declared, that the lives of the advocates of

* General Gadsden.

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the measure should atone for the disgrace inflicted on the country. The resolve was made known by them to members of the council, and how far this may have prevented the proposition from being pressed further upon the British commander, must ever rest in conjecture. The negociation terminated where it ought to have begun, by leaving the subject with the military commander. "I will then save the city," was the plain firm answer of the hero of the 28th of June, and a defiance was the last message communicated to the enemy.*

That night Provost decamped, and fearing to be intercepted by Lincoln at some one of the many difficult passes on the road by which he had advanced, he took shelter on the islands until he could procure the means of secure transportation, and then proceeded to Savannah; leaving, however, Colonel Maitland with a strong detachment at Port Royal.

In the occupation of these positions the enemy remained, until the arrival of Count D'Estaing in the month of September following, obliged Provost to collect all his forces and concentrate them for the defence of Savannah.

The unfortunate atack on that place on the 8th October, blasted all the high hopes of the combined armies of Lincoln and D'Estaing, of recovering at one blow all that had been lost in the south, and of inflicting a wound upon royal power from which it would scarcely have recovered in that quarter; and which would have saved oceans of blood, and prevented the exhibition of scenes of barbarous warfare of which the details would shock an Arab. When the French fleet first arrived, their army might have landed at several points on the south, and marched into the town. The delay from the 9th September to the 8th October, was fatal. Yet even at the last moment the attack might have succeeded had not the treachery of a deserter assisted the vigilance of the enemy in making dispositions to meet it; and had all the corps of the American army fought with equal bravery.

The failure of the attack on Savannah was the precursor of the loss of Charleston, and the reduction of the southern provinces. Immediately after that event, D'Estaing had left the American coast, and his mortification, disap-

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* We have not been able to ascertain all the members of this council, as the journals of that time cannot be found. A diligent search has been made, but the book containing those journals is not in the secretary's office, where it ought to be. In the minutes of the court of equity for April 1779, which jurisdiction was then exercised by the governor's council, we find the court consisting of the lieutenant governor, C. Gadsden, C. Pinckney, J. Ferguson, R. Smith, J. Parker, J. Neufville, J. Edwards, and J. Miller. Moultrie relates that Mr. Gadsden, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Edwards, voted against the proposition.

pointment and actual loss, made it improbable that he would ever return. There were then many concurrent causes that invited an attack on Charleston. CHAP. VIII

Howe's unfortunate expedition against Florida had totally broken up the southern army. The Carolina regiments were thinned down by sickness to a mere handful; the northern regiments that had been sent on with Howe and Armstrong had also melted away, chiefly by the expiration of their term of enlistment; and the Georgia regiment had nearly all been made prisoners at different times, and perished in the prison-ships. The quiet possession of Georgia also gave such countenance to the loyalists and Indians as to secure a powerful co-operation to the enemy from that quarter. Of the loyalists, great numbers had fled from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and taken refuge in Florida and the Indian nation. These now began to collect from all quarters under cover of Provost's army, and either to add to the strength of the enemy, or, united in formidable bodies, to hunt down and distress the whigs, so that many of them were forced in their turn, to desert their plantations and transport their families beyond the mountains. It was obvious, that the possession of Charleston would complete the British ascendancy in the south, and should the southern army fall with it, the reduction of the whole state, and most probably of North Carolina, must ensue. Besides which, Charleston was the strong hold for the privateers and their prizes, and supplied the wants of a great part of the United States, during the interrupted state of commerce to the north. Such too was the confidence reposed in this post as a place of security, that very considerable magazines had been collected in it, and it always contained shipping of considerable value; nor was there a place on the continent which held out greater allurements to those who pursued plunder instead of honourable warfare; and the work of rapacity and sequestration had already been successfully carried on under the auspices of General Provost. As furnishing the means of subsistence to an army, no place held out greater temptations than this. The country was productive in rice and other articles of bread, and the woods had swarmed with hogs and cattle. The enemy also well knew the embarrassments of the state, in common with all the others, in procuring men or money. Nothing but a paper of mere nominal value was to be had, and the reader will judge how far this was adequate to tempt men to enlist, when seven hundred dollars was the price of a pair of shoes. In fact it was impossible to fill up the regiments, and the six which then belonged to South Carolina, mustered but 800 men. Nor could this defect be supplied by militia, for besides the apprehensions reasonably excited from leaving their plantations unprotected, and being cooped up in a town during a siege, and from thence transported to a prison-ship; the small-

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pox had made its appearance, and very few of the colonists, and none of their slaves had had this dreaded (now vanquished) disease. The actual situation of this state at that time, has called forth from an enemy this confession: "That it must ever appear a paradox to future times how the Americans were enabled so long to keep up the conflict."

The British force destined to act against Charleston embarked at New York the 26th of December 1779. As soon as their destination was ascertained, a reinforcement of 1,500 men of the Virginia and North Carolina lines, were sent on by order of congress, and two frigates, a twenty-gun ship, and a sloop of war, dispatched for the same purpose. Feeble as was this contribution to the defence of the place when compared with the army that was sent against it, it was the utmost that the reduced resources of the congress admitted of their making.

The commander in chief of the British forces in America, took command in person of the army destined to act against Charleston; and to secure himself against a reiteration of the disgraceful issue of the expedition of 1776, he omitted nothing which his ample resources could command to secure success. Arbuthnot also, chief in the naval command in America, convoyed his transports, and conveyed to the scene of action an immense supply of arms and munitions of war. At least 10,000 chosen men, with heavy battering cannon, and all the instruments of destruction or annoyance which the malice of man against man has ever brought into requisition, were landed from the fleet on John's Island by the 11th February 1780.

When the news of the intended attack reached Charleston, the assembly was in session. Although there were not at that time above 800 regular troops in the state, and the defences of Charleston in the most miserably dilapidated or unfinished state, the assembly with one voice resolved to defend it to the utmost; and vesting Mr. John Rutledge, then governor, with dictatorial powers, they adjourned to add their personal influence to the general efforts in preparation for defence. The siege of Charleston is a prominent event in the history of the American war. It was the only instance in which American firmness was tried during the toils and dangers of a protracted siege. The issue was unfortunate, and thus the grand criterion of opinion not only in military, but in all human affairs, decided against the prudence of sustaining it. But as to the conduct of those who defended the place, there never was but one opinion. There were not in the place at any one time, above four thousand combatants, consisting of twenty-three hundred regular troops, and the rest citizens and sailors. The enemy, after the capture, by taking into account every male in the place from seventeen years and upwards, made the

number much greater; as they also managed to swell the artillery to a most extravagant return, by taking into account every swivel lying on the wharves, as well the guns substituted for posts at the corners of the streets. Five thousand good troops are perhaps as many as could be brought to operate to advantage in a close siege in so small a place. General Lincoln had been promised by the two states of North and South Carolina as many as nine thousand, and had that force been collected, he would probably have kept the field with the greatest number; and finally have succeeded in relieving the besieged. Indeed, the provision laid in, was not more than adequate for the actual number of the garrison, for it began to fail before the surrender. From which circumstance and various others, it is inferred, that Lincoln's expectation was, that six or seven thousand men would be advanced upon the rear of the besiegers, in which case they would undoubtedly have retired, or at least been obliged to divide their forces and attention. He was also obviously misled in another very important point. He supposed that the same forts which in 1776 had proved so successful in repelling the enemy, would now be sufficient to prevent his ships from approaching the town. In this he was soon made sensible of his error. The castle which at present commands the anchoring ground near the city, was not then in existence; and profiting by former experience, the enemy with little loss, passed the forts and occupied positions which enabled him to cut off the communication between the forts and the city, and in a great measure between the city and the country.

Yet the defence was protracted from the 29th March to the 12th May; and all the hardships and toils of it sustained by every description of troops in the garrison, with a patience and cheerfulness that ever called forth the most ardent and grateful acknowledgments of their venerable commander.

Yet, under every disappointment it was very much doubted at the time of the surrender, whether victory was not hovering over the American standard, just at the moment when she was driven away by one of those untoward accidents which no foresight of a commander can guarantee him against. The siege had evidently been protracted much beyond the calculations of the British commander. A division of the French fleet was hourly expected on the coast; preparations were known to be in forwardness to co-operate with it against New York; rumours prevailed of the approach of militia and regular troops from the neighbouring states; and two corps were then actually on their march towards Charleston, whilst Mr. Rutledge was scouring the country and thundering his anathemas to rouse the militia to action. And it was asserted and generally believed after the fall of the city, that preparations were in forwardness for raising the siege, when accident threw a letter into the hands

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of the British commander, that determined him to persist, whilst it cast a gloom over the spirits of the besieged.

It was thought necessary to send some intelligence to the governor; and his brother, Mr. Edward Rutledge, was selected for the purpose. A more faithful and devoted agent could not have been chosen; but his confidence in a friend and connexion, betrayed him into an act of indiscretion the ultimate effects of which must ever remain to be regretted. This was to take a letter from Mr. Benjamin Smith, addressed to his lady, then at her father's in North Carolina. As the roads were now every where beset, the communcation to the governor was confided to Mr. Rutledge orally, and it is understood, with the strictest injunctions to take no written communications from the garrison. A letter addressed by a friend to his lady, under an assurance that it was only a family letter, Mr. Rutledge unwarily considered as no violation of his instructions. He was captured soon after he left the city, and printed copies of the letter were next day thrown into the garrison in blank bomb-shells, and most unaccountably, through a secret agency, dispersed through all parts of the city in printed handbills. The letter plainly told that the garrison must soon surrender, their provisions were expended, and Lincoln only prevented from capitulating by a point of etiquette. From that time, hope deserted the garrison, whilst the re-animated efforts of the enemy showed the excitement revived amonst them. Such is the precariousness of military fame! Had the siege been raised, the hoary head of the highly respectable man who commanded in the town, would have been encircled with imperishable laurels. As it was, he retired under a great deal of unmerited censure, to be no more called into service in the field.

The fall of Charleston was followed up by a train of occurrences fixing indelible disgrace on the British arms, but calculated to exhaust the resources, break the spirits, and weaken the efforts of the patriots of the country. The retreat of Provost had been followed by scenes of devastation and pillage that would have disgraced a horde of Tartars. But the loyalists and Indians who were in his retinue afforded a pretext or apology for these transactions. Now, however, the loyalists were excluded from participation. It was the perquisite of the royal troops: and the commanders themselves, openly shared in the proceeds of the plunder. Among other items, two thousand stolen negroes are said to have been shipped off in one adventure; not to the asylum of Sierra Leone; that was an after thought; but to find a market, or cultivate plantations in the West India Islands.* These unhappy wretches occupied the decks

* Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 333.

of the vessels, while the waistes were filled with the spoils of the plundered province.*

But perhaps the presence of his majesty's fleet sanctioned this plunder. Such seems to be the British doctrine. Nothing, however, could sanction a deviation from an honourable compliance with the articles of capitulation. Yet it is certain that they were most shamefully violated in the treatment of the prisoners.

For the continental troops and sailors the third article stipulates, "that they shall be conducted to a place to be agreed upon, where they shall remain prisoners of war until exchanged. While prisoners, they shall be supplied with good and wholesome provisions, in such quantity as is served out to the troops of his Britannic majesty."

Yet it is most certain that they were in a few days crowded on board prison-ships, in opposition to remonstrances, and in violation of previous arrangement. There, unaccustomed to confiement, foul air and bad provisions swept them away with unexampled rapidity. Few, very few survived to be exchanged. Nor was this treatment without an obvious motive. Whilst surrounded with the sick, the dead, and the dying, they were urged to enlist in the royal service, and the constancy of many was not proof against the horrors that surrounded them. But still, "I cannot bear arms against my country," was the general cry. This difficulty was obviated by a proposition that they should be garrisoned at Pensacola. The temptation took. The British garrison was withdrawn from that place, the American recruits substituted, and they have never been heard of more. Nor did the evil rest here; the American physician and attendants were removed from the hospital, that the British agents might be at liberty to operate with the greater effect upon the minds of men just snatched from the jaws of death, and presented with the alternative of returning to the abhorred prison-ship, or enlisting in the British service.† Finally, we have the authority of the venerable hero of the 28th of June for asserting, that when arts had failed, compulsion was resorted to, and several hundred men were forced away, many of them from their families, shipped off to Jamaica, and there made to serve in Sir C. Montague's regiment. The following pathetic letter of Moultrie on the subject, was not even honoured with an answer: "What I am now to remonstrate against, is a violent and inhuman breach of the capitulation; which is, in pressing the American soldiers from on board the prison-ships, taking them away by violence, and

* Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 333.

† Moultrie's Revolution, p. 143, 151, 159.

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sending them on board the transports to be carried away from the continent of America, many of them leaving wives and young children, who may possibly perish for the common necessaries of life. If I cannot prevail upon you to countermand this violation altogether, let me plead for those unhappy ones who have families, to be exempted from this cruelty."*

By the departure of General Lincoln for the northern states under parole, Moultrie was the senior American officer then in captivity at Charleston. It was not with indifference that he witnessed the reiterated violations of faith exhibited in that place by the conquerors; but his remonstraces were in vain, and finally drew forth from the tyrannical Balfour this haughty reply: "I shall do what I think best for his majesty's service towards the prisoners."† Let those who would be further informed on this subject, peruse the letter of a man of high character, Dr. Peter Fayssoux.‡ It presents a striking picture of barbarous and unprincipled conduct on one hand, and magnanimous suffering on the other.

For many months whilst the British were in possession of Charleston, were the covered carts bearing away the dead, continually passing between the prison-ships and the grave-yard. With a benevolence that ever characterized the ladies of Charleston, they formed little associations to relieve the distresses of these poor martyrs of liberty. The benign example spread even to the lowest orders of the tender sex; and among the most conspicuous of those who poured oil and wine into the wounds of the obscure sufferer, was a poor Magdalen, whose youth had wanted the hand of religion to guide it, but whose heart ever retained a benevolence which secured her a portion of esteem even among the virtuous of both sexes. When the messenger of death summoned her to another world, the last tokens of respect were paid her by hundreds of respectable citizens, who followed her remains to the grave, commemorating her active benevolence, and regretting that such a heart should ever become the victim of the remorseless seducer.

But the most conspicuous violations of candour and good faith were exhibited in their conduct towards the citizens who had been made prisoners.

In the articles of capitulation Lincoln appears to have been completely overreached by his more wary adversary, or rather he appears to have treated like a soldier, while the other practised the finesse of the special pleader. In his original propositions for surrender, Lincoln had endeavoured to exempt from captivity the citizens who had fought under him. He was aware of the

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* Moultrie, vol. 2. p. 194. † Ibid. 142. ‡ Ibid. 397.

danger to which their persons would be exposed; and his enemy, as well aware of the danger of releasing the lion from the toils now thrown around him. For some time the negociation was suspended on this point, until the citizens made a voluntary sacrifice of the exception interposed in their behalf. In the articles then submitted, on the renewal of the parley, the American general proposed, "that the citizens should be protected in their persons and properties." In that substituted, the British general stipulates, "that all civil officers, and the citizens who have borne arms during the siege, must be prisoners on on parole; and with respect to their property in the city, shall have the same terms as are granted to the militia." The article referred to as defining the terms granted to the militia, is in these words: "The militia now in garrison shall be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole; which parole, as long as they observe, shall secure them from being molested in their *property* by the British troops."

Little did Lincoln, or the whigs who fought under him, suppose at the time, that these articles held out no security to the *persons* of the latter; that they were liable to be treated as rebels and traitors. If such had been their idea while they had arms in their hands, desperate and bloody must have been the contest before surrender. But they very reasonably concluded, that being received *as prisoners of war*, entitled them to the rights of civilized warfare; that an express stipulation secured their property in town, whilst the general reference to the terms granted the militia, protected that part of their property which lay in the country. A very large proportion of the prisoners of this description having both town and country property, and occasionally occupying one or the other, in a liberal construction were actually comprehended under the general term militia.

But they soon found that neither person nor property was secure; and that the articles of capitulation were little more than a mere *ruse de guerre* to conquer without fighting. Or perhaps his majesty's officers did not hold themselves bound to keep faith with rebels. Certain it is that immediately after the capitulation a most vexatious persecution was set on foot; and unprovoked aggressions, both on property and person, committed with the sole view to break down the spirits of the whigs, and oblige them to return to their original allegiance; and finally, after ascertaining those whose resolution there was no hope of subduing, they were suddenly seized in their houses by an armed soldiery, torn from their families and transported to St. Augustine.

The pretext at first was, that they had engaged in a conspiracy to get possession of the town; but when their accusers were demanded, and a trial braved and solicited, it was poorly excused as "a measure of policy." Yet these were

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the men on whom Andrè afterwards wished to draw down vengeance for his forfeited life. The truth is, their presence was thought to prevent many from submitting to the royal government, and their eye was a continual reproach to the dastardly spirits who had already joined the royal standard.

Colonel Tarleton has asserted that "some papers taken in the baggage of the American general officers, (at Gates' defeat,) and other collateral intelligence, displayed the late opinions and conduct of many of the principal inhabitants of Charleston. Upwards of thirty of that description, since they had received *pardon and protection* from the British commanders, had held treacherous correspondence with the armed enemies of England, or had been indefatigably engaged in secretly advancing the interests of congress throughout South Carolina. An order was immediately given to secure the persons of those individuals who had violated their engagements. The accused were committed to prison-ships, and from thence conveyed to confinement at St. Augustine."

It is some gratification to the injured, when his oppressor acknowledges some apology necessary. But whatever may be the evasions or artifices which opinion sanctions in military or political life, he who assumes the character of an historian, enters into solemn compact with the world to observe a respect for truth. Nothing can be more destitute of foundation than the accusation made by Colonel Tarleton against the individuals who were exiled to St. Augustine. It would surely have been an easy matter to confront the accused with evidence thus obtained. No considerations of policy could require the suppression of papers taken in battle; and if the British commander was not above all obligations to respect the opinions of the world, what would have been easier than to refer the case of these prisoners to the scrutiny of a court-martial?

Another motive for this conduct suggests itself from concurrent circumstances. Cornwallis had, after the defeat of Gates, commenced his career of blood; he had hung several respectable men at Camden. Retaliation might ensue; many British officers were prisoners, and others might become so. The secure possession of these respectable victims as hostages might be resorted to, as the means of saving the lives of those who had excited the vindictive passions of the Americans. In the case of Andrè this was actually resorted to; and at a subsequent period also, in the case of Colonel Browne, on the fall of the British post at Augusta.

The subjoined letters will show that the conduct of the British commander was not passed unnoticed by the proper authority, and exhibit a specimen of

the stately step with which the representative of majesty strode over the necks of his enemies. CHAP. VIII.

General Moultrie to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour.

"*September 1st*, 1780.

"SIR,

"On my perusing the paper of the 29th August, published by authority, to my astonishment I find a paragraph to this effect: 'The following is a correct list of prisoners sent on board the Sandwich, yesterday morning;' and underneath the names of a number of the most respectable gentlemen, inhabitants of this state, most of whose characters I am so well acquainted with, that I cannot believe they would have been guilty of any breach of their paroles or any article of capitulation, or done any thing to justify so rigorous a proceeding against them. I therefore think it my duty as the senior continental officer prisoner under the capitulation, to demand a release of those gentlemen, particularly such as are entitled to the benefit of that act. This harsh proceeding demands my particular attention, and I do, therefore, in behalf of the United States of America, require that they be admitted immediately to return to their paroles, as their being hurried on board a prison-ship, and I fear without being heard, is a violation of the 9th article of the capitulation. If this demand cannot be complied with, I am to request that I may have leave to send an officer to congress to represent this grievance, that they may interpose in behalf of these gentlemen in the manner they shall think proper."

ANSWER.

"*Charleston, September 4th*, 1780.

"SIR,

"The commandant will not return an answer to a letter wrote in such exceptionable and unwarrantable terms, as that to him from General Moultrie, dated the 1st inst.; nor will he receive any further application from him upon the subject of it.

"By order of the commandant.

"G. BENSON,
Major of Brigade."

"*To General Moultrie.*

It was not long before a communication from the same quarter openly avowed a resolution, to set all restraints from the articles of capitulation absolutely at nought. This was, of a resolution to ship all the prisoners, officers.

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regulars, and militia, off to the West Indies. A resolution, the execution of which was only prevented by a general exchange which soon after took place. The transports for the purpose were all ready-prepared.*

In Charleston the whole southern army fell, and the effect of the capture of that place upon the whole interior country, was the best justification of Lincoln in his effort to preserve it. There is not perhaps a seaport-town on the continent, so necessarily involving in its fall a large district of country, as this. It is the natural barrier against the possession of all the country lying between the waters of the Savannah and Pee Dee, perhaps the Roanoke. Accordingly, in a few weeks after the fall of the city, the enemy found himself in the tranquil possession of the country from the sea nearly to the mountains, with the exception of a part of the present districts of York and Williamsburg. The inhabitants very generally submitted, and either were paroled as prisoners, or took protection as British subjects. The few small parties that remained in arms, were either surprised and cut to pieces by Tarleton, or fled into the state of North Carolina, to be secure from the pursuit of the enemy. But human prosperity is ever beset with snares, and seldom can uncontrolled power brook the limits of reason and justice.

It was at this very time, when Lord Cornwallis was boasting that there was left nothing more for him to do in this quarter, that he was preparing the causes that led to the expulsion of the British army. Under the specious names of commissaries, suttlers, quarter-masters, expresses, foraging parties, and a thousand others, the country now swarmed with peculators and plunderers, and although his majesty was regularly charged with the maintenance of his troops, the honest commissary found the means of maintaining them gratuitously on his part. This charge, which was first preferred by Dr. Ramsay, was indignantly repelled by Mr. Steidman; and it is but justice to admit the belief, that to him the conduct of his inferiors was unknown, and would have been reprobated by him. But many officers of high standing in the British army little knew of the contempt, and insult, and imposition that the dispersed inhabitants had to sustain, either from authority or the assumption of it.

The hopes of a quiet retreat on their farms, with which the inhabitants had consoled themselves in submitting to the conquerors, were soon ascertained to be wholly illusory. Nor were they suffered to remain long in suspense as to the requisitions which the British commander meant to make upon them. It was very soon announced to the loyalists, or those who had taken protection,

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* Moultrie, vol. 2. p. 178.

that it was expected of them to embody themselves for actual service. There were men found among them, and many of these young men of family and fortune, from whom their country had expected better things, who accepted of commissions; and many of those, whose affections were with the royal government, received this notification without repining. But to the great majority of the loyalists it was a thunder stroke. Many had taken protection for want of nerves to support the conflict, and to these it was the death of all their hopes. But by far the greater proportion of those who had adopted this measure, had only yielded to the impulse which at last will govern the actions of men—the dictates of natural affection, the desire of enjoying the society, and providing for the wants and safety of their families. Yet their best wishes were with their countrymen, and they had no idea of being called upon to take up arms against them. CHAP. VIII.

This measure therefore disgusted great numbers of those who had returned to their allegiance, and converted them either into decided enemies, or lukewarm friends. It was not long before this measure was followed up by another which drove the inhabitants of the country to renew the contest. The following is the account given of this undertaking by themselves.

"The commander accordingly, in settling the affairs and government of the province, adopted a scheme of obliging it to contribute largely to its own defence; and even to look forward to future security, by taking an active part in the suppression of the rebellion on its borders. In this view he seemed to admit of no neutrals, but that every man who did not avow himself an enemy to the British government, should take an active part in its support. On this principle, all persons were expected to be in readiness with their arms at a moment's warning. Those who had families, to form a militia for home defence; but those who had none, to serve with the royal forces for any six months of the coming twelve in which they might be called upon to assist 'in driving their rebel oppressors, and all the miseries of war, far from the province.' Their service was, however, limited, besides their own province, to North Carolina and Georgia, beyond the boundaries of which they were not to be marched. And after the expiration of the limited term, they were to be free from all future military claims of service, excepting the local militia duties." *

Thus were many of all classes of people disgusted with their new rulers, and the public mind very generally disposed to welcome the arrival of a continental army.

* Annual Register, 1780, p. 223.

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In the midst of the general submission which followed the fall of Charleston, there remained a few unconquerable spirits whom nothing but death could quell. These were Sumpter, Marion, and Williams, in South Carolina, and Clarke and Twiggs in Georgia. There were many others whose hearts were as warm in the common cause, but circumstances had obliged most of them to yield to the current that overwhelmed the country, and wait until some favourable event should again restore them to a capacity for action. Of these last was General Pickens, who had ever been among the foremost in maintaining the cause of the revolution, but who, together with the whigs of his neighbourhood, had surrendered himself prisoner and received his parole.

Clarke, and Twiggs, and Williams, had never submitted, and were for ever in motion, harassing and waylaying the enemy; but their force was seldom considerable. Sumpter and Marion, both colonels on the continental establishment, had retired, on the fall of Charleston, into North Carolina; not to shun the war, but to gather the means of carrying on that partisan warfare, in which they both afterwards became so eminently conspicuous.

No sooner was the enemy in possession of the city than they entered upon measures for securing the submission of the remote parts of the state, and pushing their conquests into North Carolina. A party under Colonel Wemys was dispatched to take possession of Georgetown, and his posts were advanced up the Pee Dee to the line of that state. Another under Cornwallis proceeded by Nelson's Ferry to Camden, and occupied and fortified that place. A third did the same in the western part of the state at Cambridge, the county town of Ninety-Six District, the most extensive, fertile, and populous district of the state.

Scarcely had these arrangements been made when the approach of the American army under Gates was announced, and with it was communicated intelligence of a disposition to rise, manifested by the whigs in various quarters of the state. Lord Rawdon was then in command in Camden. Clinton had been called away to New York, and Cornwallis had been summoned to Charleston to assume the chief command.

The number of British troops in the state at that time, is variously stated. Tarleton acknowledges 5,400 effectives.* The least computation makes it 4,000,—a number quite inadequate, but for the dependence that Clinton had been led to repose in the zeal and numbers of the loyalists, and the pacific appearances every where, prior to his departure. But it was the calm which rests on the deep, when the conflict of the elements is concealed in the clouds.

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* Page 86.

The moment the approach of Gates was announced, the flame that had been covered broke out in various places. It was soon apparent that neither the affections of the people had been conciliated, nor their spirits broken. And now prevailed a scene of horrors almost unexampled in the history of modern warfare. The origin, progress, and termination of the private, cold-blooded butchery, which so often occurred in these states during the last two years of this war, and gave so much embarrassment to the southern commander, require our attention. It began among the inhabitants, but was consummated by the bloody massacre of Colonel Bufort's command, inflicted by Colonel Tarleton.

When it became obvious that Charleston must sustain a siege, Governor Rutledge left the city for the purpose of collecting the forces that were expected to advance upon the rear of the besieging army. To promote the same design, and to cut off the supplies of the enemy, whilst they covered the embodying of the militia in their rear, Colonels White and Washington were ordered to keep the field with about three hundred cavalry. This party was successively surprised by Colonel Tarleton, first at Monk's Corner, and afterwards at Lenud's Ferry, and the last blow nearly annihilated it. Colonels Washington and White, with about thirty or forty men, escaped by swimming Santee River.

All the efforts of Governor Rutledge to rouse the militia proved vain. The small-pox was then in the city, and this, with the apprehension of being shut up and undergoing the horrors of a siege, with death in their front and disease in their rear, generally deterred the country militia from marching to join the garrison; and when, afterwards, the attempt was repeated to collect them for the purpose of obliging the enemy to raise the siege, the want of an army to cover them whilst embodying, and the terror inspired by the rapid movements of the British cavalry, and the successful blows struck by Colonel Tarleton, had completely prevented every movement on their part.

Virginia had made two efforts to push forward reinforcements to General Lincoln. One, under Colonel Porterfield, had not reached the line of the state when the news of the fall of the town warned him to halt and wait events. The other, under Colonel Bufort, had proceeded as far as Santee River, when the success of the enemy imposed on him the necessity of commencing a retreat. The remains of the cavalry who escaped the sabres of Tarleton's legion and the waters of the Santee, had formed a junction with Bufort's corps, and the whole formed a body of about four hundred infantry and forty cavalry. The retreat of this corps was considerably impeded by a number of baggage waggons, transporting a supply of clothing, and other articles of infinite value to the service, and the loss of which was not easily to

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be replaced. Yet it had reached the Waxaw settlement before it was overtaken by Colonel Tarleton.

Immediately as Cornwallis had crossed the Santee, Tarleton had been dispatched, with 280 well mounted cavalry and infantry, to overtake Bufort's party. In fifty-four hours they made a journey of one hundred and twenty-five miles, regardless of the number of horses killed on the journey, as they were easily replaced by the seizure of others from the inhabitants on the road. Yet the American commander was apprized of his approach, and had a force amply sufficient to have destroyed his fatigued and inferior adversary. The strangest mismanagement produced the destruction of Colonel Bufort's whole command. They were cruelly butchered whilst supplicating for quarters. The hacked condition of two hundred and eighty human bodies sufficiently testified the relentless fury of the victors, while their own loss of but two killed, proves that necessity did not justify it. Colonel Tarleton excuses it on the ground that his own horse having been shot under him, the rage of his men proceeded from a report that their commander was slain. It is a poor apology for conduct which his own dispatches rather boast of than disapprove. It was from this event that cutting down the suppliant who had surrendered, acquired the epithet of "Tarleton's quarters;" and too often did the memory of this event afterwards lead to the retaliation of the horrors that attended it. Colonel Bufort with the cavalry, and a few men who cut horses from the waggons, were all who escaped. Only fifty-three prisoners were taken, for only fifty-three were in a condition to be carried off behind the troopers, and the wounded were left to perish on the field. Nothing but the humanity of the neighbouring inhabitants saved any of them; and very small indeed was the number that survived. Six of these unfortunate men were not long after casually seen together, four of whom had lost both their arms, and the other two, each one arm. Two arms remained to the six.

This event left South Carolina without a single organized corps for its defence; and left a deep and ominous impression on the minds of the inhabitants. Those of the immediate neighbourhood in which it occurred, were the first who resumed their arms, and they never afterwards relinquished them, until the enemy was expelled from their country. They were the men who first embodied under Sumpter. It is a fact, the recording of which is due to the merits of a particular description of the inhabitants of South Carolina, that the settlements which furnished the partisan corps which kept up the spirit of opposition during the revolutionary contest, were generally composed of emigrants from the north of Ireland, or their descendants. This was particularly the case with Williamsburg, the Waxaws, the Calhoun settlement in Ninety-

Six, and the present district of York. On the other hand, where the Scotch interest predominated, the leaning of the inhabitants was very general towards the enemy. This was the case with the Cunningham settlement, between the Broad and Saluda Rivers, and the country lying between the great and little Pee Dees. And the observation is peculiarly applicable to that part of the state of North Carolina which stretches along the dividing line of the two states from the coast to the county of Mecklenburg. The dissentions which arose out of the regulating system, and converted the one settlement or the other into whig and tory, more immediately operated upon settlers of a different description.

As the epithet of whig or tory-settlement frequently occurs in the history of the southern war, it is proper to observe, that in most parts of the interior of these states, the population for some miles in extent is derived from a common origin. A few Scotch, Irish, Dutch, Virginia, Maryland, quaker, presbyterian, or baptist families would sit down on a particular spot and form a nucleus, around which a circle would extend, until checked by approaching the circle of some other settlement. Sometimes the predominance of a particular name would furnish the distinguishing epithet of the settlement; sometimes the country from which the settlers emigrated, and not unfrequently the sect to which they belonged. The influence of early associations, or of leading individuals, generally directed the politics of these circles to the same point. Natural attachments and antipathies no doubt often influenced them in the party they espoused, but generally where the American or Irish influence predominated, the settlement favoured the cause of the revolution. The settlement of the interior was too recent to have formed a general amalgamation, and many of the inhabitants of the fine country that stretches along between the falls of the rivers, and the foot of the mountains, felt very little attachment to the government of their respective states. Very little had been the protection they received from their rulers in settling that country; they considered it as the land they had won with the sword and the spear, and had only felt the government by the exaction of fees and taxes, not by the participation of the benefits expected from it. But fortunately the enemy felt too confident in themselves, or too much contempt for their enemy, to act with moderation or policy. Amidst the infatuations of power and victory, their commanders appear to have forgotten, that a nation may submit to conquest but never to insult. On this point most men feel cast upon themselves for revenge or protection; and that nation cannot be conquered in which this individual feeling exists in all its force. They seemed to have forgotten also, that religion, which looks to another world for its recompense or enjoyments, becomes the

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most formidable enemy that can be raised up in this. As the dissenters of New England had the reputation of having excited the war, dissenters generally became objects of odium to the enemy. Hence their meeting-houses were often burnt or destroyed. One of them in Charleston was converted into a horse-stable; in the populous settlement of Waxsaws, their minister was insulted, his house and books burnt, and *bellum internecionis* declared against all the bibles which contained the Scotch version of the Psalms. The author of these indignities paid for them with his life; and such injuries were calculated to sink deep into the minds of men, whose ancestors had long maintained a pious war against the church of England, and who had lately been delivered by the present revolution from an established church.* Great were the obligations of the American cause to the licentiousness and folly of the British commanders!

The foregoing observations are not applicable to the quaker and Moravian settlements. As their doctrines are abhorrent of war, they of course look with an unfriendly eye on every attempt to shake off an established government. Nor are they applicable to the Scotch and British traders who had spread through the interior and established themselves in the small villages which began to rise in situations favourable to trade. Their affections and those of their retainers were, of course, under the influence of strong national attachments, and wedded to the power which they supposed best able to protect them in the prosecution of their business. Their influence was generally against the whigs wherever they had established themselves. Yet there were some eminent exceptions.

From the first commencement of the revolutionary ferment, a partisan warfare had occurred in the interior between the whigs and tories. The royal governors had, at a very early period, established a correspondence with several populous settlements in all the southern provinces. How much soever all parties must deplore the melancholy consequences which resulted from these internal dissentions, it cannot be denied that both in North and South Carolina the loyalists were the aggressors. As early as November 1775, a party of loyalists between Broad and Saluda Rivers, under Patrick Cunningham, rose in arms and seized a quantity of gunpowder, which the whigs were forwarding as a present to the Indians. The royal governor of the province, apprehending that this peace offering would detach the savages from the royal interests, and defeat the plan which had already originated of bringing them

* Ramsay, vol. 1. p. 352.

upon the backs of the whigs, while the royal army attacked them in front; excited this settlement, (the only one in the southern states in which the tories outnumbered the whigs,) to commit this act of aggression. This was the first link in that chain of causes which led to the depopulation of this beautiful tract of country. CHAP. VIII.

After this event, it was not until the enemy overran Georgia that the tories again appeared in arms. But, that a correspondence had been kept up between them and the enemy, was obvious from the promptness with which they embodied and marched to join the enemy as soon as Campbell advanced to Augusta. A Colonel Boyd of South Carolina, recently arrived from New York, and a Major Moore of North Carolina, were the leaders; and eight hundred men marched under their standard. The South Carolinians and Georgians, about five hundred in number, commanded by Pickens, Clarke, and Dooley, pursued, attacked, and killed, captured or dispersed the party. This was at Kettle Creek in Georgia. Their leader fell, and not more than 200 men made their way good to Augusta. The prisoners were delivered to the civil magistrate, tried and convicted, and seventy of them sentenced to suffer death as traitors.* All but five were pardoned, and the political rulers of the day thought the example of the execution of five necessary to the future tranquillity of the state. It is not easy in the midst of the angry passions which influence the mind in civil contests, duly to estimate the value of lenient counsels. But consequences soon followed upon this measure, which opened the eyes of the leading whigs to the danger of inflicting punishment even under the sanction of existing laws. When men are taken with arms in their hands prosecuting open war, however inconsistent with their civil duties their conduct may appear to the victors, it is dangerous to stretch out the arm of civil power against them, at least while the contest is still raging.

Colonel Brown, soon after this event was placed in command at Augusta. History has preserved the memory of too many monsters in the human form; but this man has been surpassed by none. Yet his history conveys some useful lessons. It proves the danger of inflicting wanton outrage on the meanest of human beings, and the fatal consequences that ensue from indulging popular licentiousness, and the vindictive passions that predominate in times of civil commotion.

In the hour of festivity Brown had indulged himself in indiscreet censure of the revolutionary party. He had done worse,—he had committed a fault

* M'Call's History of Georgia.

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less easily forgiven; he had ridiculed them. Being apprised that their resentment was excited, he attempted to escape; but he was closely pursued, brought back to Augusta, tried before a committee of surveillance, and sentenced to be tarred and feathered and carted, unless he recanted and took the oath of allegiance prescribed by the administration of Georgia. Brown was a firm man, and resisted with a pertinacity that should have commanded the respect of his persecutors. But the motions of a mob are too precipitate to admit of the intrusion of generous feeling. After undergoing the painful and mortifying penance prescribed by the committee without yielding, it is too true that he was doomed to have his naked feet exposed to a large fire, to subdue his stubborn spirit. But in vain; and he was at length turned loose by a groupe of men, who never once dreamed that the simple Indian-trader would soon reappear, an armed and implacable enemy. He first visited the loyalists of Ninety-Six, concerted his measures with them, then made his way to St. Augustine, received a colonel's commission, placed himself at the head of a band of desperate refugeess, and accompanied Provost in his irruption into Georgia. His thirst for revenge appeared afterward insatiable, and besides wantonly hanging many of his prisoners, he subjected the families of the whigs who were out in service, to accumulated sufferings and distress. It was not long after he was left in command at Augusta by the British general, that Colonel Clarke, with a determined party of the militia whose families he had persecuted, aimed a well-directed blow at his post. But Brown proved himself a man of bravery and conduct, and he well knew that at all times he was fighting for his life. After a severe and partially successful contest, the approach of a party of Indians obliged Clarke to retreat and leave his wounded behind him, with a letter addressed to Brown, requesting that he would parole them to their plantations. But Brown's thirst for revenge knew no bounds; it had been irritated in this instance by a wound which confined him to his bed. The unhappy prisoners, twenty-eight in number, were all hung; thirteen of them were suspended to the railing of the staircase, that he might feast his eyes with their dying agonies. This he justified on the ground of the execution of the prisoners taken at the defeat of Boyd, and of a sanguinary order of Lord Cornwallis, which will hereafter be noticed.

Among the prisoners thus executed were many of high respectability, and one youth whose conduct merited a better fate. He was but fifteen years of age; his brother, but two years older, was wounded and fell beside him. He refused to leave him, and they perished together on the gallows.

The outrage did not end here; the bodies were given up to the savages to

be scalped, mangled, and thrown into the river. These things are beyond contradiction true,—they were extracted from the letters of British officers.* CHAP. VIII.

In the state of North Carolina, the first aggression of the loyalists took place in February 1776. This was under the command of one M'Donald, created a general by the royal Governor Martin for that purpose. But M'Donald, too proud of his new dignity, or too zealous to repress his ardour, precipitately led out his followers from Cross Creek, before his royal coadjutors were ready for action. The consequence was, that they were soon dispersed, and for a long time afterwards, were too seriously impressed with the terrors of battle to do more than keep up a correspondence with the enemy, and make large promises of aid, which they never after felt themselves safe enough fully to realize. They, however, and their connexions, stretching down between the Pee Dees, constituted the perplexing enemies with whom Marion afterwards was destined to cope. The district of Marion now comprises the country in which the contest was long kept up between these parties.

It was not until the advance of the enemy to Camden and the Cheraws, that the loyalists of North Carolina resumed their arms. Lord Cornwallis had instructed them not to rise until his approach into North Carolina should afford them countenance and support. But, after arrangements were made for embodying, it was not so safe as his lordship supposed, for his majesty's loyal subjects to remain in a state of separation. They knew they were watched, and military execution or civil prosecution might invade their firesides, before they could convene their friends for mutual protection. Colonel Moore, the same who had accompanid Boyd, again made his appearance at the head of an armed band from Tryon county. But before he had advanced far, Colonel Rutherford was upon him, and his party was killed or dispersed. Colonel Bryan, from the lower part of the Yadkin, was more fortunate. He heard of the approach of an American army under De Kalb, on a route which led near his habitation, and collecting about 800 followers, he hastened to join the 71st British regiment, then stationed at the Cheraws.

Thus reinforced, the commander of the regiment, Colonel M'Arthur, dispatching his sick and convalescents with a part of his baggage down the Pee Dee in boats, under an escort of militia, struck across the country to unite with Lord Rawdon at Camden. This left an opening for Marion to penetrate into South Carolina on the enemy's right, of which he soon availed himself; whilst Sumpter was entering upon active operations on his left.

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* M'Call.

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A singular coincidence of events facilitated the career of these two active commanders, and placed them most unexpectedly in the command of a force which sanctioned their advance into the heart of the country. They were both feebly attended, when, nearly about the same time, two instances of treachery (as it was called by the enemy) placed them in the command of troops who could never afterwards desert them—because of that treachery.

Among the few who had accompanied Sumpter, or united themselves to him when he fled into North Carolina, was Colonel Neale. This gentleman's command lay in the neighbourhood of the Tiger and Enoree rivers. After the British commander had resolved to convert the militia into active instruments in the war, Neale's command was given to one Floyd; and Major Lile, who, bending to the times, had taken protection, was made second in command. While the British troops hovered near them, and no American force was in view to protect them, the men had patiently submitted to be marshalled under his majesty's commission. But no sooner was information brought them that Sumpter was on the Catawba, accompanied by their beloved colonel, than the whole regiment, with Lile at their head, marched off and joined him. Shortly after, he formed a junction with the Waxsaw whigs, and in the space of twenty-six days, drove in the advanced parties of the enemy on the Catawba, and severely handled them in three sharp conflicts, to wit, at Williams', at Rocky Mount, and the Hanging Rock. The last affair occurred eight days before the defeat of Gates, and near the scene of that action. Immediately after it, Sumpter had recrossed the Catawba, and was lying on the west side of the river at the time of Gates' arrival at Rugely's Mills.*

The same thing happened to Marion. With his little band, generally well mounted but miserably clad and equipped, he sought out General Gates, who, after superceding De Kalb, was then on his advance to Lynch's Creek, and with him concerted the plan of penetrating into the heart of the state. A messenger from the whigs of Williamsburg had invited Marion to place himself at their head, and he was cautiously tracing his way through a country much infested with loyalists, when M'Arthur's boats were descending the Pee Dee. The advance of Marion spread an alarm among the loyalists, and the intelligence was promptly communicated to the escort of the boats, with advice to hasten their descent to a place of security. The effect was exactly the reverse of that intended. No sooner did the men receive this intelligence, than, rising on their officers, they carried them off, and making the convalescents of the

* Tarleton's Campaign, p. 93.

British army prisoners, they, with a very seasonable supply of munitions of war, were delivered to Marion.

When these acts of "black treachery" (as they were denominated) became known to the British commanders, their indignation knew no bounds; and the beneficial effects of these events on the American cause, is best expressed in Colonel Tarleton's own language: "It ruined all confidence between the regulars and militia." All Sir Henry Clinton's fairy visions of converting the militia of South Carolina into a British army, at once vanished.* Yet such is the unwillingness of men to acknowledge themselves wrong in their speculations, that his commanders would not for some time relinquish the idle project. Many of the whigs whose high standing, or rigid notions of truth would not admit of temporizing, had to sustain imprisonment and chains in their resistance to this imperious measure. These persecutions caused many to flock to the standard of Marion, and soon swelled his corps to a size which enabled him to scour the country from the North Carolina line even as far as Monk's Corner, and greatly interrupt and embarrass the communication between Charleston and the posts at Georgetown and Camden.

As soon as the formidable expedition under Sir Henry Clinton had sat down before Charleston, congress resolved on making further provision for sustaining the war in the southern states. But so feeble were their means, that after leaving the necessary force for holding the enemy in check in New York, they could spare but fourteen hundred men to be detached to the south. The command of this detachment, consisting of the Maryland and Delaware lines, was confided to Major General Baron De Kalb, and was intended as a reinforcement to the army under General Lincoln. But Lincoln having been made prisoner before their arrival, it became necessary to appoint a successor to him in the command of the southern department.

The victor of Burgoyne at that time maintained an almost unrivalled eminence in popular opinion; and such were the relative standings of himself and Washington, even in the opinion of congress, that without consulting the commander in chief, General Gates was ordered, by a vote of congress, to take command in the southern department. It has been seen that Washington would have conferred it on another, had the choice rested with him.

The Baron De Kalb had pressed his march to the south by the direct route from Petersburg in Virginia, for Camden in South Carolina. On the 6th of July he reached the banks of the Deep River, and halted at Coxe's Mills to

* Tarleton's Campaign.

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collect provisions, and decide from intelligence on his future course. A militia force had been raised in the state of North Carolina and placed under command of General Caswell. This was now in advance of De Kalb, beyond the Pee Dee, on the route to Camden by Mask's Ferry. On the same route Col. Porterfield, with his small detachment of Virginia regulars, was also posted. But the country lying between was alarmingly sterile, and had been so exhausted of its few means of subsistence, that to pass it without forming magazines in advance, or transporting the means of subsistence with him, De Kalb thought impracticable; and such was the abject state of the means of transportation, that either to collect provisions or transport them, was nearly impossible. Thus circumstanced, he was meditating on the project of deviating to his right, so as to avail himself of the fertile and friendly counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan, when General Gates arrived and took the command.

Orders were immediately issued for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to move at a moment's warning, and on the 27th, the army was under march, in the direct route across the barrens to Mask's Ferry.

General Gates had not at this time one day's provision to serve out to his army; and a measure so fraught with danger, and which, in its consequences, had so nearly brought his army to starving or disbanding, must ever remain the subject of severe criticism on his military conduct. Colonel Williams, then adjutant-general under De Kalb, has written his apology, which, as an authentic and interesting fragment of original history, and a specimen of the talents and excellence of a man whom his country has reason to be proud of, will be found at large in the appendix to this work.* The reason urged for this dangerous adventure was, that General Caswell, too confident in his numbers, and too emulous or avaricious of fame, and unconscious of the danger to which he had exposed himself, had avanced to Lynch's Creek, and was in the most critical situation from his near approach to the enemy: and that a precipitate march was necessary to support or extricate him; as, in case of his dispersion, all hope of military support from North Carolina must be abandoned. It would also seem, that Gates had some how been led to anticipate supplies which never reached him, as he assured the men that there were waggons loaded with supplies in the rear, which must overtake them in two days. Yet how could this have happened? It was fortunate for him that he commanded a body of the best officers and best troops in America. Well disciplined as the troops were, and with all the zeal and devotion of his officers, it

* Appendix B.

was scarcely possible to preserve them from mutiny, such was the absolute state of starvation to which they were reduced before they formed a junction with General Caswell.

The most reasonable conjecture as to the motives of General Gates is, that he urged his march across the desert, with the double intent of concealing his own approach and anticipating that of reinforcements to the enemy.

Lord Rawdon being then in command in Camden, it was to be expected that immediately as intelligence reached Lord Cornwallis of the advance of an army to attempt that post, he would press forward reinforcements to Rawdon's support. But, if this object entered into General Gates' views, it is not easy to assign a cause why, when opposed by a very inferior force to his own on the banks of Lynch's Creek, he should have suffered himself to be forced to ascend its left bank and to pass its head, instead of forcing his way across to Camden. Yet it is certain that he was detained manœuvring on the east bank of Lynch's Creek, from the 7th of August, the day on which the junction was formed with Caswell, to the 13th, when the army encamped at Rugely's Mills, called Clermont. The imputed object of General Gates in ascending the stream, from the point where he first struck it to that at which Rugely's Mills are constructed, was to effect a junction with Gen. Stevens, then on his march with a brigade of Virginia militia; but if this was his purpose, it would have been equally well answered by crossing the stream below, and pressing on to the great road to Camden by which Stevens was advancing, so as effectually to cover the latter from all danger of attack. But the motives which govern the conduct of a military commander can seldom be determined by conjecture, however justly they may be weighed when avowed or discovered.

On the march through Virginia, De Kalb had been joined by Colonel Carrington, with three lean companies of artillery, manning six pieces. On the banks of the Pee Dee, Colonel Porterfield had joined the army, and shortly after, Colonel Armand, with a legionary corps of about sixty horse and as many foot. The day after the army had encamped at Rugely's Mills, General Stevens also came up with his brigade of militia; and the combined returns of these several commands now flattered General Gates with the idea of being at the head of seven thousand men.

The next day presented a fair opportunity for entering upon active operations.

Camden Ferry, on the line of communication between the enemy's posts, had always been an important pass to the garrisons of Camden, Granby, and Ninety-Six. The recent irruption of Marion had rendered the line of communication between Camden, Fort Watson, and Charleston, by the east side

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of the Waterree and Monk's Corner, so insecure as to compel the enemy to resort to a more westerly route, crossing above the mouth of the Wateree at M'Cord's Ferry, and ascending the west bank of the Wateree to Camden Ferry. Here again the communication was watched by Sumpter, whose recent victories over the advanced posts of the enemy, enabled him to occupy the country in the vicinity of Rocky Mount. This rendered it necessary to defend the pass at Camden Ferry, and a Colonel Carey, with a body of loyalists, was at this time employed in erecting a fort on the west side of the Wateree for that purpose.

On the morning of the 14th of August, Colonel Sumpter received intelligence of the advance of a considerable convoy of British waggons on the route from M'Cord's to Camden Ferry, and dispatched an express to General Gates to solicit of him a reinforcement of regulars to support his militia infantry, in order to attempt the destruction of Carey and capture of the convoy. One hundred picked men of the regulars and three hundred militia of North Carolina, with two pieces of artillery, under Colonel Woolford of the Maryland line, were immediately ordered on this service; and General Gates put the army under marching orders for Camden, with the double design of supporting Sumpter, if necessary, and availing himself of the opportunity of attacking Lord Rawdon, or his redoubts, if the latter should march out in force to repel the attack of Sumpter.

On the night of the 15th at 10 o'clock, the American army moved from Rugely's Mills, little dreaming of the terrible fate to which a few hours were about to consign them. The interval between their march and their destruction scarcely measured a span.

It is truly astonishing that General Gates should have been profoundly ignorant of the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Camden the evening previous. Yet so it was; and at the head of 2,000 finished troops, at the very hour that Gates moved from Clermont, Cornwallis had taken up the line of march to attack him in his encampment. An event so probable, and so decisive on his future operations, surely ought to have commanded General Gates' earliest attention. The obscure route by which Gates approached Camden, has been mentioned as the cause why the movements of Cornwallis had not been communicated by Gates' friends; but surely, if the necessary measures for obtaining intelligence had been adopted, the route of the latter's march would have been made known to those who were to communicate with him. There is too much reason to believe, that those means were not adopted.

Nor was there the least necessity for his remaining destitute of intelligence. For he knew that Marion had penetrated into the state before him: and through

the medium of the settlements along the head waters of the Black River, only a little distance to his left, swarming with animated whigs, nothing would have been easier than to have dogged every step of the British commander. And even if the want of means be urged; up to the time of his junction with Caswell, it may be admitted, but after that event there was nothing to prevent his dispatching proper persons to procure the necessary intelligence along the line of communication on the east side of the Wateree River, from Lenud's Ferry, where Cornwallis crossed the Santee, even to the gates of Camden.

The unhappy fate which awaited him, is that which must ever attend the commander who neglects the means of intelligence. His laurels were strewed in the dust, his venerable head bowed down with humiliation, an army destroyed, and the southern states brought to the verge of ruin.

Lord Cornwallis, on the contrary, appears to have been accurately informed of every particular relating to his adversary. It is even asserted that an emissary sent from Camden had had the address to pass himself upon Gates as a friend and win his confidence. Thus instructed, the British commander resolved to make a night attack upon his unsuspecting enemy, then posted but ten miles in advance of him.

The first intelligence communicated to either army of the near approach of the other, was from the fire of the British advance-guard upon the American. The cavalry of Armand's legion being struck by this discharge, wheeled off in confusion and carried dismay into the columns advancing in their rear. But the infantry under Porterfield, who were advancing in files on the right of the road, coolly returned the fire and checked the advance of the enemy. This was about half after two in the morning, and about mid way between Clermont and Camden. The ground was equally unknown to both commanders, and the meeting equally unexpected. As if by mutual consent, the two armies drew off to reconnoitre and prepare for ulterior measures. Orders had been issued by the American general for forming for battle, and the line was soon formed under the activity of their adjutant-general. The first Maryland division, including the Delawares, under De Kalb, was posted on the right; the Virginia militia, under Stevens, on the left; and the North Carolinians, under Caswell, in the centre: the artillillery in battery on the road. Both wings rested on morasses, and the second Maryland brigade was posted a few hundred yards in rear of the first, to act as a reserve.

The enemy was formed in one line, with each wing covered and supported by a body in reserve.

Thus drawn up, the break of day discovered the two armies to each other, and the action was brought on by the American left wing's advancing upon

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the British right, which had the appearance of still being unsettled in its position.

The reception which the Virginians met with soon proved that their adversary was prepared for them; and the proof of that fact was all they stood to ascertain. They fled in the most abject confusion, "few discharged their guns, and fewer still carried them off the field."

The North Carolina militia, with the exception of one corps under a Major Dixon, which was on the extreme right of their brigade under protection of the Marylanders, followed the cowardly example of the left, and broke away notwithstanding every effort to detain them. Armand's cavalry also fled, *a bride abattue*, and a charge of the British cavalry soon put an end to every hope of rallying the fugitives. They scattered through the woods, seeking the swamps or their homes, and spreading a paralysing alarm throughout the country. As no returns could ever be obtained of the North Carolinians, it is not known how many suffered; but as some of them behaved well, it followed that they sustained some loss; but of the Virginians it is confidently asserted, that their returns exhibited "three wounded."

The devoted Marylanders and Delawares were now left to struggle against double their numbers. The state of affairs would have dictated a retreat, but a post had been assigned them and they nobly maintained it, waiting for orders from the commander in chief. But he, it seems, had been borne away by the torrent of militia, and could not find an aid to convey his orders. Why else was there no attention paid to the safety of these brave men?

The artillery was now lost, and Armand's legion fled; the regular infantry numbered but nine hundred men, and these had now to bear the undivided pressure of two thousand of the best troops in the British service. But they not only resisted, but at some points carried the bayonet into the ranks of the enemy and made many prisoners. It was impossible that this could last. De Kalb had fallen under eleven wounds, the British cavalry had returned from dispersing the militia, the ground was unfavourable to manœuvring in a square or covering their flanks, and the only chance that remained to avoid a surrender on the field, was to break away for the morass in their rear, into which they could not be pursued by the cavalry. This was done; and by this alone did any part of this devoted corps escape from the swords of the dragoons, in which the enemy was very strong. In this effort a large proportion of the officers escaped; but Major Anderson was the only one who succeeded in keeping together any body of men. Colonel Howard and some others collected some men in their train, and the whole proceeded on in a state of utter dissolution until they reached Charlotte. Scarcely any of the waggons escaped; for the horses

were very generally brought into requisition to carry off the wounded officers. The artillery, baggage, every thing became prize to the victor, and to the utter astonishment but infinite relief of the scattered Americans, Lord Cornwallis, satisfied with his triumph, returned to celebrate it in Camden—by offering the lives of some of his prisoners to the manes of his soldiers, or the demon of revenge.

It was in the midst of the hurry of flight that a courier overtook General Gates with the consoling intelligence, that Sumpter had completely succeeded in his enterprize. But Gates had only to communicate in reply intelligence of his own irretrievable misfortune, and the necessity of Sumpter's urging a retreat to the mountains for safety.

The moment the detachment under Woolford joined Sumpter, he put his command under march for Camden Ferry. Near the break of day on the morning of the 16th, he found himself advanced undiscovered to within a few miles of Carey's fort. A strong detachment of militia under command of Colonel Thomas Taylor, was then pushed forward to gain the rear of the fort and cut off the retreat of Carey's detachment, or prevent it from forming a junction with the convoying party. Taylor approached with such caution and silence as to find Carey's party wholly unconscious of the danger that awaited them. The opportunity was favourable, and he improved it by so sudden and impetuous an attack, that the whole party surrendered without any serious opposition. Learning from them that the convoy was at no great distance in the rear, and equally unapprehensive of danger, Taylor immediately advanced upon it, and the similitude of his appearance with the home-spun dresses of the loyalists, excited no apprehension in the convoying party until they found themselves surrounded and secured.

A retreat up the river was immediately commenced, and the party under Sumpter far advanced before either he, had notice of the advance of Cornwallis upon Gates, or Cornwallis, intelligence of the disaster sustained by his convoy. But it happened that Sumpter had been approaching danger instead of avoiding it, for he was now nearly opposite the ground on which the battle of the morning had been fought. The river lay between him and the enemy, but there were several points at which it could be passed.

As soon as Lord Cornwallis received intelligence of the capture of his convoy and the route by which Sumpter was retreating, he detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion and a corps of mounted infantry, to pursue the American party by the route over Rocky Mount Ford.

Colonel Sumpter had acquired a valuable booty—forty waggons laden with arms, spirits, clothing, and every thing that the American army stood most in

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need of. But he was also encumbered with near three hundred prisoners, and the whole, greatly operated to impede his retreat. Nevertheless by urging his march by day and by night, he passed Fishing Creek about noon of the 18th, and halted to afford a moment of rest and refreshment to his harassed troops. That moment proved fatal to the most flattering hopes that ever dawned on the enterprize of a commander. Colonel Tarleton with his cavalry burst upon them when there was not a man standing to his arms, and threw themselves between the men and the parade where their muskets were stacked.

By what means Tarleton succeeded in effecting this unequivocal surprise we are uninformed; the force under Sumpter was sufficient to have swept his cavalry from the face of the earth had it been prepared to receive them. It cannot be supposed that the army had been halted without posting proper videttes and a camp-guard; and Tarleton's reaching the parade ground before a drum beat to arms, must ever remain a mysterious occurrence until some explanation of the causes shall be furnished to the world. The only one ever furnished is, that the videttes were sleeping on their posts, and the commander supposed himself beyond the reach of danger. Never is a military commander more certainly in danger, than when lulled by the belief that he has nothing to fear.

By this unhappy occurrence many brave men lost their lives. Some few of the regulars took post behind the waggons in hopes of rallying the militia, but their fire only sharpened the swords of the dragoons, by the death of a few of their number. No other opposition was made; the rout was total; Colonel Sumpter had the good fortune to escape, but very few of the officers or men got off. The aggregate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was very little short of that sustained by General Gates, and served to swell the returns of the victors to the still exaggerated account of one thousand prisoners, and eight or nine hundred killed and wounded—a loss which has been erroneously attributed to the defeat of Gates alone.

It was on this occasion that Colonel Tarleton set the example which was but too closely imitated about six weeks afterwards upon the followers of Colonel Ferguson. There are still living the most respectable witnesses who saw him ride up in person, (for he was in the rear of the party that charged,) and, under the information derived from the loyalists, late prisoners to Sumpter, select and pinion with cords a number of the American prisoners, and in this situation march them off to Camden. These were the men who were, a few days afterwards, consigned to the gallows by "the amiable Cornwallis,"*

* An epithet given the British commander by Colonel Lee in his Memoirs.

without even a form of trial. Were they British subjects? were they Americans? were they rebels? were they even deserters? were they any thing but spies? Whence could a British commander derive this savage right? It was an expression of contempt for the struggle in which they were engaged, and the whigs, when victorious at King's Mount, were resolved not to be despised with impunity.

Discordant, as usual, are the accounts transmitted, as well of the numbers engaged, as of the losses sustained at the defeat of General Gates. The British contended that they had fought and dispersed treble their own numbers; and could General Gates have brought into action the whole force supposed to have been collected at Clermont, they would have exceeded that number. But his march through the desert had made sad havoc in his line of regulars; and as to the militia, the fatigues of duty, change of habits, and a long march, had reduced them to almost one third the number that had been mustered. It is positively known that the American returns of the morning of the 15th August gave exactly three thousand and fifty-two fit for duty. Of these, nine hundred were of the line, two hundred artillerists with four pieces, and one hundred and fifty of Armand's legion—about sixty of whom were mounted, but proved themselves very indifferent cavalry. The rest of the troops, about seventeen hundred, were Virginia and North Carolina militia, nearly in equal numbers.

The British army are acknowledged to have consisted of about seventeen hundred regulars and three hundred loyalists. On the night of the engagement, some prisoners taken in the rencounter between the advanced guards, reported it three thousand strong, and with that number General Gates supposed himself about to engage. With what hope of success he could venture, with a force like his, to cope with three thousand British veterans in an open champaign country, it is impossible to conceive. But it scarcely seems to be the question whether he ought to have engaged them. The doubt is, whether it was possible under actual circumstances, to avoid a general action. De Kalb certainly thought that the army ought to retreat, and considering that it wanted yet four hours of day, there was probably much more to have been hoped for, from the attempt to retreat, than from the possibility that a body of raw militia, agitated by all the anticipations of four hours spent in the dark in the face of a disciplined enemy, would stand its ground against their bayonets. Nor is this all; it will be seen from Colonel Williams' narrative, that an injudicious measure in the distribution of provisions, had actually put them in a state of debility little adapted to the tug of battle.

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The loss admitted by the British commander, is three hundred killed and wounded. No other evidence exists on that point. As to the American loss, as the militia scattered to all the winds of heaven, there is no certainty of the number killed of them. With regard to the North Carolinians, as the 300 men who accompanied Sumpter were made prisoners, we find 350 North Carolina militia made prisoners by the enemy. One of their best officers, Gen. Rutherford, was wounded and fell into the enemy's hands. Their General Gregory also was severely wounded. Of the regulars, not above six hundred escaped; so that the loss here, exclusive of those who had shared the fate of Sumpter's detachment, was not less than six hundred,* a very large proportion of whom were killed and wounded. Many valuable officers shared the same fate, and none of them more deservedly lamented than Colonel Porterfield; who was severely wounded and fell into the enemy's hands. When able to travel he was paroled, but his wound was incurable, and he finally expired under it.

The tomb of De Kalb, erected by congress, still occupies a conspicuous place in the cemetery of Camden, and history has reared a more imperishable monument to the gallant Du Buissy, who with his own body shielded that of his friend and commander from the British bayonets,—which had already drank his blood from eleven orifices.

The command of Sumpter was irrevocably dispersed, but its commander, supported still by the hope of retrieving the fortunes of his country, retired to North Carolina. to endeavour once more to collect his followers.

General Gates, after ineffectual attempts to rally his men, first at Clermont, then at Charlotte, then at Salisbury, finally retired to Hillsborough, to solicit the support of the state legislature then in session. Gunby, Williams, Howard, Anderson, and as many of the regular officers as had escaped, collected the "*tristes reliquiæ*" of their late gallant regiments at Charlotte, and under the conduct of General Smallwood, retreated to Hillsborough. Here, upon bringing together the little remnant of the southern army, they found the whole of all descriptions in the Maryland line, including those who had been left in the rear on the day of the action, to amount to six hundred and ninety-seven rank and file, and eighty non-commissioned officers and musicians; total, seven

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* Colonel Williams says the killed, wounded, and missing, after the two affairs of the 16th and 18th, were, 3 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 15 captains, 13 subalterns, 2 staff officers, 52 non-commissioned officers, 74 musicians, 711 rank and file.

hundred and seventy-seven: Delawares, one hundred and seventy-five: Virginians, fifty. CHAP. VIII.

After the dispersion of Colonel Sumpter's command, there did not remain in South Carolina a man in arms in the American cause, except the few who were embodied under Marion. This officer still maintained his ground below the Santee River, and managed, among the swamps and defiles of that region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. Nay, the communication with Charleston by the way of Nelson's Ferry, was almost broken up by his persevering watchfulness, and even the defeat of Gates did not warn him to retire, as long as the British cavalry remained with Cornwallis.

A masterly enterprize, marked with the boldness and intelligence that distinguished all his movements, and crowned with signal success, soon made it necessary for Cornwallis to dislodge him. Intelligence was communicated to Marion that a detachment of the prisoners taken from Gates, about one hundred and fifty in number, were on their march for Charleston, under an escort of nearly the same number. Placing his mounted militia in ambush in one of the swamps that skirt the road from Nelson's Ferry to Monk's Corner, he darted upon the escort at a moment when least expected, and made every man of them prisoner. Then placing their arms in the hands of their prisoners, paroling the officers and taking their receipt for the British prisoners, to be exchanged, he hurried across the Santee and up the west bank of the Pee Dee, until his prisoners were safely disposed of within the limits of North Carolina. He was far beyond the reach of danger before the parties detached to drive him from his covert had reached the scene of his recent enterprizes.

Thus was the state of South Carolina wholly abandoned to the enemy.

From the fatal 16th of August to the 7th of September, Lord Cornwallis was occupied at Camden in measures to secure the province against that spirit of revolt, which had so recently manifested itself on the approach of Gates. During this interval it was, that the most influential of the whigs in Charleston, in contempt of the faith of treaty, were torn from their families, hurried into transports, and conveyed to the fortress of St. Augustine. And every measure was adopted in council and enforced by example, which could give the citizens to understand that their lives and properties were held in subjection to a military despotism. At the same time, measures were adopted to embody and discipline the zealous loyalists; and for this purpose, Colonel Ferguson, an active and intelligent partisan, and possessing peculiar qualifications for attaching to him the marksmen of Ninety-Six, was dispatched into that district. To a corps of one hundred picked regulars, he soon succeeded in attaching twelve or thirteen hundred hardy natives; his camp became the rendezvous of

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the desperate, the idle, and the vindictive, as well as of the youth of the loyalists whose zeal or ambition prompted them to military service.

There was a part of the state which had not yet been trodden by a hostile foot, and the projected march through this unexplored and undevastated region drew many to his standard. This was the country which stretches along the foot of the mountains towards the borders of North Carolina. His progress is said to have been marked with blood and lighted up with conflagrations.

On the 7th September Lord Cornwallis, at the head of all his disposable force, lightly equipped, as the English writers say, and not prepared for permanent conquest, commenced his march for Charlotte; while Ferguson, by an oblique route, moved from Ninety-Six towards the same point. There was, seemingly nothing to oppose, nothing to molest the progress of either. Yet one met with death and ruin, and the other found an enemy swarming round him, who could neither be driven away, nor evaded.

It was at the time of Clarke's retreat from Augusta that Ferguson was crossing the country to form a junction with Cornwallis. The route that the American colonel was pursuing in his retreat, appeared to indicate an intention to pass in front of the British army, and form a junction with Gates, or with the North Carolina militia, which had been recently called into service. Ferguson, conceiving the idea of intercepting him in his course, made a movement to the left, which seemed to threaten the habitations of the hardy race that occupy the mountains. It was approaching the lair of the lion; for half the families of the persecuted whigs had been deposited in this asylum.

The fate which Ferguson met with has been generally attributed to a casual meeting of bodies of militia, who acted without any preconcert. To the British commander, the force that destroyed him appeared to have sprung up like the soldiers of Deucalion. But that country was never without the force that Ferguson had to encounter. The same fate would have awaited any other commander at any other time, who had approached that sanctuary in no greater force.

From the Kenhawa to the Ogechee, there existed a connexion between the frontier settlements stretching along the mountains. Their contiguity to the powerful Indian nations, the Chickesaws, Cherokees, and Creeks, cemented their union, by the sympathies that sprung from common danger and mutual protection. Their frequent exposure to the incursions of these hostile nations, kept them always on the alert, and always ready to fly to the support of each other. The same cause had rendered them deadly hostile to the British interest, for the Indians had repeatedly stained their hearths with blood, under the influence of British emissaries. To the loyalists they were still more hostile.

for many of the latter had taken up their abode among the Indians the better to facilitate their plundering excursions; and in the incursions of the Indians which had recently harassed this whole frontier, white men had always mingled with the savages in Indian disguises. At this very time, the whole frontier was in alarm from rumours of hostile preparation among the Indian towns. The forward movements of the British army had always been accompanied by a simultaneous irruption of their barbarian ally. Environed by their mountains, the inhabitants had hitherto felt secure from British invasion, and the same consideration had collected about them the families and property of many of the whigs from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. From the last-mentioned state a caravan of hapless exiles had recently arrived among them. The comrades of Clarke had all been plundered, their houses destroyed, and their families turned destitute into the woods. This was among the measures which claimed sanction under the instructions and proclamations of the "amiable Cornwallis." This defenceless group had now been expedited to the mountains, where they received such marks of kindness and hospitality as can never be forgotten. CHAP. VIII.

Maddened by the view of their sufferings and the anticipation of the evils which invasion must bring along with it, the militia of this region was precisely in that state in which a militia becomes terrible. Their families were behind them, the enemy before them, and there was no time for hesitation. Simultaneously all flew to arms, and the few passes of the mountains through which they must penetrate, or at which they must make a stand, necessarily drew them to a common point. The same cause also brought together a number of the whigs from the planes of South Carolina and Georgia, fleeing from the approach of Ferguson.

Clarke's march along the foot of the mountains was intended to cover the retreat of the Georgia families from the enemy embodied on his right, and Cleveland, Williams, Lacy, Brennan, and many others of the South Carolina whigs had collected their followers on the approach of Ferguson, and taken the route for the passes of the mountains to avail themselves of the protection of the defiles, and of their friends who lay beyond them. Thus by a combination of causes all leading to the same end, did near six thousand of the choicest yeomanry of the country find themselves collected in front of Colonel Ferguson, at a place called Gilberttown.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the British colonel at finding himself in the presence of this formidable force. He dispatched couriers to Lord Cornwallis for relief, but the country through which they had to pass was too hostile to admit of their reaching him. Nor would the distance, though not

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great, have admitted of support against an enemy capable of moving with such rapidity. For they were all well-mounted, and not an article of baggage impeded their march. His blanket, his rifle, and his ammunition, was all which any one carried with him into the field. In a mild and happy climate, they sought no other covering but the heavens; and the morsel furnished from a scrip, supplied the food for several days of fatigue.

A retrograde movement made by Colonel Ferguson betrayed his apprehensions, and pointed out the necessity of an effort to overtake him. Nine hundred and ten picked men* were immediately mounted on the fleetest horses; the command of them given to Colonel Arthur Campbell, and under him, to Cleveland, Sevier, Shelby, and Williams.

On the 7th October, Campbell overtook Ferguson, who had taken post on King's Mountain, near the borders of North Carolina, where the great natural advantages of the ground might well have protected him from a far more numerous enemy. But Campbell did not hesitate to attack him, and in a manner altogether new and characteristic.

It was precisely the Parthian contest, which proved so fatal to the disciplined legions of the Romans.

Campbell divided his force into three equal parts; the one he led in person, the others were commanded by Shelby and Cleveland. There were three different points at which the mountain might be ascended, and these were severally assigned to the respective commanders. It seems, that Ferguson had supposed himself assailable only by one route; for on one only there was posted a picket guard. This was the pass by which Cleveland ascended, and he was in consequence the first engaged. His simple, manly, and forcible harangue as given by Ramsay, is not imaginary, as there is reason to believe that most of those transmitted to posterity as the speeches of military commanders, are. From the conduct of Colonel Ferguson, it would seem, that he was not aware of his enemy's order of battle until it was too late to counteract it. He trusted to the bayonet against an enemy as nimble as the antelope, and who, being altogether destitute of this weapon, had calculated on drawing his enemy from the heights he occupied, by receding before it, while the other parties advanced to possess themselves of the ground thus abandoned. There was nothing gained by repulsing detachment after detachment, at the point of the bayonet; on the contrary, it impeded the use of the only instrument of

* Mr. Marshall says sixteen hundred. We know not from what authority he takes this number. But the American account was certainly as here stated.

death that could reach them. Ferguson has been much eulogised for his conduct; but it will rest with military men to determine whether the measure he persisted in, of keeping his men together and alternately pressing upon detachment after detachment, did not insure to him the fate he met with. It is most probable, that he was unaware of the smallness of the number he was engaged with, but supposed the whole body of six thousand upon him. But it is not proble that he could, by any measures that his situation admitted of, have escaped; for the party surrounding him could certainly have detained him, until the main body came up. CHAP. VIII.

After a severe conflict of an hour, in which one hundred and fifty of his men were already killed, and three or four hundred wounded, Ferguson himself fell, and his whole command surrendered. Eleven hundred men, including the wounded, with fifteen hundred stand of arms, fell into the hands of the victors. About two hundred, chiefly those whose crimes rendered it dangerous to fall into the hands of their countrymen, escaped during the action, through the intervals between the American parties.

The loss of the whigs was inconsiderable as to numbers, but rendered distressing to the Carolinians by the fall of Colonel Williams. When this state shall perpetuate her own gratitude and the memory of the worthies of the revolution, by dedicating a column to the preservation of their names, let not that of Williams be forgotten. But the time is not yet arrived when impartial history can graduate the rank of merit by an unbiassed judgment.

During the time of the events that terminated in the fall of Ferguson, Lord Cornwallis was moving on, in all the tranquillity of conscious security, towards Charlotte. It is not easy at this day to decide upon his views; when he afterwards found it necessary to retreat to Winsborough, he wrote, that his sole object was "to obtain recruits." But the known unwillingness, and even impolicy in a commander to acknowledge that he has been baffled in his manœuvres, will ever cause the human mind to extend its scrutiny beyond his avowed motives, in determining on his views and actions. It is not very likely that the British commander would have left behind him the many friendly settlements, in which the recruiting service was now going on with but too much success, to seek recruits among the last men in America to furnish them, —the determined whigs of the Waxsaws and Mecklenburg. A more simple solution of his motives is to be gathered from a few facts unquestionably established. Emissaries* had been despatched from Camden to the loyalists

* Steidman. Marshall.

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in the vicinity of the Deep and Haw rivers, with instructions to hold themselves in readiness to act in concert with the British army; and his lordship had ventured to boast that two provinces were subdued, and the third was but the stepping-block to the conquest of Virginia. It was then with a view to realise this boast, that the expedition had been undertaken. There was no army to oppose him from Georgia to the Delaware; and after a junction with Ferguson in Charlotte, at the head of three or four thousand men, he may have marched to Hillsborough, where he was sure to be joined by a host of loyalists; and from which, Gates' little army must have retired, if not prevented by the rising of the loyalists in force.

All these plausible anticipations were blasted by events as unexpected as they were vexatious.

As Ferguson's approach to the mountains had excited an opposition which he had not anticipated, so Lord Cornwallis' movement to North Carolina awakened the whigs of Waxsaws and Mecklenburg to efforts of daring and active hostility which entitled them to receive from the British commander the distinguishing epithet of "the hornet's nest." On this occasion was elicited the first spark of that military genius which was destined, on the planes of New Orleans, to shed so much lustre on the American arms.*

Fleeing from their homes, and removing their families as far from the approaching danger as they could, the inflexible whigs collected under popular leaders, and beset every road on which the foraging parties of the enemy had to pass. Often in small volunteer parties, they approached the pickets and encampment of the enemy, and selected their objects with unerring aim. Watching the rear of the army, no straggler escaped them, and expresses, escorts, and detachments found no safety from their persecutions.

Among the partisans who now rendered themselves conspicuous, was the late general, then Captain W. R. Davie. Scarcely attained to the age of manhood, he gathered around him a small band of brave and adventurous youth, and showed himself every where, where danger was to be sought, or service performed. It was he who, at the head of his little corps, made such a stand at the court-house of Charlotte, as actually brought the whole British army to a halt. Nor was it a bloodless effort that dislodged him.

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* General Jackson, then 14 years of age, took the field on the advance of Lord Cornwallis. Little was it imagined that the obscure strippling, who was contemptuously ordered by a British officer to clean his boots, and sabred for his disobedience, would be honoured with the greatest triumph ever acquired over a British army. Heaven decreed to him a signal opportunity of appeasing the manes of a mother, and a brother, who perished through cruelty.

But General Davidson, then in command of the Mecklenburg militia, necessarily acted the most conspicuous part. Brave, active, intelligent, and influential, he so inspirited the inhabitants in their opposition, as to leave no rest to the enemy by day or by night. Judiciously instructing his men to distribute themselves in small parties so as to be every where at once, and leave no prominent point for the enemy to strike at, he greatly delayed and incommoded their advance.

Lord Cornwallis had passed Charlotte and was advancing to Salisbury, after leaving orders for Ferguson to follow him across the Yadkin, when he received the appalling intelligence of the catastrophe of King's Mountain. Whatever had been his ulterior views, it was necessary now to abandon them. For the fall of Ferguson had so inspirited the militia beyond the Catawba, that they now began to gather round him in shoals. Could Campbell's six thousand men have been kept together, and marched across the Catawba into the rear of the British army, a distance not thirty miles, the crest-fallen Gates might still have had a hope of giving to America another exhibition as brilliant as that which crowned his efforts at Saratoga. He had, by this time, collected about one thousand three hundred regulars, and some militia, and the interval between himself and his now retreating enemy, did not much exceed eighty miles.

But immediately after the affair of King's Mountain, the militia had marched home under their respective leaders, and by a most unexampled act of lenity to their militia prisoners, had suffered them also to return to their homes, on a solemn promise to keep aloof for the future from the existing contest. This was a most unfortunate measure, inasmuch as there were then many prisoners from Sumpter and Gates' defeats, perishing in the dungeons of Charleston; for near a thousand of whom, the captured loyalists ought to have furnished the means of liberation. Yet the indulgence was not indiscriminately extended to all. Ten were taken from the ranks on the field of battle and hung in the view of both armies.

Many severe animadversions have been showered on the brave men who fought at King's Mountain; and they have been feebly repelled, or quiescently admitted by most of the American writers. As to the charge of indignity shown to the body of Ferguson, it does not merit a serious refutation. But as to the execution of ten* of their prisoners, the fact is unquestionable; it never was disavowed.

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* There were eleven selected, but one of them broke from the party conveying them to execution;

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War in its mildest form, is so full of horrors, that the mind recoils from vindicating any act that can, in the remotest degree, increase its miseries. To these, no act contributes more than that of retaliation. Hence no act should be ventured upon with more solemn deliberation, and none so proper to be confined to a commander in chief, or the civil power. But the brave men who fought in the affair of King's Mountain, are not to be left loaded with unmerited censure. The calmest and most dispassionate reflection upon their conduct, on this occasion, will lead to the conviction, that if they committed any offence, it was against their own country, not against the enemy. That instead of being instigated by a thirst of blood, they acted solely with a view to put an end to its effusion; and boldly, for this purpose, took upon themselves all the dangers that a system of retaliation could superinduce. The officers of the American army, who, twelve months afterwards, hazarded their lives by calling upon their general to avenge the death of Hayne, justly challenge the gratitude and admiration of their country; but the men of King's Mountain, (for it is avowed as a popular act, and not that of their chief alone,) merit the additional reputation of having assumed on themselves the entire responsibility, without wishing to involve the regular army in their dangers. And this was done in the plenitude of British triumph, and when not a man of them could count on safety for an hour, in any thing but his own bravery and vigilance. But what was the prospect before them? They were all proscribed men; the measures of Lord Cornwallis had put them out of the protection of civilized warfare; and the spirit in which his proclamations and instructions were executed by his officers, had put them out of the protection of common humanity. The massacres at Camden had occurred not six weeks before, and those of Brown at Augusta, scarcely half that time. Could they look on and see this system of cruelty prosecuted, and not try the only melancholy measure that could check it? The effect proved that there was as much of reflection as of passion in the act; for the little despots who then held the country, dared prosecute the measure no farther. Another and an incontestible proof that blind revenge did not preside over the counsels that consigned these men to death, is drawn from the deliberation with which they were selected, and the mildness manifested to the residue of the prisoners. It has been before observed, that in the ranks of Colonel Ferguson there were many individuals notorious as habitual

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and although he had to make his way through a thousand of the best horsemen and marksmen in the world, such was the universal admiration or feeling on the occasion, not one would lift a hand to stop him.

plunderers and murderers. What was to be done with these? There were no courts of justice to punish their offences, and to detain them as prisoners of war was to make them objects of exchange. Should such pests to society be again enlarged, and suffered to renew their outrages? Capture in arms does not exempt the deserter from the gallows; why should it the cold-blooded murderer? There was no alternative left; and the officers, with all the attention to form, that circumstances would permit, and more a great deal, it is believed, than either Brown* or Cornwallis had exhibited, could only form a council, and consign them to the fate that would have awaited them in the regular administration of justice.

Yet, however justice or policy may have sanctioned the act, there would have been infinitely more magnanimity in abstaining from this act of severity. The act of mercy would have been grateful to Him who had so signally crowned their arms with victory; and a remote gaol might perhaps, have confined to inactivity those who could not be enlarged without exposing the country to pillage and murder. Besides avoiding exposing others as well as themselves to

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* The following is the account given of the conduct of Brown at Augusta, after the affair of the 18th, in which Clarke was repulsed: "Captain Asby, an officer noted for his bravery and humanity, with twenty-eight others, including the wounded, fell into the hands of the enemy, and were disposed of, under the sanguinary order of Lord Cornwallis, in the following manner: Captain Asby and twelve of the *wounded prisoners*, were hanged on the stair-case of the white house, where Brown was lying wounded, so that he might have the satisfaction of seeing the victims of his vengeance expire. Their bodies were delivered up to the Indians, who scalped and otherwise mangled them, and threw them into the river. John Burgamy, Scott Ruder, Jordan Ricketson, —— Darling, and two youths, brothers, of the name of Glass, were all hanged; the former of these youths was shot through the thigh, and could not be carried off when the retreat was ordered, and the younger brother could not be prevailed on to leave him; his tenderness and affection cost him his life: a horse was the fatal scaffold on which they were mounted, and from the gibbet they entered together the long journey of eternity." What was the crime of these youth? They certainly never had been requested to take protection. But the narrative does not end here. "All this was merciful when compared with the fate which awaited the other prisoners; they were delivered to the Indians to glut their vengeance for the loss they had sustained in the action and the seige. The Indians formed a circle and placed the prisoners in the centre, and their eagerness to shed blood spared the victims from tedious torture: some were scalped before they sunk under the Indian weapon of war; others were thrown into fires and roasted to death. The record of these transactions is now before the author from the pens of British officers who were present, who exultingly communicated it to their friends in Savannah, Charleston, and London, where it stands upon record in the papers of the day." *M'Call's History of Georgia, vol. 2. p.* 326.

Should the British nation ever be induced to believe that such horrors have disgraced the sanction of British authority, their indignation will exceed that of those who witnessed them and suffered under them.

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the dangers of retaliation, they might have been satisfied with the numerous victims then bleeding around them, who had fallen in honourable warfare. And there is very little doubt that they would have been satisfied, had they not been goaded by the thought that the enemy believed they did not dare to retaliate.

When the remains of the southern army became concentrated at Hillsborough, they were placed under the command of Colonel Williams; and being hutted in the neighbourhood of the town, by dint of perseverance in their officers, and the best of dispositions in themselves, they soon resumed their wonted discipline. Yet they were not without temptations to adopt a contrary conduct. This honourable testimony to their good conduct is recorded by one who shared in all their toils, and had better opportunities than any other to judge of their merits. "Absolutely without pay—almost destitute of clothing—often with only half a ration—and never with a whole one, (without substituting one article for another,) not a soldier was heard to murmur."

Nor should one honourable anecdote of their good conduct ever be forgotten. When the Pennsylvania line revolted and yet had the fidelity to deliver up the agents sent among them by the enemy, a corrupt world gazed with astonishment on an instance of such fidelity exhibited under such circumstances. But though it has never been told, the example had been set by the soldiers under Williams: but it was in a remote part of America, and no effort was made to blazon it to the world. It is known that emissaries had been sent from Camden into the neighbourhood of Hillsborough, and some of them who ventured to tamper with the American troops, were actually delivered up by them to the civil authority and punished.

On the advance of General Gates towards Camden, he had fortunately been obliged to leave two pieces of artillery on the road, for want of horses to carry them. These were now brought up to camp, and a few iron pieces gathered from various places, being also collected, formed a small park of artillery.

The legislature of North Carolina being in session when General Gates arrived, he presented an earnest request to them, to make efforts to call out militia, collect munitions, and take such measures as the resources of the country would admit of, to put him in a condition again to take the field. The legislature manifested the best disposition imaginable to comply, but such was the excitement produced among the loyalists by the recent successes of the British army, that the assembly itself could scarcely sit in safety; and an opposition was sustained from the disaffected which paralysed every effort that was made. They could scarcely furnish provision for the troops: and when, after-

wards, Lord Cornwallis passed Charlotte and advanced upon Salisbury. the confidence of the loyalists appeared approaching to open insurrection.

Measures had also been adopted to bring forward reinforcements from Virginia; for that state having been engaged in recruiting, there was still a hope of drawing some men from her depots. All that could be sent into the field were promptly forwarded, but unfortunately, in no better condition for taking the field than the troops encamped at Hillsborough. On the 16th September, Colonel Williams says, "Colonel Bufort arrived from Virginia with the mangled remains of his unfortunate regiment, reinforced by about two hundred raw recruits; all of them in a ragged condition. Uniform and other clothing were to be sent after them, but they never arrived. About the same time, a small detachment of Virginia militia arrived, without even arms."

Of the men whom Porterfield led into action on the 16th, only about fifty escaped; these, added to Bufort's reinforcement, constituted the Virginia line then in the field, about three hundred in number: to which are to be added, the remains of Harrison's regiment of artillery, commanded by Captain Anthony Singleton; the numbers we do not find specified, but the brunt of the battle of the 16th had fallen very heavily upon this corps.

Gates now only waited for a supply of clothing and the embodying of the militia, to take the field.

Upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis from Camden, extraordinary exertions had been made by North Carolina to draw out a respectable militia force. The command of them was conferred on General Smallwood, and at their head he advanced to the Yadkin.

About this time the celebrated Colonel Daniel Morgan, who had already reaped such harvests of laurels at Quebec and Saratoga, arrived in camp. He had been instructed so to do, from his high reputation as a partisan officer, and great popularity as a commander of militia. A few young men, emulous to serve under him and near him, were all the force he brought with him.

Immediately on his arrival, General Gates ordered four companies to be drafted from the regiments, to be equipped as light-infantry, and to form a partisan corps to serve under Colonel Morgan. The arrival of Colonels White and Washington, with the remains of the first and third regiments of dragoons, so roughly handled by Tarleton after the fall of Charleston, enabled the general to add a body of seventy cavalry to Morgan's command. These were commanded by Colonel Washington, as Colonel White appears never to have met with a refusal when he solicited leave of absence. To these were added a small corps of riflemen, about sixty in number, under Major Rose.

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By extraordinary efforts the government of North Carolina had succeeded in collecting a small supply of clothing, which soon after arrived in camp, and enabled General Gates to furnish Morgan's command with a suit of comfortable clothing round, before they entered upon the severe and active duties which they were detached to perform. The rest of the troops also were partially supplied with clothing from the same quarter; but tents they had none, and very few blankets in proportion to their numbers.

Yet the winter had commenced, and without a murmur, nay, with expressions of anxiety to proceed, on the 2d November the army took up the line of march for Salisbury.

Morgan's command had marched the day before; and while General Smallwood with his militia took post at Providence, six miles below Charlotte, and the main army encamped and hutted itself in the latter place, Morgan pressed forward into the neighbourhood of Camden, and an American force again occupied the ground which had been the scene of the disaster of the 16th of August.

Such was the state of the war, and the position of the army, when General Greene arrived and took command of the southern department.

After the fall of Ferguson, Lord Cornwallis crossed the Catawba River at Land's Ford, and took post at Winsborough. This completed his chain of posts from Georgetown to Augusta, in a circle, the centre of which would have been about Beaufort in South Carolina, equidistant from Charleston and Savannah. These posts consisted of Georgetown, Camden, Winsborough, Ninety-Six and Augusta. Within this circle was an interior chain, at the distance of about half the radius, consisting of Fort Watson on the road to Camden, Mott's house, and Granby on the Congaree. Dorchester and Orangeburg on the road both to Ninety-Six and Granby, were fortified as posts of rest and deposit on the line of communication, as was Monk's Corner, or Biggin Church, and some other small posts on that to Camden. These posts were all judiciously chosen, both for covering the country and obtaining subsistence; and the English writers speak with exultation of the excellent and abundant fare produced from the confiscated and sequestered estates in their vicinity.

In these positions the British army was stationed when Greene took command of the southern department. Their numbers then amounted to about five thousand men; their situation was highly favourable to recruiting, and parties for that purpose were pushed into the tory-settlements in all directions. Colonel Tarleton acknowledges they were very successful. No less than one hundred and fifty were added to his own corps. In addition to the increase from this source, five hundred recruits and convalescents, belonging to the

different regiments in this quarter, had recently arrived from New York, and joined the corps they belonged to. In December, their numbers were further augmented by a reinforcement of two thousand three hundred men under General Leslie. This body had been employed, it will be seen, in Virginia; but upon the news of the advance of Gates from Hillsborough, and the movements of the militia which followed or attended it, they were ordered to Charleston to reinforce Cornwallis. Major General Leslie, on his arrival, found an order to join Cornwallis with about fifteen hundred men of his command, consisting of the brigade of guards, the Hessian regiment of Boze, one hundred and twenty yagers, and a detachment of light dragoons.* As Cornwallis was then preparing to advance through North Carolina into Virginia, Leslie was ordered to take the route by Camden, there to await ulterior orders.

After Marion's exploit in releasing the prisoners taken at Gates' defeat, he had been obliged to dismiss his followers, and retire to his secret and impervious swamps. Sumpter also, after the surprise and dispersion of his force on Fishing Creek, had fallen back with the wreck of that fatal day, to the neighbourhood of the mountains. But no sooner was the American army again in motion, than they emerged from their several retreats, and renewed their harassing and distressing enterprises against the enemy and his adherents.

Tarleton's successes against Sumpter, and the ordinary promptness and celerity of his motions, pointed him out to Cornwallis as the proper officer to ferret out and destroy, the wary Marion. But after the affair of Fishing Creek, the star of that officer commenced its decline; he never afterwards effected any important services in South Carolina. Marion eluded and baffled all his adversary's manœuvres to bring him to action, and remained in possession of the whole disputed ground when Tarleton was recalled by his commander to restrain the incursions of his ancient adversary, Sumpter; now advanced within twenty-eight miles of the British camp at Winsborough. Having formed a junction with Colonels Taylor, Winn, Middleton, Lacy, Bratton, Hill, and a number of the whigs of Georgia under Clarke and Twiggs, his force had accumulated to an imposing bulk; and at the head of these, he had lain too long encamped at the Fishdam Ford, on the east bank of the Broad River. The daring measure of approaching so near the royal army, suggested to Cornwallis the enterprise of surprising Sumpter in his encampment. Such importance was attached to securing his individual person, that it is confi-

* Tarleton's Campaign, p. 3.

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dently asserted, an officer with five dragoons had it specially in charge to force their way to his tent and take him, dead or alive.

The late writers on the American war, have taken Colonel Tarleton as their guide in relating the incidents of this battle. But nothing can be more imperfect, nay, incorrect, than his account of it. It was not the fall of Wemyss, or his arriving sooner than he expected at the American camp, that produced his failure; but the firm and steady resistance made to him by the American advanced guard, under Colonel Thomas Taylor. Wemyss had been very fortunate in the circumstances attending his advance. He had obtained for his guide a young loyalist, who had been discharged from confinement in the American camp the day before; and his detachment narrowly escaped being discovered by the American patrole, which had been pushed far in advance, but had commenced its return when at a very short distance from meeting the British detachment on its march.

Fortunately, General Sumpter had given more than usual strength to his advance-guard, and Colonel Taylor, who commanded it, had caused a number of fires to be lighted in front of his line, and made the necessary arrangements, in case of alarm, that his men should form so far in the rear of the fires as to be concealed, whilst an approaching adversary would be exposed by their light.

The army had lain so long in their position, that he anticipated an attack. The videttes and pickets did their duty, and by the time the enemy had reached his fires, Taylor's men were under arms and prepared to receive them. A well-directed and murderous fire at their exposed enemy, prostrated twenty-three of them on the spot where they received it; and the rest immediately recoiled, and retreated one hundred yards in front of the fires before they could be rallied. Here the infantry dismounted, and being formed, advanced steadily on the Americans. Several discharges were exchanged, but the enemy pressing forward with the bayonet upon Taylor's troops, who had none, he ordered his men to retire and form under cover of a rail fence in his rear. The order was executed with precision, and a well-directed fire from this position compelled the enemy to draw off. One of those curious incidents now occurred which exemplify the vicissitudes of a day of battle. It is a fact, that at the instant the enemy retreated, the party that repelled them had also broken and fled. But the darkness of the night concealed their flight; and had it been discovered by the enemy, the other troops were under arms in the rear to prevent his availing himself of it.*

* The fate of one individual deserves notice. This was Sealy, the loyalist who acted as the

The highly military conduct of Colonel Taylor was the decisive cause of this repulse. The obscurity of the night rendered it impossible for the rest of the troops to yield their assistance, or the affair would have been fatal to the British party. There were not above one hundred and fifty of the Americans actually engaged. The rest were prepared for action, had the enemy succeeded in passing Taylor; but could not fire, lest their arms should be pointed towards their friends.*

The repulse of this party gave such eclat to the American arms that Tarleton was immediately recalled from the pursuit of Marion to retrieve the lost ground of the royal cause. He lost no time in obeying the mandate, and immediately on his return, entered on the pursuit of the American party, until his career was checked by the affair at Blackstock's house, on the banks of the Tiger River. Here he was made severely to feel the consequences of that contempt for his adversary which had been imbibed from his own previous successes, and which was destined soon to strip him of all the military plumes in which his exploits had heretofore decorated his character. Never did a more uncandid account of an action find its way into the records of history, than that which Colonel Tarleton himself has given of this event. He has managed to convert a signal defeat into a brilliant victory.

The astonishing rapidity with which Colonel Tarleton returned from the pursuit of Marion, exposed Sumpter's command to the most imminent danger. Whilst the cavalry and light troops of the British army were detached on a distant expedition, Sumpter had no apprehension from Cornwallis superiority in infantry. He knew he could retreat with superior celerity, for he was entirely unencumbered with baggage. His men wanted no covering but

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guide. The sabre wound of which he died proved that it was inflicted by his own party; and it is thought to have occurred thus: after conducting the party that penetrated to Sumpter's tent, (which was easily done, as it stood beside the main road which crossed the encampment,) in his hurry to rejoin the main body he forgot that the presence of the party was necessary to prevent his being mistaken, by his homespun clothing, for an American. And thus he incurred the fate that he merited.

* Colonel Wemyss was found wounded in the morning, shot through both thighs. His being left on the ground, is the strongest proof of the precipitate flight of his men. He had recently returned from carrying into effect Lord Cornwallis' measures of mercy against the whigs on Black River and the Pee Dee. The whigs had reason to believe, that he had in person attended at the execution of a respectable citizen named Cuzack. He also had in his pocket the report of the houses he had burnt over the heads of the families of the whigs. The paper was handed to General Sumpter; he read it, threw it in the fire, and ordered every attention to be paid to the wounded officer. Col. Wemyss is said to have been not a little surprised at such treatment.

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the heavens, and were satisfied to subsist on the coarsest diet. Provided with their own horses, and intimately acquainted with all the roads, streams, and recesses of the country, they could move with the speed of the Arab; and when pressed, disperse and retire, to meet again at some place of rendezvous assigned by their commander. He, therefore, after the affair with Wemyss, still hung upon the skirts of Cornwallis, and proved himself a most disquieting neighbour.

But he now learned that Tarleton was on the march to meet him, furnished with artillery, his infantry on horseback, and a large force of well-mounted cavalry: being himself destitute of both cavalry and artillery, he was forced to hasten his retreat for the purpose of throwing the rapid Tiger between himself and his adversary. By the celerity of his movements, he reached the banks of the river on the 20th of November, and soon after, the British legionary troops accompanied by a mounted detachment of the 63d regiment appeared in view.

Blackstock's house is on the south-west bank of the Tiger River, and, together with the ground about it, afforded a highly advantageous position for drawing up a small force in order of battle. Sumpter stationed his men so as to avail himself of every advantage; not doubting that the whole force of the enemy was upon him, he resolved to maintain his ground during the day, and, under cover of the night pass the river and disperse.

Tarleton's command consisted of his legion, a battalion of the 71st, and a detachment of the 63d British regiments; with a lieutenant's command of the royal artillery and one field-piece. Of this force, about 400 were mounted; and with these Tarleton had pressed forward to overtake and retard the American party.

It was not long before Sumpter discovered that the whole British force had not come up, and very judiciously resolved to baffle the views of Tarleton, by commencing the attack and cutting him up in detail. Tarleton supposing that he had his prey secure, immediately on arriving occupied an elevated piece of ground in front of the American position, dismounted his men to relieve themselves and horses, until the arrival of his infantry and artillery should enable him to commence the attack with advantage. Sumpter seized the critical moment, and succeeded in repulsing him.

The Americans not being near enough to use with effect their rifles and fowling-pieces, with which chiefly they were armed, descended from their heights, and poured in upon their enemy a well-directed fire. The 63d pressed forward with the bayonet, and the Americans retired to their heights,—because they had no bayonets to meet their adversaries with, and were previously

ordered to do so. This brought the enemy within rifle-shot, and at the foot of the hill, they received a fire which brought many of them to the ground and threw the rest into confusion. Tarleton seeing his danger, made a desperate effort to obviate it, by charging directly up the hill; but the Americans stood firm, and his ranks were thinned by the deadly rifle. Drawing off his whole corps, he then wheeled upon the Americans' left towards Blackstock's house, where the ground was not so precipitous, and a better footing was afforded for his horses. Here the Georgians were posted under Clarke and Twiggs, and their little corps of about 150 men, displayed the courage of veterans; but the pressure of Tarleton's whole force was too much for them to withstand, and at this point was gained the only semblance of advantage on the side of the enemy. The left gave way; but the timely interposition of the reserve, under Colonel R. Winn, and the enfilading fire from the house, in which a company had been posted, soon restored the fortune of the day; and the officer who, in the face of the world, has boasted of a victory, actually ran away, and was pursued, and the Americans say, was saved by the darkness of the night.

His assertion is, that "from the time the left yielded, the Americans began to disperse, and nothing but the approach of night prevented the pursuit." Strange, then! how the Americans came to possess themselves of all his wounded, and many of his horses! The fact is, he never halted until he joined the residue of his corps, then two miles distant, and there he encamped. The Americans, inferior in number and destitute of cavalry and artillery, could not venture from their heights, and had obtained all they fought for,—safety in crossing the river, and security in dispersing among their friends. That they did not retreat precipitately, is obvious from the acknowledgement which truth has wrung from the British commander, "that before they left the ground, they paid the most humane attention to the wounded of the enemy." These are said, by the Americans, to have amounted to one hundred, and the dead to ninety-two; but Tarleton's account reduces the whole to fifty, with what fidelity may be determined by the following fact. He makes the American loss to have consisted of three colonels, and upwards of one hundred others killed and wounded; whereas, in truth, there were but three men killed, and the general and three men wounded. The enemy never reached the American line with the bayonet; and as well from the elevated position of the latter, as the ordinary habit of the British soldiers, they fired entirely over the heads of the Americans. The truth is, that so quietly did the Americans remain in possession of the ground, that their rolls were called before they marched away.*

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* Middleton. Taylor. M'Call.

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There is not less contradiction in the accounts relative to the numbers engaged, than relative to those who fell in the action. Tarleton makes his number 280; and an American writer adopts it as the truth, because "he must be supposed to have been best informed on this subject."* This conclusion assumes that the fidelity of the British colonel was unquestionable; but we have already seen some reasons to hesitate at adopting this admission; and there are still others of equal weight. The writer himself would have hesitated at it, had he compared the loss which he admits on the side of the enemy with the number engaged. One hundred and ninety-two men to have fallen out of two hundred and eighty, is an unexampled carnage in modern battles, unless the catastrophe of the drama should resemble that of Colonel Bufort's. But to sustain such a loss and then to claim the victory, would have been an instance of extraordinary effrontery. There can be litttle doubt that Tarleton had with him a much greater number of the 63d regiment than he admits. The Annual Register asserts that he had the whole; and if he took with him all his men who were mounted, this is probably the correct account; for in the letter of Cornwallis to him, of the 10th November,† we find these words: "The 63d are well mounted for infantry, and may occasionally ride in your train." These were the men who accompanied him in pursuit of Sumpter; he admits their number to have been but eighty; but it would be supposing in their commander madness, and in his followers more resolution than falls to the ordinary lot of man, to have charged with so small a number as eighty, the whole American force, advantageously posted on a commanding eminence. The Americans assert that their number approached nearer two hundred. Tarleton admits his cavalry to have been 170, (Cornwallis says 190,) and this brings the number to near the American account of 400 on the British side. Three hundred more are said to have remained in the rear with the artillery.

Not less variance exists as to the number of the Americans. Tarleton makes it 1,000; but the Americans, reduce their numbers to 420, or at the utmost 500.

There are two other points in which the narrative of Colonel Tarleton is held to be exceptionable. He relates that he cut up the American rear-guard and carried off fifty prisoners. On these facts the testimony of the Americans is uniformly as follows.

Colonel Thomas Taylor, with a small party of select horsemen, had been ordered to approach the front of the enemy to reconnoitre and obtain intelli-

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* Marshall. † Tarleton's Campaign, p. 201.

gence. Having made prisoners of a few unarmed men and boys driving carriages, and supposed to have passed through the enemy's camp, or to be able otherwise to give intelligence, he had loaded them with provisions and was proceeding with them to rejoin Sumpter, when he found himself pursued by a party of dragoons. His party easily escaped by the fleetness of their horses, but the prisoners were necessarily left behind; and as the British dragoons passed these unhappy wretches in pursuit of Taylor, they amused themselves with hewing them down from their horses. This was the rear-guard that was cut to pieces. As to the fifty prisoners, the high-minded colonel had read of the triumphs of a Roman emperor over the ocean, and gathered on his return a few unarmed rustics, many of them loyalists, to grace his entry into camp.*

It would have been well had his retreating steps been marked only by the traces of idle vanity. But his rage and disappointment was not extinguished by the humanity shown to his wounded; he appeased it by the sacrifice of a respectable whig of the name of Johnston, whose only crime was his fidelity to his country, and whose large family of young children survived to execrate the hand that made them orphans.

Sumpter's wound was very severe, (a ball through the right breast near the shoulder,) and detained him a length of time from service. Suspended between horses and guarded by a hundred faithful followers, he was conveyed to North Carolina; whilst Twiggs and Clarke, with their persevering Georgians, moved along the foot of the mountains, to annoy the enemy in another quarter. The rest of Sumpter's force separating in small parties, retired to places of security, ready to re-assemble whenever their country's service required it.

* Taylor, M'Call, and others.

CHAPTER IX.

General Greene proceeds to the south. Efforts to provide for the southern department. Arrangements in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Takes command of the army at Charlotte. Moves to Hicks' Creek on the Pee Dee. Morgan detached across Broad River. Camp of repose. Reinforcements arrive. Attempt on Georgetown. Descent into the interior contemplated. Morgan's movements. Battle of the Cowpens. Retreat across the Catawba. Greene joins Morgan in person.

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IT was a highly gratifying circumstance to General Greene, and no unfavourable augury of his future fortune, that the first annunciation of his appointment to the southern department was followed by earnest solicitations from some of the most gallant spirits in the service, to be enrolled under his banners. Colonel John Laurens,(1) Colonel Christopher Greene,(2) Dr. M'Hen-

(1) Colonel JOHN LAURENS, the son of Colonel Henry Laurens, the second president of the continental congress, who was at this time a prisoner in the tower of London. He was literally the chevalier *sans tache et sans peur.* His intemperate bravery was the only fault ever attributed to him. The following anecdote of him has not, we believe, ever been minutely related. When, at the battle of Germantown, the American column on the right became embarrassed by the party who occupied Chew's house, Laurens requested of Wayne forty volunteers to join him in the attempt to force the door or windows. The request was readily complied with, and such was his chivalrous character in the army, that volunteers promptly offered to accompany him. They moved on as briskly as possible up to the house, and Laurens gave his horse to a serjeant-major, who, in emulation of his bravery,

ry,(3) then an aid to General Washington, Major Lee,(4) and finally, the Marquis La Fayette,(5) all pressed to share his fortunes. Their affectionate letters addressed to him on this occasion, are still extant. CHAP. IX.

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had kept pace with him. An officer, at this time, was holding the door ajar, that his men might use their muskets through the opening. Laurens made at him with his small-sword, and they actually exchanged several passes before the door was shut by some person of more discretion than the officer opposed to Laurens. Turning round, he then perceived that not a man of his command was on his legs, and at that instant, a musket fired perpendicularly down from a window, put an end to the brave man who held his horse. Nothing but his own very near approach to the house had hitherto saved him from the same fate. He then mounted his horse and gallopped briskly off; but not so as to escape altogether; for a ball glancing on his back, inflicted on him a severe contusion under which he suffered greatly, rather than complain of a wound not very flattering to his soldierly pride. Nor did he retire from the field until he received another ball more honourably placed in the front of the shoulder.

Having been captured in Charleston, he was a prisoner on parole when General Greene was appointed to the southern department; but at the general's solicitation, General Washington got him exchanged. It was long after this period, however, before he joined the southern army. When he reached Philadelphia, on his way south, he was arrested by an order from congress, to repair to France, attended by the celebrated Thomas Payne, to solicit supplies abroad. For such an undertaking his elegant acquirements and frank, engaging character, eminently qualified him. On his return from Europe, he immediately hastened to the southern army,—led by destiny.

His letters abound in the warmest expressions of personal attachment to General Greene, and exhibit in every line the scholar, the gentleman, and the soldier.

(2) Colonel CHRISTOPHER GREENE, the hero of Red Bank. He was a near relation and intimate friend of General Greene, and a brave and amiable man. They served their noviciate together in the Kentish Guards; and when the Rhode Island contingent was formed, he was made a major under General Greene. When Arnold was permitted to embody the celebrated command of volunteers, who penetrated through the deserts of New Brunswick to Quebec, Major Greene led off a number of volunteers from the corps that he commanded, and was one of those who, in the attempt to storm that place, penetrated into the town and were made prisoners. He never reached the southern army. Whilst just ready and prepared to move southwardly, he lost his life, under some very melancholy circumstances.

He had been ordered by General Washington with a detachment, to take post beyond the Croton River, in the state of New York, to check the incursion of hostile parties into the country beyond that river. While there, he one evening visited Major Flagg, who commanded one of his outposts, and took a bed at his quarters. In the night, a party of the enemy suddenly fell upon Flagg, and forcing the post, rushed into the house where Flagg and Greene were lying in the same chamber. As neither of them lived to explain the circumstances, nothing more is known than what was afterwards visible to the eye. Several of the enemy lay dead in the chamber-door, about the body of Flagg, and poor Greene was actually cut to pieces. In that condition, bleeding and expiring, the man whose humanity to Donop and his soldiers, called forth public acknowledgments, was thrown across a horse

CHAP. IX. The head quarters of the northern army were, at this time, at the Falls of Pasaic, and it became necessary for Greene to repair to that place for the purpose of a personal conference with General Washington. The interview

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and hurried on some miles, until death released him from his sufferings, when he was thrown carelessly off, an object for common charity, by the road-side.

This was attributed to the tender-mercies of the New York loyalists.

(3) Neither did Dr. M'Henry ever reach the southern army. He appears to have been a particular favourite with General Greene.

As passing from the family of the commander in chief into that of General Greene would have lowered his rank, General Greene solicited of congress a major's commission for M'Henry, and the application was backed by the commander in chief, although generally, they were both very much opposed to promotions out of the line. The request was at present refused; but afterwards, in the month of May, it was complied with. Then, however, General Washington having very great designs in contemplation, could not immediately spare him; and the siege of Yorktown afterwards following, M'Henry was still detained.

During that expedition it will be recollected Colonel Hamilton, from some unfortunate misunderstanding with the general, left his family, and M'Henry could not be spared at all.

This was the gentleman who was afterwards secretary at war. He was zealously friendly to General Greene in promoting his interests in Maryland, during the southern campaigns; and maintained a regular and useful correspondence with him.

(4) The celebrated partisan Colonel Lee,—afterwards governor of Virginia,—the author of the memoirs of the southern war. Known in the latter years of his life as General Lee. After passing through more vicissitudes in life than generally fall to the lot of man, he closed his days in the mansion-house of General Greene's family, on Cumberland Island,—where he was thrown by accident; and where the friendly hand of the general's youngest daughter solaced his last moments, and bestowed the last cares of humanity upon the remains of one who shared largely in the affections of the father.

(5) Neither did the Marquis La Fayette ever reach the southern army. After obtaining leave from the commander in chief, he had proceeded as far as Philadelphia on his way south, when he was called to the negociations then going on with the French minister, to forward the concerted co-operation of the French forces in the West Indies, which finally resulted in the capture of Lord Cornwallis. After terminating this important affair, he immediately resumed his journey, and had advanced as far as Petersburg, on his way to join the army, when he was recalled to take command of the combined expedition against Arnold when in Portsmouth. From that time until the capture of Cornwallis, he acted under the command of Greene, and we shall have occasion to dilate upon his occupations in Virginia. Immediately after the surrender of Cornwallis, the interests of the United States drew him to Europe, to promote the negociations then pending both for supplies and peace. In the year 1784, he took another voyage to America, to which his attachments, as well private as public, were strongly drawn.

The following extract of a letter, written at this time, will show what proportion of his regard was bestowed on the subject of these pages.

which took place is said to have been attended with some painful sensations on both sides. From the first day of General Washington's command, with the exception of a few weeks, he had never been separated from General CHAP. IX.

"*Light Camp, Nov.* 10, 1780.

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"As soon as your letter from head quarters came to hand, I hastened to make an answer to the several articles it contained, and was greatly disappointed to hear you were gone before it could reach you. For my friends, my dear sir, I have no different feelings from those which I experience for myself. I therefore feel for you as I would on my own account, were I appointed to command the southern army. You will, I confess, have great difficulties to struggle with; the worst of them all will, I fear, be the article of provisions. But, on the other hand, defeats are expected from that quarter. It was yet more the case before Ferguson's affair. Could it have been properly agreeable for the public welfare, I wish this affair had been postponed. Indeed, my friend, if I feel for you on account of the obstacles which you will have to encounter, I, on the other hand, cannot help foreseeing a great deal of personal glory which you are entitled to hope. But whatever might be hereafter the case; whatever bad chances (and in our profession chance is something,) a malignant fortune might throw in your way, believe me, my dear sir, my friendship, as well as my esteem for you, are founded upon such a basis as cannot be shaken by any run of good or ill luck, which may subject you to the praise or the blame of common opinions. In all cases I am heartily willing to have my fate united to yours, and by this junction of stars to have my little share in any thing good or bad that may happen to the troops under your command.

As soon as we enter into winter quarters, I shall the more freely ask the general leave to join you, as by that time letters from France will have convinced us that my presence at head quarters is not, for some months, useful to his purposes of co-operation. By the 1st of January at farthest, and sooner I hope, I intend to be with you, and to consecrate to the country I early loved, under a general I have long marked out as my friend, the efforts of my zeal, and of any thing by nature or acquisition I may be worth in the military profession. [We give the marquis' own English.] Hamilton has told me that you have conversed with him on the manner of being employed that you thought most agreeable to me. Though by my temper and principles I am bound to accept of any thing, and cheerfully to act upon any scale that a superior officer thinks fit for me, I cannot help acknowledging your kindness and frankly tell you, you are not mistaken in believing that the command of a flying-camp, composed of the horse and light-infantry of your army, will better please me than the honourable, but less active command of a wing. As I am sure that my friend Lee will apply for being attached to me, I beg leave to support the motion of that officer, whom I love, and in whom I greatly confide, both for counsel and execution.

"In case the dispositions of the enemy make you wish that I should repair to such or such [any particular] place, I will, on the least hint from you, ask leave from the general to fly there with the greatest dispatch," &c.

"P. S. I have not yet settled with the general about leaving him this winter, so that I beg this to be confidential."

While the marquis remained in America on his last visit, he spent a portion of his time with General Greene at Rhode Island; and on his return to France took with him the general's eldest son

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Greene; and to the habit of consulting him on every occasion, had succeeded a great personal attachment. Colonel Hamilton, who was then in General Washington's family, has often dwelt upon the uneasiness expressed by General Washington at relinquishing the society, services, and counsels of Greene. But the sacrifice was due to his talents, services, and rank, and even to the claims of that friendship which would have detained him. The most painful circumstance, however, to General Washington was, the paucity of his means to place the southern army in a situation, which could promise even justice to the talents of his favourite commander, or vindicate his own selection. It was the affectionate parent, dismissing a favourite son from the paternal domicil to seek his fortune, upon nothing but a parental blessing. Yet he did not dismiss him wholly unendowed; for, Major Lee and his legion were ordered to follow him; and the zeal, experience, and talents of Steuben, added to the gift. It will be seen in the sequel, how invaluable were these acquisitions to the southern army.

Nor was there any opposition made to the humble petition to have Laurens, Greene, and M'Henry spared to his necessities. The standing and high claims of the marquis of course obviated all difficulties on his account, and the only subject discussed was, how to employ him in a manner most flattering and grateful to himself.

The following is the order under which Greene assumed the command of the southern army. As it relates to General Gates, the reader will perceive and readily account for the extreme caution of its provisions.

"*To Major General Greene.*

"Congress having been pleased, by their resolution of the 5th instant, to authorize me to appoint an officer to the command of the southern army, in the room of Major General Gates, till an inquiry can be had into his conduct as therein directed, I have thought proper to choose you for this purpose.

George Washington, who appears to have been equally an object of interest to both the great man whose name he bore, and to the marquis, who formed with them a virtuous and illustrious trio in mutual attachment.

As he acted under the command of General Greene whilst operating in Virginia, we are in possession of his official as well as private correspondence, and his letters exhibit a dignified, amiable, and virtuous character.

Happy had it been for France could the benevolence, moderation, and good sense they exhibit, have directed the early movements of their late revolution!

"You will, therefore, proceed without delay to the southern army now in North Carolina, and take command accordingly. Uninformed as I am of the enemy's force in that quarter, of our own, or of the resources which it will be in our power to command for carrying on the war, I can give you no positive instructions; but must leave you to govern yourself entirely according to your own prudence and judgment, and the circumstances in which you find yourself. I am aware that the nature of the command will offer you embarrassments of a singular and complicated nature; but I rely upon your known abilities and exertions for every thing your means will enable you to effect. I give you a letter to the honourable the congress informing them of your appointment, and requesting them to give you such powers and such support as your situation and the good of the service demand. You will take their orders in your way to the southward.

"I also propose to them to send the Baron Steuben to the southward with you. His talents, knowledge of service, zeal and activity, will make him useful to you in all respects, and particularly in the formation and regulation of the raw troops which will compose the southern army. You will give him a command suitable to his rank, besides employing him as inspector-general. If the congress approve, he will take your orders from Philadelphia.

"I have put Major Lee's corps under marching orders, and as soon as he is ready, will detach him to join you.

"As it is necessary the inquiry into the conduct of Major General Gates should be conducted in the quarter in which he has acted, where all the witnesses are, and where alone the requisite information can be obtained, I am desirous, as soon as the situation of affairs will possibly admit, you will nominate a court of inquiry to examine into his case, agreeably to the fore-mentioned resolve of congress. Major General the Baron de Steuben will preside at this court; and the members will consist of such general and field-officers of the continental troops as were not present at the battle of Camden; or being present, are not wanted as witnesses, or are persons to whom Major General Gates has no objection. I wish this affair to be conducted with the greatest impartiality, and with as much dispatch as circumstances will permit. You will on your arrival at the army, take the sense in writing of the principal officers concerning the practicability of an immediate inquiry. If they judge it practicable on the principles of these instructions, you will have it carried into execution. If they think it cannot take place immediately, you will inform Major General Gates of it, and transmit me their determination; and you will, from time to time, pursue the same mode, that any delay which may happen may appear, as I am persuaded it really will be, unavoidable. The court

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need not consist of more than five, nor must it consist of less than three members; in all cases there must be *three general officers*. You will keep me advised, &c. My warmest wishes, &c.

"Given, &c. *22d October* 1780.

"P. S. Should General Gates have any objection to this mode of inquiry, which he wishes to make to congress or to me, you will suspend proceeding in the affair till he transmits his objections and you receive further orders."

The first object of General Greene, on his arrival in Philadelphia, was to inform himself accurately of the force and condition of the southern army, the next, to make provision for supplying its present and future wants. Free access to the correspondence of the southern department put him at once in possession of the one object; but every thing conspired to multiply the difficulties before him in effecting the other.

From General Gates' letters he gathered, that the southern army was, as he expresses himself to General Knox, "rather a shadow than a substance, having only an imaginary existence." Artillery, baggage, stores, every thing had gone by the board on the fatal day of the recent defeat, and it now became indispensable to obtain a new supply of almost every article that an army could want. It is of importance to the reputation of General Greene to know, that the subsequent sufferings of his troops for the want of many, if not every article, are in no wise chargeable upon the inattention of their commander.

To every department connected with the army, whilst in Philadelphia he addressed the most earnest remonstrances on the destitute state of his command, and every motive that could be urged, as well as every engine that could be set in motion, were brought up to his aid in assisting to obtain the necessary supplies. And when the depressed credit and empty coffers of congress dissipated every hope of present relief, he had recourse to a voluntary contribution or loan among the merchants, as a *dernier resort* to obtain clothing for the troops whom he believed to be naked. This also failed, and he would have wanted even arms, or waggons to carry them, had not private friendship afforded him that assistance which the United States were incapable of contributing. General Read, then governor of Pennsylvania, supplied him with arms for present use from the depot of the state, and even the waggons to transport them were principally obtained from his kindness. In return Governor Read relied on the armories of the United States and the pledge of General Washington for his indemnity.

All the support that General Greene actually received from the United States was, annexing Delaware and Maryland to his department, and furnishing him

with money to bear his expenses on the journey. Perhaps we ought to add, gratifying him in a request that Major Lee be promoted to a colonelcy, a request which was also made in favour of Dr. M'Henry, but for the present refused. CHAP. IX.

Liberal promises, however, were made by the several departments; and that these promises might not be forgotten, or the performance unnecessarily delayed, General Greene did not leave Philadelphia without placing at their elbow, Colonel Febiger, an officer on whom he could rely, and to whom he gave it particularly in charge never to let the memory of men in office flag for want of a little modest importunity.

By a resolve of congress passed when General Gates took the command of the southern department, power was vested in him to draw from the states within his department, the contingent of men and money which they were bound to contribute to the common cause; to call on them when necessary, for reinforcements of militia, and to impress for the subsistence of his troops, whenever unavoidable necessity should require it. The same powers were now transferred to Greene, and his journey from Philadelphia to Charlotte, was one continued effort to avail himself of these powers for the purposes of recruiting and supplying his troops.

On the 23d of November, accompanied by Baron Steuben, and his two aids, Major Burnet and Colonel Morris, he commenced his journey to the south. This journey was interrupted only by a short halt at the seat of government of each state, for the purpose of investigating the resources of each, and the measures adopted for applying them to the support of the army; of making his requisitions upon them, and awakening them to the necesssity of a prompt and early compliance. His letters addressed to the executive of the states respectively, exhibit some thing more than strong good sense; they are marked by a judicious application of his topic to the peculiar circumstances of each state.

Thus to Governor Rodney of Delaware he says, "Enclosed is a requisition which I have to make upon the legislature of Delaware; I must beg their earliest attention to the subject, as the situation of the southern army presses hard for the most speedy reinforcements of men, and supplies of every kind. General Gist of this state, will wait upon your excellency in a few days, and fix upon proper places of rendezvous for collecting and inspecting the recruits. I persuade myself that your legislature will be fully impressed with the necessity of putting the southern army in a condition to stop the progress of the enemy; otherwise these states, which now appear remote from danger, will soon become the seat of war. Besides, it will not be less inhuman than impo-

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litic, to suffer those states, now struggling with the enemy, to sink under their oppression for want of a reasonable support. Should this be the case, I cannot contemplate our future miseries without the deepest distress and anxiety. Every wise people will keep the war as far from them as possible. The middle states have no way of effecting this but by giving timely support to the southern operations. It is in vain to expect to stop the progress of the enemy with the little force we have now in the field; and it is of the highest importance to succour the inhabitants of the southern states while the tide of sentiment is in our favour," &c.

To Governor Lee of Maryland he writes, "The efforts which the inhabitants are making to prevent the further encroachments of the enemy, deserve the most speedy and effectual support; as well from principles of humanity, as of sound policy. Unless they are soon succoured and countenanced by a good regular force, their distresses will inevitably break their spirits, and they will be compelled to reconcile themselves to their misfortunes—than which nothing can be more fatal to the happiness and independence of these states. It is much easier to keep up an effectual opposition while the tide of sentiment is in our favour, than it will be to secure the remaining states from the enemy's further encroachments, after those states are subdued. There is no alternative but base submission, or an effectual prosecution of the war. The horrors of one, and the blessings which will result from the other, cannot admit of a moment's hesitation on the choice. But in vain shall we contend, unless we raise, clothe, and equip a regular army. The mode to effect this is not for me to point out; *but if a draught could be once accomplished, I am persuaded it would damp the hopes of the enemy more than ten victories.* Congress, in order to reduce our national expense, and proportion the demands of men upon the several states to the force of the enemy and the present plan of the war, have made a great reduction of the regiments. Unless those required are filled up to the full establishment, no effectual opposition can be made. Nor can I be responsible for consequences without it. Nothing on my part shall be wanting to fulfil the duties of my command as far as my abilities extend, or the means put into my hands are competent to; but without support, I foresee myself devoted to ruin, and the southern states to subjection; and I wish that those who now seem at a distance from the scene of operations, may not rest in the shade of security, until the ravaging hand of war begins to spread desolation and terror within their own jurisdiction. I flatter myself, as well from the past conduct of the legislature of this state, as from the assurances of the committee of the two houses who did me the honour of a conference this morning, that they are actuated by too just principles, and have too clear a

view of their own situation, to need arguments to induce them to give all the aid in their power. Eclosed are requisitions," &c. CHAP. IX.

In this letter it will be perceived that, the writer ventures to urge personal considerations. Nor were they ill-timed, or ill applied, when addressed to the state of Maryland; for the transition was easy and natural from his "ruin," or disgrace, or danger, to that of the many valuable and well-connected officers of the Maryland line, which, at this time, constituted two thirds of the army in the field. To which we may add, that among the leading men of that day in Maryland, he counted several intimate and zealous friends.

Conformably to the system which General Greene had adopted, of not permitting the cause to suffer for want of solicitation, or a representative at hand to suggest expedients, or remove difficulties, General Gist was charged with paying the necessary attention to the interests of the southern army in Maryland as well as Delaware; and the attention and influence of General Smallwood were, a short time after, superadded. The following is a specimen of the orders under which they acted: "You will please to make all your applications in writing, that they may appear hereafter for our justification that we left nothing unessayed to promote the public service. Let your applications be as pressing as our necessities are urgent. After which, if the southern states are lost, we shall stand justified. The greatest consequences depend upon your activity and zeal in the business."*

In Virginia, the objects which demanded General Greene's attention were various and peculiarly important. Every thing in that state had become involved and difficult of management, from the pressure of those great national evils, want of money and want of credit. A recent invasion had called the whole attention of the government to its own defence, and the expenses and sacrifices it had required, both discovered and increased the embarrassments of the state.

General Mathews, in the year preceding, had contented himself with exposing the vulnerable condition of the towns communicating with the Chesapeake, and plundering Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Gosport. Upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis after Gates' defeat, an expedition under General Leslie of near 3,000 men, was fitted out at New York with orders to penetrate into Virginia, and await the orders of Lord Cornwallis.

Leslie took possession of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and proceeded with all diligence to secure the possession of both places by strongly fortifying the latter.

* To General Gist, November 20, 1780.

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Virginia had at this time but very few regular troops in the field. A considerable force in militia had been called into service, and these, with all the drafts and recruits then collected to reinforce the southern army, were at this time watching the movements of General Leslie, under the command of Generals Muhlenberg and Weeden.

The important objects which at this time divided the attention of General Greene were first to establish that chain which binds together every military operation—the quarter-master-general's department; secondly, to establish depots and laboratories for the ordnance department, in convenient and secure situations; and lastly, to draw forth assistance from the state without exposing it, and along with it, his own army to the injuries which must result from incursions of the enemy. As to the commissariate, he saw the impossibility of making any present arrangements respecting it, and resolved to defer the subject until he reached the army.

The business of transportation in the southern department was, at this time, in a miserably deranged state. It had been conducted hitherto, principally by waggons and teams the property of the United States; and where they proved inadequate or extraordinary aid became necessary, then by requisitions on the states, and under the superintendance of state officers, or of deputies appointed by the quarter-master-general. As all the public waggons, and most of their teams, had been captured in Gates' defeat, and the government had no money to procure others, the business of the department had necessarily been conducted since this fatal event, upon state requisitions. On these, he plainly saw there could be no dependance placed. For, directly after Gates' misfortune, and prior to the invasion of Leslie, the state of Virginia had been endeavouring to send on her recruits to reinforce the army, but could not for want of waggons. Out of one hundred ordered, (and impress-warrants issued to collect them,) in three weeks, the governor could collect but fifteen or eighteen.* Plainly foreseeing, therefore, that he must sustain the most ruinous disappointments unless some remedy could be found for this evil, General Greene made a strong representation of it to congress, and the states north of Virginia; and resolved to appoint an officer who should combine the whole means of transportation in his department, so that those of the north might supply the deficiencies of the south.

It happened fortunately for this and several other purposes, that General Greene had an intimate personal knowledge of all the officers of the Virginia

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* Gen. Washington, Nov. 19, 1780.

line; they had served under his immediate command in several campaigns, as that line had composed his division. An intimate knowledge of their characters and talents, as well as much mutual confidence and esteem, had grown out of this connexion. By the reduction of the Virginia contingent in number of men to each regiment, and still more by the actual reduced state of the numbers in service, many of their officers were now out of employ, and among these was Colonel Edward Carrington. On this gentleman he fixed his eye as eminently qualified to undertake the task of combining and conducting the feeble means at the command of the quarter-master-general's department. Carrington obeyed the call to the office, and discharged it with unequalled zeal and fidelity. CHAP. IX.

To fix on eligible depots and laboratories, and posts of rest and communication in the southern department, was a work of no small difficulty. In Maryland they would have been too remote, in North Carolina too near the scene of action. In Virginia, therefore, it was necessary to establish them; and against the risk of invasion there, the only security that could be afforded was to establish them under the protection of the populous counties of the north-western parts of that state. At the confluence of Rivanna and Fluvanna, called the Point of Fork, the principal laboratory was established, and at Prince Edward Court-House the principal depot of stores and arms. To keep these regularly supplied with powder from the manufactories, and with lead from the mines in Fincastle county, Virginia, was one of the subjects given specially in charge to Baron Steuben.

Among other officers whom General Greene found out of employment in Virginia, were Captain Pendleton, Major Pearce, and Major Forsyth. The merits of these gentlemen were personally known to him, and he resolved to avail himself of their talents. The two former he attached to his family, and to the last he offered the place of commissary of prisoners; but on his declining it, recommended him to the commissary-general, for the post of his deputy in the southern department.

Having made every arragement which the service required, and the actual state of things admitted in Virginia, General Greene vested the Baron Steuben with the military command in that state, with particular charge to collect, organize, discipline, and expedite the recruits for the southern army. He then, preparatory to his departure, addressed to Governor Jefferson a letter, of which the following is an extract: "The present state of the southern department, and the future operations that must be carried on in that quarter, induce me to lay before your excellency the enclosed requisitions for men and supplies of different kinds. Uninformed as I am at this time of many things neces-

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sary to explain the extent of our wants, I have confined myself in this application to some principal articles, which will be requisite under all circumstances. But as the scene of operations may change, and as the emergencies of war are numerous and various, from which new and pressing demands may arise, I hope the legislature will vest you with full and ample powers to comply with such as may happen. Without this, I foresee the most fatal consequences may attend the army for want of timely support. It will be my province to inform you, from time to time, of the men and supplies necessary to our operations, and to conduct the force and direct the use when sent into the field. But the levying of one and collecting of the other, must depend upon yourselves; and on your exertions hang the freedom and independence of the United States.

"It is perfectly consistent with sound policy in all cases to carry on war abroad rather than at home, as well in matters of expense, as in humanity to the inhabitants. But this policy is rendered doubly necessary to Virginia, from the ease with which the enemy can penetrate the country, and the numerous blacks and other valuable property which must inevitably fall into an invading enemy's hands. It is pretty evident that it was the enemy's original plan of operations to penetrate through North Carolina and possess themselves of all the low country of Virginia; and notwithstanding they may have sustained a temporary interruption to their plan, I make no doubt they will prosecute their design as soon as the prevailing obstacles are removed; unless they are convinced by the exertions of the southern states that the thing is become impracticable; nor will they relinquish the object from the feeble opposition that may be made by the present force opposed to them.

"It affords me great satisfaction to see the enterprise and spirit with which the militia have turned out lately in all quarters to oppose the enemy; *and this great bulwark of civil liberty promises security and independence to the country, if they are not depended upon as a principal, but employed as an auxiliary.* But if you depend upon them as a principal, the very nature of the war must become so ruinous to the country, that though numbers for a time may give security, yet the difficulty of keeping this order of men in the field, and the accumulated expense attending it, must soon put it out of our power to make further opposition; and the enemy will have only to delay their operations for a few months, to give success to their measures. It must be the extreme of folly to hazard our liberties upon so precarious a dependance, when we have it so much in our power to fix it on a more solid basis. I hope, therefore, the most speedy and effectual measures will be taken to fill up the army according to the new arrangements; and I have only to remark, that the reduction of the regiments renders it absolutely necessary that those remaining should be

completed to their full establishment. It is not only necessary to furnish the number required, but that the men be of a proper size, perfect in their limbs, of a good sound constitution, and not exceeding forty years of age. I would wish a law relative to this matter might be passed, with proper directions to the county-lieutenants not to receive any recruits, unless they are agreeable to the foregoing description, as the continental officers stationed at the different places of rendezvous will be instructed to this purpose.

"Officers are the very soul of an army, and you may as well attempt to animate a dead body into action, as to expect to employ an army to advantage when the officers are not perfectly easy in their circumstances, and happy in the service.

"I am sorry to find that great dissatisfaction prevails among your officers. I am not fully informed of the several grievances, but would beg leave to recommend an inquiry, and that immediate and reasonable satisfaction be given to their just demands.

"The late distressing accounts from the southern army, claim the immediate attention of government both with respect to provision and clothing. It is impossible for men to continue long in the field unless they are well furnished with both these articles; and to expose them to the want of either, will soon transfer them from the field to the hospital, or lay them under the necessity of deserting. In either case, government is burdened with the expense of raising men without the benefit of their service. Clothing is more important to an army than, at first view, may be imagined, and to send troops into the field without it, is to devote them to certain destruction.

"The business of transportation is accompanied with so many difficulties, that I think great pains should be taken to fix upon some plan for feeding the army with live stock; and I can think of none unless it be putting up a large quantity of beeves to stall-feed; which may be driven to the army from time to time, as the service may require. I wish that some person could be commissioned from this state to concert with North Carolina the most proper measures for carrying such a plan into execution.

"There are a variety of stores of different kinds coming from the north which, I am afraid from the deranged state of the quarter-master-general's department, will meet with great difficulty in getting on. I most earnestly recommend that the most speedy and effectual support be given to the officer charged with that business, that he, without loss of time, may make the proper arrangements for forwarding the supplies as they arrive.

"I have this moment received letters from General Washington and from Mr. Mathews, chairman of a committee of congress appointed to correspond

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with the commanding officer of the southern department, which mention the enemy's preparation making for another detachment to the southward. The distress and sufferings of the inhabitants of North and South Carolina, deserve the most speedy support, to keep alive that spirit of enterprise which has prevailed among them lately so much to their honour. It is much easier to oppose the enemy while the tide of sentiment sets in our favour, than it will be to secure Virginia after they are overrun.—A misfortune which may prove fatal to the happiness and independence of America!

"I purpose to set out in the morning for Hillsborough, but shall leave Major General Baron Steuben to command in this state for the present, and to put things in the most proper train for forwarding reinforcements of men, and supplies of every kind for the southern army. He will advise with your excellency," &c.

As acquiring an accurate knowledge of the rivers of the country which was likely to become the scene of active operations, was a favourite and interesting object with General Greene, the first service he required of Colonel Carrington was to explore the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba, and to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the streams into which they discharged themselves. Besides the indispensable purpose of ascertaining the places and means of crossing those streams, either in pursuit or flight, General Greene flattered himself with the hope that they would present facilities for the transportation of heavy articles which would greatly relieve the quarter-master-general's department. For this purpose Colonel Carrington accompanied the general on his journey from Richmond, and entered upon this undertaking. Intelligent and active officers were employed in forwarding the design on the Dan, and it was expeditiously completed. A number of light boats also were built on the banks of that river, and had the means of transportation by land been more abundant, it was intended that a number of these should always have attended the army on its marches.

General Stevens of Virginia, at that time commanding a detachment of militia with the southern army, undertook and executed with equal promptness a survey of the Yadkin; while the celebrated Kosciusko, who had attended General Gates as engineer to his army, was dispatched to perform the same service on the Catawba. These surveys proved in the sequel of no little importance in the progress of the campaign, as the general acquired a thorough knowledge of the depth, course, and the places and means of crossing these rivers from sources which inspired thorough confidence.

There is reason to believe that General Greene was the first person who explored the navigation of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers to any

extent; and although the course of events did not lead him to make much use of the navigation of those streams, these surveys contributed not a little to opening the eyes of the inhabitants to the uses which might one day be made of them for water-transportation. The magazines which he established on the banks of the Roanoke, and at Oliphant's Mills on the head of the Catawba, proved of no small service in the future operations of the campaign. CHAP. IX.

At the time of the arrival of the southern commander at Hillsborough, he found that place abandoned both by the officers of the state and the army. The latter, it has been seen, had moved forward to Charlotte, and the invasion of Leslie had called the former away to Halifax, by exciting public apprehension for the safety of the south-eastern quarter of the state. As it did not comport with his views that the exertions of the state authorities should be expended in vain and unnecessary efforts in that direction, he informed Governor Nash from Hillsborough, that he had, by his measures in Virginia, provided for the defence of that quarter of the state, and solicited that the governor would turn his attention to the more pressing object of preparing to meet Lord Cornwallis, on the opposite quarter.

On the 2d day of December, General Greene reached the encampment at Charlotte, and on the 4th, took command of the army. The delicacy with which, on this occasion, he conducted himself towards his unfortunate predecessor, is pronounced by Colonel Williams to have been "edifying to the army." Every measure that could console his feelings and preserve respect for him in the minds of the army, was cautiously attended to. But it was impossible that a court of inquiry could, at that time, be held upon his conduct pursuant to the order of congress. It was not the absence of Steuben that prevented the holding of this court, for that could have been obviated by his presence; but General Washington's order, it will be recollected, requires "that the members of the court should consist of such general and field officers of the continental troops as were not present at the battle of Camden; or being present, are not wanted as witnesses, or are persons to whom Major General Gates has no objection." To comply with these orders under existing circumstances, was impossible; there were not three general officers to sit upon it. General Smallwood, even though he could have been dispensed with as a witness, could not sit upon this court, for he is understood to have been Gates' principal accuser; and Muhlenberg and Weeden could not be withdrawn from the defence of Virginia. The court could not have consisted of field-officers alone, and General Morgan, recently created a brigadier, was the only general officer besides Smallwood at that time with the army. The number of field-officers who were not necessary as witnesses, on the one side or the

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other, was exceedingly small, consisting altogether of Colonel Bufort, and those who had joined the army with the fragments of his regiment. Nor would the circumstances of the army, and the probability of its being called into immediate action, have sanctioned the delay incident to such an investigation.

But there were other, and some very benevolent motives for deferring the investigation. The present state of Gates' feelings upon the loss of an only son, disqualified him from entering upon the task of his defence; and it would have been indelicate in the extreme to have pressed on him an investigation which his honour would not have permitted him to defer; besides which, General Greene, in common with most of the officers whom he consulted, was of opinion that his was a case of misfortune; and the most honourable course to be pursued, both for Gates and the government, would be to make such representations as to obtain a revision of the order of congress which enjoined the inquiry into his conduct. A measure which was successfully pursued.

The order on this subject, was communicated to General Gates in the most delicate manner, immediately after General Greene assumed the command, and Gates' reply solicits an immediate inquiry; when, afterwards, the decision of the council of war was communicated to him, he appears to have received it with regret, but with perfect acquiescence in its correctness. Certain it is, that the state of mutual coldness, if not ill-will which previously existed between these officers, from this time wholly disappears; and several subsequent letters written by General Gates to General Greene, are all subscribed "yours affectionately," and written in a style of perfect cordiality.

The first hours of General Greene's taking command of the southern army were brightened up by an event which the superstition of the soldiery seized upon as a promising omen. This was the capture of Rugely's command at Clermont, made by Lieutenant-Colonel Washington. The happy union of triumph and mirth, diffused through the camp by this fortunate though ludicrous occurrence, gave the first day of vivacity to the army that it had enjoyed since the late defeat. Every one knows how the valorous loyalist laid down his arms at the view of a pine log mounted on waggon wheels in imitation of a field-piece. A respectable number of prisoners, and a seasonable supply of refreshments and munitions of war, rewarded the ingenuity and enterprise of the victor.

The narrative of Colonel Williams affords a tolerable perspective of the condition in which General Greene found the southern army; the sectional views of it are to be fully obtained from the correspondence of the day, both of General Gates and General Greene. The tattered remnants of their uni-

forms drawn over the small supply of clothes which the public spirit of North Carolina had afforded them, presented rather an uncouth appearance to the eye of the beholder. Nor was the appearance of the recruits that had joined them since the distribution of clothing took place, a whit better; they were wholly destitute. The whole number of regulars of all arms in camp, did not exceed eleven hundred, and of these, not eight hundred could be mustered with arms and clothing fit for duty. Such was the naked condition of some of Col. Washington's cavalry, (who being absent, seem to have been shared out in the distribution,) that they were ordered back to Virginia, upon Colonel Washington's representing that they were too naked to be put upon service.

Two days after General Greene took command of the army, he addressed a letter to Governor Jefferson on this subject, of which we will copy an extract, as it furnishes the most authentic view of the state of his troops. "I arrived at this place on the 2d instant, to which General Gates had advanced with the army some days before I overtook him. I find the troops under his command in a most wretched condition—destitute of every thing necessary either for the comfort or convenience of soldiers. It is impossible that men can render any service, however well disposed, while they are perishing with cold and hunger. Your troops may literally be said to be naked, and I shall be obliged to send a considerable number of them away, into some secure place and warm quarters, until they can be furnished with clothing. It will answer no good purpose to send men here in such a condition, for they are nothing but a dead-weight upon the army, and altogether incapable of aiding in its operations. There must be either pride or principle to make a soldier. No man will think himself bound to fight the battles of a state that leaves him to perish for want of covering; nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride, while his situation renders him more an object of pity than of envy. The life of a soldier in the best state, is liable to innumerable hardships; but when these are aggravated by the want of provision and clothing, his condition becomes intolerable; nor can men long contend with such complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, and the hospital must soon swallow up an army, under such circumstances, and were it possible for men to maintain such a wretched existence, they would have no spirit to face their enemies, and would inevitably disgrace themselves and their commander.

"It is impossible to preserve discipline when troops are in want of every thing;—to attempt severity, will only thin the ranks by a more hasty desertion. The article of clothing is but a small part of the expense in raising, equipping, and subsisting an army, and yet on this alone the whole benefit of their service depends. I wish the state to view this matter in its true point of

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light. Some may think it is urged for the sake of military parade, but be assured you raise men in vain, unless you clothe, arm, and equip them properly for the field. I should not dwell upon the subject, did I not foresee the misfortunes that must follow the neglect of it. The states may seem to derive credit from having numbers in the field, however wretched their condition, but a general with such troops can give no protection to the country. This policy may serve to disgrace an officer, but never can promote the public interests.

"I see by the Charleston papers, a large reinforcement is coming from New York, and part already arrived. There can be no doubt that Lord Cornwallis will push his operations this winter to the utmost. Exertions on the part of the states are necessary to counteract him. I hope your excellency therefore, will press the assembly to give the most speedy and effectual support to this army. We have no magazines of provisions in the state, but depend upon daily collections for support; and this state has been so ravaged by the numerous militia that have been in the field, that it is a doubt with me whether, with the greatest industry and the best dispositions, any considerable magazines can be formed."

In General Greene's private and confidential correspondence, his representations of the distressed state of the army are still more strongly coloured. To the Marquis La Fayette he writes,* "It is now within a few days of the time you mentioned of being with me. Were you to arrive, you would find a few ragged, half-starved troops in the wilderness, destitute of every thing necessary for either the comfort or convenience of soldiers." "Indeed, my dear sir, the department is in a most deplorable condition, nor have I a prospect of its mending. The country is almost laid waste, and the inhabitants plunder one another with little less than savage fury. We live from hand to mouth, and have nothing to subsist on but what we collect with armed parties. In this situation I believe you will agree with me there is nothing inviting this way, especially when I assure you our whole force fit for duty that are properly clothed and properly equipped, does not amount to 800 men." "Your professions and assurances of friendship are very flattering and soothing to my feelings. I wish my situation and future prospects afforded something more inviting and worthy your attention, that I might have an opportunity to indulge your wishes and gratify your feelings. But I fear this department is to be the

* December 29th, 1780.

great Sarbonian bog to the American armies, and particularly to the general officers."

To Colonel Coxe he writes,* "The condition of this army for want of clothing would move your compassion, were you here to behold their wretchedness." "This country is very extensive and thinly inhabited, which renders it exceedingly difficult getting supplies, if every thing were managed in the best manner with the most perfect arrangement. But the loss of the army in Charleston and the defeat of General Gates, alarmed North Carolina to such a degree, that they have kept on foot such hosts of militia as have ravaged the country from one end to the other; and to pay the expense of subsisting them, this state has been obliged to strike such quantities of money as have almost rendered it worthless.

"Thus, with an army without clothing or provisions, in a country exhausted, its currency ruined, the inhabitants divided, and our force less than one third of the enemy's, I believe you will agree with me the situation is disagreeable and the prospect dismal.

"The whigs and tories too pursue each other in this country with little less than savage fury, and such a spirit for plundering prevails as threaten the depopulation of the whole country. The whigs and tories are continually out in small parties, and all the middle country is so disaffected, that you cannot lay in the most trifling magazine, or send a waggon through the country with the least article of stores, without a guard. I am subsisting the army by small daily collections made by the credit and influence of individuals, who have charitably engaged in the business. Nor have I the least aid of government in the business of transportation, and not a shilling to help myself. Our situation is still more wretched than I have described it, and must soon terminate in the ruin and loss of this country, unless some more perfect arrangements can take place for the support of the army."

It was not the habit of Greene's mind to pause longer on difficulties than to understand their full extent; the next moment was devoted to the application of the means to obviate them. The method of subsisting the army from hand to mouth was by no means to the taste of a general who had adopted the military maxim, that "good feeding was the first principle of good service." The inquiries made into the arrangements and means of subsistence, convinced him both of the necessity of adopting some general improvements in the one, and moving elsewhere to seek for the other. The country about him was so

* January 9, 1781.

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much exhausted, that Colonel Polk, who then acted from mere patriotism as commissary, declared it could scarcely afford subsistence for a week longer. To draw provisions from any distance was utterly impracticable for want of the means of transportation; and that which the contiguous country afforded, had been consumed alternately by friends and enemies, until there scarcely remained subsistence for the inhabitants. At the same time, it was with regret he learned from the respectable commissary, that many reasons concurred to compel him to relinquish his office.

To find a substitute, and a place to remove to, now occupied the attention of the southern commander, and his resolution was quickly taken as to both. Plenty and retirement directed his choice as to the latter; talents, integrity, influence, and zeal, as to the former.

In the person of Major Davie, the active partisan who has already made his appearance with eclat in these pages, he found a commissary every way suited to his purposes; and the public spirit of that gentleman prompted him to yield to the solicitations of the southern commander to undertake the office. To this appointment in behalf of the United States, he had the good fortune also to procure the appointment of state commissary to be added, both for North and South Carolina; and with every thing that could ensure success, except money, Major Davie entered upon the duties of his office.

In fixing on a place to retire to, General Greene did not hesitate in giving a preference to the head of the boat-navigation of the Pee Dee River. No army of any magnitude had ever visited that neighbourhood, and a very fertile country, extending some distance down its banks—accessible to boats of common burden, offered plenty and convenience to an army so destitute of the means of transportation. Thither Kosciusko was dispatched with a single guide, to explore the country and select a position; while the general occupied himself in digesting a plan for combining the operations of the commissariat and quarter-master-general's departments throughout the state.

Intelligence had now been received of General Leslie's departure from the Chesapeake, and of a large embarkation of troops from New York. General Greene had no doubt of Leslie's destination to South Carolina, and it remained only to be ascertained, whether the detachment from New York, said to be 3,000 strong, was not intended also for Charleston. For that place or Norfolk it certainly was destined. In the one case, his little force was to be overwhelmed at once by the torrent that would move northwardly; in the other, it was to be cut off from its resources in Virginia, and made to linger and perish under the persecutions of the force under Cornwallis. In either case, it was obvious that North Carolina must be the scene of active operations; and

it became the more important to explore and combine its resources, so as to act with a full knowledge of the means of subsistence and transportation which every part could afford him; since it must depend upon casualties in what part he must meet his enemy, it was necessary to be prepared to meet him every where.

It was about this time that congress made that great change in its system of subsistence by which the states were severally called upon to support the war by specific contributions. Hitherto money had been required of them; but "they asked bread and received a stone." The money contributed consisted in "promises"—for the printing-press was the only mint which furnished a medium of circulation. Paper money was sunk to a mere nominal value, and such was the absolute prostration of public credit, that specific contribution was the *dernier resort.*

In order to make efficient arrangements for availing himself of the contributions of North Carolina, Major Davie was dispatched to attend on the legislature, and concert with them a plan for registering all the waggons and teams of every county, so that, together with correct information of their number and place, the burden might be equally distributed; and for collecting small magazines at various points in the rear of the army, in bulk not sufficient to make them an object of enterprise to an enemy, and in situations adapted to the triple purpose of supplying the army, supporting the recruiting service, and furnishing subsistence to the troops advancing from the north and west to his relief. At Oliphant's Mill, high up the Catawba, one extensive magazine was directed to be established, as the operations upon the Catawba might create a large demand in a quarter from which river transportation would present such facilities.

Major Davie met with the most prompt and liberal support from the state authorities, and arrangements were made for collecting magazines at every court-house in the state, as well as officers appointed to register and report the produce and means of transportation of every county. But the want of zeal in the county deputies sadly baffled these judicious arrangements.

The next object that drew the attention of the general was the re-establishment of the North Carolina line. That state had not, at the time, an enlisted man in the field. Their whole force on the continental establishment, about five hundred in number, had been captured at the fall of Charleston, and no measures had been taken to restore the state's quota. Many of their officers were dispersed throughout the country; and, although it was conjectured that there were then wandering through the state several hundred soldiers of their

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line, who had been left behind from sickness or other causes, or had escaped or deserted, no measures had been taken to embody them.

General Sumner, the senior officer on the continental establishment in the state, was called upon to pay immediate attention to this subject, and a strong remonstrance addressed to the governor against the impolicy and injustice of leaving it neglected, at a time so critical. "On my arrival here," says the writer, "I find nothing but the shadow of an army in the midst of distress. War is a very critical business; even where every precaution is taken, it is subject to great and sudden changes. Nothing, therefore, should be left to chance, but what cannot be avoided. In all governments much depends upon opinion, but more in this than almost any other, from the circumstances of the currency and the division of sentiment among the inhabitants. The liberties of the people are a great object, and the security of their property little less so. I persuade myself, therefore, if the inhabitants are rightly informed, they cannot be averse to taking such measures and submitting to such inconveniences as are indispensable to their future security; especially as many have already felt the ravaging hand of war. It does not admit of doubt, that the enemy mean to prosecute offensive operations against this state. The only matter of uncertainty is the force to be employed, and the particular places of destination. Part of the troops said to be embarking at New York mentioned in my former letter, have arrived in Charleston, and the rest cannot be far distant. The small force which we have in the field is very incompetent to give protection to this state; nor would a large body of militia remedy the evil, as our difficulties in the articles of forage and provision are not less than the want of men, and these evils must constantly increase as long as the war is carried on by the militia of the country. It requires more than double the number of mititia to be kept in the field, attended with infinitely more waste and expense than would be necessary to give full security to the country with a regular and permanent army. Add to this, the obstructions to business, and the distress it spreads among the inhabitants at large, and no one who has the true interests of his country at heart can hesitate about the propriety of filling the continental battalions agreeably to the late requisitions of congress. This I wish may take place immediately, and, (if it can be effected,) *by draft;* as I am persuaded, if it can be, it would damp the enemy's hopes more than ten victories.

"It appears to me, the misfortunes which have attended this country have been owing to the commanding officers putting too much to the hazard; and this I fear, with a wish of complying with the wishes and impatience of the inhabitants. By trying to save too much we often lose all. It is natural for people who are affected with the calamities of war to wish to make a great

effort to remove the evil, but ill-judged exertions only serve to fix the chains so much the faster. CHAP. IX.

"It is my wish and shall be my endeavour to render this state every service in my power, and I hope every aid and support will be given me to crown my efforts with success. I may not always agree with the people in the manner of conducting the war, but they may be assured that I have their true interests at heart.

"The king of Prussia says, in defending a country you must attend to great objects and submit to partial evils.

"It is natural for an army in distress to lose its discipline and invade the rights and property of the citizens; nor is it possible always to avoid it without driving your men to desperation. Soldiers feel like other men, and their miseries should not be insulted, if they cannot be remedied. Many affect to express their apprehension of the ambitious views of an army. Nothing can be more idle; for, what can be effected by an army when left to itself, which can scarcely be subsisted by all the powers of government? It is my wish to pay the most sacred regard to the laws and constitution of the state; but the emergencies of war are often so pressing, that it becomes necessary to invade the rights of the citizens to prevent public calamities. The occasion must always give justification to the measure, and few but the captious will cavil at it. This is what we are often driven to at the northward, and the commander in chief never hesitates to take whatever is necessary for the support of the army. At the same time we consider it as a great misfortune to be reduced to this necessity; for nothing is more destructive to the discipline and good government of an army. And for this reason, it is my wish that the state would take measures for giving us the most effectual support. Every possible severity shall be exercised to preserve the property of the people from unjust invasion. Many may think that war can be accommodated to civil convenience, but he who undertakes to conduct it upon this principle, will soon sacrifice the people he means to protect," &c.

It is obvious that this letter has in view another object besides inciting the government to the raising of a regular force. It was to prepare them for the exercise of that supreme authority which the commanding officer was resolved to assert in the conduct of the war—not to be turned aside or controlled in his measures by popular opinion or popular clamour; and to incur any responsibility in order to promote the great end of his command—the protection of the country. Hence he intimates that while he will sacredly respect private property, yet even that must be invaded when the exigencies of war shall require it. A principle from which, it will be found, he never deviated, but which

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was exercised with such justice and moderation as to produce the least possible inconvenience, and passively acquiesced in until a phantom inspired the opinion that it was no longer indispensable.

A multitude of minor cares shared the attention of the southern commander during the first fortnight after he took command of the army; and it was not until every thing necessary for the operations of an army, even to an axe or a nail, had received his attention, that he allowed himself a moment's respite from the most intense application to business.

On the 16th of December, the troops were put under marching orders, but incessant rains prevented them, not from striking their tents, for they had none, but from abandoning their huts at Charlotte, until the 20th. On that day they took up the line of march by Wadesborough to Haley's Ferry, where it was originally designed that they should be posted, but on the recommendation of Kosciusko, they were moved down the east side of the river to Hick's Creek, nearly opposite the Cheraw Hill, the present site of the village of Chatham. On this march they were commanded by General Isaac Huger, the only general, and almost the only officer of the Carolina line not in captivity. He had joined Greene at Charlotte, and was at this time, the only general officer with the southern army.

On the same day that the army was put under marching orders for the Pee Dee, a movement to the enemy's right, the detachment under General Morgan was ordered to cross the Catawba and approach the position of Lord Cornwallis at Winnsborough, on his left. Their numbers, and the instructions under which their commander acted, will be best developed in the following letter:

"*Camp Charlotte, December 16th*, 1780.

"You are appointed to the command of a corps of light-infantry of 320 men detached from the Maryland line, a detachment of Virginia militia of 200 men, and Colonel Washington's regiment of light-horse, amounting to from sixty to an hundred men. With these troops you will proceed to the west side of the Catawba River, where you will be joined by a body of volunteer militia under command of General Davidson of this state, and by the militia lately under command of General Sumpter. This force and such others as may join you from Georgia, you will employ against the enemy on the west side of the Catawba, either offensively or defensively, as your own prudence and discretion may direct—acting with caution and avoiding surprises by every possible precaution. For the present, I give you the entire command in that

quarter, and do hereby require all officers and solders engaged in the American cause to be subject to your orders and command. CHAP. IX.

"The object of this detachment is to give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people—to annoy the enemy in that quarter—to collect the provision and forage out of their way—which you will have formed into a number of small magazines in the rear of the position you may think proper to take. You will prevent plundering as much as possible, and be as careful of your provisions and forage as may be, giving receipts for whatever you take to all such as are friends to the independence of America.

"Should the enemy move in force towards the Pee Dee, where the army will take a position, you will move in such a direction as to enable you to join me if necessary, or fall upon the flank, or into the rear of the enemy, as occasion may require. You will spare no pains to get good intelligence of the enemy's situation, and keep me constantly advised of both your and their movements. You will appoint for the time being, a commissary, quarter-master, and forage-master, who will follow your instructions in their respective lines. Confiding in your abilities and activity, I entrust you with this command, persuaded," &c.

The main army reached their encampment on the 26th, and were soon after joined by their commander. The motives which determined him to adopt this position were, plenty, water-transportation, and security; and although the total prostration of government in South Carolina, and the extreme feebleness of that of North Carolina, in that remote and disaffected country, greatly embarrassed the supplying of his army, his situation was perfectly secure from disturbance, and left him at liberty to pursue the great design of the movement,—recruiting the strength and spirits, and reviving and improving the discipline of his army. It was a camp of repose.

To this great object every one's attention was now directed. In order to give his soldiers the full advantage of the instructions and exercises of the camp, a number of the neighbouring militia were called into service to perform those duties, on which otherwise it would have been necessary to detach regular troops; and every effort was made to give to the army that consistency, to impress upon it those habits of acting and thinking, to instruct it in that camp economy, and inspire it with that martial spirit, which were necessary to prepare it for the active scenes now confidently anticipated.

But the work of preparation was not confined to the men; there was much to be done towards combining and directing the feelings and talents of his officers. Nothing is more fatal to an army than the want of harmony among

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those who command it. The want of cordial, mutual, zealous support among officers, will mar the best digested plans of operation; men will not contribute to increase the military fame of those whom they hate, or envy, and many have been the sacrifices of public good to the baneful influence of jealousy and rivalship. To inspire a noble emulation, far above yielding to the low suggestions of selfishness in his officers, is of incalculable importance to him who stands responsible for the conduct of an army.

Few instances have ever occurred of the prevalence of more perfect harmony in a camp than that which was exhibited in the southern campaign of 1781. The principal cause was unquestionably the good sense and excellent qualities of the officers generally. It would be difficult to conceive an idea of an army better officered. Young, gallant, intelligent, and devoted to the cause, they sought out opportunities for service and distinction, but forgot not the deference due to rank and merit, or the just claims of a brother officer. Sympathizing in the distresses of the country they came to protect, they submitted to every hardship and privation, not only with resignation but with cheerfulness. With most of them the general had been previously acquainted, for they had served with him or under him, from an early period of the war, and what he had wanted of opportunity to study their characters, his camp of repose on the Pee Dee now afforded him.

One consequence of his previous knowledge or subsequent observation was, an obvious effort to find some honourable pretexts for keeping several distantly employed, and a prompt extension of the furloughs of others, because their presence would have superceded officers of inferior rank. Thus were Colonels Williams, Howard, Ford, and Washington, kept in command as much as possible.

So much importance did General Greene attach to the preservation of harmony among his officers, that he never thought any pains too great to bestow upon it. His own example undoubtedly contributed much towards promoting it, for the manners of officers in camp soon receive a tone from those of their commander, where he reigns in their affections as well as over their actions. The winning benevolence of his deportment towards them, directed their attachments to the same object, and this naturally leads men to regard each other as a band of brothers. Nor did he consider it of small importance, to give that direction to their pursuits and appropriation of time, which would add dignity to their profession, and contribute to render the society of his camp both pleasant and instructive Of this he set them examples well worthy of imitation. His only amusements were reading and conversation; but neither of them ever suffered to intrench upon the hours of business, or the calls

of duty. His industry was even laborious; for all his letters were written by his own hand and distributed to his aids for copying. The labours of the day were uniformly closed by preparing the dispatches which the occurrences of the day had required. It was seldom before midnight that he retired to rest, and then, when the hum of the camp had subsided, and the silence of the night was only interrupted by the challenge of the sentinel, or the heavy tread of the night-guard, was his favourite time for reading and reflection. To these purposes the allotted hour was uniformly devoted before he committed himself to his pillow.

Nor was General Greene inattentive to the good effects of promoting convivial intercourse among his officers. It contributed to the promotion of all his views; for while it brought them under his own eye in situations in which the heart becomes undisguised, and temper and talent will flash out in their true characters, it produced that additional tie among men, of mutual dependance for enjoyments, and habitual participation of the same pleasures or privations. Nor was it without its effects in opening the eyes of the junior officers to the deference which mind, merit, and talents will command, or the necessity of manners and acquirements to mantain the rank of an officer.

The officers of the army were regularly invited in rotation to their general's table, and though the commander, who had neither riches of his own, nor money of the state at command; who was not in the receipt even of a cent of pay, and subsisted in common with others by forced means, could not offer much to the palate of the epicure, or the eye of fastidious taste, every deficiency was made up by the cordial manners of their entertainer, and an occasional promise to treat them better when he should have the pleasure of entertaining them in Charleston. At the social board the restraints of parade no longer existed, yet little was necessary for tempering familiar intercourse with a dignity of manner that repressed familiarity. On these occasions the sentiments of the young were elicited and the diffident encouraged to adventure in conversation—an expedient well calculated to create a necessity which can only be supplied by study and application. Modesty never was permitted, at his table, to repine at the superior attention commanded by the gay and the forward, and no guest left it dissatisfied either with himself or his entertainer.

The general was fond of conversation, and delighted to render it general and entertaining. Yet he rather ranked among the listeners than the speakers, and seldom did more than direct it by an observation or an inquiry. His favourite subjects were ethics, politics, and military history. On these his funds were very ample, both of native and acquired materials—a circumstance which probably recommended these topics to a preference, not less than their

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being calculated to give dignity as well as an improving character to conversation. Nor were subjects of taste and science excluded, or any restraint set upon the predilections of his guests; he had many officers well calculated to give all the grace to convivial enjoyment that spirit, wit, and classic reading bring in their train. Nor was the general deficient on subjects of taste; for although he had no knowledge of any language but his own, he had not passed unnoticed the authors of rank of this class, either ancient or modern. But the solid acquirements which the grave concerns of that day brought into requisition, stamped a superior value on that kind of reading which was useful, rather than ornamental.

The time spent on the Pee Dee was also beneficially emproved to other important purposes. It was at this period that his active and intelligent agents were employed in exploring the rivers above him, and digesting those arrangements relative to the means of crossing them, which might become necessary either to check the progress of an enemy, or facilitate his own. At the same time, with regard to the country below him, which being in possession of the enemy could not be thus examined, he was himself busily employed in collecting from intelligent men brought together by the aid of Governor Rutledge, then in camp with him, the most minute accounts of every thing that had relation to the movements and subsistence of an army. The routes in all directions were carefully minuted down in books, some of which are still extant; the topography of the country minutely ascertained, with a particular notice of the ferries and fords of the rivers, and the means of transportation which they afforded.

The following summary of his views of his situation is gathered from his own correspondence as communicated to his friends from time to time, as those views opened upon his inquiries. "I am here in my camp of repose, improving the discipline and spirits of my men, and the opportunity for looking about me. I am well satisfied with the movement, for it has answered thus far all the purposes for which I intended it. It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts of Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia while I am here with the whole country open before me. I am as near to Charleston as he is, and as near to Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut off from my reinforcements, while an uncertainty as to my future designs has made it necessary to leave a large detachment of the enemy's late reinforcements in Charleston, and move the rest up on this side the Wateree.

But although there is nothing to obstruct my march to Charleston, I am far from having such a design in contemplation in the present relative positions and strength of the two armies. It would be putting it in the power of my enemy to compel me to fight him. At present, my operations must be in the country where the rivers are fordable, and to guard against the chance of not being able to choose my ground. Kosciusko is employed in building flat-bottomed boats to be transported with the army, if ever I shall be able to command the means of transporting them. I am now at the falls of the Pee Dee, and the region of my future operations must be above the falls of the rivers, until I can control the movements of my adversary. Below the falls, all through this country from the Alleghany to the seacoast, and from the Chesapeake to Georgia, the coutry is champaign, and presenting no passes that can be held by an inferior force. Below the falls, the rivers are deep, and their banks are covered with impassible swamps, across which, at long intervals, roads have been constructed which afford the only avenues of retreat. I cannot venture to get entangled among the difficulties they present until I can turn upon my enemy and fight him when I please.

"I find the difficulties of subsisting an army far beyond all anticipation. Even here, where the inhabitants are generally well disposed, they will not gather in their crops from the field, because depositing their grain in their barns exposes it to be seized by their friends, or burnt by their enemies. It is hard to stand so much in need of friends, and be compelled to subsist ourselves by means so well calculated to convert our friends into enemies. But we have not a shilling of money, and must collect subsistence by force, or disband. I have had an opportunity of learning the force of the loyalists in these states, and the parts of the country in which they reside, and their numbers and zeal present a formidable obstacle to our future measures. On the other hand, the whig population has been greatly reduced by the numbers that have fled from the distress that friends and foes have heaped upon them. The enemy are now recruiting in all parts of this state, and the command of gold, aided by the public distress and loyal feeling, has been too successful in promoting the project of making one conquest the stepping-stone to another. At present they are in possession of all the fertile and populous parts of South Carolina, and until circumstances will admit of my penetrating into the heart of the country to meet and fight him, we shall have to operate in a country that has been exhausted and depopulated by the swarms of mounted militia that have rather been impoverishing than defending the country.

"Yet I should feel no apprehension for the event, had I a prospect of being supported by a permanent force. But North Carolina has not a man on foot,

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and Virginia only a few raw and naked troops, and those enlisted for a short time. The fine troops of Maryland and Delaware, enlisted for the war, are now reduced comparatively to a handful, and General Gist gives me no hope of an early reinforcement from that quarter. North Carolina seems disposed to assist us, but her councils are so distracted that I cannot hope much from her efforts. The whigs will not serve unless the tories are compelled, and the tories are too strong to be driven, or if forced to take the field, will run away, desert, or betray us. Virginia, without money and without credit, I fear can do little more; and in both states, militia substitutes are too much in demand, to leave materials for enlisting an army, except for very limited periods. Hence their troops will be for ever fluctuating, and will scarcely have acquired discipline sufficient to give reputation or confidence to their officers, before they must be discharged, greatly to the disgust of the troops enlisted for the war."

Great would have been the relief to General Greene's mind, if the immediate cares of the camp alone had been those which, at this time, engrossed his attention. But the arrival of General Leslie in Charleston, had now been communicated to him by Marion, and the daily accession of strength to his adversary's force, caused him to turn his eyes anxiously to the north for supplies and reinforcements. It has been seen, that among the considerations which had given a preference to his present position, was that of its being nearer to Hillsborough, through which all his supplies must pass, than any other place which could afford him subsistence without bearing the aspect of a retreat. His late movement, therefore, produced no delay in the approach of reinforcements, yet no supplies, and only a few convalescents had as yet arrived in camp.

Whilst in Philadelphia, General Greene had satisfied himself on a subject of which he had previously very little cause to doubt, to wit, that he could draw nothing from the magazines of the United States, without distressing the commander in chief. Unwilling to do this, he had endeavoured, as has been seen, to spirit up the merchants of that place to a voluntary contribution of clothing; he had also repeated the effort at all the towns on his journey south, with as little success. But congress, really solicitous on this subject, had appointed a committee of their body for the express purpose of procuring clothing. To this committee he had recommended to make an effort at purchasing clothing for the southern army by drafts upon our envoys abroad, in anticipation of the sums which those envoys were authorised to borrow. This measure they at first declined, but were soon after obliged to resort to. Still there was a hope that the states would be able to afford him relief, but after diligently exploring their resources, he found it a folly to rest on this dependance, and

renewed his instances to the committee of congress. From Richmond he wrote to Colonel Matlock, chairman of that committee. "It was my intention to have addressed you before this, respecting the prospect and encouragement I met with of obtaining a supply of clothing, but I have postponed it with a view of satisfying myself on this head in this state; and am now fully convinced that the southern army will be entirely without clothing unless you draw bills on France and provide for us in the way I proposed. The accounts from the southern army mention the condition of the Virginia line as naked and distressing beyond description, and this state says it is utterly impossible for them to furnish clothing, (nor do I believe they can,) in time to save us from ruin. You may depend upon its being utterly impossible to keep up a force sufficient to oppose the enemy's operations in the southern quarter, without clothing. It may be disagreeable to draw bills on France, but it is better to do this than to let the army go to ruin. The distress and suffering of the troops of the southern army on account *of provision*, is sufficient to render the service so disagreeable as to make it impossible to keep them in the field. But when they are perishing with cold as well as hunger, the whole army must become deserters, or patients in the hospitals. Both policy and humanity call loudly for supplies of clothing. The people of this state and Maryland say they are willing to do all in their power to provide clothing, be the consequence what it may, and I wish that their ability to supply it may not be overrated." CHAP. IX.

His importunities were ably seconded in Philadelphia, by the instances of Colonel Febiger, and a respectable supply of tents, stores, and some clothing, were put in motion for the southern army early in November. Colonel Pickering also, and General Knox zealously contributed their good offices in the quarter-master and ordnance departments, and artificers and stores for the laboratories were forwarded to Virginia, together with a respectable supply of equipments for cavalry horses. These had now been on their way for a length of time, but the miserable state of the means of transportation in the south, and the Virginia roads, even then celebrated for their distinguishing characteristic, had greatly impeded their progress. Apprehensive that great embarrassments would result from these causes, General Greene had, early in December, dispatched Colonel Carrington to Virginia, to superintend this important business of transportation, with orders to hasten to rejoin the army as soon as he should have completed his line of arragements.

Nor had less delay been encountered in the advance of the reinforcements which the southern commander had a right to calculate on—an evil which he had early anticipated, from finding on his journey that the quarter-master's

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stages could not furnish even forage for his own horses, not even in Richmond.

These reinforcements consisted of Lee's legion—a body of Virginia recruits, and a legionary corps commanded by General Lawson of Virginia, which had been put under marching orders for the southern army.

The legionary corps commanded by Col. Henry Lee, was perhaps the finest corps that made its appearance on the arena of the revolutionary war. It was formed expressly for Colonel Lee, under an order of General Washington whilst the army lay in Jersey. It consisted, at this time, of about 300 men in equal proportion of infantry and horse. Both men and officers were picked from the army; the officers with reference only to their talents and qualities for service, and the men by a proportionable selection from the troops of each state, enlisted for three years or the war. Virginia contributed twenty-five as her quota. No state South of Virginia contributed any, as they had no troops in the field.

Colonel Lee had been expected to march early in October from Philadelphia, but the equipping, disciplining, (and perhaps exhibiting) his command, had rendered his movements very slow; his journey from Fredericksburg to Richmond, for instance, required a fortnight, not a little to the distress of his commander, who, having sent home Armand's corps as no longer to be depended upon after their conduct at Gates' defeat, and having sent off all Washington's cavalry with Morgan, had not a horseman with his army.

In Maryland, General Greene had made a requisition of seventy-five cavalry horses, and sundry equipments for the legion, and the liberal spirit in which the requisition was complied with, gave Lee an opportunity of equipping his cavalry in a brilliant style. In Virginia they were reviewed and completed by Steuben, and moved on, at the same time with a body of recruits under Colonel Greene.

Major General Baron Steuben is little known to the people of the United States in any other character than the man to whom they were indebted for the discipline of the army. Had he never rendered any other service than this, those who are sensible of its indispensable nature, would acknowledge him entitled to lasting gratitude. But he has a higher claim on the affections of this country; this was the ardent zeal with which he was animated in its service, and the indefatigable spirit with which he struggled against difficulties, (the extent of which is known to those only who peruse his letters,) when promoting the interests of the cause of the revolution. Those letters exhibit him as a man of a warm and amiable heart—a clear, unclouded mind—and of

perseverance, that no injury could disgust, no obstacle turn aside, while labouring to emancipate his adopted country. CHAP. IX.

To these motives were added that of a strong personal attachment in stimulating his efforts to serve the southern commander. Unfortunately, his zeal involved him in the sequel in the mortification of giving great disgust to Virginia, and the lips of many were closed by state or individual resentment, who could best have testified to his zeal and services. He had the hardihood to assert, "that the war could not be carried on by militia," and to express his feelings when he thought his friend and commander abandoned before Ninety-Six; and the injury sunk deep.

But his patience had repeatedly before been severely tried. It was so in a high degree, about this time.

Virginia had now collected about a thousand recruits, who could not be sent into the field from mere nakedness. But very extensive powers had lately been delegated to Governor Jefferson, and he proved himself worthy of public confidence by daring to exercise those powers. In order to clothe their soldiers, he was compelled to resort to an impress warrant, and from the articles thus procured, Steuben was able, by the 1st of December, to equip 400 of the recruits, enlisted for eighteen months, (a great part of which was already expired,) in a condition fit to be marched for the southern army. But even then, in the depth of winter, all the clothing he could procure for each, consisted of one jacket with sleeves, one shirt, a pair of *linen* overalls, a knapsack, a blanket, and a pair of shoes.*

This detachment together with Lawson's corps, supposed to contain 500 men, were put under marching orders for the 3d of the month from Petersburg; and in high spirits, Steuben had written to his commander, that he should forward on to him a reinforcement of 1200 men, consisting of Lee's and Lawson's legions, and the 400 recruits, to enable Greene to meet the enemy's reinforcement under General Leslie. Steuben was fully sensible of the importance of time, not only for the purpose of giving strength to the southern army, but to anticipate any interruption to the marching of these troops from another invasion of Virginia; an event by no means improbable or distant, from the state of intelligence from New York,—and an apprehension which subsequent events proved was perfectly well founded, for these troops finally moved off barely in time to avoid being detained to oppose Arnold.

* Steuben, 15th December 1780.

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A reader must have been acquainted with the military feelings and habits of Europe, to form an adequate idea of the chagrin of a disciple of the great Frederick, at finding that on the day appointed, not a man could be marched from the ground. Only one half of Lawson's corps paraded, and *they* were ordered by the legislature of Virginia to be discharged, because their term of service was far advanced to a termination; and the officers of the detachment of recruits had sent in a remonstance to the legislature for certain ill-usage complained of, which must be redressed before they were ready to march. "You may suppose," observes the baron, "I was exceedingly shocked at such a procedure."*

It was in vain to struggle against the tide that opposed him; to attempt the exertion of positive authority might produce absolute insurrection, and after trying every thing that remonstrances and negociations could suggest, he was obliged to acquiesce.

Lawson's corps was discharged, and the 400 recruits detained until the middle of the month, that the officers might settle their differences with the government.

On the 15th, however, Steuben had the happiness to see Col. Greene with 400 men, and Colonel Lee with his legion of 300, move off for the southern army. On the 12th of January, they reached the encampment on Pee Dee, where Lee had been for some time impatiently expected, to carry into effect a plan of operation projected against Georgetown.

Among other inducements for taking the position on the Pee Dee, was, that it placed the army directly in the rear of Marion, and whilst it gave countenance to his operations and inspirited the whigs on the Pee Dee and Black rivers, secured to the commander the earliest and most direct intelligence of the movements of the enemy in the low country, and the occurrences in Charleston. For this kind of information, General Greene relied altogether upon Marion. At his first arrival in Charlotte, on the day he took command, Greene had addressed the latter on the subject, requesting that he would devote himself particularly to the important care of gathering intelligence. "I have not the honour of your acquaintance," says the writer, "but am no stranger to your character and merit. Your services in the lower part of South Carolina, in awing the tories and preventing the enemy from extending their limits, have been very important. And it is my earnest desire that you continue where you are, until further advice from me. Your letter of the 22d last month

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* Steuben, 4th December 1780.

to General Gates, is before me. I am fully sensible your service is hard and sufferings great, but how great the prize for which we contend! I like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently prevents a surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, we must endeavour to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people in our favour as much as possible. Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them a general is always groping in the dark, and can neither secure himself, nor annoy his enemy. At present, I am badly off for intelligence. It is of the highest importance that I get the earliest intelligence of any reinforcement which may arrive at Charleston. I wish you, therefore, to fix some plan for procuring such information and conveying it to me, with all possible dispatch. The spy should be taught to be particular in his inquiries and get the names of the corps, strength, and commanding officer's name, place from whence they came, and where they are going. It will be best to fix upon somebody in town to do this, and have a runner between you and him to give you the intelligence, as a person who lives out of town canot make the inquiries, without being suspected. The utmost secrecy will be necessary in this business," &c.

This letter found Marion at one of his lurking places on Black River,* and as he had never been without his spies and runners, every occurrence in Georgetown and Charleston was early known and promptly communicated. Yet he complains grievously of the embarrassment arising from the want of hard money to assist his emissaries in communicating with the enemy's posts; —a want which his commander was very far from being able to supply.

The last exploit related of Marion's, it will be recollected, was his liberating a detachment of prisoners taken at the defeat of Gates. Through the whole course of his operations, it was his practice never to rest long in a place where he had done mischief. This is known to be a habit of Indian warfare, a nation known to excell in wariness and stratagem. After seeing his prisoners in safety over the Pee Dee, Marion renewed his persecutions on the enemy on both sides the Santee, directing his operations against the parties communicating between Camden and Charleston, and the boats transporting supplies between Granby and Charleston.

At the time when General Greene moved down to the Cheraws, Marion had been engaged in some very active movements against a party under

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* Marion, 22d December 1780.

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M'Arthur and Coffin, about Nelson's Ferry, and between that and the High Hills of Santee; and with the hope to cut off his retreat by the Pee Dee, a strong detachment had been pushed on from Charleston to Georgetown, intended to interrupt him by ascending the north bank of the Pee Dee River. But Marion soon received intelligence of this movement, and divining its object, retired across the country and took a strong position on the north bank of Lynch's Creek, in the vicinity of his favourite retreat at Snow's Island, where he always kept a party to guard his boats and awe the loyalists.

From this place he communicated to General Greene, on the 27th of December, the arrival of General Leslie, and successively his march for Camden —the return of the detachment which had marched to Georgetown—and the establishment of Colonel Watson near Nelson's Ferry, with about two hundred men.

The retirement of the detachment from Georgetown left Marion once more at liberty to resume active operations. In a short time, his parties were pushed down near to the town on all the rivers that flow into the Winyaw Bay, and employed in collecting boats and removing provisions up to Snow's Island. This was with the double purpose of supplying the army above him, and of straitening the enemy in his movements and resources. In the mean time, with a respectable force of mounted infantry, he pressed close to the town himself, watching an opportunity to attack them in that place. But they confined themselves to their redoubts, and he had neither bayonets nor artillery to attempt carrying their works. With one hundred continental troops, he informs the southern commander, he should be able to render important services.

Whilst thus employed, he received intelligence that the loyalists, emboldened by the main army's being destitute of cavalry, were embodying above him under the celebrated Hector M'Neal. This was at Amie's Mill on the Drowning Creek. To detach a force sufficient to disperse him, was not in Marion's power, and to suffer them to come upon him whilst his detachments were dispersed, must prove destructive. He therefore resolved to call in his detachments, and communicate to the commanding general the necessity to reinforce him against his increasing enemies, and to look to the movements of M'Neal, as he supposed them to be in part directed against the country between the Waccamaw and seacoast, which had never been foraged, and contained at this time abundance of provision.

This was the situation of things when Colonel Lee reached the American camp, and the moderate speed of his movements leaving the legion in the finest order for service, he was immediately placed under marching orders to join

Marion; while a detachment of light troops under Major Anderson, was ordered to prepare for a movement against the loyalists at Amie's Mills.

Colonel Lee reached Marion's camp on the 23d, and on the 24th a combined attempt was made to surprise Georgetown. Marion furnished guides, boats, and intelligence, and Captain Carnes, with the infantry of the legion, undertook the enterprise. The enemy had no apprehension of an attack by water, and were wholly unprepared to repel it.

The banks of the Pee Dee, closely covered with woods and deep swamps, afforded a perfect covering to Captain Carnes, as he fell silently down the river and occupied an island at its mouth, within a few miles of the site of Georgetown. The rear of this place was wholly undefended, and dams running through the rice-fields, which extend from the rear of the town to the river, afforded easy access to it on the south-east.

On the island at which they had landed, the American party lay concealed until one o'clock of the 25th, when, under the darkness of night, they landed undiscovered, and entered the town before any alarm was given.

Yet the enterprise proved unsuccessful; nor is it easy to determine the cause, for we find the failure variously accounted for. Colonel Lee, in his Memoirs, attributes it to an error in the plan, and assigns as the cause that both columns in which the party entered were ordered to observe the parade ground, where it was expected the troops would assemble upon the alarm; whereas one of the columns ought to have been ordered to carry the fort with the bayonet. But this varies materially from his official account of the affair, in which he says, "Destitute of the expected assistance, my force was inadequate to the assault of the enemy's enclosed works, nor was the possession equivalent to the certain loss to be expected from such a measure." And again: "The blunder of the guides prevented a full correspondence in the movements of the cavalry and infantry, by which mistakes we were in some degree baffled in the important consequences which the prowess of the infantry gave a right to expect."

But Marion says, "Colonel Lee informed you yesterday by express, of our little success on Georgetown, which could not be greater *without artillery*."

General Moultrie, on the other hand, says, "In this hurry and confusion the guides got so alarmed and frightened that they lost their way to the fort, where the main body of the British were quartered, or else the surprise would have been complete." And again. "By this time, the enemy began embodying, and the firing being heard from different parts of the town, and General Marion and Colonel Lee not entering the town at the same time, Captains Carnes and Rudulph thought it proper to retreat." "The cavalry under General Marion and Colonel Lee did not arrive [during the action;] and as they met

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with a breastwork not easily to be mounted, they proceeded no farther, particularly as the infantry had already retreated."

This probably, was "the want of due co-operation" between the cavalry and infantry to which Colonel Lee alludes, in his letter; and it agrees with contemporaneous accounts, which represent the cavalry as having never entered the town, and the failure as attributable to the attention of the attacking party having been drawn away from capital objects to the minor one of catching the commanding officer, Colonel Campbell, in his bed, and pursuing the fugitives, who ran in confusion about the streets. This account is also corroborated by a passage in Colonel Lee's letter to General Greene in which he says "Many were killed, few taken; among the former is Major Irvine, among the latter, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, the commander of the garrison." That Colonel Lee was in no wise satisfied with the issue of the enterprise, appears from a letter of his of the 27th, in which he says, "I congratulate you from my soul, on the glorious victory obtained by General Morgan; I wish my fortune had been equally propitious, as then Lord Cornwallis must have been exceedingly distressed."

An assertion of which there cannot be the remotest doubt. For the great object of the commanding general in dispatching Lee to operate with Marion, would then most probably have been attained. This was to draw the enemy's attention towards the safety of his posts in the low country, and check his advance against Morgan; whom to have pursued to any distance would have left his line of posts along the Santee up to Ninety-Six exposed to destruction. Nor would complete success have been of little importance in another view. Besides the military stores and prisoners that would have fallen into their hands, the plan would have afforded clothing to a considerable amount, and the fall of Georgetown would certainly have produced an effect upon the public mind which the arrival of all the reinforcements under Leslie would not have been more than sufficient to counteract.

Nevertheless the attempt was brilliant—the spirit displayed in its execution served to raise the reputation of the American arms, and checked the forwarding of reinforcements to the British army, by exposing the necessity of strengthening their garrisons below. A considerable reinforcement to Georgetown was forwarded from the metropolis the moment the narrow escape of that place was known.

The surprise of Georgetown was not a simple *coup de main;* it was the first step in gradation of the measures which General Greene had then in contemplation. The object which he proposed to himself was to recall Lord Cornwallis from his views on Virginia and to detain him in South Carolina until

an army could be collected and equipped of sufficient strength to penetrate into the country and fight him. CHAP. IX.

This plan of operations is distinctly avowed in his correspondence in October; and although the celebrated descent into South Carolina in the April following, has been treated of as an idea then first presented to the general's mind, it constituted in January, the subject of a correspondence between Greene, Morgan, Marion and Lee. The project was for Morgan to pass on towards Ninety-Six, and even into Georgia, while a detachment ascended the Santee and formed a junction with him before Ninety-Six, and the main army attracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Camden.

The advance of Colonel Lee at this time, and his junction with Marion, had expressly in contemplation a blow at the posts on the Santee and Congaree, with a view of feeling the operation of the measure on the future movements of Lord Cornwallis, as well as to injure him by their actual destruction.

In a letter of General Greene's to Marion, of the 25th, before the news of the victory of the Cowpens was received, the general writes, "I wish to have your opinion of the practicability of crossing the Santee with a party of three or four hundred horse, and whether they would be much exposed by being in the rear of the enemy;—also whether the party could not make good their retreat, if it should be necessary, and join our people towards Ninety-Six. If the thing is practicable, can your people be engaged to perform the service? It may be a matter of the highest importance, connected with other movements, and therefore I beg you to give me all the information upon the subject you can, *without hinting the design to any person whatever, except Colonel Lee*, whom I wish you to advise with," &c. And Colonel Lee, on the 30th, writes, "In your letter of the 26th, you suggest an idea of a very extensive movement, and intimate a desire for a correspondent movement in me, at the proper moment if practicable. My part of the game can be played, and in my opinion, will be of the most durable and comprehensive service." "I pray to hear from you, and beg you to cherish the movement mentioned in yours of the 26th," &c.

In the orders under which Colonel Lee marched to join Marion, he was instructed to direct his attention, first to the surprise of Georgetown, and then to an attempt on Watson, who had taken post at Nelson's Ferry; and, notwithstanding Marion expresses strong doubts of the practicability of succeeding against Watson, the general still urges him to attempt it. Thus too, in a letter to General Sumpter of the 3d February, General Greene says, "I agree with you in opinion, that if proper measures are taken, the enemy may be made apprehensive for his rear. For this purpose, I desired General Marion to

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cross the Santee if possible; and in order to pave the way for this service, I desired Lieutenant Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown,* that the militia of that quarter might be left more at liberty to cross the river." Accordingly, after the attempt on Georgetown, Marion and Lee halted but a few hours to rest their troops, and moved the same day directly up the north bank of the Santee towards Nelson's Ferry. But Watson did not wait to receive them; after throwing a garrison of about eighty men into Fort Watson, five miles above the ferry, he moved off to Camden. An attempt was then made to throw a detachment of dragoons across the river, with orders to ascend its south bank and destroy the enemy's stores at Colonel Thomson's, and some other depots on the Congaree. Some delay ensued from the want of boats, but the detachment was out on that service, when Colonel Lee was recalled, with orders to hasten to Salisbury and join Morgan, then retreating before Lord Cornwallis.

The route which Morgan pursued from Charlotte, led across the Catawba at Biggin's Ferry, below the mouth of the Little Catawba, and across the Broad River, above the mouth of the Pacolet. On the banks of the Pacolet he took post on the 25th December, and was soon after joined by about 220 mounted militia from North and South Carolina.

The state of things in that country was at this time, highly favourable to this expedition. The whigs, it will be recollected, had, after the fall of Charleston, been obliged to submit and give their paroles to remain inactive. The pledge on the other side was, protection to their property and families. The arbitrary and oppressive conduct of the enemy had satisfied them all, that the protection promised them could not or would not be afforded, and a very general disposition prevailed among them to resume their arms. General Pickens who, among the rest had been compelled to submit, now resolved to lead the way in exciting the well-affected to the American cause, to brave all the hazards of taking the field. Clarke and Twiggs, after the battle of Blackstocks, had kept together a small body of their followers, and moving along in the rear of the whig-settlements towards Georgia, they presented a favourable opportunity to the inhabitants to carry their resolution into effect. General Pickens and Colonel M'Call, at the head of about one hundred men, took the field, and sending off their families and slaves over the mountains for security, they proceeded to join Morgan. Hundreds of others were ready to follow the example, and only waited a favourable opportunity to effect their purpose. The whigs of Mecklenberg also began to assemble, and General Davidson

* Yet Colonel Lee takes the credit of this surprise altogether to himself.

having collected about one hundred and twenty, marched them to Morgan's camp, and by returning to hasten on 500 more who were embodying, he lost the honour of participating in the victory of the Cowpens.

On the second day after Morgan's arrival on the Pacolet, an opportunity for enterprise presented itself, which was promptly embraced. A body of loyalists had advanced from the banks of the Savannah to Fair Forest Creek, to check the spirit of disaffection which had began to manifest itself, and had commenced their depredations upon the settlements on that stream. Their distance was about twenty miles in advance of Morgan's in the direction towards Ninety-Six, and their number was reported at 250.

Colonel Washington with his cavalry, 75 in number, but of very superior quality, and 200 mounted militia under Colonel M'Call, were dispatched to dislodge this body of loyalists. The latter receiving intelligence of the approach of Washington, retreated about twenty miles, to a place called Hammond's Store, where being covered as they supposed, on their right by Lord Cornwallis at Winnsborough, and on their left by the post at Ninety-Six, they halted in mistaken security. Washington pressed the pursuit with such diligence that he overtook them early the next day after a march of forty miles, and instantly ordered a charge. It was a flight and not a conflict that ensued, and we regret to state that the *killed and wounded* were reported at one hundred and fifty, and the *prisoners* at forty. Such were the bloody sacrifices at that time offered up at the shrine of civil discord! Posterity will never conceive an adequate idea of the dreadful state of society then prevailing in that unhappy country. Yet let not unmerited censure fall on the officers who commanded.* Men who had been in the habit of giving no quarters naturally expected none, and in their flight the unerring rifle brought many of them to the ground. There was little time for hesitation or room for pursuit, for Washington was now so far advanced between the enemy's posts, and so near Colonel Tarleton at the head of 250 cavalry, that prompt measures alone could insure his safety. Yet he would not let another opportunity of service escape him, though it brought him still nearer to the enemy. At a place called Williams, General Cunningham was at this time posted with about 150 men, in a stockade fort which, without the aid of artillery, could only be carried by surprise. Thither, Colonel Hayes at the head of a detachment of the infantry, and Cornet Simmons with a command of the cavalry, were instantly dispatched. But intelligence of Washington's approach had preceded the party, and the garrison were retiring precipitately as the Americans

* Morgan, 30th December 1780.

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came in view of the fort. A few of the British party were killed and taken, and the fort destroyed.

Morgan's fears were somewhat excited for the safety of Washington, on hearing the distance to which he had penetrated between the enemy's posts, and his whole force was now advanced to cover him on his return to camp. But he reached the army in safety, and Morgan resumed his post on the north of the Pacolet, carefully shifting his encampment every night to guard against surprise.

The effect of Morgan's advance and Washington's enterprizes, soon began to be sensibly felt by Lord Cornwallis, in their effects upon popular sentiment. Why measures were not more promptly adopted to drive him off or destroy him, must probably be attributed to the hope of entrapping him. As soon as it appeared that he had again established himself on the Pacolet, with a view to collect and embody his militia preparatory to ulterior movements, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was detached with orders, as he expresses it himself, "to push Morgan to the utmost."

Lord Cornwallis had been for some time preparing to prosecute his designs upon Virginia; the arrival of the reinforcements under Leslie, was the event on which his getting into motion depended. That officer was now on his march to Camden, a destination which, his lordship informs us, was intended to hold Greene in suspense as to his future movements. But how the advance of a reinforcement to Camden could produce this effect, it is not easy to imagine! Nor could it be of any importance to hold him in doubt after the movement to Pee Dee; for, whether the intention was to push him, or to pass him, he was equally prepared to fall back upon his reinforcements, until he could turn upon his pursuers. For the purpose of meeting either movement, his position was admirably calculated; and it combined with that advantage, the additional one of threatening the right flank and rear of the enemy.

Whatever may have been the original designs of the British commander, it is very certain that his actual movements, if not governed, were materially controlled by those of his adversary. For the posts of Camden and Ninety-Six were those which kept both North and South Carolina in awe, and while the advance of Morgan threatened the latter, the position of Greene looked so directly towards the former, that the safety of both became subjects of uneasiness to the British commander. As these places were intended to be left shortly to their own protection and that of the loyalists, they were at this time, filled with all the munitions necessary to the prosecution of the war. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, determined to divide his force; to press forward one detachment under Tarleton to destroy Mor-

gan, or drive him out of the state; and as he doubted not that the latter must be compelled to fight, or fly towards Virginia, it was intended to move rapidly forward himself, so as to cut him off from the place of his retreat; whilst Leslie, by marching up the east side of the Catawba River, would effectually prevent Greene from advancing to Morgan's support.

All this well-digested plan was deranged by the unexpected event of the battle of the Cowpens, or by causes preceding it.

Poetry, oratory, religion, have concurred in addressing the Supreme Being as the God of armies, and it would seem that military events were peculiarly the subject of a particular providence. Mortifying would it be to human vanity or ambition, if those who guide the destiny of nations, would pause and reflect with candour, how often the fate of battles depends upon single, unexpected, and even minute incidents. Discipline, as it reduces more than any other cause the number of these contingencies, is the only reliance on which mature experience will calculate with confidence.

It is not easy to determine with precision, the number of troops with which the British commander commenced operations in January 1781. Contemporaneous information on such a point is seldom to be depended upon. There are great temptations, or delusive prepossessions always influencing commanders and historians, to give an inaccurate estimate of rival forces and rival losses. Whether it be to exult in a victory, or apologize for a defeat, the mind leans to diminution on one side, and exaggeration on the other; and perhaps it is only when facts are wrung out by contention, or the secrets of the cabinet fearlessly explored, that we can look confidently for truth. When misfortune overwhelmed the British commanders engaged in this expedition, mutual jealousies and criminations arose, and these disputes put the world in possession of perhaps, the only evidence that can be relied on, on the point of numbers. This is to be found in the private and confidential correspondence of the time, as exhibited in a publication by Lord Cornwallis, entitled, "*An answer to that part of the narrative of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. which relates to the conduct of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, during the campaign in North America in the year* 1781;" and in the notes to Tarleton's Campaigns, inserted to support many of the historical facts related in the work of Sir Henry Clinton.

Referring to these sources of information, we find an official return, making the British force under Cornwallis, comprising the three detachments then in the field, to amount to 3,224 men. But as official returns are liable to many of the objections which may be urged against the authenticity of other official information, it may be proper to remark, that Cornwallis, in a letter of the

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18th December, written at Winnsborough, when the reinforcement under Leslie was not expected at that place, says, "I have a good account of our recruits in general, and hope to march from hence *three thousand five hundred fighting men*, leaving those I mentioned to you on the frontiers." And in a letter of April 30th, 1781, from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, is contained the following passage: "By the distribution sent me in your letter of the 6th January, I am to suppose, it was your intention to take with you the regiments mentioned in the margin, which, (notwithstanding the loss of the 71st and legion, in the unfortunate affair of the Cowpens,) I should have imagined must have amounted to *considerably above* 3000, *exclusive of cavalry and militia.*" If the opinion of Sir Henry Clinton is to be relied on, (and it would seem that the information of the commander in chief is the least questionable,) it would follow, that the force with which the British commander took the field in this campaign, considerably exceeded the number of 4,000, which is greatly above the usual estimate. The names of the several corps that marched under him are accurately known; these were, the brigade of guards, regiment of Bose, Hamilton's regiment of North Carolina loyalists, the 7th, 23d, 33d, and 71st British regiments, with three companies of the 16th, a light company attached to the 71st, two companies of yagers, the British legion, and a company of the 17th dragoons. But the sum of the whole must depend upon the numerical amount of each corps, which is only to be had from actual returns, and these returns, it is to be presumed, were duly transmitted to the commander in chief.

Upon receiving intelligence of the advance of Morgan to the Pacolet, the fears of Lord Cornwallis were seriously excited for the security of Ninety-Six. Although Morgan's force in regular troops, destitute as he was of artillery, was not sufficient to excite any serious alarm for that post, yet the British commander knew the disaffection of the people, and exaggerated accounts poured in upon him of the rising and embodying of the militia. His whole force at that time, lay between the Broad and Catawba rivers; the main body at Winnsborough, and Tarleton a short distance in advance of him. The latter had just then returned from the pursuit of Sumpter to Blackstocks, and, without accounting for any other reinforcement than that of the 71st, of 200 men, had with him a force exceeding 800 effectives.

On the 1st of January Tarleton received orders from Lord Cornwallis, to strike across the country and throw himself between Morgan and the post at Ninety-Six. With his usual celerity, for his motions were always rapid, he obeyed this order; and leaving behind him his baggage, advanced twenty miles beyond Broad River, to a position which placed him nearly south of that

of Morgan. Here in a few days, he was joined by his baggage, and reinforced with the 7th regiment and about fifty cavalry of the 17th dragoons. His force now amounted to about 1100 men, 550 of whom were the formidable legion, who had been so long, with unvarying success, traversing every corner of the state, and triumphing over every corps they had encountered. His field-pieces were served by a detachment of the royal artillery, soon to have an opportunity of proving that they justly merited the high reputation of the corps they belonged to. The 7th regiment of 200 men, and the first battalion of the 71st, the light infantry of the 71st, the dragoons of the 17th, and some loyalists, made up the residue of his force, admitted by himself to have amounted to one thousand, but which the Americans contend equalled eleven hundred and fifty.

With this force he prepared to obey the orders of his commander, "to push his adversary to the utmost." But that the fate of his victim, who lay on the west side of Broad River, might be rendered inevitable, it was concerted that Cornwallis should commence his march a few days before Tarleton; that, by advancing northwardly as far as King's Mountain, on the east side of that river, Morgan might be cut off from retreat and compelled to fight, to surrender, or to fly across the mountains.

But other thoughts had now taken possession of Cornwallis' mind. The force then remaining with him did not by his account, much exceed that detached under Tarleton. Should he advance too far, the fate of Ferguson might await him. A fire had burst from the earth to consume that commander, and his lordship's route lay directly towards the ominous King's Mountain. The same Scythian warriors might there arrest his progress, as their appearance was not more unlooked for formerly than at this time. Or, the reinforcements flocking in upon Morgan, might excite in that commander the audacity to strike at the main body in the absence of Leslie's corps, of the light troops, and cavalry. A cause of uneasiness had also occurred for the security of the troops under Leslie. The whigs of Mecklenberg had been summoned to the field under Davidson. Great efforts were making to embody them; with what success it would be attended, was then uncertain; and to advance on the east side of the river, with Greene but 100 miles on his right, might prove perilous. He concluded, it was no longer safe for his two corps to be separated by the Catawba: and concluded justly; for, it will be seen by the official correspondence of the day, that Greene actually contemplated striking at his several corps whilst they remained in this detached and divided situation. Lord Cornwallis accordingly ordered Leslie to cross the Catawba, and join him on the route towards King's Mountain.

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And now were felt the consequences of ordering that officer to take the route by Camden. Had he ascended the Congaree to Granby, (the shortest route to head quarters,) besides having a plentiful country to draw supplies from, there would have been no impediment to his advance. But by ordering him to the other route, a deep and rapid river, with wide and often impracticable swamps, and no ford until you ascend many miles, was thrown between Leslie's force and the main army. Several days were consumed by General Leslie in the passage of the swamps, and on the 16th, Cornwallis, waiting for his reinforcements, was still no further advanced than Turkey Creek, twenty-five miles to the south-east of the position of Morgan; instead of having advanced as many miles, to the north of his position, and on the route which the latter must pursue, either to form a junction with his commander, or to seek shelter in Virginia.

The conduct of Cornwallis during this campaign has been the subject of much eulogy; and in the field, it must be acknowledged, he always supported the character of a brave and able commander. But in all his general measures we see exhibited this strong proof of ill fortune, if not of inferior capacity, that they uniformly worked together for his ruin. His operations at this period of the campaign, are strikingly marked with this characteristic. Nor is his conduct secure from the charge of indecision,—that bane of military enterprise, and strongest proof of a want of concoction in design; nor of neglect in obtaining and communicating intelligence,—among the first of military duties, and not the least of military talents. With a commanding superiority of cavalry, and innumerable loyalists at command, he ought never to have been without the best of intelligence, and might have pursued whatever course of operations he pleased with the greatest confidence. His measures against Morgan were not, therefore, forced upon him, they were perfectly spontaneous: but both the British commanders appear to have been seduced by the eclat of a brilliant *coup de main*, and to have sacrificed to that object a more secure, but less imposing course of conduct. And the usual result of too much confidence, attended their measures.

Had Tarleton, instead of being ordered "to push his adversary to the utmost," been simply instructed to hang upon his rear and embarrass his march whilst Cornwallis advanced up the east side of Broad River far enough to cut off his retreat and then turned upon him, it would have been impossible for Morgan to escape, except by the mountains. Or had he advanced up the east side of Broad River as was originally projected, whilst Leslie continued his march up the east side of the Catawba: even after the victory obtained over Tarleton, it would have been impossible for both Morgan and his prisoners to

have effected their retreat by the route he pursued. If it be urged that his uncertainty relative to the military force collecting in his front, would have rendered it imprudent to advance into a hostile country with his army in that divided state, the reply is; that we could scarcely credit it, were it not asserted by his own officers, that with the advantage of having all the loyalists of Tryon county in his front to furnish him intelligence, he could remain in such a state of ignorance on that subject. But it is not more surprising than that he should have had no certain intelligence of the advance of Morgan, until the latter reached the Pacolet; and then not to have known with certainty that he had no artillery. To this last circumstance we are to attribute his apprehensions for Ninety-Six, a post which had been rendered perfectly secure against an enemy destitute of artillery; more especially when there was a considerable British force in the field in its vicinity, composed of loyalists and regulars, under a Colonel Innis. But a fact is asserted by Tarleton, on this subject, still less creditable to the generalship of the British commander; which is, that though situate but a moderate distance from each other, and engaged in joint operations against Morgan, yet from the 14th to the 17th, he left Tarleton entirely without intelligence of his own movements or further intentions; so that Tarleton remained under the impression on the day of the battle, that the British army was in the rear of Morgan, and, that though he should himself be repulsed, the retreat of his enemy was effectually cut off, and his fall rendered the more certain when crippled by the attack.

It was on the 12th January that Tarleton commenced his march to attack Morgan. At that time it was completely in the power of the latter to have evaded it, though it would not have been so but for the slow progress or oscillating counsels of Cornwallis, who in eight days, had advanced but twenty-five miles. It has been said by General Lee, that Morgan's decision to fight Tarleton "grew out of irritation of temper." But there can be little doubt of an original and deliberate intention to fight his adversary, if only a favourable opportunity presented itself. General Greene speaks of it as an event which he had sanctioned and anticipated, and it is known that Morgan was "nothing lothe" to meet an adversary. It was not without his knowledge that the movements of the enemy were made; for in one of his letters to Greene, to whom he was very particular and regular in making his communications, notwithstanding the distance of one hundred and forty miles which separated them, he mentions that he had emissaries always within half a mile of their camp, and was regularly informed of all their movements. The last of these letters bears date the 15th, two days before the battle, and we will give it to

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the reader as a specimen of the calmness with which he viewed events, and his utter freedom from the influence of *irritation*.

"*Camp at Burr's Mills, Thickette Creek, Jan.* 15, 1780.

"DEAR GENERAL,

"Your letters of the 3d and 8th instant, came to hand yesterday just as I was preparing to change my position,—was therefore obliged to detain the express until this evening.

"The accounts I have transmitted you of Lieutenant Colonel Washington's success, accord with his opinion. The number killed and wounded on the part of the tories must depend on conjecture, as they broke on the first charge, scattered through the woods and were pursued in every direction. The consequences attending this defeat will be fatal to the disaffected. They have not been able to embody since.

"Sensible of the importance of having magazines of forage and provisions established in this country. I have left no means in my power unessayed to effect this business. I dispatched Captain Chitty, (whom I have appointed as commissary of purchases for my command,) with orders to collect and store all the provisions that could be obtained between the Catawba and Broad rivers. I gave him directions to call on Colonel Hill, who commands a regiment of militia in that quarter, to furnish him with a proper number of men to assist him in the execution of this commission, but he, to my great surprise, has just returned without effecting any thing. He tells me that his failure proceeded from the want of the countenance and assistance of Colonel Hill, who assured him that General Sumpter directed him to obey no orders from me, unless they came through him.

"I find it impracticable to procure more provisions in this quarter than is absolutely necessary for our own immediate consumption, indeed it has been with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to effect this. We have to feed such a number of horses that the most plentiful country must soon be exhausted. Nor am I a little apprehensive that no part of this state accessible to us, can support us long. Could the militia be persuaded to change their fatal mode of going to war, much provision might be saved, but the custom has taken such deep root that it cannot be abolished.

"Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The enemy's great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to

our safety to avoid coming to action; nor will this be always in my power. No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated as we must be, every possible precaution may not be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes it impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling. These reasons induce me to request that I may be recalled with my detachment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be left with the militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia. They will not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, and will be capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all I can effect. CHAP. IX.

"Colonel Pickens is a valuable, discreet, and attentive officer, and has the confidence of the militia.

"My force is inadequate to the attempts you have hinted at. [An attack upon Cornwallis in the security of his camp.] I have now with me only 200 South Carolina and Georgia, and 140 North Carolina volunteers. Nor do I expect to have more than two thirds of these to assist me, should I be attacked; for it is impossible to keep them collected.

"Though I am convinced that were you on the spot the propriety of my proposition would strike you forcibly, should you think it unadvisable to recall me, you may depend on my attempting every thing to annoy the enemy, and to provide for the safety of the detachment. I shall cheerfully acquiesce in your determinations.

"Colonel Tarleton has crossed the Tyger at Musgrove's Mill; his force we cannot learn. It is more than probable we are his object. Cornwallis by the last accounts was at the cross-roads near Lee's old place.

"We have just learned that Tarleton's force is from eleven to twelve hundred British," &c.

This letter furnishes an ample exposition of the causes which induced Morgan to resolve on fighting Tarleton. The opposition of General Sumpter to his collecting magazines in his rear, had put an end to all hope of performing that service, so indispensable to a rapid retreat to the mountains: the vast consumption of forage from the militia horses rendered it impossible to retain his present position: to retire before the enemy would be injurious to the cause he came to foster; and Lord Cornwallis, instead of detaching against him an overwhelming force, had detached Colonel Tarleton at the head of a force numerically not superior to his own. We may add to these reasons, that his men were in high spirits from their late success against the loyalists, and

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he had reason to expect from his adversary all the errors that flow from pride and confidence, or from contempt for the forces he had to cope with.

Morgan's resolution was therefore promptly taken, the measure was submitted to his troops, the cry to lead them on was universal, and he advanced immediately to the Pacolet, intending to avail himself of the advantage which an attack on his enemy while crossing the stream, seemed to promise. This, it must be acknowledged was a measure of at least "a noble daring;" for Lord Cornwallis' position was little more than a day's march on his left. But Tarleton's avidity for glory rendered him as anxious as his adversary to anticipate the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, or rather, according to his own account, worse informed than Morgan, he thought his commander at this time in the rear of his adversary. The two detachments arrived opposite to each other near the banks of the Pacolet about the same hour.

The Pacolet is a small river fordable in many places. Tarleton did not leave his adversary long to deliberate. On the evening of the 15th, he put his troops in motion towards the head of the stream to indicate an intention of crossing it above Morgan's position, and thus to place his adversary between himself and the main army. The stratagem took effect, for it was exactly that measure which seemed to promise him the greatest advantage. Morgan accordingly made a correspondent movement, but his adversary silently decamping in the night, descended to a crossing place a few miles below, and made good the passage of the river before daylight. Morgan then moved off precipitately, and before night regained his position on Thicketty Creek, and resolved to await the approach of the enemy. Tarleton halted for the night on the ground that the Americans had abandoned, and supposing that his adversary was resolved to fly, early on the morning of the 17th resumed his march, with every preparation to embarrass the progress of the Americans, until he could overtake them; and if that event should be protracted until their reinforcements of militia rendered them an overmatch for the force under his command, to hang upon their march until he could obtain the co-operation of the grand army. All this was foreseen by Morgan; as well the conduct as the motives of his adversary; and he prepared to avail himself of the advantages to be derived from them.

It was about 8 o'clock, A. M. that the British army arrived in view of the Americans; and instead of overtaking his adversary in the hurry, confusion, and fatigue of a flight, Tarleton found him rested, breakfasted, deliberately drawn up, every man at his post, and their commander in a popular and forcible style of elocution haranguing them. On the other hand, the British troops had been five hours that morning on the march; but Tarleton judged

the excitement of the moment of greater consequence than rest or refreshment, and prepared immediately for battle. The spirit and alacrity exhibited by his troops justified the determination.

Morgan has been blamed for risking this battle; notwithstanding the imposing effect of its brilliant result, his military reputation has materially suffered from it. Success seldom needs an apology, and he was too haughty and too indifferent to the opinions of historians or critics, ever to have given publicly his own explanations. Hence public opinion has settled down in one general conclusion,—that he was a brave and fortunate, but not an able commander. It is thus that reputations are gained or lost. One asserts, another repeats, and no one afterwards takes the trouble to examine, or is sufficiently adventurous to advance an opposite opinion. Thus too it is that science tyranizes over genius. The most brilliant achievement, unless obtained by the rules of art, is not permitted to establish the reputation of the performer, lest it should detract from that of the learned theorist. There are thousands, who must ever limp after the rapid conclusions of genius, and quick movements of bold and decisive minds, who will yet be supported in their reveries by tens of thousands of others, merely because the latter can best follow the views and actions of the lower orders of genius.

It is a delightful part of this undertaking that it affords us so many opportunities of doing justice to the actions of the worthies of the revolution.

There is no part of Morgan's conduct in this affair that does not admit of explanations calculated to exculpate him from the charges of irritation or indiscretion, or that will not show him to have acted under the influence of that self-devotion for which he was eminently distinguished.

The subjoined answer to Morgan's letter of the 15th, shows that his commander attached much importance to his holding his ground.

General Greene to General Morgan. Camp Pee Dee, January 9th, 1781.

[EXTRACT.]

"Your favour of the 15th was delivered me last evening about 12 o'clock. I was informed of Lord Cornwallis' movement before the receipt of your letter, and agree with you in opinion that you are the object. And from his making so general a movement, it convinces me he feels a great inconvenience from your force and situation. He would never harass his troops to remove you, if he did not think it an object of some importance. Nor would he put his collective force in motion if he had not some respect for your numbers. I am sensible your situation is critical, and requires the most watchful attention

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to guard against surprise. But I think it is of great importance to keep up a force in that quarter; nor can I persuade myself that the militia alone will answer the same valuable purposes as when joined by the continental troops.

"It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. Regard not the opinions of the day. It is not our business to risk too much, our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone.

"If General Sumpter and you could fix upon a plan for him to hold the post which you now occupy, and he to be joined by the militia under General Davidson, and you with your force and the Georgia and Virginia militia, to move towards Augusta or into that quarter, I should have no objection, provided you think it will answer any valuable purpose, and can be attempted with a degree of safety.

"I am unwilling to recall you if it can be avoided, but I had rather recall you than expose you to the hazard of a surprise.

"Before this can possibly reach you I imagine the movements of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Tarleton will be sufficiently explained, and you obliged to take some decisive measures. I shall be perfectly satisfied if you keep clear of misfortune; for, though I wish you laurels, I am not willing to expose the common cause to give you an opportunity to acquire them."

Colonel Tarleton, with characteristic candour, seems to have been resolved to exempt his adversary from the reproach of having engaged with a great disparity of force, for he asserts upon "accurate knowledge," that Morgan's force amounted to 1300 militia, 500 regulars, and 120 cavalry,—exactly double of what it did consist of. Colonel Tarleton may have consoled his mortified feelings with believing this "accurate account." But the reader may rest assured from the most authentic information, that Morgan's whole force on duty, consisted of 290 regular infantry, 80 cavalry, and 600 militia, in all 970. Tarleton certainly numbered 1050 regulars, and about 50 loyalists; leaving the Americans only 130 inferior in numbers. In quality of troops, it has been supposed the British had infinitely the advantage; but in this there is some mistake. At least three or four hundred of the enemy are said to have new recruits, and probably not yet subdued by discipline, or ever before in battle. On the other hand, such a body of militia as were collected under Morgan, has seldom been collected on the field of battle. Two companies of them under Captains Triplet and Tait, were from Virginia, and were very generally veteran soldiers, who had served out the time of their enlistment, and were

now hired as substitutes by the drafted militia. The Georgians consisted of Clarke's veterans, who had been almost the whole war in constant service, and a more dauntless little corps it would have been difficult to collect. Their gallant colonel did not share with them in the honours of this field, for he had recently been disabled by a severe wound; but they were led by two distinguished officers Cunningham and Jackson. The residue of the militia were all determined whigs, practised marksmen, and most of them, like their commander Pickens, fought literally with halters round their necks. They were also commanded by officers of distinguished merit, and who possessed their unlimited confidence.*

There were among the militia forty-five men well mounted and equipped with sabres. These were placed under the command of M'Call, and being added to Washington's corps, increased that command to one hundred and twenty-five men. Therefore, the disparity in quality of troops, though decidedly in favour of Colonel Tarleton, was not so overwhelming as it has generally been rated. Yet two pieces of artillery, and treble the number of cavalry and bayonets, presented a most appalling superiority.

It was met in the only way in which it could have been met. Morgan's marksmen, if they could not maintain order themselves in action, presented the means of introducing disorder into the ranks of the enemy. For this purpose they were used, and the experiment succeeded.

But the subject on which Morgan has been most severely censured, was the choice of ground. An open woodland, possessing nothing to recommend it but a trifling elevation; and a river winding round his left at the distance of six miles and extending parallel to his rear, so as to cut off all retreat in case of misfortune. It is obvious, that the alternative exhibited is, extraordinary indiscretion, or extraordinary boldness and originality of design. The well-read tactician, who squares his opinions by military dogmas, will not hesitate to decide against the prudence of leaving his wings in air exposed to a superior cavalry and more numerous infantry, and a river in his rear, which cut off every hope of retreat.

But those who were acquainted with the character of the man, may recognise in the following brief justification of himself, that dauntless decision of

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* No eulogium of ours can add to the reputation of Pickens. But M'Call is less known, and has been too soon forgotten. He was among the most distinguished partisan leaders of his time. But he did not live to see the issue of the contest in which he had taken a part. Excelled by no one for activity, resolution, and intelligence, he fell a sacrifice to the small-pox, contracted in one of his rude encounters with the enemy.

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character which always distinguished him, as well as something more than a plausibility of reasoning. "I would not have had a swamp in the view of my militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking as Bufort's regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me."

If these were really Morgan's reasons for selecting his ground, we can easily account for his having never avowed them in his official communications; as they carry with them assumptions not calculated to add to his popularity with the militia, and unfavourable to the courage and conduct of men from whom he derived the most essential services in the action. Yet we have seen, that in his communications with the general he expressed doubts of the stability of at least one third of the militia force then with him. A number whose defection in time of battle might have been sufficient to carry with them many more.

Unscientific as these reasons attributed to Morgan will be adjudged, yet, if several eminent commanders of other times, have been immortalised for burning their fleets, that their men might have no other alternative but conquest, it will be difficult to show in what their conduct differed essentially from that of the American general.

It may be (and has been) contended that the obligation to fight was not in this case imperative. But this point, it will be found very difficult to sustain. It is true that the halt made by Tarleton on the ground abandoned by the Americans on the morning of the 16th, left the latter in possession of considerable ground. But it did not exceed ten or twelve miles. And the British dragoons had been pushed forward in the evening with orders to hang upon the American rear and impede his march. Morgan then well knew that the moment he prepared to decamp, intelligence would be communicated to the British commander, and the forces of the latter be set in motion to overtake him. This they probably would have done before he could have crossed the river; and he must then have fought, with his troops fatigued and dispirited by retreat, most probably, much diminished by desertion, and under the dis-

advantage of forming in the face of a superior enemy, on ground, the choice of which would be forced upon him by his adversary. Could he even have reached the river before the main body of his enemy had come up with him, crossing it in the face of a powerful cavalry, must have been attended with great loss, and a loss of such a nature as might afterwards have brought him completely into the power of one or the other of the enemy's divisions. There is one circumstance relative to the ground on which the action was fought, the importance of which has never been duly estimated, but which it will be found in the sequel, promised and subserved the most important uses. This was, that in the rear of the eminence on which his regular troops were posted, the ground, after descending a few yards, rose into another eminence sufficient in height to cover a man on horseback placed in the rear of it; so that it protected his cavalry from the artillery, and furnished a secure rallying point to his militia. CHAP. IX.

The battle of the Cowpens was fought on the 17th of January 1781. It cannot be passed over without due attention, as it was the first link in the chain of events that led even to the capture of Cornwallis and the successful termination of the revolutionary war.*

Many authors have described this battle; and by collating the accounts of it given by Ramsay, Tarleton, Lee, Moultrie, and a late very accurate historian, Captain Hugh M'Call, a correct general view will be presented of it. But there still remain a few important facts that have not been noticed, and others, the connection and dependance of which have not been fully explained.

It will be recollected that Morgan had taken his ground on an eminence gently ascending for about three hundred and fifty yards, and covered with an open wood. On the crown of this eminence were posted his best troops, composed of the 290 Maryland regulars, and in line on their right, the two companies of Virginia militia under Triplet and Tate, and a company of Georgians under Captain Beatie, about 140 in the whole, making his rear line to consist of 430 men. This was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard.

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* The place of this memorable event has now lost its name, but no American will reflect with indifference on the possibility of its identity ever becoming doubtful. The following remarks may direct the researches of some future traveller or historian. At the first settlement of that country, it was a place of considerable notoriety from a trading path with the Cherokees which passed by it. In the early grants of land in that neighbourhood it is distinguished by the epithet of Hannah's Cowpens, being the grazing establishment of a man of the name of Hannah. In time it became known by the epithet of the Cowpens, and is now distinguished as attached to Nesbit's iron works, the property of the honourable Wilson Nesbit.

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One hundred and fifty yards in advance of this line, the main body of the militia, about 270 in number, were posted in open order. These were all volunteers, and practised marksmen, most of them glowing under a sense of personal injury, and were commanded by Colonel Pickens.

In advance of the first line about one hundred and fifty yards, were posted 150 picked men, extending in loose order along the whole front;—on the right commanded by Colonel Cunningham, and on the left by Major M'Dowel, the former of Georgia, the latter of South Carolina. This selection was calculated and intended to excite rivalship and emulation, and undoubtedly had its effect. No particular orders were given to this corps to select objects, but they signified their knowledge of the service they were calculated to render, by exclaiming as they separated, "Mark the epaulette men." A strange inconsistency of idea prevails among military men on this subject. They justify the employment of marksmen, yet affect to execrate the direction of their skill to the use to which they know it will be applied, and for which chiefly it must be intended. If it be lawful to use them, it would seem to follow, that it it is lawful to use them to the best effect. An army without officers becomes a mob. Far be it from the author to inculcate any doctrine that would aggravate the horrors of war, but it is not improbable, that if those who rule the destinies of nations, (and you may follow the chain down to the lowest ruler of the destinies of armies,) were oftener brought within the reach of an hostile rifle, the world would be less vexed with wars.

It has been remarked that in the rear of the second line the ground descended and then rose to an eminence sufficient to cover a man on horseback. Behind this the American reserve was posted, consisting of Washington and M'Call's cavalry, 125 in number. Their position was highly eligible, as they were near enough to render the most prompt assistance, and yet perfectly secure from the enemy's artillery.

The militia of the front line were also permitted to consult their security as far as circumstances would admit, by covering their bodies with trees and firing from a rest.

The order to the advanced party was, not to deliver their fire until the enemy was within fifty yards, then to retire, covering themselves with trees as occasion offered, loading and firing until they reached and resumed their places in the first line.

The orders to the first line were, to deliver two deliberate discharges at the distance of fifty yards, and then to retire and take their post on the left of the regulars. If charged by the cavalry, every third man to fire and two to re-

BATTLE of the COWPENS.

1st View. Order of Battle.



REFERENCES.

W. Cavalry commanded by Col. Washington.
H. Maryland Troops — by Major Howard.
T. Virg.ª & Geor.ª Militia — Gen.ˡ Trigler.
P.P. Militia, Col. Pickens.
a.a. British Cavalry on the Wings.
b.b.b. Dº Regular Troops.
c.c. Artillery of Dº
e. Infantry of the Reserve.
d. Cavalry of the Reserve.

3d View. When the British b.b.b. surrendered.



2nd View. When the Militia were driven in.



main in reserve, lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire; or to be used if they wheeled to retire.

The orders to the second line were, not to be alarmed at the retreat of the militia, (and the orders given to the latter were detailed to them,) to fire low and deliberately, not to break on any account, and if forced to retire, to rally on the eminence in their rear, where they were assured the enemy could not injure them.

The baggage of the American army, had been sent off early in the morning under a suitable escort, with orders to halt a few miles in the rear, and the militia horses (for the volunteers were all mounted) were secured to the boughs of trees, a convenient distance in the rear of the reserve.

Every arrangement being thus completed, the men were ordered, in the military phrase, "to ease their joints," by which is meant, to dispose of themselves at their ease without quitting their ranks.

All were in high spirits, for all had concurred in a wish to be led to battle.

Thus circumstanced the American army calmly looked on while the enemy formed his order of battle at the distance of four hundred yards from the first line.

The British infantry with the exception of the 71st, were drawn up in one line, co-extensive with and parallel to those of the Americans. Most of the American writers place the artillery in the centre of the whole, but the position of the two pieces was, equidistant from each other and from the extremity of each wing, dividing the line into thirds.

In the rear of the left, at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards, was posted the British reserve, consisting of the 71st and 200 dragoons. The residue of the dragoons covered the two wings, giving a squadron of fifty to each.

If the reader will now place himself on the eminence in the rear of the line, he will have a distinct view of the battle.

Tarleton has generally been charged with having, in his impatience, commenced the attack before his dispositions were completed. But the mistake arose from the following circumstance. Upon his advancing to reconnoitre, the parties under Cunningham and M'Dowel prevented his approaching near enough to distinguish satisfactorily the American order of battle. He therefore ordered the cavalry to advance and drive them in. On the advance of the cavalry, the American parties retreated and fell into the first line, and were thus precluded from performing the service for which they were most probably assigned to this advanced position. But they peformed another which in the sequel answered nearly as beneficial a purpose. They gave the cavalry a few

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discharges which made them tremble, for at least that day, at the deadly aim of an American rifleman.

The dispositions of the enemy being completed, he advanced steadily under fire of his artillery, and the militia maintained their ground with perfect coolness. At the assigned distance they delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day, "that here the battle was gained." The killed and wounded of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen was delivered, and the high proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number, sufficiently justified the assertion.

As soon as the militia broke from their line, the enemy rent the air with their shouts and quickened their advance; and from that moment the want of officers discovered itself by the confusion which ensued in their ranks.

As soon as the militia were cleared away from before the second line, the latter commenced their fire, and for near thirty minutes, it was kept up with coolness and constancy. The enemy, although halted frequently for the restoration of order, steadily advanced; yet obviously with such hesitation that the British commander was induced to order up the 71st into line on his left; while the cavalry made a sweep upon the American right. Morgan perceived this movement, and with it the necessity of covering his flank.

The events of the succeeding fifteen minutes of this action are almost too rapid and crowded to admit of description. They moved together like the rays of light, but are not as easily shown in their distinct brilliancy, when separated through the medium of language.

Howard naturally cast his eyes to the reserve as the ordinary means to be resorted to for protection. But Washington was at that time actively and vigorously engaged where duty called him on the left. The cavalry of Tarleton's left wing had poured upon the rear of the retreating militia. As the right of the line of militia had to traverse the whole front of the second line to reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, they were necessarily very much exposed to this danger. Washington flew to their assistance, and repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to regain the tranquillity necessary for returning to a state of order. The eminence which had covered the reserve was exceedingly favourable to this purpose, and Pickens knew how to avail himself of it. Here most of them gathered round him and were soon reduced to order.

Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend his exposed flank, or if it were, that it would leave his other flank too much ex-

posed, Morgan dispatched an order to the militia on his right, to fall back from their right so as to form at right angles with his line, and repel the enemy's advance upon his right flank. To effect this manœuvre with precision and dispatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right about, and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with coolness and recollection, and the militia began to move. At this point of time it was that fortune, ever hovering over fields of battle, played off that celebrated freak which at first threatened destruction to the American arms, but in a moment after, crowned them with the most signal success. Seeing the movement of the right of their line, and supposing that this was the state of things which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, the whole American line faced about and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect order, towards their intended second position. Howard presuming the order must have emanated from the commander, made no opposition, but bent his whole attention to the preservation of order, and encouragement of his men. Morgan also under the impression that the movement was made under the order of Howard, and thinking favourably of it, under existing circumstances, rode along the rear of the line reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground. But just at that crisis they were accosted by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an immediate change of measures. This officer was a messenger from Colonel Washington, who having been carried in pursuing the enemy's cavalry some distance in advance of the American line, found the right flank of the enemy wholly exposed to him, and had a fair view of the confusion existing in their ranks. "They are coming on like a mob, give them a fire and I will charge them," was the message delivered, and the messenger galloped back to join his command. At that instant Pickens showed himself above the second hill, advancing to support the right, and in twenty minutes more the whole British army were in possession of the Americans.

No sooner was the resolution taken to halt and resume the action, than the order flew to right and left; "Face about, give them one fire and the victory is ours," was reiterated by Morgan as he passed along the line. It was promptly obeyed; the enemy were within thirty yards, tumultuously shouting and rapidly advancing; scarcely a man of the Americans raised his gun to his shoulder; when their fire was delivered, they were in an attitude for using the bayonet, and the terrible *pas de charge* in a few steps brought them to that crisis which ever terminates in victory or defeat—the bayonets of the two armies were interlocked. The enemy threw down their arms and fell upon their faces. Happy was it for the honour of the American arms, that the

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soldiers now found before them only a prostrate enemy. These were the men and this the commander who had massacred the troops under Bufort, and "Tarleton's quarters" had already rung from right to left. But Howard (and humanity seems identified with the name) anxiously exclaiming "Give them quarters," soon had the pleasure to see, that an American soldier could not shed the blood of a conquered enemy.

There was much yet to be done on the field of battle. The 71st had got upon Howard's right, the dragoons were also approaching the same vulnerable point, and Washington had his hands full in front with the artillerists and the cavalry of the enemy's wings. But Morgan's measures were taken with promptness, and his orders obeyed with alacrity. One company advanced to the support of Washington, three remained in charge of the prisoners, and the right battalion wheeled upon the 71st.

The affair in this quarter now became very animated. In vain did Tarleton urge forward his dragoons. Pickens' marksmen had now opened upon them, and they literally broke away with a "*sauve qui peu.*"

These dragoons never fought well; they had repeatedly hacked to pieces a flying, unarmed, or supplicating enemy, but neither at Blackstocks, in this affair, or any other did they ever do any thing to distinguish themselves in fair conflict.

How unlike was theirs to the conduct of the British artillery. This devoted corps, thrown in the rear by the advance of the line, abandoned by the cavalry, supported only by a few fugitives of the infantry, seemed resolved to surrender their guns only with their lives. There was no time to parley, the busy scenes now acting in every part of the field obliged the Americans to act towards these brave men, with a dispatch wholly inconsistent with the esteem which their noble conduct inspired. They were mostly killed or wounded by the time that Tarleton, with a number of mounted officers, and all that remained to him of his cavalry about fifty in number, arrived to support them. It was here and in this part of the contest, that occurred that memorable conflict from which Colonel Washington so narrowly escaped.*

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* The affair thus occurred. Whilst Washington was engaged with the artillerists Colonel Tarleton, at the head of all the cavalry who could follow him, hastened to their relief. Washington perceiving his approach, ordered his men to charge and dashed forward himself. Tarleton prudently commanded a retreat. Being of course in the rear of his men, and looking behind, he perceived that Washington was very near him and full thirty yards ahead of his troops. Attended by two of his officers, he advanced to meet Washington. One of his officers led, and parrying a blow aimed at him by Washington, the sword of the latter proved of inferior temper and broke midway. The

In the mean time all was over with the British army on the extreme right of the Americans. The 71st exhibited for some time a firm countenance, and maintained their order to the last. But when the cavalry fled, and the whole weight of the American army pressed upon them, resistance was vain. They laid down their arms, and Colonel Pickens in person received the sword of their commander M'Arthur.

Never was victory more complete. Not a corps retired from the field under command, except the few cavalry who accompanied Tarleton. Washington pursued the flying enemy until the declining sun and his panting horses, warned him to retrace his steps and join his commander. On his return he drove before him near one hundred straggling prisoners collected on his route.

Two field-pieces, (four-pounders,) eight hundred muskets, two stand of colours, thirty-five baggage waggons, and one hundred dragoon horses fell into the hands of the victors.

The loss sustained by armies in battle is generally as difficult to be ascertained as the relative force of the contending parties. The British assert that the American loss amounted to 150 killed and wounded. But this is altogether erroneous; nor is their account entitled to much credit, since they had no possible means of ascertaining the fact. The truth is, it was surprisingly small for an action kept up for fifty minutes with so much animation. As usual, the enemy fired entirely over the heads of the Americans. The whole loss of the latter from authentic returns, were 11 killed and 61 wounded. No officer of rank was among the killed or wounded.

The loss admitted by the enemy to have been sustained on this occasion was, 150 killed and wounded and 400 prisoners. The accounts published at the time by the Americans, stated 150 killed, 200 wounded, and 500 prisoners,

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next effort must have brought Washington to the ground. But a little Henchman not fourteen years old, who was devoted to his master, and carried no other weapon but a pistol at his saddle-bow, had pressed forward to share or avert the danger that threatened his beloved colonel, and arrived in time to discharge the contents of his pistol into the shoulder that brandished the sword over Washington's head. It fell powerless, but the other officer had already raised his sword to inflict the wound, when Serjeant-Major Perry reached the side of his commander just in time to receive the sword-arm of the officer upon the edge of his extended weapon. The wound also broke his blow. But Colonel Tarleton in the mean time was securely aiming another from his pistol. The noble animal that bore Washington was destined to receive the ball that had, rather discourteously, been aimed at his rider. Poor Perry's destiny was bound up with that of his commander, for at the battle of Eutaw, when the latter was made prisoner, Perry by the same discharge fell under five wounds. We are uninformed, but believe that he never recovered from them.

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exclusive of the wounded. Historians have generally estimated the slain of the enemy at 100, and it probably did not equal that number. But their loss in officers was very great. At least one tenth of the killed and wounded were commissioned officers. Ten, almost all where the militia delivered their fire, were found on the field of battle. Hence that irretrievable confusion which the writers on both sides admit to have ensued in the British line.

The world is at present in possession of the means of ascertaining with tolerable precision the actual amount of the British loss. This is in the correspondence between Cornwallis and Clinton, in which the former admits a loss in this affair of 700 men. But by comparing the returns of the British army of the 15th of January and 1st of February, we find the diminution amounting to 784 men. Which number agrees with other facts in our possession on the same subject; for, Major Hyrne, the commissary of prisoners, received of Morgan, 600 on the east bank of the Catawba, and this will leave 184 for the killed and wounded, probably the true number; we may estimate the slain at sixty.

Among the booty taken on this occasion and probably among the causes, why the enemy were beaten, must be included a great number (it is said seventy) negro slaves. The luxury of being waited upon, it would seem, had spread among the British officers along with the facility of obtaining expert waiting men. Nor were waiting women at that time altogether unknown in the British camp; but Tarleton had a few days before disembarrassed himself of a swarm of the latter. The slaves were of course returned to their original owners; but having been originally included among the prisoners, their number swelled that of the former up to the American estimate of 850 killed, wounded and taken.

If the reader has perused Colonel Tarleton's account of this affair, he will be surprised to find that officer taking credit, for having performed two gallant feats as he left the field. The one was repulsing Washington's whole command with fifty of his dragoons and fourteen mounted officers; the other, dispersing an American party which had seized upon his baggage. It was a bold attempt, to adorn his crest with plumes which there existed so many hands to pluck away. These feats dwindle astonishingly upon a candid investigation of facts.

The personal rencounter with Washington in which his sword was broken, was the ground work on which imagination got up a repulse of his whole corps. The other was a ludicrous incident. The reader must be prepared for such an event, when he is told of an American party which had preceded the flight of the enemy and taken possession of his baggage. Colonel Tarleton

had in his train a party of about fifty loyalists, good woodsmen, excellent marksmen, but great plunderers and scoundrels. They were beneficially employed as spies and expresses. These men, having moved off at a convenient season during the action, and finding the baggage abandoned, very laudably entered upon the work of saving what they could of the officers' effects from the enemy, by appropriating it to their own use. Alarmed by the trampling of Tarleton's horses as they approached, these zealous loyalists hastened their retreat to the bushes, imagining that the enemy was upon them. This movement, with the identity of dress and accoutrements, presented them to their friends as a party of their enemies; and the wrath of the mortified dragoons was let loose upon all who were not fortunate enough to make good their retreat, or secure themselves from the sword by the body of a waggon. CHAP. IX.

It is an observation of Colonel Lee's, that "the British cavalry having taken no part in the action, except the troops attached to the line, were in force to cover the retreat." But in this the colonel is in part mistaken. That there were two hundred of them remaing unhurt, and that if they had kept together, both the baggage and the fugitives might have been brought off, is perhaps true; for Morgan could not have spared the time or men necessary to disperse them. But the fact is, that the cavalry on that day had been handled very roughly, as is evidenced by the capture of one hundred of their horses. One third of their number had fallen under the sword of the American cavalry, or the deadly aim of the riflemen. In the two attacks made, first upon the advanced party and then upon the American right, opportunities had been presented and successfully improved, of using that weapon with effect. Colonel Tarleton acknowledges that they were reduced to two hundred and fifty. but the British returns of the 1st February give one hundred and seventy-four as the total of the legion remaining on that day. So that the cavalry of the enemy, admitting that none of the infantry escaped, must have been greatly reduced in this action.

Morgan was neither dazzled, nor lulled into security by his signal success. Reasoning to what his adversary would do, from a knowledge of what he ought to do, he made no doubt that Cornwallis would be in motion to cut him off from retreat before night. His distance was not much above 25 miles, and the speed of the terrified and flying cavalry would complete that distance in five or six hours. It was not yet noon when the battle was terminated, and he knew that the main army had been for some days held under marching orders. He halted, no longer on the field of battle than to refresh his men and prisoners, and make the dispositions which humanity required of him; and moved across the Broad river the same evening.

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Colonel Pickens with a suitable detachment of mounted militia, was left upon the field of battle to bury the dead and provide for the wants and comforts of the wounded of both armies. This duty was discharged with all the care and diligence of a brave and benevolent man. The baggage of the enemy furnished an abundant supply of tents, (the Americans had none,) and comforts and even luxuries were drawn from the same source without sparing. After making every possible provision for their care and attendance, the wounded of both armies were left upon the field of battle under a safeguard and a flag, and the next day Pickens rejoined his commander.

Early in the morning Morgan had resumed his march, anxiously expecting the return of his patroles with intelligence that the enemy was at hand; but never was surprise or relief greater, than when authentic intelligence was received, not only that the enemy had not moved, but exhibited no present evidence of an intention to move on that day. Still, however, he pressed his march to reach the fords of the Catawba, and escape interruption from the rise of the waters. He felt himself still within the power of his adversary, and resolved to spare no pains to escape his grasp.

It is truly astonishing that Lord Cornwallis has not only escaped all censure for suffering his enemy to elude him and carry off prisoners, arms, ammunition, artillery, every thing in triumph, but has been most extravagantly eulogized for his conduct on this occasion; yet it is most certain that, under the favour of providence, Morgan owed his escape to the supineness and indecision of his adversary.

At the time the battle was fought, the position of the two armies was nearly equidistant from the point of concurrence of the two roads by which the one must retreat, (if North Carolina was his object,) and the other might pursue. The time necessary to convey intelligence of the defeat could not exceed that which must have been consumed in the cares devolved upon Morgan by his very victory. And Cornwallis being already on the east side of Broad River, which Morgan must cross, had in his favour the time which the latter necessarily consumed in the passage of the river, and which could not have been less than what was necessary to put in motion an army under marching orders. To these considerations we must add, that the British army was at this time completely rested, refreshed and recruited, and abundantly furnished with every thing necessary to give vigour and promptness to its movements.

On the other hand, Morgan's army had begun its march after the fatigues of a hard-fought day. It was not encumbered with its own baggage, because almost destitute of every thing; but it was embarrassed with a mass of prisoners equalling two thirds of his whole force, and perseveringly dragging after it.

a prize too valuable to be relinquished. The heavy baggage of the enemy, after supplying the wants of the wounded, Morgan had consumed, but the muskets, artillery, and ammunition, were too much wanted to be relinquished while a hope of saving them remained. With all this he moved so slowly as not to have reached the north fork or main stream of the Catawba until the 23d.

Where was the British commander during this time? The precious and irretrievable day of the 18th, the day after the action, he consumed entire in his encampment, "to effect," as he tells us, "a junction with Leslie, and collect the fugitives of Tarleton's detachment." In war, days are years. Here again, the notable manœuvre of ordering Leslie to halt at Camden, "that General Greene might be uncertain of his intended movements as long as possible,"* retroacted upon the British commander with fatal consequences. It is impossible to justify this delay, except upon the supposition that Cornwallis, deceived by the exaggerated account which Tarleton, to palliate his defeat, had communicated of the American force, had formed the opinion that it was superior to his own. This inference is fairly deducible from the representation of that force, which Colonel Tarleton, in his publication, has palmed upon the world. He may have believed that his enemy numbered two thousand four hundred; but it is astonishing that he should have believed it, after deliberately reconnoitring his force, obtaining the most authentic intelligence, and measuring his line by his own. We take his own acknowledgments.

Had Cornwallis immediately on receiving intelligence of the disaster his detachment had encountered, put in motion one thousand infantry and a few pieces of light artillery, with orders to the cavalry to follow, after resting for the night, it is unquestionable that he must have overtaken General Morgan at Ramsour's Mills, where their roads united and crossed the south fork of the Catawba. For his baggage he had nothing to apprehend, since he could still have left a sufficient guard for its protection, and the army of General Leslie was encamped on the night before at so short a distance as to have joined him early on the 18th. Morgan, with numbers diminished by the preceding battle, numerous detachments ever out to collect provisions, and one third of his force at least, appropriated to guarding the prisoners, could have done nothing against one thousand of such infantry as Cornwallis had under him. He must have abandoned his prisoners and baggage, mounted his infantry behind his militia, and escaped by a hurried march, or fled to the mountains on his left.

* See the Correspondence, &c. p. 24.

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Even after the loss of the 18th, when joined by the division of Leslie, the means were still in Lord Cornwallis' power of reaching his adversary.

The immense attirail of the army, prepared for an entire campaign and a junction with the forces under Philips, could not but have furnished a sufficient number of horses to have mounted and pushed forward one thousand infantry by forced marches for two days, either directly upon Morgan, or by a route which, crossing the Little Catawba near its junction with the Great, leads up the west bank of the latter stream, so as to intersect the route which Morgan was pursuing. This route would also have presented the advantage of leading through a country not exhausted by the recent march of the army he was pursuing, an inconvenience which, it appears, he felt when too late, in pursuing the route by Ramsour's Mills. But the commander, whose vigour, activity, and sacrifices on this occasion, have animated the pens both of British and American writers, not pursuing either of these measures, contented himself with putting the whole army in motion on the 19th, dragging after him in the chase a lengthened train of cumberous baggage, and employing his still respectable cavalry to no other use than reconnoitring the field of battle, with orders to return under protection of his camp before night.*

This vigorous pursuit after an enemy of whose activity and enterprise he had had sufficient evidence, brought Cornwallis to Ramsour's Mills on the 25th†—a place which, if we credit Colonel Tarleton, he ought to have reached by the day of the battle. Had he done so, Morgan's victory would have availed him little; for, to cross the Catawba in the rear of Cornwallis, would have been impossible, since Leslie advancing at that time to join the latter, would have intercepted him; and could he have reached the mountains on his left, he could not have passed them with his baggage, or probably with his prisoners, for want of subsistence, and would have been in that case, effectually cut off from forming a junction with Greene. Or had Cornwallis pursued the design originally attributed to him, of pressing Leslie up the east side of the Catawba, whilst he ascended on the west, Morgan's escape would have been most certainly intercepted. And the British divisions would still have been so near to each other as to have easily formed a junction on the approach of Greene. Though, had the British commander been well informed of the weak and destitute state of the main southern army, he would not have been disquieted on that subject; neither could he have entertained a fear of the militia on the east side of the Catawba, had he been in possession of that

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* Tarleton's Campaign, p. 222.

† See his letter, *ante*.

intelligence which his connection with the loyalists of that country, and other advantages which he possessed, might have insured to him.

The escape of Morgan has been generally atributed to an extraordinary interposition of providence in raising the waters of the Catawba between the night that he passed it and the morning following, when the British reached it. The incident was handsomely worked up in the papers of the day, and having some foundation in truth, the circulation was favoured, since it served the purposes of both parties. To the British it furnished an excuse, and to the Americans a fine subject for working upon the enthusiasm of the people. But a simple reference to original documents respecting dates, will prove that Cornwallis was neither so pressing, nor Morgan so pressed as to need the interposition of a miracle to check the one, or save the other.

Much error has crept into the details of the events of the period between the time when Cornwallis commenced his pursuit, and the 1st of February, when he crossed the main stream of the Catawba. Neither the actions nor motives of the rival commanders appear to have been well understood, or correctly explained. Dazzled with the magnanimity of the sacrifice made by Cornwallis in destroying his baggage in order to give speed to his movements, historians shut their eyes upon the concomitant errors which rendered that sacrifice in the first instance, vain and useless, and finally, fatal to the British commander. On the other hand, the American commanders, satisfied with having secured to their country the benefit of their manœuvres, were willing to sacrifice a portion of their military merit, that they might secure to the service the eclat of an imputed miracle in behalf of their cause.

Several authors mention the destruction of the baggage as a measure preparatory to Cornwallis' first movement. Had this been the case, it would have afforded an excuse for the loss of the 18th, a day which he never did recover. But the fact was not so; it was at Ramsour's Mills that he destroyed his baggage, six days after the commencement of his march, and when his adversary had already, two days before, passed the other branch of the Catawba, twenty miles in advance of him. Nor is this all; he consumed two days at that place in the performance of this work and the collection of provisions, and did not resume his march until the 28th.*

In the mean time, had his adversary been disposed to do so, he could easily have advanced too far beyond the North Catawba to have been again approached by his enemy. But Greene had now joined him in person, though

* See his letter, Correspondence, &c. p. 25.

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with no reinforcement. And it was resolved to make a stand on the east bank of that river, to endeavour to check the advance of the British army, that the prisoners and baggage which had never been halted, should be secured from molestation while hurried on to the interior of Virginia.

Thus like those birds, which instinctively throw themselves into the way of the fowler and imitate death or decrepitude to draw him away from their young, Morgan's little army braved the approach of the enemy, to detach him from the pursuit of the object of their solicitude,—the trophies of the day of the Cowpens, by inviting him to exhaust his efforts on themselves.

It was during the march of Lord Cornwallis from Ramsour's Mills that the swell of the waters of the Great Catawba took place,* and not on the night of the day on which Morgan crossed that river. It is correctly stated by Colonel Lee and others to have occurred on the night of the 29th, but the American army had crossed several days before. And the prisoners were then so far advanced on their march, that Greene might have left the bank of the river without apprehension, had not the height of the water given him more time to endeavour to collect the militia, and if successful in this effort, to dispute the passage of the river, until his main army should have advanced sufficiently up the country to facilitate his reaching them by a few forced marches. To have collected in this neighbourhood a considerable reinforcement of militia, was an object of the greatest importance, and every hope of this must be abandoned the moment the troops under Morgan should move away.

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* See his letters before referred to.

CHAPTER X.

State of the Southern army. Moves to Guilford. Morgan's retreat from the Catawba. Junction at Guilford. Movement across the Dan. Lord Cornwallis in pursuit, reaches the Dan. Retires to Hillsborough. Greene recrosses the Dan. Interesting manœuvres. Affair with Colonel Pyles, of Alemance Creek, of Wetzel's Mills. Dash at the American reinforcements. Greene throws himself in face of the enemy. Lord Cornwallis retires to Deep river. American army moves to Guilford.

GENERAL Greene had been called to the banks of the Catawba, by intelligence of Morgan's victory. It will be recollected that we left him on the banks of the Pee Dee, prosecuting enterprises against the enemy's posts in the interior, at the moment when this interesting piece of intelligence was received. This was on the evening of the 25th of January, and the army was immediately put under marching orders.

The situation of Greene was at that time truly tantalizing. With the finest opening imaginable for rendering important service and increasing his military reputation, under circumstances too, calculated greatly to excite public expectation and increase the demand upon him for some brilliant achievement, he found himself without men, without money, without clothing, and so scant even of provisions as to be obliged to gather the corn from the field, prepare it for the mill, and guard the mill during the process of converting it into

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meal. Such and so many had been the interruptions to the labours of the husbandman, that at that late day, much of the Indian corn, (the only grain cultivated in that country,) still remained ungathered. As to men, notwithstanding the reinforcements lately received under Colonels Greene and Lee, his regular force, including that under Morgan and every other detachment in the field, did not exceed 1426 infantry, 47 artillerists, and 230 cavalry. In addition to which he had with him about 400 militia. But both the regulars and militia were for ever fluctuating in number; for, the continentals of the Virginia line having been enlisted for various periods of service, and calculating their time from the date of enlistment, were continually claiming their discharges; and their commander had the mortification of seeing daily his best troops drop off in detail.

As to the militia, most generally, being volunteers they came and went when they pleased; or being summoned into service for a short time, one half of their term was consumed in marching and countermarching, and they could never be calculated upon for a week together.

As to money, he literally had none. There was not a dollar in the military chest when he assumed the command, and for two months after, he had not wherewith to bear the expense of his expresses: they had to live at free quarters in traversing the country. He had even occasionally to borrow from his officers, when money became indispensable for secret services. Congress, it is true, at the earnest instances of Mr. John Mathews, voted him a supply of 10,000 hard dollars, deemed at that time a great stretch of liberality; but we cannot find that he ever received a cent of it. The only supply that came to the hands of the paymaster during the whole campaign, arose from the sale of bills on our ambassadors abroad,—an expedient which shed a momentary gleam over his prospects, but soon left him in total darkness.*

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* This measure of finance, it will be recollected, was adopted by congress at a time when they were literally pennyless. As it was in its nature temporary and speculative, it soon faltered and failed. The great relief which it at first afforded to the necessities of the United States made several persons emulous of arrogating the praise of it. We will not undertake to say with whom it originated, but we have furnished the reader with an extract of a letter to Mr. Matlock in congress, which shows that General Greene had pressed it upon that body, as the means of clothing the army. It certainly is spoken of in the correspondence of the day as "his plan;" and that, whilst yet in the quarter-master-general's department. He recommended its adoption as soon as the negociation commenced for borrowing money abroad. He had received letters from Commodore Gillon and Mr. Adams, from which he concluded that the negociation for loans would be successful, and urged the necessity of adopting this method of anticipating the result. There was at that time a considerable

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As to clothing, the situation of the southern army had been recently somewhat improved; otherwise it would have been impossible to take the field. Early in January several hundreds of the troops actually could not appear at drill, or perform guard-duty, for want of clothing. They had not even what was indispensable to decency, notwithstanding the small supply, gathered with infinite difficulty in North Carolina, which had enabled General Gates to furnish his men with a single suit. What they thus obtained, was light and scanty, by no means such as was necessary to comfort, in a march to the north at that inclement season of the year. The following brief extract of a letter of the 15th January to General Sumpter, needs no comment: "It is a great misfortune that the little force we have is in such a wretched state for want of clothing. More than one half our numbers are in a manner naked, so much so that we cannot put them on the least kind of duty. Indeed, there is a great number that have not a rag of clothes on them except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form around their waists."

But there was no time now for hesitation, every hardship must be encountered, every thing put to hazard, to succour General Morgan and intercept the march of the enemy through the state of Virginia. Reinforcements, supplies, every thing on which the hope of a successful opposition could have rested,

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forced trade carried on with Europe, and as shipments could not be made of produce to meet the purchase of articles adapted to this trade, money was very much wanted in Europe by the traders in America. The enemy had hitherto supplied the bills which the trade required, and drawn to them many of the advantages resulting from this branch of commerce. As it was known that congress had opened negociations for loans in Europe, and was treating even with the crowned heads which favoured their cause, to obtain advances, these bills found at first a ready sale, as they were naturally supposed to be drawn upon funds realized, and not upon speculation. But the delusion soon vanished; a minority seldom suffers such measures to remain secret long, and the market either became glutted, or the truth leaked out too soon to permit the southern army to reap much benefit from this project.

The commissary of purchases for the southern army at that time was Mr. Joseph Clay, a highly respectable, intelligent, and patriotic gentleman from the state of Georgia. Deprived of an ample estate, and driven into banishment, he at present resided at Newbern; and by his integrity, assiduity, and knowledge of business, contributed to the utmost of the means allowed him, to promote the interests of the southern army through the medium of the fast-sailing vessels that traded between the Pamptico and Albemarle Sounds, and the neutral or friendly islands in the West Indies. To him the bills allotted for the southern army were transmitted; some he succeeded in selling or passing off in purchasing, and a small amount of them was placed in the hands of General Greene for negociation. Some money was realized for these, but the amount was quite inconsiderable, and exhausted in the purchase of hospital and other stores.

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would have been cut off, could Lord Cornwallis have succeeded in destroying Morgan, and securing a position beyond the Roanoke.

The 25th, 26th, and 27th of January, General Greene employed in making the indispensable arrangements for the march of his army, and on the 28th he committed, what will be deemed by many the most imprudent action of his life. With only a guide, one aid, and a serjeant's guard of cavalry, he struck across the country to join the army of General Morgan, and aid him in his arduous operations. The distance was one hundred miles at least, the country infested with tories, and Camden not far on his left, where such a prize would have been liberally paid for. But there is less danger in such enterprises than is generally imagined. History furnishes many instances of their successful issue. The very surprise produces hesitation in the minds of many, who, if they had time to deliberate, might be inclined to treachery; and the boldness of the design deters or overawes those who might be disposed to make advantage of the occasion.

Immediately on the receipt of the news of Morgan's victory, orders had been dispatched to call in all the detachments, and transport to camp all the provisions which did not lie on the route of the intended march. Colonel Lee was instructed to hasten his return from below with all possible dispatch, and proceed immediately to join Morgan by the shortest route. To the commissary of purchases were issued orders to transport every thing from the seacoast to a place of safety; to the several commissaries at Salisbury and Hillsborough, to hold themselves in readiness to move off with prisoners and stores in their charge, into the upper counties of Virginia; to the quarter-master-general, to hold his boats in readiness on the Dan and collect magazines on the Roanoke; and the most pressing letters were written to the governors of the state of North Carolina and Virginia, to fill up their quotas of regulars and to call into the field all the militia they could command, to oppose the progress of the enemy and enable the army to fight them; to Steuben, to hasten on his recruits; to Colonels Shelby, Campbell, and others who had signalized their zeal in the affair of King's Mountain, were addressed the most earnest and flattering letters reminding them of the glory already acquired, and calling upon them to come forward once more to save the country from invasion. These letters, it will be found commanded very general attention, and prepared for the British army the reception they met with at Guilford.

Some extracts of letters written at this time we will lay before the reader to satisfy him that we have not imagined the picture that we have presented of Greene's situation. Many others to the same effect could be produced.

To the late Mr. John Mathews, chairman of a committee appointed by congress to correspond with the southern army, he writes:

"This is a great affair, [the victory of the Cowpens,] was our situation such as to take a proper advantage of it; but as it is, I fear little good will result from it as to the final recovery of the country.

"The situation of these states is wretched and the distress of the inhabitants beyond all description. Nor is the condition of the army more agreeable. We have but few troops that are fit for duty, and all those are employed upon different detachments, the success of which depends upon time and chance. We are obliged to subsist ourselves by our own industry, aided by the influence of Governor Rutledge, who is one of the first characters I ever met with. Our prospects are gloomy, notwithstanding these flashes of success, and I hope congress will not imagine that Lord Cornwallis is ruined from this fortunate event. There is wanting for the recovery of this country, a well-appointed army consisting of about 5,000 infantry, and 6 or 800 horse. These, with the auxiliary aid of the militia, would be superior to any force the enemy have, or can maintain in this quarter.

"You may depend, my utmost exertions shall not be wanting to take every possible advantage that our situation will admit, to give a favourable turn to our affairs in this quarter; but unless I am better supported than I have at present the most distant prospect of being, I have little to hope, and much to fear."

It will be recollected that when General Greene was on the way to the south, he left behind him General Gist to urge his claims on the legislature of Maryland. He had not omitted the same precaution either as to congress, or the legislatures of the other states on which he was obliged to depend for the means of prosecuting the war; he had rigidly observed his favourite maxim, that those whom you are obliged to solicit ought not to be permitted to forget you.

To General Gist he writes in these words: "Surely the states must be sufficiently impressed with their own dangerous situation; and if they will not come to some decisive measures for giving effectual support to this army, they may have to repent in the hour of distress, of their own languor and indecision.

"These southern states have been struggling a long time with a superior force, until their spirits are broken, and the resources of the country exhausted. Where the people are kept constantly in arms, they must live altogether on their past labours, and totally neglect any future provision. This is the situation of these southern states, which must render the condition of the inhabit-

CHAP. X. ants distressing, and the support of the army impracticable. Such great bodies of militia have been kept on foot, and those subsisted in a way so very expensive and wasteful, that the states of North and South Carolina are in a manner laid waste. Nor can any state when invaded, afford considerable support to an army for any length of time, it causes such an universal obstruction to all kinds of business. It is the states that are in tranquillity which have it in their power to give effectual aid to an army, not those that are in distress.

"When I left Annapolis I was in great hopes that the legislature would have taken measures before this for filling their regiments, and for supplying the waggons which this army was, and still is in such want of. The cash which I required was so essential, and might have been obtained so easily from hundreds of private gentlemen in Maryland, that I am surprised it has not been forwarded, especially as I mentioned the purpose for which it was wanted, [secret service.] I persuade myself, if the state of Maryland could realise the critical situation of this army and the disagreeable consequences that may follow the neglect of not giving it timely support, we should not be long without further aid. The enemy are receiving reinforcements continually, and our numbers are daily declining. Nor is our whole collective force more than one third of theirs, and the greatest part of those rendered unfit for duty for want of clothing.

"General Smallwood is gone home to join his influence to yours, in order to bring out a seasonable reinforcement as soon as possible. Whatever stores you send on to this army, give positive orders to the waggon-master in writing not to deliver to the order of any person whatever except the Baron Steuben, until he arrives in camp. The agents of posts have made such a practice of opening and taking out stores for their own use, that the stores are generally plundered in such a manner before they get to camp that there are little or none left; and if we cannot check this practice, it is impossible for this army to be properly supplied.

"We are now obliged to collect our own provisions, and were it not that we have some of the militia of the country to assist us, we should be scattered over the face of the earth, little less remote from each other than the inhabitants themselves. Our situation is distressing, and we must be ruined if the enemy push us, which we have great reason to expect, as Lord Cornwallis has been in motion some days past."

To General Varnum, then a member of congress, a very early acquaintance and associate in arms, and who always stood high in his affection and confidence, he writes thus: "By a letter from General Washington which came to

hand a few days since, I am informed of your being on your way to congress, which I am happy to hear of. You have the feelings of a soldier, and know the wants of an army. But you have never been in a southern army, where distress and difficulties beset you on every side. This department affords a checkered scene. Sometimes one party is successful, and sometimes the other. General Morgan gained a complete victory over Colonel Tarleton. The particulars are forwarded to congress; for them I refer you to Major Giles, an old acquaintance, who will have the honour to deliver you this," &c.

"This army is in a deplorable condition, and notwithstanding this little success must inevitably fall a prey to the enemy if not better supported than I can see a prospect of. Don't imagine that Lord Cornwallis is ruined; for depend upon it the southern states must fall, unless there is established a well-appointed army for their support of about 5 or 6000 infantry, and 800 or 1000 horse, and these to be well equipped for active operations. Such a force, assisted by the auxiliary aid of the militia, would prove superior to any force the enemy could maintain in the field in this quarter.

"There is a great spirit of enterprise prevailing among the militia of these southern states, especially with the volunteers. But their mode of going to war is so destructive, that it is the greatest folly in the world to trust the liberties of a people to such a precarious defence.

"In this command I am obliged to put every thing to the hazard, and, contrary to all military propriety, am obliged to make detachments that nothing but absolute necessity could authorize, or even justify. If they are successful it is well, if not I am ruined. There is no alternative—I must commit myself to fortune and trust myself to my friends for support. It is my only wish to be upon an equal footing with Lord Cornwallis, and if I did not give a good account of him, I would agree to be subject to censure," &c.

To the commander in chief also, General Greene had written, announcing the victory of the Cowpens and expressing his deep chagrin at not being able to avail himself of all the advantages which ought to be drawn from that event. To this General Washington replies: "I wish I had it in my power to congratulate you on the brilliant and important victory of General Morgan without the alloy which the distresses of the department you command, and apprehensions of posterior events intermix. Amidst the complicated dangers with which you are surrounded a confidence in your abilities is my only consolation. I am convinced you will do every thing that is practicable. I lament that you will find it so difficult to avoid a general action; for our misfortunes can only be completed by the dispersion of your little army, which will be the most probable consequence of such an event."

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The apprehensions which these letters express were not a little increased about this time, by intelligence that a British fleet had made its appearance off the Cape Fear river. A reinforcement landed at that place and rapidly pushed up the river, through the numerous settlements of loyalists who inhabited its banks, would have produced no small embarrassment to the American commander, and possibly must have occasioned a diversion of his forces from direct operation against the grand army. Wilmington lay directly in the rear of the American position, and communicated by a navigable river with Cross Creek, now Fayetteville, where stores had been collected, a manufactory of shoes established, and the salting of provisions going on for the relief of the American troops.

Lord Cornwallis had foreseen all this, and knew also that great advantages might be derived from establishing a post at Wilmington, as well in giving countenance to the loyalists, as in furnishing a magazine or depot preparatory to his operations both in North Carolina and Virginia. Previous, therefore, to opening the campaign, he had detached Major Craig to seize upon and fortify that place. Craig found the place in a defenceless state; it had generally, during the war been in the hands of the enemy, and was now taken possession of with little or no opposition. From some intelligence previously communicated, General Greene was apprehensive that it was Arnold from Virginia; but his fears subsided when he learned that the troops landed were only sufficient for a garrison, and he did not despair of seizing an opportunity to possess himself of it by a *coup de main*, and converting to his own relief the magazines that had been provided to aid the operations of his enemy.

At present the relief of Morgan claimed his undivided attention.

It happened at this time when his necessities were most pressing, that the time of service of the Virginia militia brigade was near expiring. It was commanded by General Stevens, who, from a colonel in the regular service, had been promoted to the command of a brigade in the militia. According to an established rule, which was necessarily adhered to, or the militia would have come no more into the field, it was necessary to march off this regiment in time to arrive at their place of rendezvous, to be there discharged when their tour of duty expired. Greene availed himself of this opportunity, of performing a pressing service, without thinning his ranks by sending off a considerable detachment. Stevens was an excellent officer. Greene knew his value, and hurried him away with his command, ordering him to take charge of the prisoners then in the depot at Hillsborough, to hasten them on so as to intersect the line of march of those recently taken by Morgan, and make the

best of his way to the interior counties of Virginia, where, the whole would be secure and remote from the danger of recapture.

These orders were ably executed, and Stevens never rested after performing this service, but hurried back to take part in the active scenes that he anticipated, and rejoined his general in time to perform the most brilliant services at Guilford. It is perhaps due both to the penetration of Greene and the merits of Stevens to mention, that in the letter addressed to the governor of Virginia pressing him to order out a reinforcement of militia, Greene solicits particularly that it should be placed under the command of Stevens. His subsequent conduct proved that he merited the high opinion that his commander had formed and expressed of him.

The state of things in Virginia at this time, left no doubt on the mind of General Greene as to the course Lord Cornwallis would pursue. In the last of December the celebrated Arnold entered the Chesapeake, and ascending the James River on the 4th January, debarked about 700 men on the north side of that river about 25 miles below Richmond.

The account of his subsequent proceedings, will be extracted from Baron Steuben's official letter of the 8th of that month.

"The 4th in the morning we received intelligence that the enemy's fleet lay off Westover, and were preparing to disembark. It was then evident their object was Richmond, and orders were immediately given for the removal of the public stores. As the enemy had 25 miles to march before they reached the town, I was in hopes a force would collect sufficient at least to check their progress; but to my surprise, about 100 men were all that could be assembled. These I sent down under the command of a Major Dick, a state officer to whom I gave orders to harass the enemy by firing at them from every favourable piece of ground. These orders were, however, ill executed. The enemy moved that evening to Four Mile Creek, where they encamped about eleven o'clock.

"What few continental stores were in town I sent out to Westham, having before ordered Major Clairborne up the river to collect boats there to transport them across. I also ordered the 150 continental troops to march from Petersburg and take a position opposite to Westham; and, Colonel Davie having sent all the stores and hospital from Chesterfield, was ordered to the same place with the remainder of his naked troops. The state stores, of which great quantities were in town, were under the direction of Colonel Minter, by whose inactivity and downright negligence they were lost. Of their artillery I saved myself five pieces which were mounted. The rest, consisting of three brass and a great many iron pieces, fell into the enemy's hands.

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"Not a single man except those I sent out presenting himself to oppose the approach of the enemy, I thought it prudent to cross the river in the evening, and took my quarters in Manchester, and next day about 12 o'clock the enemy took possession of the town, having marched about twenty-five miles with 850 men and 30 horse, without receiving a single shot. They left half their force in the town and proceeded immediately with the rest to Westham, where they burnt all the public buildings, consisting of a foundry, with a boring-mill, powder magazine, and some small ships, and returned to Richmond the same evening. The continental stores had been all sent across the river, and some state stores; what part was left I have not yet learnt. About 800 militia had arrived at Westham on their way down, and arms were actually recrossing for them, but hearing of the enemy's approach and being unarmed, they dispersed," &c. "In fact," the narrative concludes, "the enemy returned as they went, without receiving a single shot, and have lain quietly at Westover in a scattered manner all this day," (the 8th.)

In tranquillity, Arnold shipped his plunder; and exulting in his triumph over that pride which he had contributed to elevate, he descended the river and took possession once more of Norfolk and Portsmouth.

It may appear astonishing that such an enterprise, with such a handful of men should have so effectually succeeded; but it is a fate which a recent event has proved, all those places communicating with the Chesapeake must be exposed to, from an enemy who can lie in security with his shipping, in that bay. While an enemy can move on the wings of the wind, a force equal to his own must be held in readiness to meet him at every assailable point at the same time. The expense of this and of the preparation necessary to give certainty to resistance, is too great to be incurred.

No preparation for defence had been made in this instance, except a small fort on the river, which the enemy soon carried at the point of the bayonet. Yet the most immediate resort was had to the defence on which the public mind had rested in security, to wit, the militia. On the first intelligence of the appearance of the fleet, Steuben had demanded 4,000 militia, and Governor Jefferson had promptly issued the order for their assembling. But it was not until the enemy had retired, that they could be brought together in any force; and a panic, the general forerunner of an approaching enemy, will probably always produce the same effect, among men, whose families and property lie scattered along the line of the enemy's advance.

Steuben flew to his depot of recruits at Chesterfield, and there were in it at that time 600 vigorous young men, who might alone have covered Richmond, could they have been brought into the field. But of the whole, there

were only 150 who had clothes on their backs,* and these were so badly clad, that he had to hasten them back to shelter, the moment the enemy had shrunk from his design of crossing over to Manchester. With these Steuben, had first taken post at Petersburg; and it appears that a show of resistance at that place and Manchester, saved a vast property in shipping and tobacco for the time; but it was only saved until another and more formidable enemy appeared. This was General Philips, at this time preparing to embark from New York.

Whether Richmond, nay the credit of the state might not have been saved by the rising of the militia *en masse*, we are unable to determine. The population of Richmond, Manchester, and Petersburg, all within a scope of twenty-five miles, the same distance that Arnold had to march after landing, added to Steuben's little force, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, ought to have greatly outnumbered the enemy.† But unfortunately upon such occurrences, the tendency of every man's mind is first to look to individual interests, and before he turns his attention to the public defence, the evil is consummated. The governments of the states had not at that time, and perhaps never will have sufficient militia organization, to counteract the certain effects of this individual influence upon the militia of a state on sudden emergencies.

When intelligence reached the southern commander, that Arnold had seated himself down in Portsmouth and was fortifying it, that a formidable embarkation of troops under General Philips was in forwardness at New York, and that Morgan was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, he no longer doubted of the course to be pursued, and the army got in motion on the 29th of January, with orders to ascend the banks of the Pee Dee, and crossing at Mask's Ferry above the mouth of Little River, to move up with all possible expedition to Salisbury.

On this occasion the army was thrown into two brigades, the Virginia troops composing one under command of General Huger, the Maryland and Delaware troops the other, under Colonel Williams; and Lieutenant Colonel Mor-

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* (Baron Steuben, 15th Dec. 1780. Extract.) "The business now before me is to get clothes for those wretches now at Chesterfield Court-House; they amount to between 5 and 600, but they are so totally naked that except I can get some clothes for them, they will be all sick before they can be ordered to march which (from the great difficulty of procuring clothing of every sort) I fear will not be sooner than four weeks. But as I wish, so my whole powers shall be exerted to support you, and I shall not think any pains too great to get 400 men on their way to camp."

† Mr. Jefferson states the numbers between the James and York rivers on one side, and the James river and Carolina line on the other upon the tide waters, at near 10,000 fighting men, and the whole militia of the state at 49,971.

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ris, of the general's family, was ordered to attend them on their march, and in the absence of the commander, to discharge the various incidental duties that might have required his attention. From Mask's Ferry, it will be seen, the army afterwards moved on by forced marches until it formed a junction with Morgan at Guilford,—a change of direction given it by subsequent events; and seldom have officers or men better deserved the gratitude of their country than those who had to undergo this laborious and distressing journey. At the time of its commencement there existed too many of those little jealousies and questions of rank which too often disturb the harmony of an army drawn together and composed as this was. These the officers were solemnly called upon to dismiss for the present, and cordially to combine their efforts in the arduous service on which they were about to enter. The request was promptly complied with, and the constraint thus imposed upon the feelings of many, terminated in explanations and cordial reconciliation. Such sacrifices are easily obtained from officers of merit in the state of predisposition which the general had been sedulous in promoting at their camp of repose.

Nor were the effects resulting from the excellent temper of the men less conspicuous. General Greene had always set a high estimate on possessing the affections of his men; he knew the full value of gratitude, in quickening obedience, and esteemed the homage of the heart the best security against treachery. Cold looks and reluctant services from dependants, are very uncongenial with the claims of a benevolent mind. Greene never failed to purchase a greeting smile from his humblest dependant at the easy rate of civil demeanour, or a kind and encouraging word. Small indeed are the demands of the common soldier on the benevolence of one high in command; trifling is the sacrifice at which he is able to purchase the willing services which flow from personal affection. A very striking proof of the success with which the general had conciliated the affections, and acquired the confidence of his troops was exhibited on this march. Severe as the weather was, in the very depth of winter, half naked, and marking their steps with the blood that flowed from their bare feet, often pinched with hunger, never regularly supplied with food, without tents, many destitute of blankets, journeying on days when every living creature else was driven to some place of shelter, drenched with perpetual rains, often wading waist deep through rapid streams, with no means but exercise of restoring warmth to their benumbed limbs, and not the ordinary solace of a glass of spirits, in a march of one hundred and fifty miles not one man deserted. This instance of patient suffering and invincible fidelity, should be engraven on the heart of every American.

Whatever danger might otherwise have attended the journey of General Greene across the country, it was greatly diminished by the celerity of his movements. He must have travelled from Hick's Creek on the Pee Dee, to Beattie's Ford on the Catawba, in two days, for we have his letters of the 27th dated camp at Pee Dee, and many of the 30th written from the camp at Sherard's Ford on the Catawba, all in his own handwriting. The hiatus is only of the 28th and 29th, during which he was upon the journey. But it has been remarked of him by one of his aids, that he never appeared to suffer in body or spirits under the effects of fatigue. We have set down the length of this journey at one hundred miles. Ramsay says one hundred and fifty; it may be stated with correctness at one hundred and twenty-five.

When General Greene arrived at Morgan's camp, he found the state of things materially changed and essentially improved from what he had reason to apprehend from his last intelligence. A letter to General Huger, written on the 30th from Sherald's Ford, will present an authentic account of the relative position of the two armies and of the measures adopted to meet the supposed exigencies of the service.

"I have just arrived at this place, where General Morgan is posted with his light troops. The enemy lie on the other side of the Catawba about 18 miles below this. All the fords between this and Charlotte are occupied by the militia under General Davidson. The enemy appear determined to cross, and from different accounts have in contemplation visiting Salisbury. If they cross and push that way, they must have in view a plan of co-operation with Arnold at Cape Fear. To disconcert them, it will be necessary for us to form a junction before them, and give one or the other of them a defeat if practicable. The militia are arming in great numbers to appearance, but there is no possibility of telling our force; and at any rate I wish to avoid an action until our force is collected. I beg you to hasten your march towards Salisbury as fast as possible. If the stores have arrived, issue whatever may be necessary to put the troops in good order for action. Let the rest of the stores be sent up to Guilford Court-House, under the care of Major Magaret, with a light guard composed of troops unfit for other duty All the artillery except the four six-pounders, may go with him, but let those that are retained be well manned. The heavy baggage of the army may move up the east side of the river to the fords at Salisbury, and there wait further orders. Give General Lillington orders to join you, leaving a proper guard at the mouth of Rocky River to guard the provision and stores at that place, and to relieve all our parties at the mills. These may be unarmed men, if he has a sufficient number for the purpose; if not, he must detach those that are armed. Should Arnold land at

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"It is necessary we should take every possible precaution to guard against a misfortune. *But I am not without hopes of ruining Lord Cornwallis, if he persists in his mad scheme of pushing through the country.* And it is my earnest desire to form a junction as early as possible for this purpose. Desire Lieutenant Colonel Lee to force a march to join us. *Here is a fine field and great glory ahead.*

"If the companies of artificers are come up, detach a few to go with the stores and a few with the baggage, and bring the rest on with you, and desire Colonel Kosciusko to join me at this place as soon as he can.

"If General Marion cannot cross the Santee, give him orders to move up towards Camden upon Lynch's Creek, that he may be at hand to co-operate with us if necessary," &c.

This letter is given as a specimen of the comprehensiveness of the mind that dictated it, and the habit of the writer of leaving nothing, not even the minutest measure, unattended to. It is obvious that it was written whilst under the impression that Arnold had sailed from the Chesapeake with a view to land at Wilmington and co-operate with Lord Cornwallis. The efficiency of such a measure made him readily credit it, for he always reasoned on the principle that an enemy would do what he had best do. But when the true state of the force landed at Wilmington was ascertained, he no longer apprehended that Lord Cornwallis would direct his march to Rocky River, and

returned to the original opinion that his views were directed against Virginia. Measures were then varied accordingly. CHAP. X

General Greene's journey to Sherald's Ford had been hastened by a hurried scrawl received from Morgan, dated at that place on the 25th of January. This letter, though brief, is an important historical document, inasmuch as it expunges from historical truth all those miracles and brawls with which historians adorn Morgan's retreat from the Cowpens to Guilford. But it is still more important, as it removes a shade from his reputation under which it has been somewhat obscured.

"I receive," says the writer, "intelligence every hour of the enemy's rapid approach, in consequence of which I am sending off my waggons. My numbers at this time are too weak to fight them. I intend to move towards Salisbury, in order to get near the main army. I know they intend to bring me to an action, which I am resolved carefully to avoid.

"I expect you will move somewhere on the Yadkin to oppose their crossing. I think it would be advisable to join our forces and fight them before they join Philips; which they certainly will do if they are not stopped. I have ordered the commanding officer at Salisbury to move off with the prisoners and stores. If you think it right, you will repeat it. I cannot ascertain their number, but suppose them odds of two thousand. That number, if they keep in a compact body, which I make no doubt they will, we cannot hurt. I have sent to General Davidson to join me, which I expect he will do to-morrow; his strength I do not know, as his men were collecting yesterday."

In another letter written at sunrise the same day, he mentions that Lord Cornwallis had arrived at Ramsour's Mills, and the two taken together, for ever put down the miracle of the 29th, so gravely insisted on by every historian, from Ramsay to the humblest copyist. It is not a little surprising that Colonel Lee should have dwelt upon the same incident with such peculiar stress. His opportunities of ascertaining dates and events render, what was pardonable in others, in him a striking specimen of inaccuracy. It is unquestionable that Morgan crossed the Catawba on the 24th, and Lord Cornwallis' van reached Ramsour's Mills the same evening. On the 25th, Morgan sent off his baggage and prisoners, and receiving intelligence that evening, that Lord Cornwallis had halted and made no dispositions for immediately proceeding, he rested in tranquillity on the banks of the Catawba, watching the movements of his adversary, and waiting the further developement of his views; whilst his own presence countenanced the collection of the militia, whom he prepared to lead to the banks of the Yadkin, where he hoped to be able to turn upon his pursuers. Thus this celebrated miracle of modern times

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vanishes at the touch of truth, and we are left to the more rational duty of adoring that providence which gave wisdom and vigour to the councils of our leaders, or confounded those of their adversary. The subsequent miraculous rise of the Yadkin will also be found to have had no more foundation in reality. That it should have rained on the 27th and 28th of the month, and that the great rivers should have thereby become swollen, has nothing miraculous in it; it was the season when these occurrences are looked for in every year; and should it be urged, that still the delays which followed the 29th, were all-important to the advance of the main army to form a junction with that under Morgan, and the security of the prisoners; while we disavow a wish to check the grateful emotions, which this and a thousand other events of the revolution are calculated to excite, it must be observed, that the same rains which checked the progress of one army also checked the advance of the other. *The miracle that saved the American army in this instance, was, that Cornwallis should have halted his whole army two days at Ramsour's Mills for the purpose of destroying his baggage.* Morgan and his prisoners were then still in his power—the river continued passable for four days, on any one of which he could have pushed forward his cavalry, and a sufficient body of mounted infantry, to have destroyed the one and recaptured the other. The distance was not twenty miles, the crossing places numerous, and the opposition to be expected trifling; for at that time the militia were not yet embodied. And a greater miracle perhaps, and one more powerfully operating in favour of the American army was, this celebrated sacrifice of Cornwallis in destroying his baggage. It would not be difficult to demonstrate, that it had then been too long deferred to be beneficial, was wholly unnecessary to the end proposed, and finally produced his complete discomfiture.

Colonel Lee has spoken of this event in a style of animation, which can only be reconciled with his military knowledge and experience, by adverting to the error which he and various others have fallen into, of supposing that the sacrifice was promptly made by the British general upon the news of Tarleton's defeat, and made before the commencement of the pursuit of the American detachment. But it has been shown, that it was not resolved on until he had first lost one irretrievable day, and wasted seven others in making good a journey of a few miles. It was not, until the British commander reached the banks of the Little Catawba, and saw his adversary still twenty miles in advance, his rear covered by a rapid stream, and his prisoners and baggage pushed forward towards the interior of Virginia, that all the dangers which threatened his military fame broke upon his lordship's views. He had boasted to the British ministry that he had subdued two provinces, that the third was

but the high road to Virginia, where a junction with Philips, it was fondly hoped, would not only insure to him the conquest of that state, but open a passage, even to Philadelphia. But now, the shame of having an entire detachment of his army captured, in sight as it were of his head quarters, and conducted triumphantly for fifty miles on a circle, the radius of which at no time exceeded twenty-five miles, making his main army the centre; his hopes of recapture now nearly desperate, and the shame of an empty boaster awaiting him; the destruction of his baggage bears more the appearance of the result of desperation, than of cool and dispassionate reflection. Nothing but complete success could obviate the dangerous consequences of the measure; and the commander who stakes all upon one throw when he has still many chances in his favour, may claim the meed of intrepidity, but nothing further. When Greene received the intelligence of this event on his arrival at Morgan's camp, it is said, that with an air and manner which marked the energy of his feelings, he exclaimed, "Then he is ours." And the event proved him right. In the smoking heap of hundreds of waggons, of tents, baggage, clothing equipage to an immense amount, Lord Cornwallis may have contemplated the funeral pile of all his hopes. His watchful adversary saw that it portended his ruin, and every movement of the American army from that period must be explained with a reference to this occurrence. To delay, and detain his now enraged adversary, was the leading motive of the American commander, until wrought up to phrenzy he should commit some act of desperate imprudence. Such an event was obviously probable, could he tantalize him with the near prospect of a battle, still carefully eluding, and for ever harassing him. With this view the march of the main army was immediately changed; it had been intended to meet and check the enemy on the banks of the Yadkin, but it now became important to tempt him higher into the country, to prolong his pursuit, to draw him into a country favourable to the proposed operation, and which at the same time facilitated a junction with Greene's advancing reinforcements, whilst it furnished provisions for subsisting the army. In the mean time, it was reasonable to expect, that the troops of his adversary, dispirited by disappointment, worn down by fatigue, disgusted with the severity of a winter campaign, vexed at being so long subjected to the severest privations, would be diminished by desertion. The event realized every calculation. Colonel Lee has been so rapt with admiration of the British soldiers on this occasion as to have broken out with this apostrophe, "A memorable instance among many others in this unnatural war of the immutable disposition of the British soldiers to endure every privation in support of their king and country!" Yet, had the colonel adverted to the British returns of the day, he would

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have found, that during this very period, without a battle, the British forces in less than a month were reduced in number two hundred and twenty-seven. This must either have been by death or desertion, and those who had opportunities of observing the numbers of Hessian and English labourers soon after dispersed through the interior of that country, were at no loss to determine who and what they were. The celebrated guards, the boast of the English army, were reduced one eighth of their number. Mere mercenaries have few of those feelings which keep up the enthusiasm of their leaders: with them it may be strong for a moment, but it is evanescent and soon yields to the pressure of natural wants or acquired habits. The want of his gill of rum was more distinctly realized by the British soldier, than the duty of supporting "his king and country." What privations had they to complain of? They were well clad, well fed, but had to march 230 miles between the 1st and the 15th of February. Before that time, their progress had been so far from being precipitated, that between the 19th of January and 1st of February, they had made good not eighty miles.

Another fact which Morgan's letter of the 15th serves to establish is, that he has been *unjustly* charged with an intention of crossing the mountains. This assertion which implies a charge of being too careful of his own safety, and too indifferent to the general interest, and the views of his commander, has not a little affected the military fame of Morgan. It first made its appearance in Dr. Ramsay's History of the Revolution in South Carolina,* and has been repeated by General Moultrie,† and various other authors. It has also given rise to a tale of an altercation or coolness that ensued between Greene and Morgan which has been assigned as the cause of Morgan's retiring at that time from the arena of the American revolution. Nothing was less consistent with the state of facts.‡

The direction of the movements of Morgan ought alone to have relieved him from this imputation. For even from the field of battle the route he took led away from the mountains, and as directly towards the point where he contemplated forming a junction with the main army, as the position of the British army would possibly admit. If any further proof be wanted, his letter supplies it; and as to any altercation with his commander, there was not the least occasion afforded for it, for Greene never did any act on this occasion, that could bear the appearance of a wish to snatch from him his merited laurels; but confined his own efforts to the principal object which had drawn him to the banks

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* Vol. 2. 206. † Vol. 2. 260. ‡ Colonel Lee.

of the Catawba, to wit, to embody the militia, to endeavour to retard the progress of the enemy, and combine and harmonize the movements of both divisions of his army. It has been noticed that he had paid the earliest attention to the object of embodying a force on the banks of the Catawba, foreseeing the probability that Morgan would stand in need of it. One of the causes of his rapid transit from the one army to the other, was a despairing letter received from General Davidson, expressing his apprehensions that very few of the militia would be prevailed upon to leave their homes. Every thing at that time conspired to prevent them. All the hopes of the husbandman in that country depend upon the labours of this month; unless his fields can be prepared for a crop in February and March, his family must suffer for the necessaries of life. Besides which, Morgan was retreating, the enemy advancing, and both the "vigorous Tarleton" and "the amiable Cornwallis"* had given ample specimens of their "tender mercies." The inhabitants well knew that every house would be in flames, and every family left "no canopy but the heavens," if the master should be in arms, or even absent during the progress of the British army. The whigs of Mecklenberg, through which county the armies must march, had too good an excuse at this time for remaining at home, and both to the north and east of them, the loyalists probably outnumbered their opponents. From points more distant, time had not yet elapsed to expect reinforcements since the letters were dispatched which solicited aid. Nor could any reasonable hopes be entertained of aid from the brave race who had swarmed around Ferguson; for the cares of husbandry pressed heavily also on them. And, as generally had been the case on all other occasions, the march of the British army had been announced to the inhabitants of the frontier by a simultaneous incursion of the Indians, headed, it was asserted, by whites painted as Indians.†

It is true that General Morgan was about this time engaged in a disagreeable altercation, but it was with Colonel Sumpter, on the subject of the magazines as previously mentioned, not with General Greene. The latter was obliged to take part in it at the instance of General Morgan, but so far from giving offence to Morgan, that, thinking him in the right, he pointedly, but in the most delicate terms, remonstrated with Colonel Sumpter on the occasion. To manage two such towering spirits was a task of no little delicacy; but notwithstanding the utmost efforts were used to avoid giving umbrage to either, it is the opinion of some, that it was the origin of a coolness in Sumpter towards

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* Colonel Lee.

† Governor Rutledge's letter, 30th December 1780.

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Greene which never subsided. The correspondence on the occasion with both these officers is before us, and exhibits a knowledge of human character, a painful apprehension for the consequences of dissensions and disgust among his officers, and a lively anxiety to obviate them, highly characteristic, and doing great honour to the feelings and talents of the commander.

It is not easy to assign a satisfactory or even plausible reason for Colonel Sumpter's interference on that occasion, to prevent his officers from executing the commands of General Morgan. The commander of the southern department was not only the supreme military governor of the country, but Colonel Sumpter was at that time actually out of the state, still confined by his wounds. Colonel Sumpter, it seems, complained of some interference of Morgan with his commands, but in what instances, or to what effect we are not informed. But supposing it to have existed, still the authority of General Greene was sufficeint to sanction it, and although Colonel Sumpter might have had cause to complain, nothing could justify him in undertaking to resist the execution of an order from the commander of the southern department. Upon the complaint of Morgan, General Greene did not think it prudent to disgust, by an exercise of authority, an officer on whose services he set such value as those of Colonel Sumpter. A correspondence and personal interview with that officer ensued, and the following two extracts will show that, if this interference was ever remembered by Colonel Sumpter with resentment, there was no just cause furnished by General Greene for exciting such a feeling.

General Greene to Colonel Sumpter, January 19th, 1781, Pee Dee.

"DEAR SIR,

"I have just received letters from General Morgan, informing me of his situation, and representing the difficulties he meets with in collecting provisions; and among other things he mentions some embarrassment which has arisen from an order of yours to Colonel Hill, not to obey any order from him unless it came through you. I imagine there must be some misapprehension about the matter, for I cannot suppose you would give an improper order, or that you have the most distant wish to embarrass the public affairs.

"It is certainly right that all orders should go through the principal to the dependants, as well for the preservation of good government, as to inspire a proper respect. This is a general rule, and ought not to be deviated from but in case of necessity, or where the difficulty of conveying an order through the principal will be attended with a fatal delay. In that case, the order should be directed to the branches and not to the head, and as the head is subject to

such order, the members are of course; for it would be very extraordinary, if a captain should dispute an order from his general, because it was not communicated through his colonel. At the same time that the right is indisputable, it should always be avoided but in cases of absolute necessity.

"General Morgan is an exceedingly good officer and understands his duty perfectly, and I know he has the highest respect for your character; and therefore am perfectly persuaded, if there has been any interference different from the general principles which should govern military matters, it must have happened through inadvertence, or from a persuasion that you did not mean to exercise command during the time of your indisposition.

"If any thing in his conduct has had the appearance of indelicacy or neglect, I hope you will not suffer it to bias your conduct from that line, which has given you weight and influence among your countrymen. It is the mark of a great mind to rise superior to little injuries, and our object should be the good of our country, not personal glory."

The same to the same, Sherald's Ford, February 3d, 1781.

"DEAR SIR,

"When I had the pleasure of a personal interview with you, I discovered nothing mercenary or illiberal in your disposition. On the contrary, I was charmed with the spirit of enterprise you exhibited, which I flattered myself would be no less beneficial to your country than honourable to yourself. I still entertain the same sentiments, and I can assure you I shall be equally as happy in an opportunity to do justice to your merits as to those of General Morgan. In what respect General Morgan's command embarrassed you, I am at loss to imagine; but I dare say I could explain it to your perfect satisfaction in a few minutes, could I have the happiness to see you. I consider you both as valuable men, as well as brave and good officers, and I hope the merit of one does not in the least detract from that of the other.

"It is true, I wish to see you again in the field, and I have ever considered it a great misfortune, that you were wounded on my first coming to the command. I have not time to go more fully into the subject; we will postpone the matter until we have the pleasure of meeting. The inhabitants are sensible of your merits, and the world does you justice," &c.

We cannot discover from any of the correspondence of this period, that the discussion on this subject left any hostile impressions between Colonel Sumpter and General Greene. As between Sumpter and Morgan there is reason to

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think there was no reconciliation; these two brave men probably ever after recollected each other with no very friendly emotions. It is, however, but too natural in man to transfer the feelings excited against a successful opponent to the judge who decides in his favour. Man seldom views with complacency the face that accuses him of error or offence, or reminds him of defeat or mortification. And the secret workings of feeling, influence our opinions and actions, where we would resist it were we sensible of its operation. It is the silent progress of contagion in the veins.*

The real cause of Morgan's disappearing about this time from the stage of the war, was unquestionably a serious indisposition. No less than ague and rheumatism, contracted during this severe winter campaign. His health had been considerably affected before he crossed the Catawba, but in the hurried march from that river to the Yadkin, it rained incessantly, and before the army reached Guilford, he could no longer withstand the combined attacks of those racking diseases.

Col. Lee, in speaking of this event, seems plainly to intimate that his retirement arose from some other cause; that his indisposition was nothing serious, perhaps feigned. But an event occurred, on the very day on which the conversation happened between himself and General Morgan which he relates,† which has caused a record to be preserved of the fact, and of General Greene's conviction, that the indisposition was too great to admit of his being detached on active duty.

After the fall of their gallant commander General Davidson, and the advance of the British army to the Yadkin, (as will be hereafter related,) the whigs of Mecklenberg, being called upon to attempt a diversion in the rear of the enemy, wrote to General Greene, to solicit that he would detach General Morgan for that service, promising much, from the influence of his name and talents, in drawing forth volunteers from their homes. To this letter General

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* Some further explanation of this affair will perhaps result from the following facts. It has been seen, that immediately after General Morgan's arrival in camp, General Gates had placed him in command of a detachment of light-infantry, and employed him in several enterprises. As the commands of the different state officers were extended over specified tracts of country, it happened that where they ranked Morgan, he found himself thus subjected to their command. This was particularly the case with regard to Colonel Sumpter. To obviate this inconvenience, Gates applied to congress, and was warmly seconded by Governor Rutledge, to advance Morgan to the rank of a general. The application succeeded, and if any indignant feeling was excited in the mind of Colonel Sumpter on this occasion, it must have been aggravated when General Greene expressly gave to Morgan command over a part of Colonel Sumpter's distuict.—*Gov. Rutledge, 4th Oct.* 1780.

† Vol. 1. p. 275.

Greene returns an answer, dated Guilford Court-House, February 9th, in which he says, "The general is so unwell, that he could not discharge the duties of the appointment if he had it." CHAP. X.

Subsequent letters show that Morgan was arrested on his journey homewards by the progress of disease, and obliged to halt at the mansion of a friend to restore his shattered health. Yet his letters constantly discover that he cast a "longing, lingering look behind," and was prevented by nothing but increased indisposition from rejoining the army. We shall not dismiss him altogether as yet from our reader's notice; for, although not actually present at the battle of Guilford, we shall have to notice a signal instance of the respect in which General Greene held his advice on that occasion. To recur to the story of his intention to make for the mountains; we can assign but one possible cause for its origin. It is obvious that Lord Cornwallis acted upon the supposition that such was his intention, as will be seen by examining his line of march; and this was probably the true reason why he followed the route by Ramsour's Mills, instead of striking across the country below them. And into this misapprehension both he and the American writers may have been led by the attempt made to establish magazines in that direction, which certainly were intended by Greene to provide for a rapid movement towards the mountains, should Morgan have been cut off from a more immediate route to form a junction with the main army.

But to return to the progress of events. When the commander of the southern army arrived at Morgan's camp, the latter lay at Sherald's Ford, on the east side of the Catawba River. On the opposite side of the river, and but a few miles distant from it, the British army was encamped, waiting for an opportunity to force a passage. At present this was impossible, and the two armies lay in perfect security from each other, although but a few miles distant. For such is the precipitance of the river when swollen by rains, as to baffle every human effort to pass it. But the same cause makes it subside rapidly. And the two armies lay in sight of each other, anxiously watching those indications which foretel its return to its ordinary level. In the course of the 31st it became obvious that this event must soon take place.

When General Greene left his army on the Pee Dee, their orders, it will be recollected, were to cross that river, then to proceed up the stream, and with all possible dispatch to reach Salisbury. Here they were to receive his further orders; and he contemplated either to order their further advance to the Catawba, should the enemy still not have passed it, and the reinforcements of militia been such, as to justify an attempt to arrest the progress of the enemy at that or some intermediate point: or, if otherwise, to form a junction beyond

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But the causes which have been already detailed, had prevented the militia from embodying, and notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts of General Davidson, and the early and reiterated instances of General Greene, there were only about 500 volunteers in the field. As the river was now falling, 200 of these were necessarily posted in detachments at the different fords for thirty miles along the river, to guard against surprise; and General Davidson was ordered to retain with him a corps of observation of about 300 mounted riflemen, to watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him on his passage wherever it should finally appear that he intended to attempt crossing. The fords in that neighbourhood, are very numerous, and the British commander was so posted, and had so masked his intentions, that it required much watchfulness to give a proper direction to this little force. But Davidson's capacity was competent to the task, and, notwithstanding all the false indications which the enemy displayed, he was ready to meet them at M'Cowen's Ford at daylight on the morning of the 1st, when they attempted their passage.

Morgan's detachment was encamped the day before at Beaty's Ford, six miles above M'Cowen's, and nearly that distance nearer to Salisbury.

As soon as it was ascertained that the Catawba was falling, that no more militia were to be expected, and that the enemy were making dispositions to pass the river, a hasty retreat of the party under Morgan became inevitable. Accordingly, he moved off in silence on the evening of the 31st, and pressing his march all that night and a part of the next day, he gained a full day's march upon his adversary.

General Greene had remained behind with a view to bring off the militia, as soon as the enemy had effected the passage of the river; and for this purpose he had issued orders for them to repair, as soon as that event should take place, to a rendezvous appointed about sixteen miles in advance, upon the road to Salisbury. To the place of rendezvous he repaired in person to await their arrival, and at that place he was very near terminating his military career.

At the same time that Cornwallis attempted M'Cowen's Ford in person, he dispatched Colonels Webster and Tarleton, with a strong detachment to pass the river at Beaty's, higher up the stream. Finding that ford abandoned, it was passed without loss or delay, and one of those fortuitous circumstances to which we have already frequently referred, saved the division of the army

under Cornwallis from sustaining any material injury from the attack of Davidson. CHAP. X.

It was fortunate for Lord Cornwallis that he attempted this passage in the night; the appalling prospect of a stream five hundred yards in width, foaming among the rocks, and frequently overturning men and horses in its course, might have shaken the stoutest heart. Nor would the aim of the riflemen then have been distracted by the shades of night, or been directed by nothing but the voice of the British officers, the increased noise of the current, or the mutual exhortations of the British soldiers. Placed among the trees and bushes that lined the banks, secure and destructive must have been their aim against a body of men plunged up to their waists, moving slowly as they supported themselves against the stream, and strove to preserve their arms from the spray. But a singular instance of good fortune attended the British commander. He was saved from injury by a misfortune. In the midst of the stream their guide got alarmed and fled away. The advance took the wrong course and escaped the danger that awaited them.

Davidson had posted his men so as to receive the enemy at the point where, they well knew the course of the ford led to the eastern bank. Upon losing their guide the enemy deviated from the ford, waded through water somewhat deeper, but approached a point where they were not expected. The darkness of the night, and the noise of the waters prevented this deviation from being discovered until the enemy approached the margin of the river; and as Davidson led off his men to take a position in their front, it brought him between the light of his fires and the advancing column. A well-directed volley from them put an end to his existence as he mounted his horse. Thus fell a brave and tried patriot, universally deplored. His men soon dispersed after his fall, though not without avenging it by the death of a number of the enemy, and among the rest of Colonel Hall of the guards, who appears to have been highly esteemed and much regretted by his companions in arms. Lord Cornwallis himself probably owed his safety to the darkness of the night and the deviation of his troops, for, sensible of the dangers and difficulties of the undertaking, he had pressed forward with his advance, and had his horse so wounded under him as barely to stagger to the shore and expire.

At the distance of about ten miles from M'Cowen's Fords, the roads from the different fords converge and unite near a place called Tarrant's Tavern. Here many of the fugitives from the different fords convened in the course of the day, and some, to the number of about 100, proposing to proceed in the evening to the place of rendezvous, and imagining themselves in a place of safety, very indiscreetly made a halt to take refreshment. Most of those who

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had been on duty, terrified at the fall of their commander and the retreat of the army under Morgan, had made the best of their way from the posts they had occupied, directly home. Others, after convening at this place, had adopted the same resolution, so that of the 500 who had been on duty in the morning, a very small proportion now remained.

Colonel Tarleton soon got intelligence of the party assembled at Tarrant's; and with a promptness and vigour which certainly characterized his movements, he resolved to strike at it. The officer who was senior in command of the militia was not inattentive to the ordinary precaution against surprise, and when the approach of the hostile dragoons was announced, the men flew to their horses, delivered one deliberate fire, and dashed into the woods. The pursuit would have been vain. The facility acquired by men of this description in guiding their horses and securing their rifle when pursued, is the result of early habit and frequent practice in the hunt of wild animals.

But there was another cause for arresting the pursuit. A few victims remained to glut the English broadsword. These were a small number of old men and boys, either not mounted or badly mounted, who sought security in imploring mercy on their gray hairs, or their youth. Seven of them were wantonly sacrificed, and that number is boastingly swelled in Tarleton's Campaigns, to the number of fifty. Dearly did the loyalists afterwards pay for the blood of these men.*

With characteristic accuracy the colonel has also magnified the number of the party up to five hundred, and numbered the gallant Colonel Locke with the slain. He also admits the fall of seven of his men and twenty horses. Had the half of five hundred been present, they would probably have dismounted his whole party; and as to Colonel Locke, we can produce many of his letters to prove that he was alive long after. His baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, but his good steed soon bore him beyond the reach of danger.

After this exploit, which occurred early in the afternoon, Tarleton leisurely retired to the main army, little dreaming of the prize which then lay but seven miles in advance of Tarrant's, and which twenty nimble horsemen would most probably have succeeded in securing and conducting to camp. This was General Greene and his suite, who had taken his stand at the place of rendezvous, and remained there until after midnight, when learning the fate of Davidson, and total dispersion of the militia, he proceeded on to Salisbury.

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* Brevard.

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On his arrival at Steel's Tavern in Salisbury, it was impossible not to perceive in the deranged state of his dress and the stiffness of his limbs, some symptoms of his late rapid movements and exposure to the weather; and to the inquiries of Dr. Read, who received him on his alighting, he could not refrain from answering, "Yes, fatigued, hungry, alone, and pennyless." This reply did not escape the quick ears of his benevolent landlady; and he was scarcely seated at a comfortable breakfast, when she presented herself in the room, closed the door, and exhibited a small bag of specie in each hand. "Take these," said she, "for you will want them, and I can do without them."

An acquisition so important even to the public service, was not to be declined from excess of delicacy, and the favour was afterwards amply repaid. But the general hurried away after a hasty meal, for his friends warned him against the numbers and hostility of the loyalists who surrounded him, and he hastened to rejoin the army then passing over the Yadkin.

Refreshed and recruited by the halt on the Catawba, Morgan made a rapid march to the trading ford, and by the evening of the 3d, had effected the passage of it, and seated himself on the western bank to mock the unavailing pursuit of his disappointed adversary. Lord Cornwallis had now entered upon a desperate effort to retrieve the ground he had lost by his previous want of decision; a second conflagration of waggons and baggage had announced his preparations to resume his march.* But still he was destined to feel the conquences of a want of correct intelligence. Bold as was the design and vigorous the execution of his plan for passing the Catawba River,† the very measure of attempting a private and little frequented ford, for which he claims some merit, involved him in a consequence he had not anticipated. The road to it not having been well opened, his waggons and artillery were so much delayed that on the evening of the 1st, although he had passed the river by day-break, he found himself but a few miles advanced upon the road to Salisbury. Then for the first time, he began to act with that decision and promptness for which he has been so much lauded. By the destruction of his baggage and waggons, he was enabled not only to double his teams, but to mount a considerable body of infantry. Joining his mounted infantry to his cavalry, he pushed forward a formidable corps under General O'Hara, in hopes to overtake and detain his adversary before he could pass the river; and thus at length effect the purpose for which he had made such great sacrifices, and which was so indispensable both to the service of his sovereign and his own military fame. But it was in

* O. L. to Gen. Huger, 1st February. † Tarleton, &c.

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vain. An incessant rain which drenched the army of Morgan through the whole of the day and night of the 1st, only quickened the celerity of his movements. Greene knew that a rise of the river in two days afterwards was the ordinary consequence, and pressed their advance before the occurrence of an event, which might give them security on the one hand, or expose them to delay on the other.—But not to destruction; for he had prepared the means of obviating that evil.

It will be recollected, that very early, even before he had reached his command, he had adopted the means of converting the navigable streams of the country into highways for transporting supplies to his army. It will also be recollected, that his plan of operations, upon the advance of the British commander, involved some probable manœuvring about the trading ford, which might render the quick passage of the Yadkin either for attack or defence, an important object. Both these purposes had led to the collection of the boats for some distance up and down that river, at this point. And now the advantages of this foresight were developed. The transportation of the American infantry and baggage was easily effected, and the waters were not too high for the cavalry to ford it. Yet the enemy were upon them before the rear-guard was removed. This was the consequence of a circumstance which had not been foreseen, and could not be guarded against. Some wanton and unnecessary acts of severity already committed, had excited an alarm among the whigs of Salisbury, and hastening away with their families to follow the American army, their waggons had fallen into the line of march with the baggage of the army; and as the rear-guard was composed of militia, many of them the friends or relatives of the fugitives, and no immediate danger apprehended, no opposition had been made to the measure, or unwillingness exhibited by that corps to suffer them to pass. But before the whole could be got over, the enemy were upon them, and a smart skirmish ensued, in which both parties claimed the advantage. It is certain that the rear-guard made good their retreat without loss, and that the enemy sustained some; still a few of the rearmost waggons were taken. This rencontre took place at midnight, and the nature of the ground favoured the retreat of the American party.

One day's effort such as this, at any time prior to Morgan's passing the Catawba, might have deprived the American army of all the fruits of the day of the Cowpens, except the glory. Its partial success fastens on Lord Cornwallis the reproof of not having made it before; for, the infantry alone pushed forward on this occasion, were so superior to the American force, as to dispense with the cavalry and sit down in security on the west bank of the

Yadkin, in face of an enemy abundantly supplied with the means of suddenly recrossing to attack them. CHAP. X.

But the effort was transient and desultory, and Lord Cornwallis appears to have been revisited with his yawning fit upon reaching Salisbury.

It was not long before Cornwallis with the whole British army, appeared on the bank of the river; and a furious cannonading was opened upon the Americans on the opposite bank, but without effect. Morgan secured his men behind a rising ground, while the rocks on the margin afforded shelter to his sentinels. Artillery he had none, for the two pieces taken at the Cowpens had been placed in waggons and hurried on along with the prisoners. During the cannonading a respectable eye-witness thus relates the manner in which the commander of the department was occupied: "At a little distance from the river and behind a pile of rocks, was situated a small cabin. In this the general had taken up his quarters, and while his family and some of the staff were amusing themselves as they thought proper, he was busily engaged in preparing his dispatches. All this time the artillery was playing furiously, but seemed to attract no one's attention. At length, however, whether from intelligence or conjecture, their rage seemed to vent itself exclusively at our cabin, and the balls were heard to rebound against the rocks directly in the rear of it. Little more than its roof showed above them, and at this the firing was obviously directed. Nor were they long without striking it, and in a few minutes the clap-boards were flying from it in all directions. But still the general wrote on, nor seemed to notice any thing but his dispatches, and the innumerable applications that were made to him from various quarters. His pen never rested but when a new visiter arrived, and then the answer was given with calmness and precision, and the pen immediately resumed."*

As the boats had been all secured on the opposite bank, and would certainly be destroyed before the American army decamped, it was at once obvious, that the British commander must take a circuitous route by the shallow ford, a few miles higher up but not much out of the route to Salem, (to which the American general seemed obviously directing his steps,) or await the uncertain, and at that season, improbable event, of the fall of the waters. Yet for four days Cornwallis lay tranquilly in Salisbury, and it was not until the evening of the second after his arrival, that he detached a party to reconnoitre the country, and examine the streams on the route by the shallow ford. The consequence was that he did not pass the Yadkin until the morning of the 8th,† and

* Dr. Read.

† Official letter.

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this, notwithstanding that the river, instead of rising after Greene's passage, as historians generally assert, actually began to fall on the evening of the 4th so rapidly, that it became obvious it would be fordable the next morning; and Greene, after halting a day, resumed his march on the evening of the 4th.* From the indecisive movements attributed to the British commander in the correspondence of this date, first down the river and then up it, it is reasonable to conclude that he was at this time pondering upon the question whether he should attempt to cross below and cut off his adversary from his main army; or by pushing up the river, intercept his march for the fords of the Dan, and then turn upon him when hemmed in between the Roanoke and Yadkin, thus to effect his designs as well on the divison under Morgan, as the main army under Huger. The latter was at length resolved on, and one reason assigned for it betrays a miserable specimen of defective intelligence—"that he was informed, the American commander could not collect many flats at any of the ferries on the river Dan."† He little thought of the provident care which had dispatched Carrington, and under him Captain Smith of the Maryland line, to examine and improve the facilities, and remove the obstacles which the crossing-places on that river presented.

All the writers who have treated of this celebrated retreat of our American 500, (not 10,000,) have considered it as a mere flight; it has been emphatically pronounced "a military race,"‡ and much as admiration has been excited by its vigour and success, full justice has never been done to the abilities displayed in it, because all the views which directed the American commander, as well as the dangers that threatened and difficulties that embarrassed him, have never been fully explained or duly estimated. Indeed, important facts have been suppressed, because they must appear irreconcilable with the single view of escaping; and some of his measures bear the appearance of indiscretion, because the motives for adopting them have not been kept in view. In the present instance, if escape had been the sole object of the American movements, why halt a day on the Yadkin, while the height of the river secured their rear? or why, after advancing but twenty-five miles, make a further halt of four days? Yet it is certain, although not mentioned or not insisted upon by historians, these halts were made, and their silence on this point can only

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* Both Lee and Tarleton are inaccurate in their dates as to these events. The one a day too early, the other a day too late. In such a chase, this is no immaterial circumstance.

† Letter 17th March 1781, to Lord Geo. Germain.

‡ Ramsay's Revolution in South Carolina, vol. 2. p. 207.

be ascribed to the difficulty of reconciling such delays with the idea of "a military chase." But by testing these measures by the motives and views already explained to the reader as influencing the conduct of the American commander, he will see both their wisdom and necessity. Yet, to amuse, avoid, delay and still draw on a superior enemy, was a delicate game; and the apprehensions of the American commander were frequently all awakened, by the extreme difficulty he found in collecting provisions. The country was now all in alarm and in motion, provisions removed, concealed, or destroyed, and the roads cut to pieces by the waggons of the whigs, bearing off their families and the means of their subsistence.

An event had recently occurred which had spread this alarm to no ordinary extent. On the route to Salem stood the dwelling-house of an aged lady* o the most respectable character and connexions. In the security of innocence and widowhood, she had remained in it with the younger branches of her family, notwithstanding the approach of the British army. Her house with all its contents were delivered up to the rapacity of the flames and of the British soldiery. It was no act of an incendiary, or of a party of Indians or loyalists; the "amiable Cornwallis" himself was present, ordered and directed it. Reader, we blush for human nature when assigning the only possible cause that can be alleged for the perpetration of an act so wanton.—Her eldest son was an active, influential whig, and she was mingling her tears with those of a widowed daughter over the fall of the gallant Davidson. Think not that this event is related upon slight authority; more could be told of the British commander on this occasion, but it is suppressed through delicacy to the military profession.†

In the forks of Abbott's Creek at a short distance from Salem, General Greene selected a secure position, and halted to watch the movements of his adversary. The situation was equally suitable for the prosecution of his own plans, whether the enemy should cross above, below, or at the trading ford. But it answered another purpose; it drew the eye of the enemy towards the upper fords of the Dan, as the route by which he meditated an escape. Cornwallis, in his communications to the British minister, takes to himself much credit for his successful manœuvre in cutting off the American general from that route; and some American writers, (even Colonel Lee,) suppose, that the subsequent movements of Greene were influenced by those of his opponent,

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* The house of Mrs. Brevard, the mother of the Honourable Joseph Brevard.

† Judge Brevard's letter.

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which gave the latter a position on the 10th, at the same distance from the upper ford with that of Guilford Court-House, where, by that day the American detachment had formed a junction with the main army.

The error has originated in not knowing, or not considering the objects which invited the American commander to prefer the lower route, at the same time that it was necessary to lure his adversary away from the one which led to the upper fords.

To prevent Lord Cornwallis from getting on his right, was all-important to General Greene for several reasons. When the army commenced its march from the Pee Dee, the heavy baggage had been ordered on, under a guard of militia, to take the route by Hillsborough, to unite there with the baggage removing from that place, and to pursue the march across the Dan, or until countermanded. As soon as the movements of the enemy indicated an intention to pass the Catawba, the necessity of several material changes in the movements of the main army became obvious. The following rapid letter addressed to General Huger on the 1st of the month, the original of which, in a beautiful hand, written without a mistake, interlineation, or the omission of a comma, is before us, will convey a full view of the change of movements contemplated, whilst it presents a striking specimen of measures conceived with promptness, and orders communicated with precision.

"The enemy crossed the Catawba this morning at M'Cowen's Ford, about seventeen miles below this, a little after break of day; they burnt a great number of their waggons yesterday, and seem to be preparing for forced marches. The militia is to assemble at Mr. David Carr's, where I shall remain to-night. I think the enemy will push for Salisbury; and from the rapidity with which they march will reach it in little better than a day, especially as we have little force to retard their march. If you have crossed the Yadkin and are in a condition to force a march, push for Salisbury. If not, recross and come up the other side. And if you have not already crossed the river, move up the east side of the Yadkin. To have the baggage and stores secured is the next great object to the salvation of the troops. Let them be sent to Guilford, notwithstanding the order to transport it to the ford near Salisbury. Give orders to the waggon-master-general, or commanding officer of the guard with the baggage and stores, to impress all the horses they may require to hasten the march. Let the officers keep as little baggage with them as possible, as they may stand a great chance of losing it upon forced marches. Send orders to Lee to move up with his horse and leave his infantry in the rear to follow. Had we a superiority in horse the militia would be useful, but for want of it, they dare not

go within miles of the enemy. Give orders to Colonel Wade, to have all his hogs collected at Rocky River driven off towards Guilford," &c. CHAP. X.

After reaching Salisbury and ascertaining the impossibility of forming a junction there, or on the east bank of the river, in consequence of the rapidity of the enemy's advance; orders were transmitted to General Huger to take the direct route to Guilford Court-House, with a view to forming a junction at that place: as, both Hillsborough and Guilford lay to the right or eastward of Greene's position on the Yadkin, both the baggage and the army would have been greatly exposed, if Cornwallis had directed his operations to gaining the right of his adversary.

On the other hand, the route by the upper fords led, not only to the depot to which the prisoners recently taken had been forwarded; but to that to which the troops captured under Burgoyne had been assigned. As no enemy had been expected in that quarter, no preparation had been made for meeting one, and could Cornwallis have penetrated so far as to add the prisoners in the interior of Virginia to his present strength, little could have been done to impede his junction with Philips, or to arrest his further operations for the present, in that quarter.

A position on the lower Dan was also recommended from various other considerations. The very cause which the British commander supposed the greatest objection was its highest recommendation; that, at this season, the river could only be passed in boats. It would have been gaining little to have thrown a river in the American rear that was fordable by the enemy. His passage in boats might be obstructed, but with an overwhelming superiority in regular troops and artillery, it was not to be hoped, that where the river was fordable he could be long arrested. Nor was the route by the upper fords the most convenient for favouring a junction with the reinforcements which were now advancing. All those expected from North Carolina must come up the Roanoke, and those to be looked for from Virginia must all approach from the eastward, and generally by the road to Boyd's Ferry; so that to keep his enemy to the north and west of him, without permitting him to advance too far, became all-important in the present posture of his affairs. Of his moving off entirely in that direction whilst the American army was below, General Greene felt no apprehension; because the lure of an offer of battle he knew would always draw his adversary's attention the contrary way. Nor did the American general deem it unimportant to him to occupy a position on navigable water, and as near as possible to the mouth of the Staunton; for, besides the increased facility of subsisting his army by water transportation, the Staunton

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ran through an unexhausted country, and the rich lands on that river and the Roanoke promised him an abundant supply, whilst the near approach of the Staunton to the Dan at Boyd's Ferry, which is near their confluence, afforded him a secure retreat, should the enemy cross above and descend on the eastern bank. In fact, like a double corner in some games of skill, this position once gained, presented the means of effectually eluding the attacks of his adversary, or by obliging him to divide his forces, of exposing himself to great hazards. In a letter to General Huger of the date of the 5th, General Greene expresses a hope, "that from Cornwallis' pressing disposition and the contempt he has for our army, we may precipitate him into some capital misfortune."

There was still another reason for this preference to the route by Boyd's Ferry. General Greene was persuaded that Lord Cornwallis could not follow him, in the race he meant to lead, very long before he would be obliged to descend to the head of navigation at Halifax, for the purpose of replenishing his stores; and with a view to that event he had concerted a plan of co-operation against him with Baron Steuben, which might possibly have put a speedy end to his career. The original sketch and all the details of this plan are at this instant before us. It bears the strongest features of the enterprising spirit and fruitful genius that devised it. If further evidence be necessary to prove that the passage of the lower Dan was not a measure forced upon Gen. Greene by the address of his adversary, it will be found in the fact, that before his departure from the Catawba, he had pressed on Colonel Carrington the necessity of establishing magazines on the Roanoke, foreseeing and providing for, a contingency which obviously might occur.

Colonel Lee has represented the adoption of the route by the lower Dan, as the result of the suggestion and advice of Colonel Carrington. Indeed, the colonel has scarcely ever permitted his general to enjoy the reputation of having conceived any of his most prominent measures. To Colonel Carrington, General Greene was unquestionably under the greatest obligations for the most active and zealous services, and to him in this instance he was indebted, for carrying into effect a measure, without which it would have been difficult to avoid an action, after the hazardous game that had been recently carried on. But General Greene knew that Colonel Carrington was to be depended on, in preparing the means of passing his army over the Dan at Boyd's should he be pressed so far; otherwise he would have evaded his enemy by advancing with rapidity, instead of halting so frequently at a small distance in advance of him, as we have seen him do on his retreat from the Catawba. Had he by any casualty been prevented from passing the Dan at Boyd's, he would have been driven to the necessity of falling down and uniting with his main army at

some point on its advance to Guilford, and of taxing his invention for the further means of eluding his enemy. He might then have taken the rout by Hillsborough, or retraced his steps to South Carolina, and left the road open to a junction with Philips, if his enemy would then have advanced, and left the southern army behind him ; which is not probable. CHAP. X.

At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 8th of February, General Greene received intelligence that the enemy were in full march for the Shallowford, on the Yadkin, and had probably reached it by that hour. The rout they meant to pursue was now ascertained, and he resolved to meet and fight them. This had always been his first object and leading desire, should he ever be placed in a condition that would render it prudent. His other designs were but alternative and auxiliary. He now hoped to find his army in such a state, and to be joined at Guilford by such reinforcements of militia, as would put it in his power to meet his adversary at that place, on advantageous terms. He accordingly addressed the most pressing letters to the officers of militia in the vicinity of Guilford, to call out their followers, and repair immediately to that place. Couriers were dispatched to Hillsborough, to forward on supplies of ammunition and other articles, to order the men at that post to join their regiments, and an approaching rencontre was generally and joyfully anticipated. The main army was now so far advanced, that a junction by the 9th or 10th was certain, and the exhilirating news had been received, that the prisoners, and the baggage accompanying them, were in safety.

The detachment under Morgan was put in motion soon after the intelligence of the enemy's advance was received, and arrived unmolested that night at Guilford. The main army, now increased by the junction of Lee, joined them in the course of the next day, and the general proceeded to reconnoitre the ground with a view to selecting the field of battle. It was at this time that the celebrated position was fixed on which directed the steps of Greene to this point a month after, when he found it advisable to give the enemy a challenge to battle. So truly did he exemplify the military maxim, "that a good general will fight only when and where he pleases."

But this was not the occasion on which General Greene was destined to reap the benefit of this judicious selection. New mortifications now awaited him, and he found himself obliged at present to relinquish the hopes of turning upon his enemy. The fallen countenances of his officers proclaimed their disappointment, but though grieved, they acquiesced without a murmur, in the prudent resolution of their commander.

On this occasion General Greene submitted the question to a council of war, whether it would be prudent to offer the enemy battle. The decision was

CHAP. X. unanimous, and without hesitation, against the proposition; and the reasons were such as could not have been resisted. The returns of the army are before us; the whole of all arms, rank and file fit for duty, present and detached, did not exceed 2036; of these 1426 were regulars. The militia of his army had generally been discharged; for Virginia had sent them into the field for a tour of three months, in which time they had to march 600 miles, in going and returning. The force of the enemy was satisfactorily ascertained to be from 2500 to 3000, all soldiers in the highest state of discipline and equipment. Nakedness and exposure had by this time sent a fourth of the American army to the hospitals. In a letter, addressed to General Huger, of the date of the 4th, General Greene is led to exclaim, "How is it possible, that an army, circumstanced as our's is, can make head against one organized and equipped as Lord Cornwallis'! Is it possible to guard against every misfortune with a force so inferior? If Lord Cornwallis knows his true interest, he will pursue our army. If he can disperse that, he completes the reduction of this state, and without that, he will do nothing to effect."

Yet, with these correct views of the relative interests of the contending parties, there is no doubt of his intention to offer battle on the junction of his forces, could he have drawn together about 12 or 1500 militia. In various letters he expressly avows it; but, to offer battle, with such precaution as to prevent the possibility of his being driven from the field, it may well be doubted, whether the most prudential measures can always prevent dispersion from following in the train of defeat. This point was frequently made a subject of discussion among his officers; and, on such occasions, he always expressed a perfect confidence in its practicability, with the advantage of a superior cavalry. He repeatedly exemplified the correctness of this opinion, in the events of his southern campaigns.

Yet, there were several reasons at this time which inclined the American commander to offer his adversary battle. The first was, that he believed him so anxious for it, as to be inclined to accept the offer, under any disadvantages; the second, that he dreaded the effect of a protracted retreat, as well in depressing the spirits of the whigs, as in elevating those of their antagonists. The British commander had now penetrated into a country, which by him had always been looked forward to as the land of promise. The immediate settlements through which he had passed, were well-effected to the American cause; but, this circumstance was the most favourable possible to his views, since both in front and rear lay the regions where the loyalists were numerous. The spirit of enterprise of the former, was repressed by his presence, whilst his army offered a rallying point to the latter, with the triumphs and comforts

of living at free quarters on the farms of the whigs. General Greene had just cause to fear, that the enemy's further advance would lead to a general insurrection of the friends of royalty; an event, from which every thing was to be dreaded; and an event, which would probably have been realized, but for two incidents (hereafter to be related) which combined most fortuitously to terrify and disgust the royal party. To these considerations was added another, minor in its nature, but by no means to be disregarded. General Greene was of opinion, that in time of action, the enemy were in the habit of wasting a great deal of ammunition to very little effect. They were now drawn on to a situation where this article could only be procured by descending to his depot at Wilmington, establishing himself at Halifax, or forcing his way, through Virginia at all hazards. All these considerations will be found to be held in view during the residue of the trial of skill between these two commanders. There was also another, and this is feelingly expressed in a letter to Steuben. It was to save the state, and particularly Mecklenberg and Roan, from the desolating vengeance of the enemy. The light of burning cottages had marked the stages of his advance, and the distress and consternation of the fugitives added pangs to Green's consciousness, that he could neither relieve nor protect them. CHAP. X.

As soon as the resolution was adopted to prosecute the retreat, the commanding general was not long in determining on the means of effecting it. Attention had, at an early period, been paid to raising the militia in the rear of the enemy, in order to give employ to his light troops, to intercept his foraging parties, and embarrass the acquirement and communication of intelligence. Colonel Sumpter also, whose health now permitted his return to the field, had undertaken to call together his followers, and excite the apprehension of the enemy for his posts in South Carolina. The fall of Davidson, and the office which Davie had assumed, had left the whigs in the neighborhood of Charlotte, without a leader sufficiently popular to inspirit and conduct them to active enterprise. They, therefore, held a meeting, and unanimously solicited of General Greene, to dispatch Morgan to command them. The general's answer to this request has been already noticed. But, another officer had now rejoined Greene, in whom he justly reposed the highest confidence. This was Colonel Pickens, who had proceeded in command of the detachment that guarded the prisoners taken at the Cowpens, until overtaken and relieved by General Stevens. He then hastened immediately back, and rejoined his commander at Salisbury.

His followers were now reduced to a handful, for the retreat of the army had called most of them away, to provide for the subsistence and safety of

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their families. Some active, intelligent and influential officers remained, and many of these he was directed to disperse through the country beyond the Catawba, with orders to collect the whigs in parties, to keep the tories in awe, and to throw themselves under the command of the principal leaders, whenever their assistance was required to strike some capital blow. The whigs of North Carolina were advised to place themselves under Pickens' command, and he was instructed to hang upon the skirts of the enemy, watch the movements of his small detachments, guard particularly against surprise, and, as soon as an opportunity offered, to pass Lord Cornwallis, and join the army at Guilford, or wherever else it should make a stand.

Great were the advantages which Greene derived at this time, from these watchful and active agents. The only means he had of retarding the progress of the enemy, and preserving himself from being harrassed by the loyal mounted infantry, consisted in obliging his enemy to cover his foraging parties with large detachments of cavalry. Without the protection of the cavalry, the infantry could not be pushed forward to annoy Morgan. But, for this relief, it would have been difficult for him to preserve such a distance in advance, as to put it out of the power of his adversary to control his measures. He was himself often obliged to subsist his army on daily collections, and this necessarily produced delay. To have collected magazines on his intended rout, would at once have unmasked his views towards the corner between the Dan and the Staunton: nor had the newly adopted arrangements of the state, for assisting Colonel Davie in his department, been long enough organized to be productive of very extensive relief.

But, the situation of the army was much improved upon its junction at Guilford, by the arrival of both the commissary and quarter-master-general; and now, for the first time since taking the command, the commander found himself at the head of an organized force; yet it was feeble, destitute and pennyless, and talents that merited a freer range of action, were wasted upon shifts and expedients. Neither the quarter-master, the commissary, nor their commander, had a dollar at command; and when most in need of conciliating the favour of the people, they were compelled to disgust them, by supporting and transporting every thing by exaction. It required more than ordinary capacity, perseverance and prudence, to make head against such difficulties.

Among the causes which led to the decision of the council of war at Guilford, was the arrival of Carrington, with the agreeable intelligence, that every thing was in a state of arrangement for the passage of the army below. The boats were not actually collected at the point of transportation, for that also would have unmasked the general's designs; but they were secured at conve-

nient distances, so as to admit of their being collected at a few hours warning. But for this circumstance, Greene's situation would have been such, that he might have been compelled to fight the enemy, at this time, at Guilford, or turn on him under every disadvantage, when pressed in the pursuit. It is probably owing to this circumstance, that General Lee has attributed the march of Greene for the lower Dan, in preference to the Ford, to the recommendation of Carrington. As Colonel Lee was not a member of the council of war, he might easily be led into the error of attributing that to Carrington's advice, which was only attributable to the quarter-master's report. But the fact of Colonel Carrington's continuing with the army, and actually commanding the left of Williams' detachment, ought to have satisfied Colonel Lee, that this important arrangement had been previously organized. CHAP. X.

The capital expedient resorted to on this occasion, to secure the unmolested retreat of the American army, was that of detaching seven hundred light troops, under Colonel Williams, to cover its retreat. Both officers and men of this detachment, were of the elite of the American army. Williams, Carrington, Howard, Washington and Lee, were the commanders, and the men were composed of all who had fought the day of the Cowpens, and who had ever since led and baffled the pursuit of the enemy, strengthened by Lee's legion, whose ranks had not yet been thinned by battle or severe service, and whose excellent equipment, discipline and mounting, made them an important appendage to Williams' command.

On the 10th of the month, the two armies lay within twenty-five miles of each other; the one at Salem, the other at Guilford. The halt which Lord Cornwallis made at Salem, was the first that could be satisfactorily accounted for. His antagonist had now formed a junction with his main army, and prudence dictated the necessity of determining their force, and their views, before he approached within striking distance. It is true, that in the end, this halt proved destructive to his views, and the state of facts would have justified his advancing and forcing an action; but, whatever might be the consequences attending such a precaution, he cannot be censured for adopting it. Indeed, from this time, all his conduct was marked with decision and vigour, checked only by the control of military prudence. It is true, the measures of his adversary were crowned with the most signal success; but, the errors which contributed to it, if committed at all, preceded this date, or occurred some time after.

Never since the descent of Burgoyne, had the feelings of the American people been so wrought up as they were on this occasion. The whole continent seemed to hang in breathless expectation upon the fate of the southern

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army. For near a month, had the public attention been engrossed by its perilous situation; and now the crisis of this interesting drama evidently approached. A day, an hour, might produce its dissolution; and then, what would arrest the progress of subjugation? A junction formed with Philips—the prisoners in Virginia released—Richmond fortified—and posts established at Hillsborough and Halifax; and adieu, at present, to opposition in the south. Nor was the interest of the scene confined to the people of America; Great Britain, France, the world, which had now taken a deep interest in the pending contest, all saw the consequences that might follow the struggle between these little armies, and waited with anxious anticipation upon its issue. It is true, their numbers were not great; nay, exceedingly inconsiderable, when compared with the armies that figure on the theatre of Europe. But, what are the European struggles for some *norma agelli*, or some question of succession, legitimacy or revenue, in comparison with the stake for which these little armies contended? Parties had also taken their champions; the amateurs of the military science, had conceived an interest in the issue; and a vast deal of individual anxiety prevailed on questions, only remotely connected with national considerations.

The occasion was, indeed, one which called for all the talent of these two eminent commanders. Every thing depended upon gaining a march; and the trial of skill was, to give a direction to the movements, each of the other, without letting a muscle betray the direction of his own. Spies, scouts and patrols were lurking about both, intent upon the minutest movement, and sleep seldom visited the eyes of either commander.

The first movement was, a *ruse de guerre*, attempted by Lord Cornwallis. The object of this was, to alarm his adversary for the safety of his stores at Hillsborough; these, notwithstanding the earliest attention to their removal, had been so delayed, for want of waggons, that they were, most of them, just now put in motion for Taylor's ferry on the Roanoke, below the confluence of the Dan and Staunton. Hillsborough also, as the seat of government, and depository of the state stores and records, it was thought, would claim the protection of the American army. Its situation was to the right of the road to Guilford, and accessible by a direct rout from Salem. On that rout, Lord Cornwallis made a demonstration; for if Greene lost ground in that direction, he would certainly be cut off from the banks of the Dan. But the American general was too much on his guard to be overreached, and adroitly turned the point of his enemy against himself. By pushing forward the detachment under Williams, in the direct rout for the upper Dan, he induced his adversary to make a movement to his left, for the purpose of cutting this party off from

the upper fords, still fondly believing that he had the main army in a *cul de sac*, from which it could not escape, for want of ferry boats. Williams was so lightly equipped, that he had nothing to fear from a near approach to the enemy, and coolly placing himself in front of his advance, marched as steadily before him for four days, as if he had been the enemy's advanced guard. Greene thus secured the advantage of marching direct for the place where he contemplated crossing; whilst his enemy approached it by a more circuitous rout. His own march, also, was unmolested; whilst in the rout of the enemy, every bridge was broken up, the provision consumed or removed, and every facility to his progress, swept away by his tantalizing precursor.

Williams displayed the most consummate prudence, vigilance and enterprise in this service; he was ably and zealously supported by the officers under him; and notwithstanding the extraordinary fatigue to which this service subjected his men, his engaging manners, and humane attention to their wants and comforts, kept up among them the highest spirits possible.

Colonel Lee has written, and others have copied from him, a highly interesting narrative of the march of this party, interspersed with anecdotes, and illuminated with remarks, which render it an exceedingly amusing passage. But the general nature of our undertaking, does not admit of our borrowing from it, any thing to which there is no allusion in the official papers.

From the moment of leaving Guilford, all further disguise became unnecessary or impracticable, and the American general pursued the direct rout to the lower Dan. In the mean time, a proper party was pushed forward to collect the boats, and with them General Kosciusko, who had rejoined his commander at Guilford, and who now preceded him for the purpose of throwing up a breastwork at the ferry, for the double object of protecting the boats, and covering the passage of the army.

So completely did the light detachment hoodwink the enemy, that it is an acknowledged fact, they did not know of Greene's reaching the river until they approached its banks, and saw the last of the covering party landing on the opposite shore. This was on the 15th of the month. The main army had reached the ferry the morning of the day before, and intelligence being immediately dispatched to Williams, he adopted the necessary measures for eluding his wary enemy, and making good his escape, before his intention should be suspected. For this purpose, after taking ground in the evening, and encamping as usual, leaving all his fires burning, he stole silently away, and by a rapid movement, reached the ferry, and crossed before his purpose was suspected.

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This retreat was not only the admiration of the friends of the revolution, at the time—it has called forth the most unqualified praises from every British writer. Indeed, it is remarkable that, not only in this, but in every previous and most subsequent affairs in which General Greene was engaged, and in none but those which happened under his command, has an eulogium been uttered by the British writers. Success, under most other commanders, has been attributed to some fortuitous cause; but, whether he had conciliated their esteem, or from what other cause, we know not, they have not been sparing of the commendation bestowed upon him.

Amid the general exultation, and the mutual felicitations which enlivened the American camp, on the evening of the 15th, there was found one heavy heart; and when the shades of night had summoned the weary veteran to repose, there was found one watchful eye, that consumed the midnight lamp in cares for their security. There is in many of the numerous official letters, written on this evening, a marked character of constraint, mingled with occasional bursts of indignant feeling, or of complaint, tempered by respect, which strongly pourtray the varied workings of the mind that dictated them.

Nor could it have been otherwise; for, though the army was saved, and with it the last hope of a successful issue to the campaign, yet another state was given up to the ravages of the enemy; and if this Fabian system had exposed even Washington's courage and talents to suspicion, what right had Greene to hope to escape the ready tongue, and wakeful eye of censure? There was yet a more mortifying reflection, pressing on the mind of the American commander. In one of his letters to the Baron Steuben, borrowing the words attributed to the great Frederick, he exclaims, "Oh that of the many thousands now idle at home, a few, a very few hundreds more were with me in the field!" His adversary was now obviously in his power. He had led him to the very spot where he hoped, at the farthest, to be met by reinforcements, and to be able to turn upon and destroy him; but, not a man was there; even the numbers which he counted but a few days before, had been greatly reduced. The volunteers would not wander far from their homes; some few, who had no homes, remained with him. The militia, called into the field for a short period, had served their tour and retired; and even the continentals, not enlisted for the war, were claiming their discharges as fast as their term of service expired.

But, relief grew out of his very misfortunes. The states of North Carolina and Virginia now saw the flames of war rolling towards their dwellings. Reiterated remonstrances had effected little; the approach of the hostile army produced much. Intelligence poured in from all quarters, of the approach of

the North Carolina and Virginia militia, and Steuben was hurrying on, a body of recruits for the Virginia regiments; yet, they were generally far distant, and days and weeks must elapse, before they could be marched to head quarters. Now was the time for action; a few days more and their arrival might be too late. For the third time, the enemy was separated from the American general only by a river. It might fall, and he might be attacked; or the enemy might retire, and evade the present danger. To a mind conscious of its own powers—to a heart glowing with love of country—to a soldier emulous of military fame—to a commander, high in reputation, and conspicuous in the part allotted him, it is difficult to conceive a situation more tantalizing and perplexing. CHAP X.

The morning of the 16th dawned upon an anxious night, only to add to the general's perplexities. It was announced, that the river was falling; and as the crossing places in his vicinity were too numerous to admit a hope of successful opposition to a superior enemy, a retreat appeared unavoidable: the army was therefore put under orders to be ready to act at a moment's warning. The baggage had already been ordered on the rout to Halifax old court house, and the necessary orders issued to the quarter-master's department, to make good the passage of Staunton river with the whole army, should such a movement become necessary. These arrangements made, the two armies rested in tranquility, watching each others motions. As the rise and fall of these rivers are subject to great vicissitudes, and there was still a considerable depth of water, the necessity of a movement, on the part of the American commander, had not yet become imperative. A change of circumstances, on the following day, induced him to give a new direction to his motions.

Pickens had succeeded in raising a force of about seven hundred militia, and was approaching the enemy's left. General Caswell, of North Carolina, had also collected a force below, and made a demonstration towards his other flank. The depredations committed by the enemy in his advance, had surrounded him with inveterate enemies, and he saw nothing but hostility in his vicinity, which ever way he directed his views. These considerations soon convinced the British general, that he must direct his march to some more friendly quarter, whilst the exhausted state of his stores made it advisable to approach one, from which relief might be obtained from the privations to which he had subjected his officers and soldiers.

Hillsborough was in the direct rout to Wilmington, and situate in a region known to abound in loyalists, as well as near the settlements between the Haw and Deep rivers, in which the majority of the inhabitants were reputed to be firmly and irreclaimably attached to the royal cause. Thither he directed his

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steps, and on the 18th left General Greene at liberty to resume offensive operations. These were delayed no longer than was necessary to guard against a feint.

Many reasons imposed upon General Greene the necessity of still occupying the east bank of the Dan, with his army posted partly at the river, and partly at Halifax old court house on the Banister. The first moments of rest that had been enjoyed, had been employed in the most pressing instances to all on whom the duty devolved, or in whom power existed, to press forward reinforcements at this critical juncture. None had yet arrived, but many parties were in motion, and all their steps were pointed towards this post. It was not among the least considerations that had directed his own march towards this position, that it was above all others peculiarly eligible as a point of concentration. The whole southern border of Virginia, will not furnish one better suited for collecting to a point, the population of that state; and it was little less proper, under present circumstances, for drawing together that of North Carolina and facilitating the advance of the mountain men who were expected under Shelby and Campbell. By crossing the Dan above, or the Roanoke below, the militia might follow the east bank of those rivers to Greene's encampment, in great security, from the interruptions of the enemy. Nor would his apprehensions for the post of Halifax, in North Carolina, yet permit him to abandon a situation, which would enable him to hasten, if necessary, to the protection of that place. General Kosciusko had already been dispatched to construct works for its defence, and Greene was steadily resolved not to permit the enemy to possess it without a struggle. Being accessible from the ocean, having a very fertile country above it, possessing the only manufactories in the state, and conveniently situated to communicate with the waters of the Chesapeake, it afforded too many military advantages to his enemy to be neglected. It was not, therefore, until he was well satisfied that the views of Lord Cornwallis were not directed to that post, that he recrossed the Dan, and advanced with the main army towards Hillsborough.

There was still another urgent reason for hesitating at resuming active operations with the main army. It was the depth of winter, and the climate cold beyond the gradation of its latitude. It is affected by the elevation of the earth's surface, and the vicinity of the Alleghany mountains. Long marches, thin clothing, and much exposure, had greatly thinned his ranks, and the state of his best clad men, was but ill adapted to the prosecution of a winter campaigns. The returns of the Maryland line, that body of men to whose gallantry the country was so much indebted, and whose fidelity had risen superior to suffering and temptation, exhibited 861 fit for duty, 274 in the

hospitals. In a letter from one of his officers, who had been employed in guarding and removing the heavy baggage, we find a complaint, "that as his men were generally bare foot, long marches had, at length, incapacitated them from marching at all;" and the following passage of a letter, from Greene to Washington, exhibits an original picture of the sufferings of the main army : CHAP. X.

"IRVINE'S FERRY*, *February* 15.

"The miserable situation of the troops, for want of clothing, has rendered the march the most painful imaginable ; many hundreds of the soldiers tracking the ground with their bloody feet. Your feelings for the sufferings of the soldier, had you been with us, would have been severely tried."

Nor would the effective force of the army, at that time, sanction a hasty pursuit. Sending off, and guarding the many detachments of baggage, stores, prisoners, sick, &c. had necessarily drawn off a number of men on detached commands. The militia, alone, could not be depended upon for this service, as they came and went almost as they pleased. Hence, a small guard of regulars became indispensable; and, where an auxiliary militia force was called out, it was relieved at different stages, according to the necessity of circumstances. On the 17th of this month, there were no less than 345 of the Maryland line thus employed; and, on that day, every man in camp, fit for duty, is stated at, infantry, 1078—artillery, 64—cavalry, 176—legionary infantry, 112. The militia had all departed, with the exception only, of the gallant little band under Pickens, who alone, in the worst of times, never abandoned the retreating army: but, at this time, they were detached under their leader, on the service which has been already noticed. Their numbers, then, were reduced to about 150, consisting altogether of volunteers from South Carolina and Georgia—the former under Colonel M'Call—the latter under a youthful leader of the highest promise, and who was destined to attain to the highest distinction in the councils of his country—this was the late General Jackson of Georgia, at that time a captain of militia. Most of the officers and men from the two southern states who had fought at the Cowpens, had been previously detached under the orders issued to Pickens, to diperse themselves through the interior of those two states, in order to keep alive the opposition in that quarter.

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* Irvine's and Boyd's ferry, appear to be the same, by different names, or within a very short distance of each other.

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Although no reinforcements had yet reached the American army, the most flattering promises now poured in from every side. The advance of the British army to the banks of the Dan, had spread universal alarm through the two states that lie along the waters of the Roanoke. A busy bustling scene was now exhibited in all directions. The cry "to arms," was universal; the people really manifested the best dispositions possible; and they were numerous as the locusts of the desert; a swarm of them might have swept the British army from the face of the earth. But the demon of confusion appeared to preside over every movement; and men without organization only derive weakness from multitude. Portentous, as was the aspect of public affairs at this time, it is scarcely possible to peruse the correspondence it produced, without yielding to an irresistable impulse to be amused. One officer collects a considerable force, and is ready to march to the Dan, when the legislature of North Carolina orders him to take the contrary course, and sit down near Wilmington. Another, is prepeared and anxious to march immediately, but waits the order of the major general, and knows not where to find him. A third, very high in command, excuses himself from attending to the forwarding of troops, because he is a member of the governor's council, and has been summoned to attend him an hundred miles off. A fourth, is on the march to join the American commander, and is ordered to take post at Eaton's Ferry and wait further orders. In Virginia, the people fly to arms, are willing to act as volunteers, but the county lieutenants dismiss them to their homes, because not called out according to law; and when the enemy is at their doors, insist on the necessity of awaiting an order from Richmond. Thus, in every quarter, under the most critical circumstances, when present relief appeared indispensable to ward off present destruction, were reinforcements detained, merely because the American general could not himself command them out, but must depend upon the good will, dilligence, or the intelligence of others to afford them. A wakeful jealousy of arbitrary power, is unquestionably salutary; but where the slow course of legal process must be observed in attempts to arrest the desolating flame, the best of principles may be adhered to, to the most unhappy of purposes.

Nor was the American commander doomed only to sustain these mortifications, from the delays incident to the measures of the state authorities: he was also subjected to a disappointment of the most serious nature, from a quarter whence he had least reason to expect it.

The party under General Arnold, intended to produce a diversion in favour of Lord Cornwallis, and as the precursor of the expedition under General

Philips, arrived in the Chesapeake at the close of the year 1780. Experience has taught, what reflection might have suggested, that the places situate on the navigable waters of the Chesapeake, derive very little security from their remoteness in the interior. An enemy who can command the bay, can operate with safety and effect, against the towns which are accessible to vessels of force, or not too far distant for a *coup de main*. Arnold, it has been seen, met with no opposition in penetrating to Richmond, and retired with little molestation. The rapidity of his movements, crowned them with a cheap-purchased success. Having seized upon, and fortified the post at Portsmouth, he retired securely from his devastating expedition, and placed himself in it with a force of about 1700 men. In the meantime, the Baron Steuben had collected together as many continental troops, and militia under Generals Weeden and Muhlenberg, as rendered it no longer safe for Arnold to venture out of his strong hold. Here they lay for some time watching each others motions, the one occasionally prosecuting his predatory expeditions along the shores of the rivers, the other manœuvring to decoy the wary traitor from his lurking place. Why, more efficient operations were not carried on to compel him to retire or surrender, is thus accounted for in a letter from General Muhlenberg to General Greene: CHAP. X.

"*February* 24, 1781.

"I must acknowledge it is derogatory to the honor of the state, to suffer such a handful of men to retain possession so long, (now six weeks) but what my dear general is to be done? They are strongly fortified; I have near two thousand men, and among the whole about 300 bayonets, and two brass six pounders. With such a military apparatus, we cannot think of attacking his works by regular approaches, and all my hope is, that we shall be able to coop up Arnold so close, that he will be obliged to make an effort to dislodge us."

Measures were in considerable forwardness for the purposes expressed in this letter, by the march of a large body of North Carolinas from below, and the preparations for attack under the baron above, when the most confident hopes of success were inspired by the arrival of a respectable French naval force in the Chesapeake. The escape of Arnold appearing now to be cut off, and intelligence being received of the retreat and critical situation of General Greene, Steuben resolved to order down his battering cannon, and leaving General Muhlenberg in command before Portsmouth, to march with Generals Weeden and Nelson, to the relief of the main army.

CHAP. X. For this purpose he organized a corps of 400 regulars, under Colonel Campbell, and 2600 militia under Generals Weeden, Nelson and others, and by the 25th they were in full march for the camp on the Dan. A very handsome supply also of arms and accoutrements for 600 men, was forwarded on at the same time, with the same destination.

Is the reader prepared to see all these promising prospects blasted by the most untoward incidents!

The French fleet refused to remain in the Chesapeake, and Arnold escaped; and a piece of incorrect intelligence, caused the recall of Weeden and Nelson, and prevented Steuben from prosecuting his purpose of joining his commander.

In order to make secure the effort to support Greene, and receive his orders respecting the advance of these reinforcements, General Steuben had dispatched a Captain North, who appears to have acted as his aid, with orders to proceed to head quarters, and communicate immediately with the general himself. North proceeded as far as Taylor's ferry, and hearing there that Lord Cornwallis was hastily retreating to Wilmington, and Greene in pursuit with a superior force, proceeded no further, but forwarded his dispatches by another hand, and returned to arrest the advance of the intended reinforcements. The four hundred men, under Campbell, continued their march; the rest were remanded and returned, when their presence would have rendered the most signal services. We do not find, that Captain North ever incurred the censure which this act merited, but it was impossible to justify it. To indulge conjecture on possible events, is almost nugatory, in a world where human calculation is so much the sport of fortune, or of fate; but, it is impossible to avoid reflecting on the consequences which would probably have resulted from the prosecution of the measures adopted by Steuben. That the whole reinforcements would have been in time for the battle at Guilford, is proved by the arrival of the detachment under Campbell; and that so strong a reinforcement, under such commanders, would have gathered in its progress like a popular crusade, will readily be admitted by those who are acquainted with the motives and propensities which influence militia volunteering.

Whence at last came relief to the commander of the southern department?

Colonel Lee, with the laudable feeling of a native Virginian, has asserted that, "that state may well be denominated, the matrix of resistance in the south. It is certain, that at this time, every effort of the enemy was directed against Virginia. Secure within the defences of New York, the British commander in chief was wholly occupied in blockading the French army at Newport, and prosecuting the war against Virginia. It was now plainly seen,

that nothing but the reduction of that state could secure the subjugation of those which lie to the south of it. Besides, being itself a magazine of men, and a place of retreat for an army operating in the southern department; through its upper counties must pass all the stores and reinforcements, that the northern and eastern states could furnish. Thus, whilst Lord Cornwallis was pressing upon her southern frontier, Arnold had penetrated to the capitol, and a formidable expedition was in advanced preparation at New York, to reinforce the army now lying at Portsmouth. These causes distracted the attention of Virginia; and in the necessary effort to defend herself, the resources were exhausted, which would otherwise have been applied to the relief of the southern army."*

We feel no inclination to derogate from the merits of a state, which may have been too much extolled, but which cannot be denied the honor of having done its duty as well as any other; but it must be acknowledged, that neither the force now with the army, nor the troops enlisted to reinforce it, were commensurate with what was expected of the population, resources and pretensions of the state. Some very wise and spirited measures adopted about this time, were calculated to answer public expectation; but Virginia, though abounding in men, provisions, and horses, had neither money, commerce nor manufactories. This was the great cause why at this time she makes so sorry a figure in the field. In a letter from the indefatigable Steuben, of the 22d of February, when the detachment under Campbell was preparing to march, we find the following passage:—"All this has not diverted my attention one moment from you. I have not ceased tormenting the governor for the clothing for the troops at this place; but, with all my importunities, I do no think I should have been able to have equipped them these six weeks, if a quantity of stores had not arrived from the northward. From these, I have drawn such articles as I was deficient in, and shall thereby be enabled to send on the detachments the 25th instant." Thus it was, that the sufferings of the soldiers with the army were protracted, in order to expedite the march of reinforcements.

Nor was the difficulty less with regard to arms. A dispute, it appears, arose at this time, respecting the liability of the state to furnish arms to the quota required of it. A question appears to have been made, whether a requisition of men necessarily implied armed men. On this subject, we extract the following passage of a letter from the Governor to Steuben, of the date of

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* Lee's Memoirs.

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the 21st December, 1780:—"As arms were never among the requisitions made by Congress on the several states, this state never supposed it would be expected, they should provide that article for their quota of continental troops. They have only had in view, to procure from time to time, as many as might arm their militia when necessity required the calling them into service. From this stock they have furnished arms for continental use, till it is so reduced, that they have not the smallest prospect of being able, from the state magazines, to spare as many as will arm their own continental levies."

It thus proved truly fortunate, that General Greene, before leaving Philadelphia, had drawn upon the friendship of the governor of Pennsylvania, and of the commander in chief, for supplies of arms; otherwise it is most probable, that Virginia could not at this time have sent a single recruit into the field. To the intelligence and exertions of the baron also, was the army indebted for eking out those limited supplies to their utmost. The artificers, in their establishment at the Point of Fork, were kept employed in repairing and refitting arms and equipments; and the waggons returning from the southward, were charged with the transportation of those which sustained injury in service. Thus it happened, that in the fatal irruption of Colonel Tarleton, which we shall have occasion particularly to notice, such quantities of arms are said to have been found in that depot.

The correspondence between the commander of the southern department, and Governor Jefferson, on the subject of requisitions, puts us in possession of the official statement, under the hand of the latter, of all the troops which Virginia claimed credit for, at this time; and we can, therefore, speak of it with minuteness, and with confidence. This statement bears date February the 10th. 1781, and from it, the state appears to have in the field two thousand three hundred and twenty-one men, and to acknowledge a deficiency of three thousand one hundred and eighty-eight. But of those in the field, five hundred were still to be clothed, and armed, and marched from Chesterfield court house; and the return acknowledges, that "arms, we have none, nor can by any means procure them." One thousand and sixty-one more are said to be posted at various points in the state; and the number actually with the army, is stated to be twelve hundred and sixty, consisting of Harrison's regiment of artillery, estimated at sixty—Bufort's infantry at five hundred—Greene's at four hundred—and White and Washington's cavalry at three hundred. Of the whole number in service, only one hundred and forty-four, stationed at Fort Pit, and Harrison's sixty artillerists were enlisted for the war; the rest were engaged for various, and generally very short tours of service. Of the actual state of those troops stationed in the state, we know nothing; but, if the state returns

with regard to them, be as inaccurate as they are with regard to the numbers with the southern army, the deficiencies in the Virginia line must have been much greater than that admitted. The field-return of the army of the same date, with Mr. Jefferson's statement, gives of the Virginia brigade, five hundred and thirty-four rank and file fit for duty, thirty metrosses, and seventy-four cavalry—about one half the number claimed by the state. The deficiency of six hundred and twenty-two, if with the army, must be made up of non-commissioned officers, musicians, sick, and absent on duty. But, it is well known, that the cavalry especially, never equalled one hundred, instead of three.

Yet, there was obviously no want of zeal in the government of Virginia to discharge its duty in the common cause. Their legislature being in session when General Greene was moving southwardly, passed a most liberal act in consequence of the requisitions which he made upon them. But laws, without the means of carrying them into effect, can neither create or supply an army. Very little aid to the southern army ever grew out of that law.

Yet, there was one hardship which the southern department generally, and Virginia in particular, had at this time to complain of, which has remained unnoticed, although its effects were at the time very sensibly felt. When Congress resolved, more in the spirit of policy than of faith, not to carry into effect the convention of Saratoga, the troops captured with Burgoyne were marched into the interior of Virginia, and here they were subsisted altogether by Virginia. The subsistence of prisoners, at this time, required of the state two thousand rations per day, and was so much subtracted from her capacity to supply the wants of the southern army; yet, the southern commander was prohibited from exchanging these troops, even for the southern troops, then in the prison ships of Charleston. But, a far greater cause of exhaustion to Virginia was the unbounded license which every state then exercised, of keeping just what militia they pleased in the field. Virginia, at this time, had to furnish 3000 rations per day for her own camp.

The government of Virginia, it would seem, began to be impatient at being for ever enlisting, and yet never having troops in the field; and the combining and investigating head of Steuben was called into requisition to furnish the remedy. The following lines, from his pen to the governor of Virginia, may furnish useful hints to those who shall hereafter be engaged in the same undertaking.

"By the long continuance of a war, it is natural that the difficulty and expense of raising men should be increased; and, therefore, every possible means should be employed for the preservation of the men after they are

CHAP. X. raised; and every abuse which has a contrary tendency should be inquired into, and those who commit them severely punished.

"The incomplete state our regiments have always been in, has had a very bad effect in this respect. The regiments were obliged to be incorporated into one another, and the officers being shifted about, no longer had that attachment to their men, which is necessary for their preservation. On the contrary, being disgusted at this instability, and smallness of their commands, they became careless of the men, and suffered them to absent themselves when well; and when sent away sick, took no pains for their recovery or return; and every doctor in a hospital gave furloughs and discharges, whereby numbers of them have been lost to the service. As discharges from the army have been without any prescribed form, and none printed, it is more than probable that many have been counterfeited by deserters, who have then returned with impunity to their homes," &c.

Virginia had but partially followed the wise example of some of the other states, in enlisting for the war. It was now too late, the demand for substitutes increased as the requisitions of militia multiplied, and very small indeed was the number which even a high bounty could tempt, from the more lucrative, and less permanent, and less rigid service of a militia substitute. Hence a measure was forced upon her, which for energy and wisdom, was excelled by no measure of the American war. This was a conscription; such an one as will one day be adopted by the United States, and after that day, she need never fear a foreign war. National feeling seems lately to have been interested in arrogating to Virginia, the honor of having given motion to the ball of the revolution, but it would be enough for national pride to assert the less incontestible claim of having originated this measure, although on a defective plan.

The whole population of the state was equitably distributed into 2904 divisions, and each was required to furnish a man, or stand a draft for eighteen month's service, and other specific contributions were imposed in the same just and efficient mode.

The very spirited resolutions adopted by Virginia at this time, plainly exhibit, that if the public energy had for a time flagged, the spring had now resumed its elasticity. Yet such was the baleful influence of the militia requisitions over enlistments for the regular army, that when the brigade in service under Stevens, was about being discharged, Steuben solicited the adjutant general not to order out a relief of the same species of troops, assuring him that the war could not be carried on by militia. And even after Greene had retreated across the Dan, and pressing necessity would have

made any species of reinforcements welcome, he consoles his commander for the loss of the detachment which had been halted and discharged when most wanted, by assuring him that while the militia are on foot, all recruiting of the regular troops is at an end. Yet, if the wisdom of man could have suggested an expeditious, and effectual mode of filling the ranks of the Virginia contingent, it was that of a draft. For although the demand for militia substitutes, might for a while maintain the struggle for ascendency, the union of powers and efforts, which forms the basis of the conscriptive plan, must in the end have triumphed, had there been strength enough in the civil arm to carry it into effect. CHAP. X.

Ever since General Greene had taken the command, Maryland had much exceeded Virginia in the number of her troops in the field. After the dreadful reduction of their ranks at the defeat of Gates, a number of recruits and stragglers of that line, had been collected and sent on to the army. That state very early adopted the wise policy of enlisting for the war, and the excellent effect of it was sensibly felt at the Cowpens, at Guilford, and the Eutaws. On the 17th February, the Maryland troops in the field were returned at 1312, but want of clothing, severe service and small detachments, had reduced the number fit for duty, much below the aggregate.

The Delaware troops also, it will be recollected, had suffered very severely at the defeat of Gates. This little corps, although numbering but about 60 or 80 effectives, was the admiration of the army, and their leader Kirkwood was the American Diomed. Like the Marylanders they had been enlisted for the war, and like the veterans of that brigade, were not excelled by any troops in America, perhaps in the world. The attention of General Gist, it will be recollected, had been devoted to soliciting aid from the legislatures of these two states, but not with the most satisfactory result. A few recruits were occasionally sent on, but the number in service from these two states, at no time exceeded the present return. Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina had not a single regular in the field. The miserable remnant of their troops were all pining in the prison ships of Savannah and Charleston. Immediately after the fall of Charleston, South Carolina, was entirely over run, and her constituted authorities captured or dispersed. Georgia had been similarly situated from the fall of Savannah. And North Carolina, exhausted, distracted and enfeebled, had never bent her attention to the raising of new troops. But their legislature were at this time in session at Newbern, and urged not less by the remonstrances of Greene than by their own zeal and patriotism, were seriously devising means for raising a regular force.

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The reinforcement with which General Greene determined to recross the Dan, consisted altogether of volunteers from Virginia and North Carolina. The people of Halifax county, particularly exhibited a noble zeal on this occasion. Such was the promising appearance of the temper of the people in the country adjacent to his camp, that Greene promptly resolved to take advantage of the tide that now set towards him. General Stevens had scarcely delivered his prisoners, and halted to deliver at Pittsylvania court house the public arms which had been furnished to his brigade; when, accompanied by a few followers, zealous as himself, he repaired to the head-quarters of the commanding general. His arrival was the most fortunate incident imaginable, for it enabled Greene to furnish the Virginians with a popular and able officer of their own state. On the 19th February, Stevens received an order from Greene to engage any number of volunteers in the public service, for the term of six weeks. Before the 23d he had near 1000 men enrolled.

It will readily be conceived that the spirit of volunteering had received its direction and impulse from some influential quarter. However strong may be the working of popular feeling, men generally wait for the example and countenance of those who possess the public confidence. It would be injustice to two distinguished patriots of the revolution, not to notice the share they had in this noble effort of individual patriotism. These were Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson.

A late writer has noticed the conduct of the latter gentleman about this period, with imputations of which, judging from the evidence before us, we should be disposed to pronounce him every way undeserving. Never did an officer of the United States experience more cordial and zealous support, than that which Greene received at this time from Governor Jefferson. That the governor's effort in another quarter should have been less ready, less judicious, or less efficient, it is difficult to conceive. Every requisition of the commanding general was promptly complied with; the militia of the neighbouring countries ordered into the field, and several active and spirited measures pursued for replenishing Washington's corps of horse. Indeed it is a well known fact that his popularity was at this time greatly affected, by charges of his having done too much; and if we suppose his efforts in other quarters to have been met with the same querulous spirit, it is not difficult to assign a cause why there was not sufficient preparation made for repelling the incursions of Arnold.

From the numerous letters from this gentleman now spread before us, we will only select the following passages:

"RICHMOND, *February 17th*, 1781. CHAP. X.

"In the moment of receiving your letter of the 10th, I issued orders to the counties of Washington, Montgomery, Botetourt and Bedford for seven hundred and odd riflemen, and to those of Henry and Pittsylvania, for four hundred and odd of their militia. Yet my trust is that neither these nor the adjacent counties have awaited orders, but that they have turned out and will have joined you in greater numbers than we have directed. I shall be glad if you will call on the neighbouring county lieutenants, for any succours which you may want and circumstances forbid to be delayed.

"P. S. Since writing the above we are told Lord Cornwallis has advanced to the Roanoke. I am, in consequence, issuing orders to embody every man between this and that, for whom a firelock can be procured, and that they march to join you."

"RICHMOND, *February 18th*, 1781.

"I have this moment received yours of the 15th from Boyd's ferry. I had heard yesterday of the approach of Lord Cornwallis, and gave orders in consequence, for embodying so many of the militia between this place and that as could be armed, and of this gave you information in a letter of yesterday's date. I hoped, at the same time, that the militia would not await my orders; and by the letters I receive, I trust they have not. I sincerely wish you may find it practicable to avoid a general action, till you can be sufficiently reenforced with militia, which I am sure you will be as far as arms can be found. The moment I hear Lord Cornwallis has crossed the Dan, I shall order every man to be embodied on this side the river, within a reasonable distance, who can be armed. I shall attend, as far as depends on me, to officering the militia as you recommend, [with continental officers] and mounting the cavalry. As to yourself, I would advise, that you make no scruples about property, so far as it is wanted for the public; only give orders, that the owners be furnished with proper documents, that they may be reimbursed."

"P. S. Take horses to mount your cavalry, and I will undertake to have it justified."

The day following, regular press warrants for this purpose were forwarded; and to give countenance and aid to the commanding general, in the measures which he might find it necessary to pursue, a Major M'Gill, a gentleman of respectable standing, was dispatched to attend the camp, and lend his personal assistance wherever it could be beneficial.

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It is not in our power to give any thing of this date from the pen of the celebrated Patrick Henry; for it is an acknowledged fact, that pen, ink and paper, were to him the objects of habitual loathing. But, his patriotism needs not a written record to support its reputation. On this occasion, he also dispatched an envoy to camp, with a tender of his ever ready aid. The answer of the general is before us, requesting him to set on foot a corps of volunteers, 1500 in number, if practicable. Henry's envoy had been dispatched at so early a day, as to have reached the army when it lay at Guilford; and the advantage in point of time, not less than the winged zeal of voluntary service, had brought Henry's volunteers into the field, much earlier than the drafted men of the governor.

The following extract of the letter to Mr. Henry, written on this occasion, will not be unacceptable to the reader;

"*February* 10*th*, 1781.

"My force is too inconsiderable to confine the limits of the enemy's depredations, or in any wise to check the rapidity of their march through this unhappy country. My duty compels me to retreat immediately, as the only means eventually to save the country. Your influence in Virginia, properly exerted at this important period, may terminate the war greatly to the honor and advantage of the southern states. If it is possible for you to call forth fifteen hundred volunteers, and march them immediately to my assistance, the British army will be exposed to a very critical and dangerous situation. In all probability, you will find me on the north side of the Dan river. I must repeat it, the present moment is big with the most important consequences, and requires the greatest and most spirited exertions. You, I know, are equal to them, and I trust no step will be omitted that may be necessary to call forth the power of your part to the country."

The spirited and rapid concentration of the volunteers under Stevens, enabled the commanding general to resume aggressive operations on the 23d of February. On that day he recrossed the Dan with the main army, with a resolution to cut off the British army from the upper country, and either force it upon Steuben, who was ordered to watch any attempt that might be made to strike across the country below; or oblige it to retreat to Wilmington, through a country great part of which is barren; and in passing through which, there was great reason to believe, it might be exposed to imminent danger, should the militia collect with spirit in its front and on its flanks.

Great as was the reluctance of the American commander again, to expose his barefooted troops to the severity of this service, the object was too inviting to admit of hesitation. From this time also, every moment was influenced by the necessity of making the most of the time that his reinforcements were engaged for, and in keeping up the excitement which motion communicates to a species of troops, whose spirits soon flagg in a state of inactivity; nor was he less controlled in his measures by the obvious importance of repressing that excitement which the presence of the British army was likely to produce among the settlements of loyalists. Lord Cornwallis had now seated himself down in his land of promise, and the alarming intelligence had reached the American commander, that he had succeeded in forming no less than seven companies of royalists in one day, in Hillsborough.

When the British commander abandoned the banks of the Dan, he must still have entertained the hope of drawing his wary adversary into some act of indiscretion. It is impossible otherwise to account for the apparent indecision of his movements. Instead of pursuing the direct road to Hillsborough, his first day's march was up the course of the river, on the rout by which he had pursued the retreating Americans, and appeared to threaten the party under Pickens, or indicate an attempt to cross the river above Boyd's. The next was in a direction nearly contrary, and indicated a view to the magazines and stores, (now on the east bank of the Roanoke) or an intention to take a route below, for pushing on to the shores of the Chesapeake. The third was in a direction nearly at right angles, or rather retrograde to the last, and led directly to Hillsborough. Here he arrived on the 20th, and erected the British standard, fondly flattering himself and his employers that the state was conquered. Nothing was farther from the truth, and chagrine and disappointment soon attended the development of his error.

Immediately on his arrival at Hillsborough, appeared the British commander's celebrated proclamation reciting, "that it had pleased the divine providence to prosper his majesty's arms in driving the rebel army out of the province, and as it was his majesty's most gracious wish to rescue his loyal and faithful subjects from the cruel tyranny under which they had groaned for several years, calling upon his loyal and faithful subjects to repair without loss of time to his standard, equiped with arms, and furnished with ten days provisions." At the same time appeared an advertisement, calling upon his majesty's loyal and faithful subjects able and willing to undertake to raise independent companies to be formed into regiments, to give in their names immediately at head-quarters, and offering a bounty in guineas and lands to the men who should enlist under them.

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Nothing could be more flattering than the prospects of the British commander, for the first three days after the appearance of these publications. The most earnest professions of loyalty greeted his ear, and the crowds of inhabitants who thronged around his camp, promised a rich harvest of recruits. But, suddenly the crowd began to drop away, and the dissipation of his proud hopes was soon accounted for by intelligence, that Greene, being reinforced, had recrossed the Dan, and was marching in a direction to intercept his communication with the upper country, while Pickens and Lee were already in view of his camp.

It was on this occasion that Lord Cornwallis wrote to the British ministry, that he was surrounded by timid friends and inveterate enemies. The dangers of his situation began now to open on his view; and to fight his antagonist, became from this time as much a matter of necessity, as it had been before a matter of choice. The waning state of his stores—the falling off of his men by desertion—the defection of the wary loyalists—the alarm from all quarters, of the advance of the hostile militia, and not less, a consciousness that he had made no friends in his advance through the country—plainly showed that he had now no alternative, but conquest or destruction. The army of Greene must be dissipated or driven off, or his own discomfiture was scarcely avoidable.

The numerous precautions adopted by the American commander to watch the steps of the enemy, on the first appearance of motion in his camp, affords an instructive specimen of military vigilance. An entire new combination of measures and designs was now forming; the views of the enemy in every movement were to be cautiously looked into, and it was as necessary to guard against those that were mere feints, as to prepare to counteract those which were real.

The waving handkerchief of a patriotic female, who had stolen under covert of the bank, was the concerted signal that the enemy had commenced a retreat from the Dan. Immediately every thing was in motion in the American camp. Major Pierce, one of the general's aids, with a small but select escort, equipped equally to fight or to fly, hung upon their wings and collected and dispatched intelligence. Colonels Williams and Campbell, too eminent partisan leaders of the North Carolina militia, with their faithful adherents on horse back, patrolled the banks of the river and guarded the passes above. And Colonel Otho Williams, with the same select detachment that had been placed under his command at Guilford, was pushed across the river, to hang on the rear of the enemy, watch his movements, and if his inten-

tion should be to move on for Wilmington, by all possible means to retard his march. CHAP. X.

Whilst the infantry of Williams' detachment approached with more cautious steps the rear of the enemy; the legion, under Lee, supported by two companies of Marylanders, and the cavalry, under Washington, were pushed forward by different routes on his wings.

Colonel Washington continued his march parallel to that of the enemy, until he fully ascertained its direction towards Hillsborough, when he retraced his steps and attached himself to Colonel Williams. The range of Colonel Lee was of far greater duration and extent. He was now in the very element of his talents. Better scope for the exercise of his partsian powers could not be coveted, and we find him every hour meditating or executing some new exploit. His communications, which were frequent and hurried, exhibit the greatest activity, zeal and intelligence. On the right, on the left, in the rear of the enemy, wherever service could be performed, or intelligence collected, we find him continually occupied, and forever changing his positions, to guard against surprise. At length, on the day that Cornwallis took the direct route to Hillsborough, suspecting from its being the direct route also to Wilmington, that the event which he knew his commander most deprecated, was about to take place, he formed the resolution to throw himself in the front of the whole British army, and by forming a junction with Butler or Governor Nash, then marching up the Cape Fear, to prevent, if possible, the escape of Lord Cornwallis to his shipping, until Greene could be upon him with a reinforced army.

The letter in which this communication is made, contains a passage too strikingly characteristic to be omitted:—"Should the enemy move on towards Cross Creek, [the route to Wilmington] I have determined to get in their front, in order to cause every opposition in my power, with the view of delaying their progress. In this service I must lose men; and rely on your promise for the filling up of the legion." This was all the boon that he asked for exposing *them* to loss, or *himself* to the mortification of a diminished command.

At length, having fully ascertained, that the present views of Lord Cornwallis did not threaten an immediate escape, and being informed that his pickets exhibited all that consciousness of security which flows from the supposed absence of danger, he resolved, on the morning of the 22d, to strike a blow at one posted at Hart's Mills two and a half miles from Hillsborough, and make prisoners for obtaining intelligence. Captain Egleston, of the legionary corps, was accordingly dispatched for the purpose; and with the boldness and precaution which always distinguished that officer, he approached the position of the

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picket—But, what was his surprise, to find himself anticipated, and the whole picket already killed, or in possession of an American party.

This service had been performed by a party commanded by Colonel Hugh M'Call, detached for the purpose by General Pickens. That indefatigable officer, the moment he learned that Lord Cornwallis, after a day's march towards him, had taken a contrary direction, dispatched intelligence of it to General Greene, and received from him instructions to put his command in motion, and press upon the enemy's rear. The necessities of their families, had obliged one half of his command to return to their homes; but, the gallant little band under M'Call still adhered to him, and by the accession of volunteers from Virginia and North Carolina, their numbers were increased to 360 rank and file, consisting of the party of horse formed under M'Call at the affair of the Cowpens, about 45 in number, and the rest, well mounted riflemen. With this party he had advanced upon Cornwallis by the direct route from Guilford to Hillsborough, and without knowing of his near approach to the party under Lee, although apprized of their being on the same service, had anticipated him in the enterprise against the British picket. The two parties immediately after formed a junction, and found themselves in force to brave more hazardous enterprizes.*

The obvious effect produced on the minds of the loyalists by the military insult of the morning, indicated to Lord Cornwallis, the necessity of driving away a party supposed to consist only of Lee's command; so silent had been the approach of Pickens, that his presence was not suspected, nor was it less necessary for the purpose of protecting the loyalists who were now embodying at different rendezvous appointed by their leaders. A detachment under Tarleton was accordingly sent out, and never did a detachment more narrowly escape destruction, for it passed very near the American force without knowing of their presence. It was probably an overmatch for Lee's legion, especially as it was furnished with two pieces of light artillery; but, by the junction of the party under Pickens, there was a decided superiority in numbers on the American side. The march of this party was not known to the Americans until the morning of the ensuing day.

On the night of the 21st, conformably to an intimation previously given to General Pickens, General Greene, attended by a small escort of dragoons, visited the former in his camp; and having spent the greatest part of the night

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* Colonel Lee is quite mistaken with regard to the time and circumstances of his junction with Pickens.

in his bush tent, in consultation with himself and Colonel Lee on their future measures, the two generals, wrapped in their cloaks, shared the same blanket in a refreshing nap, preparatory to the labours of the ensuing day. Greene then committed the whole detachment to the command of Pickens; and after exhorting the two commanders in the most earnest and affectionate manner, to let nothing disturb their harmony, and partaking of the sorry fare afforded by Pickens' wigwam, he took his departure for Williams' head quarters. CHAP. X.

The orders given to Pickens were, to make every effort to prevent the embodying of the loyalists, and impede the progress of the British army, should their commander attempt to retreat, before the main army could advance to attack it. And, as several rendezvous of loyalists had been appointed in the fork of the Haw and Deep rivers, and a position in that quarter would also be in the way of the retreat of the British army to Wilmington, that tract of country was particularly recommended to his attention. It was this fear of the escape of Cornwallis, that had brought Greene to Pickens' encampment within eighteen miles, and to the westward, of the British lines, and very narrowly must he have escaped Tarleton in making the visit. In the letter which announces his intention to obtain a personal interview, he writes,

"*20th February.*

"I beg you will continue to pursue the enemy, and harass them as much as possible. I have been joined by 1000 militia from this state, and expect 1000 more in a few days. If we can but delay Lord Cornwallis a day or two, he must be ruined. I am sensible that your exertions have been very great." On the following day, he writes:—"Push up with their rear as soon as possible.—Colonel Lee, with his legion, is in full pursuit—Colonel Williams, with the light infantry, is also on the march—The army will cross the river in the morning with a considerable reinforcement of militia—If we can get up with the enemy, I have no doubt of giving a good account of him—Send another express after Campbell, to push on with all imaginable dispatch—Every thing depends upon it."

By the examination of the prisoners taken in the morning, the American general became satisfied that the enemy had no immediate intention of moving southwardly. The impression that such was his design, had been produced by a movement across the little river Eno, one of the heads of the Neuse, running within a mile of Hillsborough. But, it was now ascertained, that the sole object of the detachment marched in that direction was, to take possession of a commanding eminence, from which the army might have been annoyed

CHAP. X. in its encampment. This bore the appearance of taking a post, and the American commander was no longer in doubt about his enemy's motives. He saw that the flattering appearances of loyalty in the people, and the obvious dangers attendant on a retreat, had led to a resolution to endeavour to hold the country. Nothing now remained to be done but to prepare for the decisive blow by hastening on his reinforcements, while he occupied, with the main army, a position the most favourable for covering their concentration, and for cutting off the enemy's communication with the upper country. With these views, the army was crossed over the Dan, and marched towards the head waters of the Haw river, on the route to Guilford, in a westerly direction, and encamped successively at Dobb's ferry, the plantation of Colonel Moore, and the high rock ford on the Haw river.

In the mean time Pickens lost not a moment in performing the services committed to his charge. Directing his march in a line nearly parrallel to that of the main army, and about twenty miles distant from it, he contemplated passing the Haw, and by secret and rapid movements to disperse the tories at their several rendezvous. This route soon brought him upon the trail of Colonel Tarleton, and all his apprehensions were awakened for several reinforcements of militia, whom he new to be marching to join him. One in particular under the command of Colonel Preston, and another under Colonel W. Campbell, he knew to be far advanced on their march. Colonel Locke, also had been left in his rear with a party of foot, when he advanced with his mounted men to the British lines at Hillsborough. Without hesitation therefore, he resolved to hasten forward in pursuit of Tarleton, and direct his first efforts towards the safety of his friends. As they were without cavalry, he anticipated their fate, should they fall, within the reach of Tarleton's sabres. There was no difficulty in determining the route of the British party, the smoking ruins of the settlements of the whigs, marked their course for many miles ahead. General Butler's plantation which lay in their route, was a particular object of their desolating valour. And the firm remonstrances of Major Car, an inoffensive old man, but a firm whig, was answered by a gash of the broad sword, and the mockery of the plundering soldiery.

Such was the expedition with which the American party pressed the pursuit, that at noon of the 25th, they were near surprising their enemy when securely seated at his dinner. The necessary halt in making arrangments for the attack, gave the enemy time to move off and cross the Haw, at a fording place which was too convenient to cause any delay: this was done without the least suspicion of the approaching danger. Pickens followed on with expedition, resolved to give his enemy no time to receive intelligence of his near approach. This,

but for one fortunate circumstance, would have been impossible. Nothing could be more unexpected to the natives, than an American party marching from Hillsborough. His command was therefore taken for a reinforcement to that under Tarleton, and as the uniform of the legion was precisely that of the legion commanded by the British colonel, the American commander found no difficulty in keeping up the deception. "Never" says General Pickens in his communication to General Greene, "was there a more glorious opportunity of cutting off a detachment than this; when, pushing on with the utmost hope, and our men in the highest spirits, our sanguine expectations were blasted by our falling in with a body of from two to three hundred tories under the command of a Colonel Piles." CHAP. X.

The situation of the American commander was now embarrassing in the extreme; but having ascertained, from the confident approach of a courier from the party, that the general deception had been communicated to Colonel Piles, he boldly resolved to pass him without an eclaircissement, and proceed on to the attack of Tarleton, then within one mile, and encamped without an apprehension of danger. Piles, unfortunately, inspired with a loyal desire to pay due homage to his majesty's troops, had drawn up his men on the right of the road very near to its margin; they were all mounted, and their guns resting on their shoulders. So complete was the imposition, that the dragoons which marched in files in front, their swords drawn, had reached the extremity of Piles' line, before a suspicion was excited. The infantry of the legion might also have passed, and probably the militia, for there was nothing to distinguish them from the troops with Tarleton, but unfortunately, the Maryland companies, under Lee, had been too familiarly known in that neighbourhood, and their uniform had nothing like it in the British army. Their appearance detected the deception, and the instantaneous discharge of a few guns at the rear of the cavalry brought the whole of that corps about upon the unfortunate loyalists. What followed was chiefly the result of a very few minutes. Those who did not sink under the first onset of the cavalry, broke away in confusion, and many fell beneath a volley from the riflemen. Pickens made the most earnest efforts to suppress the firing; though the dictates of humanity had not influenced him, the fear of alarming the unsuspecting Tarleton would have suggested it. But in a pell mell affair of this kind, even with regular troops, time would be requisite to convey and enforce such an order. One hundred were left dead upon the field, and very few escaped, not greviously wounded. Their commander fell under many strokes of the sword, but survived, although dreadfully mutilated.

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This was a day of tears and lamentation to that neighbourhood. Many a son, a husband, and a father, met with a most sudden and unexpected fate. The soul sickens at such an instance of unresisted slaughter, and it has called down the severest animadversions upon the conduct of the American party. It is enough to be said of it, that there cannot be found such another instance of military execution inflicted by the American arms in the whole history of the revolution. Far be it from us to stand forth the apologist of unnecessary bloodshed. Yet two things cannot be denied, that the humanity of Pickens was proverbial, and that Colonel Lee was never charged with any other instance of unnecessary severity. Let the extraordinary peculiarity of the circumstances attending the affair be considered, and it will be difficult to point out how such an issue could have been avoided. The first blow would probably be decisive between the parties. Had the enemy been allowed time to deliver their fire, the cavalry would have been prostrated, and that event would have brought destruction upon the whole corps; for Tarleton would soon have been upon the infantry. Nor would the evil have stopped there, the dispersion of this party must have been followed by that of all the detachments on their march to join it. It is appalling to follow up the train of consequences.

It is asserted that many of the sufferers endeavoured to stay the impending sword by the most earnest professions of loyalty. This is true, and easily accounted for; the deception had only been detected on their left, the Maryland troops were visible to no others, and great must have been the astonishment of the far greater number of the party at such an unaccountable assault. Colonel Tarleton relates, that some of the fugitives hurried to his camp exhibiting their wounds, with a grevious complaint against the cruelty of his dragoons, and that this was the first explanation given him of the firing which had been heard from his camp; a decisive proof that the unfortunate loyalists had been sacrificed by fortune not less to his safety, than to that of his enemy.

With regard to the fate of these unfortunate men, one fact never has been contested—that the firing of their own party on the left was the signal for their destruction. Colonel Lee asserts that his own intention was to make the discovery of the real character of his party to the enemy, and urge them to submit and retire to their homes in safety; he even asserts that he had already seized the hand of Piles and was commencing the explanation when the firing commenced. General Pickens says nothing of this part of the *ruse de guerre*, practised upon the loyalists; and by referring to Colonel Lee's own letter of the 26th, on the official files, we are induced to think him mistaken in his recollection, since he only says, "The legion cavalry passed them agreeably to order, as if British troops. I did this that no time might be lost in reaching

Colonel Tarleton, the enemy discovered their mistake, &c." But, which ever of the two accounts be adopted, it is obvious that no present mischief was meant to the loyalists; and but for their unfortunate fire upon the rear of the cavalry, they would either have been made prisoners, or passed unmolested. If also, it be admitted, that the cavalry were withheld from the pursuit, as Colonel Lee asserts, there will be added another strong evidence of the humane intentions of the American commanders. On this point however, it must be acknowledged there hangs some obscurity; since Pickens in his official letter of the 26th assigns as the cause why they did not immediately proceed against Tarleton that "unfortunately the dragoons got separated from us, and our militia could not be kept from firing. This brought night on us, &c." CHAP. X.

But, notwithstanding the approach of darkness, the American commander resolved not to rest until he had thrown himself between Tarleton and the approaching reinforcements. For this purpose, the detachment was ordered to proceed; and a place of encampment being selected, three miles in advance of the British party, Pickens halted for the night, and made every arrangement for attacking the enemy by the break of day. Never was there a more fortunate step taken than this; for, one mile beyond the American encampment, Colonel Preston, with 300 respectable followers, had halted for the night; and at small intervals beyond him, were two other small detachments o about 100 each, under Majors Winston and Armstrong. To have conquered Tarleton, would have entitled Pickens to the laurel, but, the oaken wreath he unquestionably earned this day. Colonel Tarleton had heard of the approach of these small parties, and was at that moment meditating their destruction. For Pickens to have added to the two fortunate occurrences already related, the third, of subduing the enemy he was pursuing, would have been too much good fortune to be comprised within a single circle of the sun. It would have ended in the expulsion, if not complete reduction of Cornwallis' army; for, Tarleton's detachment was very respectable, comprising all the cavalry of the British army, two pieces of artillery, and 250 infantry. Its construction was strikingly similar, though not equal in number, to that which he commanded on the day of the Cowpens; and before him lay about 250 of the men whose prowess he had once so severely experienced, and under one of the most conspicuous of the commanders in that memorable field. Deprived of his cavalry, and of so large a portion of his infantry, Lord Cornwallis must have attempted a retreat, and it was scarcely possible for him to have succeeded, with the mounted militia swarming around him in all directions.

To the American commander, the prospects of success were the most flattering that could be imagined. He had 250 excellent bayonets—Lee's and

CHAP. X. M'Call's cavalry nearly equalled the enemy's in number, and far excelled them in mounting; and in addition to the 300 marksmen already under him, he was joined that night by Colonel Preston's command of 360 more, all hardy mountaineers, and the most expert riflemen. Thus, he counted nearly double the numbers of his enemy; and the celerity of his movements might have stripped his adversary of the advantage of his artillery. A rout once commenced, not a man could have escaped the expert horsemen with which Pickens' army abounded.

But, fate had assigned the fall of Lord Cornwallis to other hands. Tarleton had no suspicion that he was in the face of so superior an enemy; and had such confidence in his strength, as to have actually drawn up his men at midnight, intending, by a circuitous route, to strike at Preston, whom he supposed to be still in his encampment, and thus to have placed himself in a situation, from which he could not have been extricated—when an express from Lord Cornwallis recalled him instantly to Hillsborough.* The British commander, it has been before mentioned, had, on that day, heard of the advance of the American army, and his fears were all awakened for the safety of Tarleton's detachment. Such was his uneasiness on account of their exposed situation, that courier followed courier to the number of three, to hasten their return. Colonel Tarleton obeyed; and marched off with such precaution, that he had gained an hour and a half upon his march, before his movement was discovered by the American centinels. On the first intimation of the unwelcome tidings, the American detachment was put in motion; and pursued with such rapidity, as to reach the banks of the river just as the enemy's rear guard ascended the opposite shore. The artillery, posted on an eminence commanding the ford, rendered pursuit in that direction impracticable; and, to ascend the river and cross it at the nearest place where it was passable, would give the enemy an advantage on the march, which could not again be redeemed, before he would meet with the support which would certainly be marched to his relief. The conjecture, in this respect was right, for a strong detachment had been pushed forward to cover the retreat of Tarleton, which he soon met, after leaving the banks of the river on the route to Hillsborough.

The events of this day present a striking picture of the uncertain issue of all militiary movements. Two incidents, not at all connected with the movements of the two detachments, and which, had they occurred but a few minutes later, would have been unconsequential—had, at two several times,

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* Tarleton's Camp, 233.

saved the British detachment, when unsuspicious of danger; three several corps of patriotic citizens, were rescued from destruction, when least apprehensive of it, by a providential event, which they were actually ignorant of; and a large number of unfortunate men had suffered death, or mutilation, while they hailed an enemy as their deliverers—and that too from hands which were raised against them, without a previous design, and contrary to the wishes and views of the American commanders. The tale would appear like fiction to one who had not before him the most authentic evidence of its truth. Should a doubt be suggested, so far as it varies from the picture of the same events drawn by Colonel Lee, the reader will recollect, that, that writer had not before him the official correspondence of the day; and being himself subordinate in command, he was not necessarily privy to the communications made by and to the commanding general, or the commander of the detachment. The reader must not be misled by the diminished figure given to his commander on the colonel's canvass; for Pickens was never a mere nominal commander; although the most unaffected and unassuming of men, he was an able and energetic officer; and, although the suavity of his manner might disguise his character, he had a firmness about him that would be obeyed. For the light in which he was viewed by the commanding general, we will refer the reader to the following extract:

General Greene to General Pickens,

"Camp at Dobbins's, *February 26th*, 1781.

"I have now to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 23d, wherein you acquaint me with the surprise of a British picket, by Colonel M'Call, and another of the 26th, with intelligence of the defeat of a body of tories under Colonel Piles, *by the detachment under your command.* It gives me infinite pleasure whenever I have an opportunity of expressing my thanks to officers and soldiers, who can embrace opportunities of ornamenting their fame by serving their country. The affair of Colonel M'Call was executed with firmness and address, and discovered a spirit of enterprise and genius, which I shall be ever happy to cherish.

"The defeat of the tories was so happily timed, and in all probability will be productive of such happy consequences, that I cannot help congratulating you on your success. My warmest thanks are due to you, Colonel Lee, and all the officers and soldiers under your command, and for the exertions which were made to bring about so happy an event."

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The conjecture of General Greene, respecting the effect of the affair of Piles upon the future conduct of the loyalists was soon verified. When the detachment under Pickens crossed the Haw and was penetrating through the Fork, the inhabitants appeared to be all in motion, preparing to join themselves to the royal army. The bleeding fugitives, who soon passed their doors, convinced them the service was attended with dangers they had not dreamed of. From that day they ventured no more beyond their own thresholds. It is said indeed, that on that very morning, another party of loyalists had suffered by mistake, under the sabres of the British colonel. The assertion appears in the annals of that time, and has been copied into Ramsay and several historians of equal authenticity. Colonel Tarleton in his narrative, has furnished a very strong corroboration of the fact; for he takes credit for having dispersed a body of rebels on his route from Hillsborough; and as it is known that no party of rebels, (unless it was poor O'Neal's family party) had been dispersed on that day, it will follow that either the mistake must be admitted to have occurred, or the colonel's veracity be questioned. That such an event did occur on the 4th of this month, rests on unquestonable authority.* Certain it is, that from this time all the British commander's efforts to rouse the quailing royalists, was like "calling the spirits from the vasty deep." They shrunk away at the recollection of these disasters. Nor could the presence of the whole royal army, which was advanced a few days after for their protection, dissipate their apprehensions or tempt them again to embody.

As soon as Colonel Tarleton had rejoined the army, Lord Cornwallis prepared once more for active operations. He quickly detected the motives of the American commander, and promptly resolved on measures to counteract them. With this view, he abandoned Hillsborough on the 26th, and pursuing the same route on which Colonel Tarleton had lately operated, threw himself across the Haw, and took post on the 27th, near Allemance Creek, one of the principal streams that feed that river. This route ran nearly parrallel to that of the American general; and leading directly to Salisbury, was well chosen to counteract the design of cutting him off from the upper country, whilst it lead him into a country favourable for subsisting his troops, and to a position well calculated to cover the loyalists in the Fork.

This very skillful movement presented to the American general three alternatives; either to offer battle to his antagonists with a certainty of its being accepted; to retreat once more across the Dan, and leave Lord Cornwallis the

* Letter to Steuben, 5th March, from Colonel W. 4th March.

undisputed master of the state; or to preserve in cutting him off from the upper counties, by advancing still further on the route by Guilford towards Salisbury. He determined on the latter, but it was a movement of the most critical kind, and a variety of precautions were necessary to strip it of its dangers. Slowly therefore, he kept pace with the march of his adversary, carefully avoiding whatever could force him to a general action, and equally providing for a forward or retrograde movement, which ever way his adversary should attempt to manœuvre. Proceeding thus, he advanced to the heights between Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek; having his head-quarters at the Speedwell Iron Works on the latter, and Boyd's Mill, on the former stream. In the meantime the American light troops were hovering close around the enemy, teazing him on his march, pouncing upon his foraging parties, intercepting intelligence, beating up his quarters, and wearing out his light troops by incessant calls upon their services. CHAP. X.

Colonel Williams in discharge of the duties assigned him, had ever since the 29th, been constantly employed in watching the movements of the enemy; always maintaining a distance proper for supporting his detachments, and equally proper for securing the support of the main army if requisite. At this time his command was manœuvering in the vicinity of the Haw River, and Pickens having fallen back upon the advancing of the British army, the two detachments now threw themselves in front of the enemy, one on each side of the Allemance Creek. Their force by the accession of militia, was so considerable, that they seriously meditated a combined attack, on the morning of the 2d of March. Such had been the celerity and secrecy of the movement of the American detachments, that Lord Cornwallis was conscious of their presence, only by feeling them, (in military language) throughout the night, and of their numbers, he appears to have been wholly uninformed. Yet they did not amount to less than thirteen hundred men. With cautious steps, Williams had approached within such a distance, as to be able to strike the meditated blow at the first tap of the reveillee, but under the earnest remonstrances of Colonel Lee, he was induced to defer the attack until the British army should have resumed its march; and subsequent occurrences prevented its being made at all.*

Lord Cornwallis had now advanced as far in that direction, as comported with his ulterior views; and his foraging parties in the morning having soon come upon the centinels of his enemy, a strong party under Colonel Tarleton, was pushed forward to disperse or drive back his unwelcome neighbours. This

* Colonel Lee, 1st March, 1781.

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brought on the skirmish of Allemance Creek, an affair which Colonel Tarleton has magnified infinitely beyond its real importance, and which, as usual, adds another wreath to his imperishable honours. We are surprised to find in Colonel Williams' official account of this affair, no other notice of his splendid antagonist, but that "Colonel Tarleton appeared, but kept at a due distance."

The affair was thus. Not finding the enemy in motion, as he expected, Williams ordered Colonel Lee, with his legion, and Major Rowland's rifle battalion, to advance with precaution, and ascertain the present designs of the British commander. This detachment was soon after joined by a small party of mounted riflemen from General Pickens' command.* After advancing about a mile, Lee's flank was fired upon by a party of the enemy, who were silently advancing, with the same views as themselves—that is, to reconnoitre. The fire being sudden and unexpected, the mounted riflemen were at first thrown into some confusion, but soon recovered, dismounted, and prepared for action. In the mean time, the legion infantry and militia on foot, were quickly formed, and made as handsome a defence as could have been desired. The appearance of Tarleton, at this junction, plainly pointed out to Williams, that a reinforcement was at hand, and he drew his men off, without sustaining any material loss—very few, not more than three of the Americans fell, and only 10 were wounded. Tarleton acknowledges a loss of one officer and twenty men of the guards killed and wounded; but, General Greene rates them at 7 killed and 40 wounded. The enemy pursued no further, and Williams could not advance upon him when so near the main army.†

The position in which Lord Cornwallis had encamped his army, was in the Fork of the Haw and Deep rivers, at the point of concurrence of the roads from Salisbury, from Guilford, from the High Rock Ford, from Cross Creek and Hillsborough. Colonel Tarleton, who seldom seems disposed to compliment his commander, remarks on this movement—"That if General Greene lost the confidence of his friends, by quitting North Carolina, when pursued by a superior force, Earl Cornwallis likewise relinquished his claim to the superiority of the British arms, by abandoning Hillsborough upon the return of the American general into the province." Yet, whoever will yield a candid examination to this movement, in relation to all its motives and consequences, will pronounce it one of the most masterly measures of this intricate campaign. Besides its effect in counteracting the designs of the American commander, as already explained; whether considered with a view to attack or defence,

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* O. Williams, 2d March, 1781. † Letter to Steuben, 5th March, 1781.

advance or retreat, it exhibits the strongest evidence of consummate generalship. But, its distinguishing excellence was, that its leading object was marked by the most specious appearances, whilst it covered the communication with his stores at Wilmington, which now began to be a very interesting consideration—for hard service had brought distress and nakedness also into his camp.

But; the principal object of the movement was, to draw the attention of the American commander another way, whilst his reinforcements were decoyed into striking distance, and both they and the arms they were guarding, exposed to a sudden and unlooked for blow; and the stratagem was not far from succeeding, for Colonel Campbell was, at this time, far advanced on his march to Taylor's Ferry, and on his arrival at that place on the 3d of the month, hearing that Lord Cornwallis had abandoned Hillsborough, and was on his march for Salisbury, or Cross Creek, Campbell immediately crossed the river, and took the direct route for Hillsborough. Generals Butler and Lawson also, who would otherwise have marched up the north side of the Roanoke, were induced to advance with their reinforcements of North Carolina and Virginia militia, by the same route. As due notice of their having adopted this course was communicated to General Greene, it was still in his power to have obviated the danger, by timely orders to recross the river and ascend on its left bank; but, so anxious was he now for the early arrival of his reinforcements, and so impressed with the belief, that Lord Cornwallis meditated an escape, that he permitted them to pursue the route they had adopted, and trusted to his own vigilance to protect them from being struck at. Could they have been intercepted, his own fate was scarcely doubtful.

Hence, the two parties under Pickens and Williams, were kept constantly hovering around the enemy, with instructions, often reiterated, to strike at his flanks should he leave them for a moment exposed;* whilst the main army advanced to Boyd's Mill on Reedy Fork, one of the tributary streams of the Haw, and lay encamped within fifteen miles of the enemy's position. Thus, General Greene imagined, that the light companies, by hanging on the skirts of the enemy, or throwing themselves in his front, could, at any time, impede his march, so as to enable the main army to avoid an action, to fly, if necessary, to the relief of the re-enforcements, or to approach the enemy's rear should he attempt a retreat.

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* Letter to Colonel Williams, March 4th, from Colonel W. March 5th.

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Notwithstanding all these precautions, Lord Cornwallis was near eluding the vigilance of his adversary, and striking a blow, from which it would have been difficult for the American army to have recovered.

Having now occupied his position for six days, and amused his importunate attendants with repeated demonstrations on the road to Cross Creek, so as to draw their attention that way, he suddenly, on the morning of the 6th, when the two American commanders least expected it, and when the reinforcement under Campbell, with thirteen waggons loaded with arms, had already passed Hillsborough on their way to the High Rock Ford, broke up his camp, and pushed with great rapidity for that pass. Williams lay that night on the enemy's left, on a road leading to the same point, and nearly parallel to that of the enemy's march; and as soon as it was discovered that the enemy had decamped, every nerve was strained, first to communicate the intelligence to the commanding general then encamped at Boyd's Mills, and then to throw themselves in front of the advancing enemy. The route of both the competitors in the race, led to Wetzel's Mills, across the Reedy Fork, and the roads united a small distance to the southward of that stream. The American detachments gained the point of concurrence first; but, they were so closely pursued by the enemy, that they were obliged to cover their rear while making the passage of the creek, by parties of riflemen under command of Colonels Preston and Campbell. This brought on the skirmish of Wetzell's Mills, in which, as usual, Colonel Tarleton has slain his thousands, and which Colonel Lee describes with a variety of amusing little incidents, but with surprising general inaccuracy. It is always a relief to us, to be able, on these occasions, to resort to the narrative of Colonel Otho Williams; it is illuminated by the touches of genius, and equally conspicuous for its perspicuity, and for the air of modesty and authenticity, with which it is delivered.

If the reader will peruse the narrative of this event, as furnished by Colonel Lee, he will find that, as usual, his commander is thrown in the back ground, whilst his own full length portrait fills up half the canvass.* The ground of the picture represents a surprise upon Williams, and the retreating army covered by Colonels Lee and Clarke. If he will then compare it with the subjoined letter, he will find that Clarke is substituted for Colonel William Campbell, and Colonel Preston; and that Colonel Washington, and not Colonel Lee, covered the rear of the army—that so far was Williams from being surprised, that the enemy were discovered when yet two miles off, and

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 323.

that Colonel Lee's services are not noticed on that day, unless it be under the general observation, that the enemy were "awed by the cavalry"—an observation in which Colonel Washington, who ranked Colonel Lee, had at least an equal right to participate:

Colonel Williams to General Greene.

CAMP NEAR THE OLD BRIDGE, ON THE HAW RIVER, *7th March*, 1781.

DEAR GENERAL,

"Early yesterday morning, I detached an officer with a small party, designing under cover of the fog, to have surprised and brought off one of the enemy's parties stationed at a mill about a mile from their camp. Soon after, I was informed by one of my reconnoitering officers, that the enemy had decamped early in the morning, and had taken a route leading to my left. We were instantly in motion—they had approached within two miles of our position, and their intention was manifestly to surprise us. I immediately ordered the troops to march to Wiley's [Wetzell's] Mills; and soon after, was informed by two prisoners, that the enemy were marching for the same place on a road parallel to that in which we were. We annoyed them by light flanking parties, and moved on briskly to the mill; but, were so closely pressed by Colonel Webster's brigade, and Colonel Tarleton's legion, that I found it absolutely necessary to leave a covering party under the command of Colonel Preston. The rest of the troops passed the Reedy Fork, and formed on the north side without interruption. Very soon after, a brisk fire began on Colonel Preston's party, which they returned with great spirit. In the mean time, Colonel Campbell, who had previously, in concert with Lieutenant Colonel Washington, served as a cover to the retiring troops, passed the creek above the mill. The ground on this side being very unfavourable, I waited only till Colonel Preston crossed, and then ordered the troops to retire; the enemy pursued some distance; but, receiving several severe checks from small covering parties, and being awed by our cavalry, he thought proper to halt. We continued to retire about five miles, where we encamped, and were refreshing ourselves, when Major Burnett delivered the instructions from you, which induced me to cross the Haw river, and take post here. Our loss is very inconsiderable; very few were killed, and most of our wounded were brought off."

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It was not until after Colonel Williams had taken his post on the north east bank of the Haw River, that he became possessed of the information necessary to point out the real object of this movement of the enemy. It then became manifest, that the object of the British commander was, to push past the detachment under Williams, and strike at a much more important object then nearly in his reach—to wit, the detachment and escort approaching under Colonel Richard Campbell of the Virginia line, and the two detachments of militia, one from Virginia under Lawson, and another from North Carolina under Butler. But, the activity of the American commander, snatched the prize from the grasp of the enemy, when it appeared to be almost in his possession.

The moment intelligence was received at head quarters, that the British army was pushing for the High Rock Ford, the American army was put in motion, to anticipate the views of the enemy; but, the morning's march gained on Williams, and the rapidity of his movements, now rendered it dangerous to return by the direct route, as the enemy might be upon the rear of the army, before the baggage and stores could make good the passage of the river. This obliged the American general to make a push for another ford higher up the same stream, and some miles nigher; while his light companies under Williams crossed it at the nearest point to their position, and by marching up while the main army descended the left bank of that stream, they formed a junction at the High Rock Ford. These well concerted movements succeeded effectually; and when the British general reached the road, on which he expectsd to intercept his adversary, and force him to action to protect his advancing reinforcements, or to cut him off from them, and conquer the whole in detail—he had the mortification to find that, having gained the opposite bank of the river, the two divisions of the American army would soon form a junction for the protection of their reinforcements, with the secure possession of the advantage of occupying the river bank, to oppose his passage. After this movement, he despaired of ever out-generalling his adversary; and not daring to attempt the perilous expedient of a retreat to Wilmington, or expose himself to the censure of abandoning the contest, he sullenly retired to the head waters of the other branch of the Cape Fear River, and devoted all his attention to refreshing his troops, and preparing them for a desperate effort against the whole united force of his enemy, for which, he now foresaw an oportunity would be offered him. There was an admirable boldness in this decision, but it was putting every thing to hazard on a single cast, and could his adversary have commanded one half the resources that had been promised him, the surrender of Yorktown must now have been anticipated.

But full to the brim as had been the cup of mortification, that his adversary had been compelled to receive, there were still many disappointments awaiting the American commander.

On all sides his promised re-enforcements melted into visions. The whole state of North Carolina at this time had but thirty men with the army, the gallant Colonel Campbell, who had promised a re-enforcement of one thousand hardy mountaineers, flushed with the capture of an entire army on King's Mountain, had, almost desperate with mortification, presented himself with only sixty followers. And such was the singular combination of difficulties which pressed upon the American commander at this time, that, weak and waning as his force was, he was obliged to detach some of his most faithful followers on distant services, and to dismiss others, or disband his army.

From the time that General Pickens joined General Morgan, it has been seen, that he had never rested a day. Most of the officers and men under him, had been engaged in the most active services ever since the fall of Charleston. In all this time, they had received neither clothing nor pay, and came into service mounted at their own expense. They were not of that class of men, who can minister to their own wants, by invading the comforts of others; most, if not all of them were men of respectable connexions and comfortable property. But their condition now was scarcely to be tolerated; they had not the clothing necessary to common decency. Yet no one deserted, no one murmured, but foregoing the privilege of volunteers, they resisted the examples of hundreds, who daily came and went as they pleased, setting authority at nought; and never winced from their duty, even in the midst of retreat, privation and suffering. At length, however, their commander could not forbear calling the attention of the commanding general, to their claims and sufferings. In the neighbourhood of their friends, their tattered wardrobes might be replenished, but from any other quarter, the prospect was still far distant, if not hopeless. Yet no demand for a discharge was hinted at; but the obvious necessity of their return at this time, could not be resisted.—The enemy were embodying the negroes in South Carolina into regiments, and appearances on the frontier threatened a serious invasion from the Indians: not only their apprehensions, but those of the commanding general were seriously awakened for the fate of their families and connexions; and General Pickens was ordered to repair with his followers to the back parts of South Carolina, to protect the whigs, suppress the loyalists, and co-operate with General Sumpter in the active enterprizes in which that indefatigable patriot was at this time engaged.

This was the only militia force which General Greene as yet ever had under him, on whose services he could venture to calculate from day to day; and

CHAP. X. the only consoling circumstance attending their departure, was, that, being all mounted, to be relieved, at this time, from subsisting their horses, was no inconsiderable object. So completely had the country been foraged by the two armies, that it was scarcely any longer practicable to find the necessary food for the horses of the regular cavalry—the officers, and the baggage. So severely had this difficulty begun to press upon the army, that General Greene had been compelled to call together the militia then in service, almost all of whom had come out mounted, and earnestly to solict them to relinquish their horses, to have them conveyed under guard to a place where they could be subsisted, and to serve on foot; pointing out to them, that his regular cavalry being superior to that of the enemy, they would be safe under its protection; and if they persisted in retaining their horses, the horses must either perish for want, the riders abandon the army, or the army abandon the country. At first the measure appeared to be acquieseed in with cheerfulness; but, to men who confided much for their safety in the speed of their horses and their own skilful use of them, and who were not at all habituated to marching under the burthen of a rifle and a knapsack, the change soon became irksome and disgusting. There was then no alternative left but to let them depart, and in a very short time the army was left without a mounted militiaman.

Yet, this was not the greatest sacrifice to which the American general was called upon to submit at this time. It is not generally known, that it was in the midst of the busy scene we have been relating, that the negotiation for the exchange of prisoners in the southern department was carried on. The original instructions to Colonel Carrington for this purpose, dated March the 11th, are before us. The negotiation was first commenced, whilst the army lay at Halifax Old Court House; but was then broken off, because the British commissioner insisted on considering paroled privates as prisoners of war, to favour their practice of exacting paroles of all the militia in the country. The negotiation was renewed and finally adjusted between Colonel Carrington on the American side, and Captain Frederick Cornwallis, on that of the British, at a subsequent meeting, held on the Pee Dee, on the 8th May.

The full bearing of this convention, upon the American cause, at that time has never been duly considered, or rather not considered at all. Yet it deserves to be estimated among the most magnanimous actions of that day. The most obvious supposition is, that such a convention must be reciprocal and equal in its advantages; that if the one side derived from it an accession of strength, the other must be equally benefited. But it was quite otherwise, the British troops returned to the ranks of the enemy, and the American troops to their firesides: their term of service had expired in captivity. With this obvious

disadvantage before him, pressed on all sides by difficulties, the country's fall, and his own reputation poised on a blow very soon to be struck, the American commander did not hesitate when the opportunity presented itself, of endeavouring to rescue, the faithful soldier from the gloomy prisonship. The American army finally obtained some officers from the exchange, but no men. CHAP. X.

But, where were the tens of thousands expected from Virginia? They were with the tale that it told—with the cloud that has passed by. The enemy turned his back upon Virginia, and the gathering thousands returned to the plough. A large portion of the volunteers under Stevens, continued faithful to their engagement; but, the whole number of militia, who accompanied the army to Guilford, including those from both states, only amounted to two thousand seven hundred and fifty-three—of which, Virginia furnished sixteen hundred and ninety-three—and North Carolina one thousand and sixty. The season of the year, as has been observed, was exceedingly unfavourable to the collection of the militia generally; it was not "the time when kings go to war." But, the disappointment in not receiving the re-enforcement expected from the mountains, was attributed to another cause. The inhabitants had just returned from an expedition against the Indians, conducted by Colonel Arthur Campbell. The tawny aborigines, as had been invariably the case, had advanced upon the frontiers the moment the British army got in motion; and, as had also invariably been the case, had painfully atoned for their wonted barbarities.*

A few days after the return of the army across the Dan, General Greene received a communication from Colonel Arthur Campbell, announcing his success in this expedition, and intimating, that the Indians were desirous of submitting; and, of negotiating a treaty with any one who should be duly authorized to treat with them. As it was not, at that early day, clearly ascertained in whom the power existed to conduct such a treaty, General Greene concluded, that the exigency of the case would sanction him in nominating commissioners for that purpose; it appertained to the conduct of the war; and he represented the United States in its belligerent capacity. Under this impression, on the 20th February, he issued a commission to William Christian, William Preston, Arthur Campbell, and Joseph Martin, of the state of Virginia; and to Robert Sevier, Evan Shelby, Joseph Williams, and John Sevier, of the state of North Carolina, "to enter into a treaty for restoring peace, and establishing the limits between those two states and the

* Appendix C.

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Indian tribes;" but with the wary precaution of limiting their powers by the laws of those states; and the duration of the commission, by the will of the congress, or the commander in chief.

The original commission is now before us; and under it was concluded that treaty, which took place the ensuing year; still, however, the Indians farther south continued hostile; and the attention of General Pickens had been particularly directed to that quarter, when he left the army at this period. It was not long after his return to Carolina, before his experience in Indian warfare was called into requisition, and rendered the most signal services.

For the fourth time had General Greene now eluded his pursuers, and found security from a superior enemy, behind the shelter of a rapid river; still, that enemy might brave this disadvantage, and attempt the passsge of the river—or, might aim a blow at his reenforcements, by crossing it lower down. Lord Cornwallis appeared to pause awhile upon the alternative; but, finally, adopted the resolution to move down towards Deep River; in the mean time, every exertion had been made to hasten on the re-enforcements, by forced marches, and by divesting them of the baggage that impeded their progress. The latter was ordered to file off to the right of the line of march of the advancing parties, while the troops hastened on to effect a junction at the High Rock Ford. By the 11th, this long looked-for event was consummated; and, although the circuitous route assigned to the baggage caused some delay, by the 12th, General Greene was prepared to advance upon the enemy, and offer him the long expected battle. With this view, he moved down and encamped at Guilford Court House on the 14th. As soon as the junction was effected with the detachment under Williams, that command was dissolved, with the highest and best merited encomiums on the spirit and ability with which it had discharged its laborious and important duties. Colonel Lee was then detached, with orders to hang upon one wing of the enemy, whilst Washington watched the other. On the 13th, orders were issued to all the detachments to join the army at Guilford; and on the next day, the order of battle was communicated to the officers, and the day spent in a critical survey of all the advantages of the ground selected for the purpose a month before. Never was conflict prepared for with more coolness by the one party, or more anxiously desired by the other.

Yet, on the part of the American commander, it was the dictate of necessity, though that necessity was not imposed by his adversary. He was still much inferior to the enemy in disciplined troops; and he knew how precarious was the dependance on militia at the push of the bayonet. But, greater evils

threatened him, than he had reason to apprehend from the issue of the battle. No more re-enforcements of regulars could be expected—he had waited long, and been flattered with a thousand hopes, before he could draw together the present moderate re-enforcements of militia; the term of service of these was rapidly passing away; the volunteers had engaged but for six weeks; and when they should leave him, where was his dependence? Nor was this all; the country immediately around him, was now so exhausted, that it could not long continue the theatre of war. The enemy had held untouched the friendly country in his rear, from which he could still draw considerable supplies. He had not been compelled to waste his resources upon swarms of mounted men, continually coming and going, and not to be subjected to the restraints of discipline. He had even been able to collect magazines at a remote place in the fork; and it was rumoured, that the loyalists were once more assembling in the vicinity of Ramsay's Mills on the Deep River. For these reasons, General Greene resolved to give the enemy battle, in hopes of crippling him by means of the militia, whilst he covered their retreat with his regulars; but resolved, not to risk the security of the latter, except from the most urgent necessity, or with the most flattering prospects of advantage; and in the mean time he dispatched Colonel Malmady, who had recently joined him with a few North Carolina troops, to descend the left bank of the Haw—make a sudden incursion into the fork—possess himself of, and remove or destroy the enemy's magazines, and disperse the loyalists. CHAP. X.

The following extract of a letter to Governor Jefferson, of the 10th of this month, selected from many others, will exhibit a succinct view of the feelings, embarrassments and motives, which influenced the conduct of the writer at this time:—"Every day has filled me with hopes of an augmentation of my force; the militia have flocked in from various quarters; but, they come and go in such irregular bodies, that I can make no calculation on the strength of my army, or direct any future operations that can ensure me success. At this time, I have not above 8 or 900 of them into the field; yet, there have been upwards of 5000 in motion in the course of four weeks. A force, fluctuating in this manner, can promise but slender hopes of success against an enemy in high discipline, and made formidable by the superiority of their numbers. Hitherto, I have been obliged to effect that by finesse, which I dare not attempt by force. I know the people have been in anxious suspense, waiting the event of a general action. But, let the consequence be what it may, nothing shall hurry me into a measure that is not suggested by prudence, or dictated by the interests of the southern department.

CHAP. X.

"General Caswell is on his way with a considerable force of the Carolina militia; and Colonel Campbell, with the Virginia regulars, I expect, will be up in a few days. When this force arrives, I trust I shall be able to prescribe the limits of the enemy's depredations, and at least *dispose of the army in such a manner as to incumber him with a number of wounded men.*"

There was one consideration which was decisive with General Greene for hazarding an action at this time. With the superiority which he possessed in the quality, rather than the numbers of the cavalry, and the precautions which he had resolved to adopt, both for action and retreat, (having the unrestrained choice of ground for both,) he was morally certain, that whatever might be the behaviour of his militia, he could not be exposed to the evils of a general rout. But he still flattered himself, from the quality of a great part of the troops of that description, and the talents of some of their leaders, that they would deliver the enemy crippled, disordered and worn down with fatigue, into the hands of his continentals. But at the worst, a defeat he was resolved should only be a partial evil.—To his adversary it could scarcely eventuate in less than total ruin.

Nor was his adversary at this time less urged by inclination than necessity to adopt the same determination. The English writers of the day observe, that the grevious distress of the army were now become nearly insupportable, under the want of supplies of every species. And that "he had now arrived at a full conviction, that nothing less than a clear and decided superiority in arms, could answer the great purpose and end of their exceedingly toilsome and arduous winter campaign, which was to draw forth into action, the supposed numerous loyalists who inhabited that province."*

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*Annual Register, 1781, p. 65.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

(See page 223.)

THE first European settlement ever made on the North-American continent, was made in South Carolina. The design is attributed to the celebrated Coligni; and the object was to secure an assylum to religious freedom. During the persecutions which harassed the Calvinists in the reign of Charles the Ninth of France, Coligni conceived the project of establishing a retreat for his followers in America, should they be driven by the legitimates of the day, from the confines of the old world. Charles readily yielded to the solicitations of Coligni, to promote the project; for, whether they succeeded, or were destroyed, he was equally relieved from a class of men whom he hated and feared; or, at least, a new direction would be given to the enterprise of a spirited race, who had often shown themselves terrible in their civil wars. Charles the Second of England, would seem to have brought with him, his sentiments on the same subject, from France.

Two ships were furnished Coligni by his sovereign; and John Ribaut, an experienced navigator, at the head of a select band of soldiers, and voluntary adventurers, all zealous Calvinists, set sail from France on the 18th February, 1562. His design was, to strike the Santee, then called the Jordan, by the discoverer Vasquez Allayon; but, falling too far to the south, he first made land south of the river St. John's, then named by him the river of Dolphins, and by the Spaniards the river St. Augustin. Proceeding northerly about fifteen leagues, he discovered another river, where he landed, erected a pillar in commemoration of his taking possession of the country in the name of his sovereign, and gave it the name of the River May, for it was on the 1st day of that month that he set foot on the land, afterwards distinguished as French Florida, as the whole of North America seems to have been by that of New France. This is said to be the river, previously named by the Spaniards, San Matteo; but the distance agrees very nearly with the mouth of the St. Mary's. Proceeding still northwardly along the coast, and mistaking many inlets for rivers, which he named after the great rivers of France, Ribaut, at length, reached what he supposed to be the Jordan; and, being favourably received by the natives, he proceeded to adopt the necessary measures to accommodate and defend their little colony.

The place where Ribaut made this establishment, has been the subject of some difference of opinion among writers. The geographer Mr. Morse is wholly mistaken, when he asserts, that it was "at the mouth of the Albemarle River in North Carolina." He has been led into the error

by copying Hewatt, who has himself been misled by Oldmixon, without observing, that the latter author furnishes the means of detecting the mistake.

The words of Oldmixon are, "At the mouth of Albemarle River, then called the Great River, the port being safe and commodious, he built a fort, which he called Charles' Fort, and gave it the name of Port Royal, in 32° of latitude, bordering on Virginia, now North Carolina.

The reference here to the latitude of the place, sufficiently detects the error with regard to the identity of the river. For the Albemarle in North Carolina, lies in 35° 30', on Oldmixon's own map. The "Grande Rivere" is, in fact, in the latiude 32°, as laid down by Charlevoix. Whether it ever bore the name of the Albemarle, we know not; yet, that name may have been given it by the Lord Cardross, when he made his settlement at Port Royal.

This confusion of names would naturally have led Oldmixon into the error; but, still it is unaccountable, that he should have noticed but one Albemarle on his map, and placed Port Royal correctly in point of latitude.

Chalmers, pursuing the narrative of Charlevoix, locates Ribaut's Fort, called fort Charles, on Edisto Island, or an Island somewhere near the mouth of that river, and it cannot be questioned, that it was situate somewhere between North Edisto and Broad River. The evidence of circumstances preponderates in favour of the present site of Beaufort. For, if it be true, and every thing seems to confirm the opinion, that it was built "at the mouth of the Grand Riviere, on an Island with a safe and commodious port," and the name of Port Royal given to it, we have the evidence of names and situation, to support the opinion that its site was that of Beaufort. The name of Port Royal is still retained, and the name of Broad River is but the translation of the French epithet, "Grand Riviere." Besides which, it is well known, that there is not to be found on any other Island extending from North Edisto to Broad River, any port to compare in excellence and depth of water with Port Royal; and the latitude agrees exactly, for it is actually situated in 32° 12′ and should be rather farther south, than farther north, to agree with the latitude given it by Ribaut.

We will conclude with a piece of evidence, well known to those who have been conversant with the southern Indians, who were compelled to retire to the west of Georgia, as the population of South Carolina pressed upon them. They still retain the tradition, that the first place at which they ever saw the whites, was at Coosawhatchie in South Carolina. Now, the Coosawhatchie River is the principal stream that forms the Broad River, and was no doubt among the first that were explored by Ribaut's boat. Nor is it at all improbable, that the whole extent of the stream to its discharge into the ocean, was known to the Indians by the name which we have borrowed from them—the Coosawhatchie. It is well known with what perfect truth, the tradition of striking events, is preserved among these people.

This first attempt of persecuted man, to seek an assylum in the new world, was attended with events too true to be disputed, and yet almost too tragical to be credited. They present a striking view of the chivalrous spirit which animated the reformers of that day, and of the bloody, unrelenting temper with which they were pursued by religious bigotry. There is no history that we are acquainted with in the English language, which has presented an account of those events as they actually occurred.

The summary of them is this: as soon as Ribaut had provided for the security of his colony, he set sail for France, to report his progress, and bring out a supply of utensils and of colonists; leaving Captain Albert in command of the post. When Ribaut arrived in France, the civil war had again broken out, and Coligni's attention was of necessity engrossed by more vital objects. It was not until April 1564, that he was enabled to resume the prosecution of this colonizing project. It was the first subject on which he addressed the king, after their reconciliation, and Charles again

readily honored him with three ships, and a considerable advance of money. The command was given to Rene de Laudonniere, and the object of the voyage, as well as the reputation of the commander and his officers, immediately drew together a crowd of volunteers, many of them of the most respectable connexions. In June this expedition reached the Florida Coast, and when approaching Fort Charles, they received the intelligence, that it was abandoned and the colony had put to sea in a boat constructed by themselves for the purpose.

It is probable that Laudonniere distrusted the account received from the natives, and for that reason, rather than those given for his subsequent measures, resolved to establish his colony at the river Mai, at which he had recently landed, and met with a most flattering reception from the natives.

Thither, however, he bent his course, and was cheerfully supported by his men in this change of design, for the unfortunate reason, that they thought this stream communicated with the country "where there was gold." Some small quantities of gold and silver, pearls, and precious stones, had been seen among the natives, and they had pointed to the south west as the region from which it was procured. It appeared afterwards to have been obtained from Spanish vessels wrecked on the Florida coasts.

Laudonniere accordingly landed and established himself on the south side of the river Mai, and constructed there a fort, which he named Fort Caroline, destined soon to be the scene of some of the bloodiest events recorded in history. Whether this fort was built on the St. Mary's, or the St. Illa (now newly named the Satilla) river, is not satisfactorily ascertained. But, the evidence is in favour of the St. Mary's, and would point to the first bluff on the south side of the St. Mary's. The distance of the river Mai, of fifteen leagues from the St. John's, and that of six leagues from the ocean, given to the fort, support this opinion; nor does there appear to have been any river of magnitude intervening between it and the St. John's. On the other hand, however, there is no river given between the river Mai and the Altamaha, which would seem to point to the St. Illa. But, the course of the St. Mary's, which, towards its source, appears to proceed from the quarter to which the Indians directed the attention of the French, for procuring the precious metals, supports the opinion, that the St. Mary's was really the river on which this second establishment was made.

In the mean time, the fate of Captain Albert and his associates was made manifest; the few who survived of them, were picked up at sea and carried to Europe. Albert, it appears, was put to death by his men not long after the departure of Ribaut; and as the only account we have of his conduct was necessarily received from them, and their safety depended upon justifying that act, it ought to be received with more precaution than historians have discovered. He is represented as having conducted himself arbitrarily and capriciously, and even to have taken the lives of some of his people, without cause or due sanction. At length, a piece of tyranny exercised towards one Lachan, a soldier, whose subsequent conduct proved his popularity well founded, was followed by a mutiny, which terminated Albert's life and the hopes of the colony. One Nicholas Barre was then chosen their leader, and nothing being heard of Ribaut, famine and disorganization began to threaten them with destruction. They now resolved to construct a vessel, and attempt the passage to Europe, without chart or compass, and almost without provisions. The consequences were inevitable. After suffering the last extremity of hunger, the proposition was made that they should cast lots, to determine which of them should fall a sacrifice for the subsistence of the rest. That the proposition should be acceded to is not to be wondered at. Men have often submitted under similar circumstances; and the hope, which ever whispers to each individual that he will escape, may well support the human mind in submitting fate to fortune. But, it requires no common effort of self devotion, for a single individual to make a willing sacrifice of his own life to save that of his companions in misfortune; yet, Lachan did this and was eaten. He bared his neck to the

knife, and died, as the narrative says, without a struggle. Nor was there any reason to suspect imposition, since the more probable account of his having suffered by lot, was equally at the command of the boat's crew. The want of water followed the want of food, and natural death had greatly thinned their ranks before they were picked up and transported to Europe.

In the meantime, intelligence was communicated to the Spanish monarch, of the attempt of the Hugonots to effect a settlement on the Florida coast. The annals of the day assert, that the treacherous Charles himself made the communication, with an insinuation of his utter indifference as to the fate that awaited them. A Hugonot settlement was, to their most Christian and most Catholic majesties, equally, an object of abhorrence.

The Spaniards resolved to destroy the settlement; and their subsequent conduct will prove, that it was religious, not political zeal, which kindled the flame that consumed it.

Laudonniere was indefatigable while he remained in command at Fort Caroline; but, his industry was unfortunately applied to exploring the country in quest of the precious metals; instead of forcing from a genial soil the more indispensable articles of subsistence. His lieutenants Oligni and Erlac, penetrated the forests in every direction, and in the course of eighteen months appear to have made excursions throughout the interior of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, even to the lakes that gives rise to the St. Lawrence, even beyond the Apalachian mountains. But, their provisions began now to fail, as the articles of merchandize which procured food from the Indians, were totally consumed. Vessel after vessel had been dispatched to France for supplies, but none had yet returned. His company also had become mutinous; and as often as he constructed small vessels for the purpose of exploring the rivers, of collecting provisions, or, if necessary, of leaving the country, they were seized upon by parties of mutineers, some of whom engaged in piratical cruizes against the Spaniards, and others made their way to the islands and to Europe, to excite a clamour against the conduct and the views of their commander. Thus, was his force reduced to a small proportion of its original numbers; and with these he resolved to build a small brigantine, to transport himself and them to France. The accidental arrival, and very liberal conduct of the English Captain Hawkins, put it in his power to procure a more suitable vessel for this purpose, and to furnish and equip her in a manner suitable for such a voyage; but, when he had dismantled his fort, and was shipping his men to depart, Ribaut made his appearance, with a well equipped fleet of nine sail of vessels, some of them heavy ships of war; four of them of a draft of water which would not admit of their passing the bar of the river, on which Laudonniere had established himself.

Mutual explanations, to their mutual satisfaction soon took place between Laudonniere and Ribaut; but, the former refused any longer to continue in command at Fort Caroline. The assurances of the Indians were again repeated, that the country produced gold, and they would point out the mines; and Ribaut resolved again to repair and garrison the fort, and to make the permanent establishment of the colony at this place.

But, on the 4th September, 1665, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, six Spanish vessels were seen to enter the road and drop anchor near the four large ships. It was a fleet commanded by Don Pedro Menendez de Avilez, an officer celebrated by his countrymen as one of the greatest heroes of the new world; and the object of his mission was the extirpation of the heretics who had polluted, by their tread, a country which had been liberally dealt out to Catholics, as a part of the patrimony of St. Peter.

This singular crusade is marked by a variety of striking incidents.

The legitimates of France and Spain, Charles the Ninth, and Philip the Second, were, at this time, at perfect peace; and, the latter finding leisure to turn his attention to the settlement of the Floridas, began to experience the most sensible, qualms at his having so long deferred the good work of

christianizing the aborigines—the very purpose for which these territories had been bountifully bestowed upon him by the legitimate head of the Church. Menendez was selected to conduct the enterprise; and, in consideration of bearing the greatest part of the expense himself, he was vested with the dignity of a Spanish Adelantade, and the hereditary government of the Floridas. It was in the midst of the preparation for the undertaking, that the intelligence arrived, that the Hugonots had made an establishment on the coast, and the Propaganda expedition, immediately assumed all the characteristics of a Proclaimed crusade. Clergy and Laiety crowded into his service, and voluntary contributions from the sovereign and individuals soon swelled his force to near three thousand men, and near twenty vessels, some of them of very considerable force. Heaven, however, could not smile upon the undertaking; and before he reached Porto Rico, storms and tempests had reduced his force to less than one-third. It was now seriously deliberated, whether they were strong enough to proceed, for they had learned from the ministers of Charles, or from some other quarter, that the re-enforcement under Ribaut had preceded them. But, either the fanaticism, or the policy of their commander, turned even their misfortunes into a reason for prosecuting their voyage. "The Almighty," said Menendez, "has thus reduced our force, that his own arm might achieve the work."

We have already seen that Ribaut had reached Fort Caroline some days before the arrival of Menendez. But the latter appears to have been no ways deficient in promptness of design, or vigour of execution. He resolved to surprise the French ships that lay in the outer road, and then proceed as after circumstances should dictate, in his designs upon the fort. The French captains charge him with the most dastardly cunning, in endeavouring to lull them into security, by approaching them under the mask of friendship; a mask very easily assumed, considering the pacific relations then existing between their sovereigns.

But, whatever was his conduct in this respect, the attempt did but succeed; the French ships eluded his grasp by putting to sea; and he thought it prudent, after thus betraying his views, to retire from a garrison which he could no longer hope to surprise. Falling down the coast, below the mouth of the river St. John's, he made choice of the present site of St. Augustine, and laid the foundation of this formidable fortress, and of the first permanent establishment on the North American continent. His intention was, to protect his present command by fortifications, and await the arrival of re-enforcements.

Ribaut now promptly resolved to pursue Menendez; and, contrary to the advice of his officers, he crowded his whole force into his shipping, leaving in Fort Caroline his stores, provisions, women and children, and the sick of the expedition, and a garrison under Laudonnaire of about eighty men, not above twenty of whom were perfectly effective.

The heavy ships which had kept the sea, were at hand to unite in the expedition; and Menendez's vessels were found moored in a situation where their fate was inevitable. Two hours more would have been sufficient to place his whole command at the mercy of his enemy; but, one of those sudden tempests, so common in those latitudes, arrested the designs of Ribaut, and drove his vessels down the Florida Gulph. This event gave an entire new aspect to the fortunes of Menendez. Knowing that some days would probably elapse before Ribaut could return to Fort Caroline, he resolved to open his way through the forests, and attack that fort before it could be prepared to resist him.

Accordingly, with five hundred picked men, carrying eight days provisions, he took up the line of march for the French post, and arrived in the forests which surrounded it and which concealed his approach, before Laudonnaire had a suspicion of his having left St. Augustine.

Dark and cruel was the superstition which appears to have clouded the minds of these bold adventurers. The massacre of the heretics had been deliberately determined on from the commencement

of this expedition; and now, solemnly, on bended knees, in prayer and praises to the Almighty, were his men prepared for this unhallowed sacrifice. From prayer they rushed to slaughter, and a feeble and unarmed garrison fell an easy prey to their pious fury. The humanity of Menendez extended no further than to spare the women and the boys that had not reached fifteen years; but his men, or their commander, appear to have amused themselves by preserving many of the garrison for a more solemn sacrifice. After the heat of battle had subsided, the living and the dying were, indiscriminately, suspended to the boughs of a tree, and their bodies left a prey to the birds of the air.

The truth of this achievement cannot be questioned, for Menendez himself commemorated it by a monument, intended to transmit the meritorious deed to posterity. At the root of the tree was erected a stone, on which he had inscribed these words—"I do not do this as to Frenchmen, but as to Lutherans." Laudonniere and about twenty of his men, effected their escape by leaping from the parapet of the fort and flying to the woods. Ribaut had left his son with some inferior vessels in the harbour; these dropped down beyond the reach of the cannon as soon as they discovered the fate of the fort, and fortunately succeeded in taking Laudonniere and his few followers on board. Some others remained in the wood, and were hunted like wild beast. If taken, they were sold into slavery. What became of the women and children we do not learn; but, they had nothing to expect from the tender mercies of their captors, unless saved by an hypocritical conversion. The number of those who were saved from the sword is stated at seventy.

But, this tragedy was trifling when compared with that which followed:

Menendez, apprehensive that Ribaut would reach St. Augustine in his absence, and retaliate by the capture of this place, and of his shipping, had scarcely terminated his butcheries at Fort Caroline, when he hastened back with a part of his forces to the protection of his own post. Here, to adopt the language of his historian—"All the world ran to meet the conqueror of the heretics, with the cross, and the clergy singing *te deum*, and conducting him in triumph."

It is not to be wondered at, if such a reception, conducted by the ministers of religion, and sanctified by the presence of its most revered symbols, should whet his appetite for the enjoyment of other triumphs similar and greater.

The fate of Ribaut's fleet had now been decided. After struggling for several days in the Florida channel, they were all dashed to pieces on the coast south of St. Augustine, near Cape Canaverel. Some arms and a small supply of privisions were saved to them—every thing else was swallowed up. Thus situated, there remained to them but one course to pursue; this was, to thread the coast northerly and reach Fort Caroline, if practicable; if not, to submit to the necessity of surrendering themselves to the Spaniards. With this view, they appear to have formed themselves into two bodies, one of which preceded the other a few days march. The first, arriving at the bank of a small river, twelve miles south of St. Augustine, found themselves arrested in their progress; and before they could prepare the means of transportation, information was communicated to Menendez that a number of white men were so situated. Accompanied by a detachment of forty soldiers, and a boat, Menendez proceeded to reconnoitre the party, and from a soldier who crossed the stream by swimming, to his great relief, he learned the fate of Ribaut's fleet.

What follows, is differently related by the French and Spanish historians; but, after all the gloss that the latter has shed over the conduct of Menendez, he appears to have been guilty of an act of deliberate tranquil barbarity—at the bare relating of which, the human heart freezes. They admit, that two hundred men were brought over the river, by tens, all bound together, and when conducted beyond the sight of their comrades, on the opposite bank, "at a line marked with his cane on the

sand," were cruelly butchered. Nor were the rites of sepulchre allowed to them—but, their bones were left to bleach upon the sands.

A few days after, the remaining party appeared, with Ribaut himself at their head; and Menendez again repaired to the banks of the river, but attended by a more respectable escort. A considerable negotiation ensued, and a large ransom was offered but, Menendez, deliberately pacing the margin of the river, and permitting the negotiators to go and return as often as they pleased, nay, even setting refreshments before them, gave them to understand that they must surrender at discretion. It is even related, that Ribaut himself came over to negotiate, attended with five or six of his officers; and after being respectfully received by Menendez, and food set before him, was conducted to the plain where the bodies of his 200 men still lay exposed, and was informed of the chastisement inflicted on those who had been left at Fort Caroline—still he was required to surrender at discretion.

It was in vain that these unfortunate men urged, that the two monarchs were not only at peace, but in alliance. All the answer they could obtain was—"It is true that the *Catholic* French are our allies and friends; but it is not so with the heretics; on them I wage a war of extermination, and I will wage it with the utmost cruelty upon all those of this sect that I meet with by land or sea; and in this I serve both monarchs. I came to Florida to establish the Roman Catholic faith. If you are satisfied to abandon yourself to my mercy, and to deliver up your arms and ensigns, I will do with you what God shall inspire me. If not, chuse your own course, but do not hope from me either friendship or peace. I have been ordered by my king, to conquer and people Florida, and establish there the gospel."

Ribaut was permitted quietly to return to his companions in misfortune, and the painful alternative was submitted to their choice. Flattering himself with the hope, that Menendez would accept a ransom, he, with about one hundred and fifty others, resolved to submit themselves to their enemy: but, the remainder, about two hundred in number, determined rather to brave every danger.

Ribaut was compelled to submit to the indignity of being tied with nine others, and met with the common fate of all who were silly enough to surrender their arms. Eight hundred in all, it is said perished; but the number, even including the sick at the fort, would scarcely have equalled that amount. The French had no interest in reducing the numbers; and the Spaniards thought it a boast to have destroyed so many heretics.

The two hundred who had the prudence to preserve their arms, finally met with a milder fate. Returning to the wrecks of their vessels, they there furnished themselves with many articles gathered from the hulks, and constructed a small fort for their defence, while they proceeded to build a vessel competent to convey them to some more hospitable shore. But, their persecutor was not yet sated with blood. His conduct had all along been regulated by the conviction, that his victims were shut in the peninsula too firmly to escape him; and now, hearing from the Indians of the measures they were prosecuting, he resolved to anticipate them. Accompanied by an armed force and attended by some small vessels, he threaded the Florida coast until he reached the resting place of the fugitives. Their vessel was far advanced, but their fort was only intended to defend them against an enemy that had not fire arms. They were, therefore, obliged to abandon it, and flying to an elevated ground, they resolved to sell their lives dearly, if they could not repulse the enemy. A negotiation ensued, and a surrender agreed on, upon a solemn pledge of security and kind treatment. Their commander, however, with about twenty, resolved rather to perish in the desert than trust themselves to their cruel enemy; and, leaving their companions in the night, sought safety in the thickets. Whatever became of them is unknown. The rest either established themselves in Florida, or found

their way home—the poor remains of the gallant company that had followed Ribaut from France, many of them men of wealth and distinction. It is very remarkable, that of all the number sacrificed by Menendez, although the question was regularly propounded to the unfortunate victims, of what religion are you, only eight saved their lives by acknowledging themselves Catholics.

This is the account furnished by the Spanish historians, and even by the brother-in-law of Menendez. But, the French writers of the day charge the Spaniards with having treacherously promised Ribaut and his companions life and security, and violated that promise as soon as the French had surrendered their arms. They further assert, that he was flayed alive, his body burnt, and his stuffed skin sent to Europe, a worthy present to the barbarians who then ruled half the world! and that the most horrid and wanton barbarities were practised upon the wretched captives. Certain it is, that when the news reached France, it was productive every where, but at court, of the keenest indignation. Nor was this feeling confined to the Protestants; it extended itself to the Catholics, and by one of that faith was it shortly after most signally avenged.

The Chevalier Dominique de Gourgues, a character that would grace an epic poem, was a Gascon gentleman, born at Mont Marsan, county of Cominges, of a respectable Roman Catholic family.

The youth of De Gourgues had been spent in arms, and he had acquired a reputation not surpassed by any subaltern officer in France. A soldier of fortune, he passed from service to service after the manner of that age, until an adventure, which occurred to him whilst serving against the Spaniards in Italy, appears to have fixed him in irreconcilable hostility to that nation. For an instance of obstinate bravery, which ought to have ensured him the esteem of a generous enemy, he was consigned to the Spanish gallies. A capture by an Algerine, under any other circumstances a misfortune, broke the chain which confined him to this most disreputable of employments; for the prize was pursued, overtaken and recaptured by a vessel of Malta, and the admiration of the brave, secured to De Gourgues his freedom and honorable employment. De Gourgues now took to the sea service, and a long absence in foreign seas, together with the accumulation of wealth, leaves little doubt of his having employed this interval in indemnifying himself for the indignities received from the Spaniards.

He had retired to private life when the news of the massacre by the Spaniards in Florida revived the half-extinguished resentment which his injuries had excited. De Gourgues immediately sold his property, vested the proceeds, and even incurred large debts in equipping two gallies and a tender, under the pretext of employing them in the African trade. The pursuits of the French, and the habits of their government at this time, were exemplified by the commission under which he sailed, which authorized him "to catch negroes on the coast of Africa."

De Gourgues communicated his design to no human being; but, he had the precaution to secure the services of one of Laudonniere's soldiers, who had resided long enough in Florida to acquire some knowledge of the country and the language of the natives. He also engaged the services of one hundred and fifty picked men, many of them gentleman adventurers; and having equipped his vessels with every thing necessary for a cruize of twelve months, set sail from Bourdeaux, the 2d August, 1567.

His voyage was not fortunate; and the better to conceal his design, he found himself obliged to take a very circuitous course, so that he approached Florida by doubling the westward of the island of Cuba.

It was not until he reached this point, that he acquainted his crew with the real object of this long and perilous voyage. In an impressive speech, he exhibited to them the disgrace that their nation had sustained in the eyes of the world, by suffering such wrongs to remain so long unrevenged; and

painted in such striking colours the enormities that the Spaniards had been guilty of—that his crew with one voice declared their readiness to follow him in the enterprize.

The rest of his voyage consumed but little time. So entirely unsuspicious were the Spaniards, of attack, that on passing Fort Caroline, now called by them Fort St. Matthew, De Gourgues received a salute. Passing on to the Altamaha, he entered the mouth of that river, and as his gallies drew but little water, and were provided with oars, he found no difficulty in ascending the river. Here he met with a great number of natives; and Laudonniere's soldier being recognized by them, they readily conjectured that the commander was bound on no friendly errand. A league was soon entered into to attack the fort, and only deferred until it could be reconnoitered by one of the officers of the expedition.

De Gourgues was not appalled at the report of this officer; notwithstanding that, the fort had been much improved by the Spaniards, supported by two other works opposite each other on the river, and garrisoned with four hundred men—two hundred in the principal, and one hundred in each of the subordinate works.

The attack was immediately resolved on, and a rendezvous agreed on at the mouth of a stream twelve miles north of the river. The affair appears to have been conducted with secrecy, fidelity and spirit; and the Europeans attribute to the Indians a degree of bravery in the assault, which it would be imposible now to excite them to.

The small forts on the north and south sides of the river were carried by assault, and the men mostly put to the sword. Then waylaying, with his Indians, all the avenues of escape from Fort Caroline, De Gourgues proceeded to a deliberate examination of the difficulties of the undertaking. It was soon discovered that it must be carried by escalade, and having brought with him the impliments necessary for such an emergency, he was engaged in preparing his ladders, when the garrison precipitated their fate, first by an imprudent sally, and then by a desperate attempt to gain the thickets. Here De Gourgues had prepared for them the most certain destruction; for the woods were full of exasperated Indians, and not one of them escaped to tell of their disasters.

Thus far there is much to admire, and according to the received opinions of that day, relative to garrisons carried by assault, nothing to blame. But there were some prisoners made, and the stone set up by Menendez, being still standing to commemorate his barbarity to the French prisoners, unfortunately De Gourgues was led to imitate as well as execrate the barbarous example. Could retaliation always fall on the actual offender, even the wise and good might often retaliate. His prisoners were all suspended on the same tree that had borne his countrymen; and instead of the stone of Menendez, was substituted a pine plank by De Gourgues, inscribed with "I did not do this as to Spaniards, nor as to infidels, but as to traitors, thieves and murderers."

De Gourgues demolished the forts and returned to France; not to enjoy the admiration of his countrymen, but to be pursued by the Spaniards, and persecuted by his own government. He lived in obscurity and dependence; for his efforts to fit out his expedition had involved him deeply in debt; and when at last he was invited into honourable, and to him, pleasant service, by the King of Portugal, against the Spaniards, he did not live to enter on his command.

Thus ended all the views of the French nation upon French Florida. Thenceforth, the dispute lay between the Spaniards and the British, which should retain the country.

APPENDIX B.

(See page 294.)

SOUTHERN ARMY.

A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780, *by Colonel* Otho Holland Williams, *Adjutant General.*

THE city of Charleston, South Carolina, was invested by a British army, commanded by General Sir Henry Clinton, on the 1st day of April 1780. Major General Lincoln of the American army, who commanded the garrison, made the best possible defence his situation and circumstances would admit of; but, finding his garrison inadequate, and the resources of the country cut off, or exhausted, he applied to the commander in chief of the American army for a re-enforcement.

On the 16th day of April 1780, the quotas of Maryland and Delaware troops, about fourteen hundred infantry, marched under the orders of Major General the Baron De Kalb, from cantonments near Morristown in New Jersey, for the head of the Chesapeake Bay. They embarked the 3d day of May, at the head of Elk River, and arrived at Petersburgh in Virginia, early in June.

Here the unwelcome news of the surrender of Charleston (on the 12th May) was first communicated to the detachment, the principal object of whose destination was lost; but the country was not yet conquered; and it was presumed that the countenance of a body of regular troops, however small, would constitute more than any thing else to sustain the fortitude of the militia. Every exertion, therefore, was made in Virginia to expedite the march of the baron's detachment, which here received a small re-enforcement of artillery. It proceeded with some celerity, and in fine spirits as far as Wilcox's Iron Works, on Deep River, in the state of North Carolina; but here, on the 6th day of July, the baron found himself under the necessity of halting for want of provisions.

The state of North Carolina, had made no provision for the troops of the union; she was solely occupied with her own militia, a great portion of which, being disaffected, were obliged to be dragooned into the service. All the baron's applications and remonstrances to the executive, were without effect; he was obliged to send small detachments, under discreet officers, to collect provisions from the inhabitants, who, at that season of the year, had but little to spare; many of them were subsisting themselves upon the last of the preceding crop of grain, and the new, although it promised plenty, was not yet mature; consequently some of the inhabitants must have suffered notwithstanding the

strict orders to the officers to impress only a proportion of what was found on the farms. In this dilemma the troops remained several days, but the resources failing, in the vicinity of the camp, it became necessary to draw supplies from a greater distance, or march to where there was greater plenty, the former was impracticable as the means of transportation were not in the baron's power. He consequently determined on the latter, previously extending the excursions of his foraging parties, with directions to form a small magazine at Cox's (or Wilcox's) Mill, on Deep River, where the troops arrived on the — day of July, and encamped near Buffalo Ford.

Still, however, the supplies of grain were scarcely sufficient, even for the present subsistence of the troops; and the only meat-ration that could be procured, was lean beef, daily driven out of the woods and the cane-breaks, where the cattle had wintered themselves. Inaction, bad fare, and the difficulty of preserving discipline, when there is no apprehension of danger, have often proved fatal to troops, and ruined whole armies. But here, the activity of the officers, and the persevering patience of the privates, preserved order, harmony, and even a passion for the service.

The baron did not fail to represent his situation to Congress, and to repeat his remonstrances to the executive of the state of North Carolina. He had been flattered with a promise of a plentiful supply of provisions and a respectable re-enforcement of the militia of North Carolina; which, about that time took the field, under the command of Mr. Caswell, who was appointed a major general. The supplies, however, did not arrive, and the commandant of the militia, ambitious of signalizing himself, employed his men in detachments against small parties of disaffected inhabitants, who, to avoid being drafted into the service of their country, retired among the swamps and other cover, with which that country abounds.

It was in vain that the baron required General Caswell to join his command; and it was equally fruitless to expect much longer to find subsistence for his soldiers, in a country where marauding parties of militia swept all before them. The baron, therefore, hesitated whether he had better march to join the militia, in hopes to find that Caswell's complaints of a want of provisions for himself were fictitious; or to move up the country and gain the fertile banks of the Yadkin River. But, before any resolution was taken, the approach of Major General Gates was announced, by the arrival of his aid de camp, Major Armstrong who was to have acted as deputy adjutant general, but was prevented by sickness.

General Gates, who had so fortunately terminated the career of General Burgoyne in the north, was appointed to command the southern army, immediately after the reduction of Charleston. His arrival on the 25th July, was a relief to De Kalb; who, condescendingly, took command of the Maryland division, which included the regiment of Delaware. Besides these two corps, the army consisted only of a small legionary corps, which formed a junction with them a few days before, under the command of Colonel Armand, being about sixty cavalry, and as many infantry; and Lieutenant Colonel Carrington's detachment of three companies of artillery, which had joined in Virginia.

General Gates was received with respectful ceremony; the baron ordered a continental salute from the little park of artillery—which was performed on the entrance into camp of his successor, who made his acknowledgments to the baron for his great politeness—approved his standing orders—and, as if actuated by a spirit of great activity and enterprise, ordered the troops to hold themselves in readiness *to march at a moment's warning*. The latter order was a matter of great astonishment to those who knew the real situation of the troops. But all difficulties were removed by the general's assurances, that plentiful supplies of *rum* and *rations* were on the route, and would overtake them in a day or two—assurances that certainly were too fallacious, and that never were verified. All were in motion, however, early in the morning of the 27th of July, and the general took the route over Buffalo Ford, leading towards the enemy's advanced post on Lynch's Creek, on the road to

Camden, leaving two brass field-pieces and some baggage, for want of horses. Colonel Williams, presuming on the friendship of the general, ventured to expostulate with him upon the seeming precipitate and inconsiderate step he was taking. He represented that the country through which he was about to march, was by nature barren, abounding with sandy plains, intersected by swamps, and very thinly inhabited; that the little provisions and forage which were produced on the banks of its few small streams were exhausted, or taken away by the enemy, and by the hordes of banditti, (called tories) which had retired, from what they called the persecution of the rebels, and who would certainly distress his army, small as it was, by removing what little might remain out of his way. On the other hand, the colonel represented, that a route about north west, would cross the Pee Dee River some where about where it loses the name of Yadkin, and would lead to the little town of Salisbury, in the midst of a fertile country, and inhabited by a people zealous in the cause of America. That the most active and intelligent officers had contemplated this route with pleasure, not only, as it promised a more plentiful supply of provisions, but because the sick, the women and children, and the wounded, in case of disaster, might have an asylum provided for them at Salisbury or Charlotte, where they would remain in security, because the militia of the counties of Mecklenburgh and Roan, in which these villages stand, were staunch friends. The idea of establishing an laboratory, for the repair of arms at a secure place, was also suggested as necessary—the security of convoys of stores from the northward, by the upper route—the advantage of turning the left of the enemy's out-posts, even by a circuitous route—that of approaching the most considerable of those posts (Camden) with the river Wateree on our right, and our friends on our backs—and some other considerations, were suggested. And, that they might the more forcibly impress the general's mind, a short note was presented to him, concisely intimating the same opinion, and referring to the best informed gentlemen under his command. General Gates said, he would confer with the *general officers* when the troops should halt at noon. Whether any conference took place or not, the writer don't know. After a short halt at noon, when the men were refreshed, upon the *scraps* in their *knapsacks*, the march was resumed. The country exceeded the representation that had been made of it—scarcely had it emerged from a state of sterile nature—the few rude attempts at improvement that were to be found, were most of them abandoned by the owners, and plundered by the neighbours. Every one, in this uncivilized part of the country, was flying from his home, and joining in parties, under adventurers, who pretended to yield them protection, until the British army should appear—which they seemed confidently to expect. The distresses of the soldiery daily increased—they were told that the banks of the Pee Dee River were extremely fertile—and so indeed they were; but, the preceding crop of corn (the principal article of produce) was exhausted, and the new grain, although luxuriant and fine, was unfit for use. Many of the soldiery, urged by necessity, plucked the green ears and boiled them with the lean beef, which was collected in the woods, made for themselves a repast, not unpalatable to be sure, but which was attended with painful effects. Green peaches also were substituted for bread, and had similar consequences. Some of the officers, aware of the risk of eating such vegetables, and in such a state, with poor fresh beef, and without salt, restrained themselves from taking any thing but the beef itself, boiled or roasted. It occurred to some, that the hair powder, which remained in their bags, would thicken soup, and it was actually applied.*

* Captain W. D. Beale, &c.

The troops, notwithstanding their disappointment in not being overtaken by a supply of *rum* and provisions, were again amused with promises, and gave early proofs of that patient submission, inflexible fortitude, and undeviating integrity, which they afterwards more eminently displayed.

On the 3d day of August the little army crossed Pee Dee River, in batteaus, at Mask's Ferry; and were met on the southern bank by Lieutenant Colonel Porterfield, an officer of merit, who, after the disaster at Charleston, retired with a small detachment and found means of subsisting himself and his men in Carolina until the present time.

Colonel Marion, a gentleman of South Carolina, had been with the army a few days, attended by a very few followers, distinguished by small black leather caps and the wretchedness of their attire; their number did not exceed twenty men and boys, some white, some black, and all mounted, but most of them miserably equipped; their appearance was in fact so burlesque, that it was with much difficulty the diversion of the regular soldiery was restrained by the officers; and the general himself was glad of an opportunity of detaching Colonel Marion, at his own instance, towards the interior of South Carolina, with orders to watch the motions of the enemy, and furnish intelligence.

These trifling circumstances are remembered in these notes, to show from what contemptible beginnings a good capacity will rise to distinction. The history of the war in South Carolina, will recognize Marion as a brave partisan, if only the actions of the two last year's campaigns are recorded.

The expectation, founded on assurances, of finding a plentiful supply of provisions at May's Mill, induced the troops again to obey the order to march with cheerfulness; but being again disappointed, fatigued, and almost famished, their patience began to forsake them, their looks began to be vindictive; mutiny was ready to manifest itself, and the most unhappy consequences were to be apprehended; when the regimental officers, by mixing among the men and remonstrating with them, appeased murmurs, for which, unhappily, there was too much cause. The officers, however, by appealing to their own empty canteens and mess cases, satisfied the privates, that all suffered alike; and, exhorting them to exercise the same fortitude, of which the officers gave them the example, assured them that the best means of extricating them from the present distress, should be immediately adopted; that if the supplies expected by the general did not arrive very soon, detachments should go from each corps, in all directions, to pick up what grain might possibly be found in the country, and bring it to the mill.

Fortunately, a small quantity of Indian corn was immediately brought into camp—the mill was set to work, and as soon as a mess of meal was ground it was delivered out to the men; and so, in rotation, they were all served in the course of a few hours—more poor cattle were sacrificed—the camp kettles were all engaged—the men were busy, but silent, until they had each taken his repast; and then all was again content, cheerfulness and mirth. It was as astonishing as it was pleasing, to observe the transition.

The general and field officers were not the first served upon this occasion; nor were they generally the most satisfied; but, as no one could point out the means of immediate redress, no remonstrances took place with the commanding officer. The commanding officer, however, was well informed of what was passing in the camp, and of the critical disposition of the troops. Impressed by a sense of difficulties, and, perhaps, conceiving himself in some degree accountable to the army for the steps he had taken, he told Colonel Williams, who acted as deputy adjutant general to the southern army, that he had, in a measure, been forced to take the route he had done—that General Caswell had evaded every order which had been sent to him, as well by the Baron De Kalb as himself, to form a junction of the militia with the regular corps—that it appeared to him, that Caswell's vanity was gratified by having a separate command—that probably he contemplated some enterprise to distinguish himself, and gratify his ambition; which, said he, "I should not be sorry to see checked by a rap over the knuckles, if it were not that the militia would disperse, and leave this handful of

brave men without even nominal assistance." He urged further, that it was the more necessary to counteract the indiscretion of Caswell, and save him from disaster, as he then commanded the only corps of militia that were embodied in the Carolinas—that the assurances he had received from the executive of North Carolina, gave him cause to suspect, that supplies of provisions had been forwarded, and used in profusion in Caswell's camp, notwithstanding intimations had been communicated to him, that the militia were in as bad a situation, in that respect, as the regular corps.

That moreover, having marched thus far directly towards the enemy, a retrogade or indirect movement, would not only dispirit the troops, but intimidate the people of the country; many of whom had come in with their arms, or sent their submissions to the general, promissing, upon his engagement to indemnify them for what had passed, to assemble themselves under their own leaders and follow the colours of the Union. The *poverty* of the country, and the *perfidy* of the people, were in vain opposed to these agreements, and in fact the troops had penetrated so far, as to make it even as hazardous to return or file off for the upper country, as to advance.

Dangerous, as deceptions had been, it was still thought expedient to flatter the expectation of the soldiery with an abundance of provisions, so soon as a junction could be formed with the militia; therefore, after collecting all the corn which was to be found in the neighbourhood of May's Mill, and huckstering all the meal that could be spared from our present necessities, the march was resumed towards Camden.

On the 5th day of August, in the afternoon, General Gates received a letter, informing him that General Caswell meditated an attack upon a fortified post of the enemy on Lynch's Creek, about fourteen miles from the militia encampment. More anxious than ever, General Gates urged on the march of the regulars. Whatever the men suffered, and whatever they thought, the example of the officers, who shared with them every inconvenience, repressed the murmurs which were hourly expected to break forth. The next morning, orders were issued for the army to march with the utmost expedition to join the militia, under the idea that it was the only expedient to gain a supply of provisions; but, another and a more vexatious cause to General Gates was, a letter from General Caswell, advising him that he had every reason to apprehend an attack on his camp by the garrison from Lynch's Creek, (the very garrison which he, the day before, had determined to assault, for there was no possibility of surprising troops so situated,) and requesting General Gates to re-enforce him with all possible dispatch.

One of Caswell's letters began—"*Sir, General W————, my aid de camp.*"—The ostentation of this address weakened the little confidence which the general in chief might have had in the major general's capacity for command, and increased his desire to have all the forces under his immediate direction. Such evasions of orders—such pretences to enterprise, and such sudden signs of intimidation in the militia general, determined Gates to reach his camp in person that same day, although it was impracticable, without retreating the militia, for a junction to be formed until the next. The deputy adjutant general had the honor of attending the general commandant to the head quarters of the commandant of the militia. The reception was gracious, and the general and his suite were regaled with wine and other novelties, exquisitely grateful and pleasingly exhilarating; but, a man must have been intoxicated, not to perceive the confusion which prevailed in the camp—tables, chairs, bedsteads, benches, and many other articles of heavy and cumbrous household stuff, were scattered before the tent doors in great disorder.

It was understood that General Caswell had discovered, upon the last alarm, that by the death of horses and breaking down of carriages, he was rendered unabled to move, and was making an effort to divest himself then, of his heavy baggage. [If, in these notes, a tenor, censorious of General Caswell's conduct, appears to the reader, the writer begs that it may not, as it ought not to be, imputed

to any personal prejudice, or malicious motive. He never had the honor of seeing the general until this time; and all that he had ever heard of him, was extremely favourable to his character as a gentleman and a patriot. A regard to facts, to which the writer thinks he may possibly hereafter be called to testify on oath, obliges him to state them faithfully as they occurred, or were communicated to him; preserving the memory of authorities, as well as incidents, in order to a correct statement of the circumstances, about which he may be interrogated.]

On the 17th of August, the wished for junction took place at the Cross Roads, about fifteen miles east of the enemy's post, on Lynch's Creek.

This event enlivened the countenances of all parties; the militia were relieved from their apprehensions of an attack, and the regulars forgetting their fatigues, and disdaining to betray the least appearance of discontent, exulted in the confidence with which they inspired their new comrades; a good understanding prevailed among the officers of all ranks, and General Caswell seemed satisfied with the honor of being the third in command.

The Baron De Kalb commanded the right wing of the army, composed of the regular troops, and General Caswell the left, of militia.

After the junction, which happened about noon, the army marched a few miles towards the enemy's post on Lynch's Creek, and encamped in order.

The deputy adjutant general, who had as much anxiety as if he had been personally responsible for the fate of the army, in order to observe what guards were established for the safety of the left wing, went with Lieutenant Colonel Ford, (officer of the day) at an unusual hour, to inspect the lines. The guards and centinels of the right wing were, as usual, attentive, and hailed the visiting rounds with that alacrity and spirit which inspired a confidence of security in that quarter; but, in the left wing, all was tranquil. The officers patroled around the encampment without being hailed once; and then rode into the lines and among the tents, and even approached the marquees of some of the general and field officers—one of whom complained of being disturbed, and intimated that it was an unseasonable hour for *gentlemen to call.* The officers of the preceding day were sent for, and guards and patrols sent out to secure the encampment from surprise.

The morning of the 8th of August dawned, without revealing any appearance of an enemy.

Under the judicious mask of offensive operations, the commanding officer of the post on Lynch's Creek evacuated it, and retired unmolested, and at leisure, to a much stronger position on Little Lynch's Creek, within a day's march of *Camden*—which last was strongly fortified, and had a considerable garrison under the command of Lord Rawdon.

The small posts which the enemy had advanced into the country, were calculated to cover the parties, which were sent in all directions to collect the forage and provisions, that might be found on the waters of Lynch's Creek and Black Rivers, and this business having been already effected, the posts were no longer an object to them.

General Gates saw himself master of the field, but it was a barren one. The troops still subsisted upon precarious supplies of corn meal and lean beef, of which they often, did not receive half a ration per day, and no possibility exhisted of doing better, without departing from the route which the general had all along pertinaciously persisted in. To have descended among the fertile fields of Black River, would have been leaving the garrison of Camden between the army and the expected re-enforcements from Virginia. Besides, the refugees of North Carolina repeated their assurances of joining in considerable numbers in a few days.

On the other hand, the Waxaw settlement offered the greatest prospect of a comfortable supply of provisions; but it could not be gained under two or three days march; it lay too much out of the way—the movement would look like retreating from the enemy, and the *swampers*, as the expected

volunteers were called, would surely desert the cause. There was no deciding—there was no delaying—the army marched unconscious what step was next to be taken. General Gates however, began to perceive the danger of approaching an enemy, of whose numbers he had no certain intelligence, incumbered as he was with an enormous train of heavy baggage, and a multitude of women, and not a few children. An effort was therefore formed under Major Dean, and a number of waggons were appointed to convey to Charlotte, all the heavy baggage, and as many of the women as could be driven from the line; many of the latter, however, preferred sharing every toil and every danger with the soldiery, to the security and provisions that were promised them. The army advanced, but approaching the enemy's post on Little Lynch's Creek, it was discovered by good intelligence, to be situated on the south side of the water, on commanding ground, that the way leading to it, was over a causway on the north side to a wooden bridge, which stood on very steep banks; and that the creek lay in a deep muddy channel, bounded on the north by an extensive swamp, and passable no where within several miles, but in the face of the enemy's work. The enemy was not disposed to abandon these advantages, without feeling the pulse of the approaching army; and General Gates observed, that to attack him in front, "would be taking the bull by the horns." It was necessary, for once, to depart from the shortest route to the enemy's principal out post—Camden. The army defiled by the right, and Colonel Hall of Maryland, with a detachment of about 300 men, covered the left flank until it was out of danger from surprise, and then formed the rear guard. This manœuvre, on the 11th of August, induced the garrison to retire with some precipitation to Camden, and about the same time the British garrison, which had occupied Clermont (or Rugley's Mills,) on the north road, retired to the same place.

Lord Rawdon, who commanded the advanced corps of the British army, wisely collected his whole force at Camden, which, besides being flanked by the River Wateree, and Pinetree Creek, was considerably strengthened by a number of redoubts.

As his lordship's emissaries were in all parts of the country, he could not fail to be informed, that General Gates was in his neighborhood with a brigade of regular troops, and two brigades of militia, besides some small corps of artillery and cavalry—that Brigadier General Stevens was on the same route, with a brigade of Virginia militia—that Colonel Marion, below, and Colonel Sumpter above Camden, were stimulating their countrymen to re-assume their arms; and that, in short, the whole country were ready to revolt from the allegiance which had been extorted from them but a few weeks before. He, therefore, permitted General Gates to march unmolested to *Clermont*, (where the Americans encamped on the 13th,) and employed his men in strengthening his post for defence, until re-enforcements might arrive from Charleston, where Lord Cornwallis was left in command; Sir Henry Clinton having returned to New York soon after the reduction of the former city.

Brigadier General Stevens arrived with his Virginians, at Clermont, on the 14th, and encamped with the rest of the army. On the same day, (or the 15th,) an inhabitant of Camden came, as if by accident, into the American encampment, and was conducted to head quarters. He affected ignorance of the approach of the Americans—pretended very great friendship for his countrymen, the Marylanders, and promised the general to be out again in a few days with all the information the general wished to obtain. The information which he then gave was the truth, but not all the truth, which, events afterwards revealed; yet, so plausible was his manner, that General Gates dismissed him, with many promises, if he would faithfully observe his engagements. Suspicions arose in the breasts of some of the officers about head quarters, that this man's errand was easily accomplished;—the credulity of the general was not arraigned—but, it was conceived that it would have been prudent to have detained the man for further acquaintance.

Colonel Sumpter of the South Carolina militia, had intelligence that an escort with clothing, ammunition and other stores, for the troops at Camden, was on the road from Charleston, by way of M'Cord's Ferry on the Congaree; and that it would necessarily pass the Wateree at a ferry about a mile from the town, under cover of a small redoubt on the opposite side of the river. This intelligence he communicated to the general, requesting a small re-enforcement of infantry, and two small pieces of artillery to join his volunteers, promising to intercept the convoy. The colonel's accurate knowledge of the geography of the country, and the qualities of the men who were his followers, favoured the execution of this enterprise. The general ordered a detachment of one hundred regular infantry, and a party of artillery, with two brass field-pieces, under Lieutenant Colonel Woolford, to join Colonel Sumpter, and act under his command.

To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, if they did not choose to retire, which seemed to be but too confidently expected; and to facilitate the execution of the little expedition under Sumpter, all other objects seemed to be suspended.

The only stores which were forwarded to the army by General Stevens, were a few articles of West India produce, the principal of which was molasses. No supply of provisions of any sort was collected, more than to serve from day to day. The obscure route the army had marched, actually kept their friends ignorant of their movements; and the arrival of General Gates at Clermont was, when known, a subject of more surprise to the patriots, than to the enemies of the country. It is probable, and in the opinion of many, a matter of no doubt whatever, that if General Gates had taken a secure position with his army, and waited only a few days, abundance of provisions would have flowed into his camp; and that, by the addition of volunteers from the Carolinas, he would have acquired such a superiority over the British army, which did not much exceed four thousand men, that he would have found no difficulty in recovering the country as far as Charleston; but, opinions are fruitless. On the 15th of August, 1780, General Gates issued the following:—

After General Orders—"The sick, the extra artillery stores, the heavy baggage, and such quarter-master's stores, as are not immediately wanted, to march this evening, under a guard, to Waxaws.

"To this order the general requests the brigadier generals, to see that those under their command, pay the most exact and scrupulous obedience.

"Lieutenant Colonel Edmonds, with the remaining guns of the park, will take post and march with the Virginia brigade, under General Stevens; he will direct, as any deficiency happens in the artillery affixed to the other brigades, to supply it immediately; his military staff, and a proportion of his officers, with forty of his men, are to attend him and await his orders.

"The troops will be ready to march precisely at ten o'clock, in the following order, viz:—

"Colonel Armand's advance; cavalry, commanded by Colonel Armand; Colonel Porterfield's light infantry upon the right flank of Colonel Armand, in indian file, two hundred yards from the road; Major Armstrong's light infantry in the same order as Colonel Porterfield's, upon the left flank of the legion.

"Advance guard of foot, composed of the advance pickets, first brigade of Maryland, second brigade of Maryland, division of North Carolina, Virginia division; rear guard, volunteer cavalry, upon the flank of the baggage, equally divided.

"In this order, the troops will proceed on their march this night.

"In case of an attack by the enemy's cavalry in front, the light infantry upon each flank will instantly move up and give, and continue, the most galling fire upon the enemy's horse. This will enable Colonel Armand, not only to support the shock of the enemy's charge, but finally to rout them; the colonel will therefore consider the order to stand the attack of the enemy's cavalry, be their numbers what they may, as positive.

"General Stevens will immediately order one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, three sergeants, one drum, and sixty rank and file to join Colonel Porterfield's infantry; these are to be taken from the most experienced woodsmen, and men every way the fittest for the service.

"General Caswell will likewise complete Major Armstrong's light infantry to their original number. These must be immediately marched to the advanced posts of the army.

"The troops will observe the profoundest silence upon the march; and any soldier who offers to fire without the command of his officer, must be instantly put to death.

"When the ground will admit of it, and the near approach of the enemy renders it necessary, the army will (when ordered) march in columns.

"The artillery at the head of their respective brigades, and the baggage in the rear.

"The guard of the heavy baggage will be composed of the remaining officers and soldiers of the artillery, one captain, two subalterns, four sergeants, one drum, and sixty rank and file; and no person whatever is to presume to send any other soldier upon that service.

"All bat men, waiters, &c. who are soldiers taken from the line, are forthwith to join their regiments, and act with their masters while they are upon duty.

"The tents of the whole army are to be struck at tattoo."

After writing this order, the general communicated it to the deputy adjutant general, showing him, at the same time, a rough estimate of the forces under his command, making them upwards of seven thousand. That this calculation was exaggerated, the deputy adjutant general could not but suspect, from his own observation. He, therefore, availed himself of the general's orders, to call all the general officers in the army, to a council, to be held in Rugley's Barn—to call also upon the commanding officers of corps for *a field return*; in making which, they were to be as exact as possible; and, as he was not required to attend the council, he busied himself in collecting these returns and forming an abstract for the general's better information. This abstract was presented to the general just as the council broke up, and immediately upon his coming out of the door. He cast his eyes upon the numbers of rank and file *present fit for duty*, which was exactly *three thousand and fifty-two*. He said there were no less than *thirteen* general officers in council; and intimated something about the disproportion between the numbers of officers and privates. It was replied, "Sir, the number of the latter are certainly much below the estimate formed this morning; but," said the general, "these are enough for our purpose." What that was, was not communicated to the deputy adjutant general. The general only added—"there was no dissenting voice in the council where the orders have just been read"—and then gave them to be published to the army.

Although there had been no dissenting voice in the council, the orders were no sooner promulgated, than they became the subject of animadversion. Even those who had been dumb in council, said that there had been no consultation—that the orders were read to them, and all opinion seemed suppressed by the very positive and decisive terms in which they were expressed. Others could not imagine how it could be conceived, that an army, consisting of more than two-thirds militia, and which had never been once exercised in arms together, could form columns, and perform other manœuvres in the night, and in the face of an enemy. But, of all the officers, Colonel Armand took the greatest exception. He seemed to think the *positive* orders respecting himself, implied a doubt of his courage—declared that cavalry had never before been put in the front of a line of battle in the dark—and that the disposition, as it respected his corps, proceeded from resentment in the general, on account of a previous altercation between them about horses, which the general had ordered to be taken from the officers of the army, to expedite the movement of the artillery through the wilderness. A great deal was said upon the occasion; but, the time was short, and the officers and soldiers, generally, not knowing, or believing any more than the general, that any considerable

body of the enemy were to be met with out of Camden, acquiesced with their usual cheerfulness, and were ready to march at the hour appointed.

As there were no spirits yet arrived in camp; and as, until lately, it was unusual for troops to make a forced march, or prepare to meet an enemy without some extraordinary allowance, it was unluckily conceived that molasses, would, for once, be an acceptable substitue; accordingly the hospital stores were broached, and one gill of molasses per man, and a full ration of corn meal and meat, were issued to the army previous to their march, which commenced, according to orders, at about ten o'clock at night of the 15th. But I must arrest the progress of the narrative to apologize for introducing a remark, seemingly so trivial. Nothing ought to be considered as trivial, in an army, which in any degree affects the health, or spirits of the troops; upon which often, more than upon numbers, the fate of battles depends. The troops of General Gates' army, had frequently felt the bad consequences of eating bad provision; but, at this time, a hasty meal of quick baked bread and fresh beef, with a desert of molasses, mixed with mush, or dumplings, operated so cathartically, as to disorder very many of the men, who were breaking the ranks all night, and were certainly much debilitated before the action commenced in the morning.

It has been observed, that the direct march of the American army towards Camden, and the prospect of considerable re-enforcements of militia, had induced the commanding officer, Lord Rawdon, to collect there, all the forces under his directions. And it is certain, that the seeming confidence of the American general, had inspired him with apprehensions for his principal post. Lord Cornwallis, at Charlestown, was constantly advised of the posture of affairs in the interior of the country; and, confident that Lord Rawdon could not long resist the forces that might, and probably would, be opposed to him, in a very short time resolved to march himself, with a considerable re-enforcement, to Camden. He arrived there on the 14th, and had the discernment, at once, to perceive that delay would render that situation dangerous, even to his whole force; the disaffection from his late assumed, arbitrary, and vindictive power, having become general through all the country above General Gates' line of march, as well as to the eastward of Santee, and to the westward of Wateree Rivers. He, therefore, took the resolution of attacking the new constituted American army in their open irregular encampment at Clermont. Both armies, ignorant of each other's intentions, moved about the same hour of the same night, and approaching each other, met about half way between their respective encampments, at midnight.

The first revelation of this new and unexpected scene, was occasioned by a smart, mutual salutation of small arms between the advanced guards. Some of the cavalry of Armand's legion were wounded, retreated, and threw the whole corps into disorder; which, recoiling suddenly on the front of the column of infantry, disordered the first Maryland brigade, and occasioned a general consternation through the whole line of the army. The light infantry under Porterfield, however, executed their orders gallantly: and the enemy, no less astonished than ourselves, seemed to acquiesce in a sudden suspension of hostilities. Some prisoners were taken on both sides; from one of these, the deputy adjutant general of the American army, extorted information respecting the situation and numbers of the enemy. He informed, that Lord Cornwallis commanded in person about three thousand regular British troops, which were, in line of march, about five or six hundred yards in front. Order was soon restored in the corps of infantry in the American army, and the officers were employed in forming a front line of battle, when the deputy adjutant general communicated to General Gates the information which he had from the prisoner. The general's astonishment could not be concealed. He ordered the deputy adjutant general to call another council of war. All the general officers immediately assembled in the rear of the line: the unwelcome news was communicated to them. General Gates said, "Gentlemen, what is best to be done?"

All were mute for a few moments—when the gallant Stevens exclaimed, "Gentlemen, is it not too late *now* to do any thing but fight?" No other advice was offered, and the general desired the gentlemen would repair to their respective commands.

The Baron De Kalb's opinion may be inferred from the following fact: When the deputy adjutant general went to call him to council, he first told him what had been discovered. "Well," said the baron, "and has the general given you orders to retreat the army?" The baron, however, did not oppose the suggestion of General Stevens; and every measure that ensued, was preparatory for action.

Lieutenant Colonel Porterfield, in whose bravery and judicious conduct great dependance was placed, received, in the first rencontre, a mortal wound, (as it long afterwards proved,) and was obliged to retire. His infantry bravely kept the ground in front; and the American army were formed in the following order: The Maryland division, including the Delawares, on the right—the North Carolina militia in the center—and the Virginia militia on the left. It happened, that each flank was covered by a marsh, so near as to admit the removing of the first Maryland brigade to form a second line, about two hundred yards in the rear of the first. The artillery was removed from the center of the brigades, and placed in the center of the front line; and the North Carolina militia (light infantry) under Major Armstrong, which had retreated at the first rencontre, was ordered to cover a small interval between the left wing and the swampy grounds on that quarter.

Frequent skirmishes happened during the night, between the advanced parties—which served to discover the relative situations of the two armies—and as a prelude to what was to take place in the morning.

At dawn of day (on the morning of the 16th of August) the enemy appeared in front, advancing in column. Captain Singleton, who commanded some pieces of artillery, observed to Colonel Williams, that he plainly perceived the ground of the British uniform at about two hundred yards in front. The deputy adjutant general immediately ordered Captain Singleton to open his battery; and then rode to the general, who was in the rear of the second line, and informed him of the cause of the firing which he heard. He also observed to the general, that the enemy seemed to be displaying their column by the right; the nature of the ground favored this conjecture, for yet nothing was clear.

The general seemed disposed to wait events—he gave no orders. The deputy adjutant general observed, that if the enemy, in the act of displaying, were briskly attacked by General Stevens' brigade, which was already in line of battle, the effect might be fortunate, and first impressions were important. "Sir," said the general, "that's right—let it be done." This was the last order that the deputy adjutant general received. He hastened to General Stevens, who instantly advanced with his brigade, apparently in fine spirits. The right wing of the enemy was soon discovered *in line*—it was too late to attack them displaying; nevertheless, the business of the day could no longer be deferred. The deputy adjutant general requested General Stevens to let him have forty or fifty privates, volunteers, who would run forward of the brigade, and commence the attack. They were led forward, within forty or fifty yards of the enemy, and ordered to take trees, and keep up as brisk a fire as possible. The desired effect of this expedient, to extort the enemy's fire at some distance, in order to the rendering it less terrible to the militia, was not gained. General Stevens, observing the enemy to rush on, put his men in mind of their bayonets; but, the impetuosity with which they advanced, *firing* and *huzzaing*, threw the whole body of the militia into such a panic, that they generally threw down their *loaded* arms and fled, in the utmost consternation. The unworthy example of the Virginians was almost instantly followed by the North Carolinians; only a small part of the brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Gregory, made a short pause.

A part of Dixon's regiment, of that brigade, next in the line to the second Maryland brigade, fired two or three rounds of cartridge. But, a great majority of the militia, (at least two-thirds of the army) fled without firing a shot. The writer avers it of his own knowledge, having seen and observed every part of the army, from left to right, during the action. He who has never seen the effect of a panic upon a multitude, can have but an imperfect idea of such a thing. The best disciplined troops have been enervated, and made cowards by it. Armies have been routed by it, even where no enemy appeared to furnish an excuse. Like electricity, it operates instantaneously—like sympathy, it is irresistable where it touches. But, in the present instance, its action was not universal. The regular troops, who had the keen edge of sensibility rubbed off by strict discipline and hard service, saw the confusion with but little emotion. They engaged seriously in the affair; and, notwithstanding some irregularity, which was created by the militia breaking, pell mell, through the second line, order was restored there—time enough to give the enemy a severe check, which abated the fury of their assault, and obliged them to assume a more deliberate manner of acting. The second Maryland brigade, including the battalion of Delawares, on the right, were engaged with the enemy's left, which they opposed with very great firmness. They even advanced upon them, and had taken a number of prisoners, when their companions of the first brigade (which formed the second line) being greatly outflanked, and charged by superior numbers, were obliged to give ground. At this critical moment, the regimental officers of the latter brigade, reluctant to leave the field without orders, inquired for their commanding officer, (Brigadier General Smallwood) who, however, was not to be found; notwithstanding, Colonel Gunby, Major Anderson, and a number of other brave officers, assisted by the deputy adjutant general, and Major Jones, one of Smallwood's aids, rallied the brigade, and renewed the contest. Again they were obliged to give way—and were again rallied—the second brigade were still warmly engaged—the distance between the two brigades did not exceed two hundred yards—their opposite flanks being nearly upon a line perpendicular to their front. At this eventful juncture, the deputy adjutant general, anxious that the communication between them should be preserved, and wishing that, in the almost certain event of a retreat, some order might be sustained by them, hastened from the first to the second brigade, which he found precisely in the same circumstances. He called upon his own regiment, (the 6th Maryland) not to fly, and was answered by the Lieutenant Colonel, *Ford*, who said—"They have done all that can be expected of them—we are outnumbered and outflanked—see the enemy charge with bayonets." The enemy having collected their corps, and directing their whole force against these two devoted brigades, a tremendous fire of musketry was, for some time, kept up on both sides, with equal perseverance and obstinacy, until Lord Cornwallis, perceiving there was no cavalry opposed to him, pushed forward his dragoons—and his infantry charging, at the same moment, with fixed bayonets, put an end to the contest. His victory was complete. All the artillery, and a very great number of prisoners, fell into his hands—many fine fellows lay on the field—and the rout of the remainder was entire—not even a company retired in any order—every one escaped as he could. If, in this affair, the militia fled too soon, the regulars may be thought almost as blamable for remaining too long on the field; especially, after all hope of victory must have been despaired of. Let the commandants of the brigades answer for themselves. Allow the same privilege to the officers of the corps, comprising those brigades, and they will say, that they never received orders to retreat, nor any order from any *general* officer, from the commencement of the action, until it became desperate. The brave Major General, the Baron De Kalb, fought on foot, with the second brigade, and fell, mortally wounded, into the hands of the enemy, who stripped him even of his shirt; a fate which probably was avoided by other generals, only by an opportune retreat.

The torrent of unarmed militia, bore away with it, Generals Gates, Caswell, and a number of others, who *soon* saw that all was lost. General Gates, at first, conceived a hope that he might rally, at Clermont, a sufficient number to cover the retreat of the regulars; but, the farther they fled the more they were dispersed; and the generals soon found themselves abandoned by all but their aids. Lieutenant Colonel Senf, who had been on the expedition with Colonel Sumpter, returned, and overtaking General Gates, informed him of their complete success—that the enemy's redoubt, on Wateree, opposite to Camden, was first reduced, and the convoy of stores, &c. from Charleston, was decoyed, and became prize to the American party, almost without resistance. That upwards of one hundred prisoners, and forty loaded waggons, were in the hands of the party, who had sustained very little loss; but the general could avail himself nothing of this trifling advantage. The detachment under Sumpter was on the opposite side of the Wateree, marching off, as speedily as might be, to secure their booty—for the course of the firing in the morning, indicated unfavorable news from the army.

The militia, the general saw, were in air; and the regulars, he feared, were no more. The dreadful thunder of artillery and musketry had ceased, and none of his friends appeared. There was no existing corps with which the victorious detachment might unite; and the Americans had no post in the rear. He, therefore, sent orders to Sumpter to retire in the best manner he could; and proceeded himself with General Caswell towards Charlotte, an open village on a plain, about sixty miles from the fatal scene of action. The Virginians, who knew nothing of the country they were in, involuntarily reversed the route they came, and fled, most of them, to Hillsborough. General Stevens pursued them, and halted there as many as were not sufficiently refreshed before his arrival, to pursue their way home. Their terms of service, however, being very short, and no prospect presenting itself to afford another proof of their courage, General Stevens soon afterwards discharged them.

The North Carolina militia fled different ways, as their hopes led, or their fears drove them. Most of them prefering the shortest way home, scattered through the wilderness which lies between Wateree and Pee Dee Rivers, and thence towards Roanoke. Whatever these might have suffered from the disaffected, they probably were not worse off than those who retired the way they came; wherein, they met many of their insidious friends, armed, and advancing to join the American army; but, learning its fate from the refugees, they acted decidedly in concert with the victors; and, captivating some, plundering others, and maltreating all the fugitives they met, returned, exultingly, home. They even added taunts to their perfidy; one of a party, who robbed Brigadier General Butler of his sword, consoled him by saying, "you'll have no further use for it."

The regular troops, it has been observed, were the last to quit the field. Every corps was broken and dispersed; even the boggs and brush, which in some measure served to screen them from their furious pursuers, separated them from one another. Major Anderson was the only officer who fortunately rallied, as he retreated, a few men of different companies; and whose prudence and firmness afforded protection to those who joined his party on the rout.

Colonel Gunby, Lieutenant Colonel Howard, Captain Kirkwood, and Captain Dobson, with a few other officers, and fifty or sixty men, formed a junction on the rout, and proceeded together.

The general order for moving off the heavy baggage, &c. to Waxaws, was not put in execution, as directed to be done, on the preceding evening. The whole of it, consequently, fell into the hands of the enemy; as well as all that which followed the army except the waggons of the General's Gates and De Kalb; which, being furnished with the stoutest horses, fortunately escaped, under the protection of a small quarter guard. Other waggons also had got out of danger from the enemy; but the cries of the women and the wounded in the rear, and the consternation of the flying

troops, so alarmed some of the waggoners, that they cut out their teams, and taking each a horse, left the rest for the next that should come. Others were obliged to give up their horses to assist in carrying off the wounded; and the whole road, for many miles, was strewed with signals of distress, confusion and dismay. What added, not a little to this calamitous scene, was the conduct of Armand's legion. They were principally foreigners, and some of them, probably, not unaccustomed to such scenes. Whether it was owing to the disgust of the colonel, at general orders, or the cowardice of his men, is not with the writer to determine; but, certain it is, the legion did not take any part in the action of the 16th; they retired early, and in disorder, and were seen plundering the baggage of the army on their retreat. One of them cut Captain Lemar, of the Maryland infantry, over the hand, for attempting to reclaim his own portmanteau, which the fellow was taking out of the waggon. Captain Lemar was unarmed, having broke his sword in action, and was obliged to submit, both to the loss and to the insult. The tent covers were thrown off the waggons, generally, and the baggage exposed, so that one might take what suited him to carry off. General Caswell's mess waggon afforded the best refreshment; very unexpectedly to the writer, he there found a pipe of good Madeira, broached, and surrounded by a number of soldiers, whose appearance led him to inquire what engaged their attention. He acknowledges, that in this instance, he shared in the booty, and took a draught of wine, which was the only refreshment he had received that day.

But the catastrophe being over, before we pursue a detail of all its distressing consequences, it may be excusable to consider, whether the measures which led to the necessity of fighting a general battle were justifiable? and whether such an event might not have been avoided, at almost any time before the two armies were actually opposed?

If General Gates *intended* to risk a general action, conscious of all circumstances, he certainly made that risk under every possible disadvantage; and a contemplation of those circumstances, would seem to justify Colonel Armand's assertion, made in the afternoon of the day in which the battle was fought—"I will not, said he, say that we have been betrayed; but if it had been the purpose of the general to sacrifice his army, what could he have done more effectually to have answered that purpose?"

General Gates, however, notwithstanding his after order of the 15th, had, in the opinion of most of his officers, and particularly of the writer, no more apprehension of meeting the enemy in force, than the least informed man of his army. The circuitous route, first recommended to him, would certainly have been the safest and best. Magazines, an armory, an hospital, and even fortified posts, might have been established, without halting the effective force of the army; posts to which they might, in case of disaster, have retired under protection of the patriotic militia of Mecklenburg and Rean Counties; who only wanted *time* to join the army in respectable numbers. Such at least, were their subsequent declarations; and such their subsequent conduct, rendered most probable.

But, even on the route the army had marched, the danger of meeting an enemy of equal or superior force, was passed when they got into the vicinity of the Wateree, and in the neighbourhood of their friends. It was only necessary for General Gates to have been informed of the march of Lord Cornwallis from Charleston, to have avoided, almost as long as he pleased, a conflict between the two armies.

In the opinion of the writer, it was not too late, even after Lord Cornwallis reached Camden. If, instead of meeting him, involuntarily, General Gates had been informed of his intended movement, and quietly, in the afternoon of the 15th, have followed, with his whole army, the detachment under Woolford, over the Wateree, it would have been impossible for the armies to have met until the next day, and after the success of Sumpter's expedition. If his lordship should then have

thought of forcing a passage over the Wateree, General Gates would have had the alternative of opposing him under that disadvantage, or of retiring to any position he might prefer, higher up the river. Lord Cornwallis could not have adventured the passage of the river, much above Gates' army, because the river being fordable in many places, his garrison and magazines at Camden would have been jeoparded; the forces he could afford to leave for its defence, would have been insufficient for half a day; and, if the *post* and its *stores* had been gained by the Americans, the British army, destitute of supplies, would have been obliged to retire towards Charleston. On the other hand, if his lordship should keep his post in his rear, he must consequently leave the communication open between the American army and their friends in the upper country; which would have rendered more practicable the avoiding of a general engagement. But, these are subsequent reflections on measures, the idea of which, perhaps never occurred, nor was suggested to the general. Involved, as he was, in the necessity of fighting, the disposition which was made for battle, after the alarm, was, perhaps, unexceptionable, and as well adapted to the situation, as if the ground had been reconnoitered and chosen by the ablest officer in the army of the United States. (It was afterwards approved by the judicious and gallant General Greene, to whom the writer had the solemn pleasure of showing the field of battle; and with whom he had the additional mortification of participating the danger and disgrace of a repulse, near the same place, the very next campaign.)

The only apology that General Gates condescended to make to the army for the loss of the battle, was, "a man *may* pit a cock, but he can't *make* him fight."—"The fate of battle is uncontrolable"—and such other common maxims as admit of no contradiction.

It is, however, morally certain, considering the disposition of the citizens generally, and the respectable body of militia that had already joined the army, that *time* was, of all things, the most important to the success of General Gates' army.

Lord Cornwallis, conscious of this truth, and of the disadvantage the least lapse would prove to him—seized the first moment to hasten the decision of an experiment, which was to gain or lose the country. For that season at least; perhaps for ever.

Generals Gates and Caswell arrived at Charlotte on the night of the action. The ensuing morning presented nothing to them but an open village, with but few inhabitants, and the remains of a temporary hospital, containing a few maimed soldiers of Colonel Buford's unfortunate corps, which had been cut to pieces on the retreat, after the surrender of Charleston.

General Caswell was requested to remain there, to encourage the militia of the country, who were to rendezvous there in three days, (as it was first intended) to countenance the reassembling of the American army. General Gates perceived no effectual succour short of Hillsborough, where the general assembly of North Carolina were about to convene; thither he repaired, with all possible expedition; and was followed the next day by General Caswell, who despaired of the meeting of the militia; probably because he thought that their first object, the army, was annihiliated.

On the two days succeeding the fatal action, Brigadier General Gist, who commanded the second brigade of Maryland troops, previous to its misfortune at Charlotte, arrived with only two or three attendants, who had fallen into his route. Several field officers, and many officers of the line also, arrived similarly circumstanced; and, although not more than about a dozen men of different corps arrived in irregular squads, from time to time, not less than one hundred infantry were collected in the village within that time; besides Armand's cavalry, which was very little reduced; and a small corps of mounted militia, which retired from the Waxsaw settlement, under the command of Major Davy, an enterprizing and gallant young man, who had been raising volunteer cavalry, to join the army.

Very few of the fugitive militia resorted to this place.

Fortunately, there was a small supply of provision in the town—the inhabitants did all they could to refresh both men and officers—and, by the provident care of Colonel Hall, of Maryland, a quantity of flour was sent back on the route of the retreating troops.

Brigadier General Smallwood, who had the honor of the second line, or *corps de reserve*, assigned him in the late action, deliberately came in on the morning, (or about noon) of the 18th, escorted by one of his aids de camp, and two or three other gentlemen, and about as many soldiers, all mounted. His route was by way of the Wateree.

The small squads assembled by Major Anderson, and the other officers already mentioned, were on the direct route. The latter were not yet arrived, but were hourly expected; and afforded, in addition to those already collected, and those with Colonel Sumpter, a prospect of forming such a body as might still encourage the militia to form, at least the semblance of an army, which might keep up some appearance of opposition, until the resources of the union could be called forth by Congress, or by the states most immediately interested.

An incident, which occasioned great distress the next day, must be here related. It has been observed, that many of the waggoners and retreating troops accelerated their flight, by taking horses from the waggons which were left on the route. In this way many wounded officers and soldiers made their escape, and bore with astonishing fortitude, the pains incident to their situation. They gave indeed, (some of them) proofs of the uttermost pain and fatigue that the human constitution can bear—others sunk under their accumulated distresses. Those who arrived at Charlotte, were taken the best possible care of—the horses were turned out to graze in the adjacent fields, no forage being provided. It should have been remarked, that the tribe of Catawba Indians, good friends to the Americans, quitted their villages on the Wateree, and followed the remnant of the army towards the town of Charlotte, where many of them had already arrived; some of them, in their irregular way, fired a number of guns after night, on the 18th, which gave a very general alarm; and many of the people fled in the night, taking as many of the horses as they could find, or had occasion for.

Another incident, much more consequential! The morning of the 19th was fair, and the officers were assembling about the public square, and encouraging one another with hopes of a more favourable course of affairs than had been current for some time past, when they received unquestionable information, that Colonel Sumpter, whose arrival they looked for every moment, was *completely surprised*, the preceding day, and the whole party *killed, captured*, or *dispersed*. Dead or alive, he was censured for suffering *a surprise*.

No organization, nor order, had yet been attempted to be restored among the few troops that had arrived in Charlotte; the privates were, therefore, hastily formed into ranks; and the officers were, among themselves, adjusting the commands to be taken by them respectively, when the number of supernumerary officers was discovered to be very considerable. Every one, however, took some charge upon himself. The care of the wounded—the collection of provisions—and the transportation of the heavy baggage, (preserved by Major Dean's small guard) and other matters, which might, in any way, alleviate the general distress, engaged the attention of those who had no division of the men.

There was no council, nor regular opinion taken, respecting this irksome situation. The general idea was, that Charlotte, an open wooded village, without magazines of any sort—without a second cartridge per man—and without a second ration, was not tenable for an hour, against superior numbers, which might enter at every quarter—moreover, it was estimated by those who knew the

geography of the country, that even then the victorious enemy might be in the vicinity of the place. It was admitted, by every one, that no place could be more *defenceless*.

Only one officer, who was of the legion, proposed a temporary defence, by pulling down the houses and forming a redoubt, which might induce the enemy to grant a capitulation. No respect was paid to this destructive proposition, and the first suggestion prevailed.

Difficulties, almost innumerable, presented themselves to obstruct a march—several officers, with small parties, were known to be on the route from Camden—some refugees might possibly escape from Sumpter's detachment—many of the wounded were obliged to be left in the old hospital, dependant, probably, on the enemy, or on a few of the inhabitants who were unable to retire—and even some who might have got off on horseback, were deprived of the means by the alarming incident of the preceding night. Were all these to be abandoned?

Time was never more important to a parcel of wretches than now; but, how to take it, whether "*by the forelock*," as the adage is, or *wait its more propitious moments*, none of us could decisively resolve. Brigadier General Smallwood, who quartered himself at a farm-house a little way from town, appeared, at this crisis, approaching the parade in his usual slow pace. As senior officer, his orders would have been obeyed, even to setting about fortifying the village.

But being informed of what has just been related, and concurring in the general sentiment, he leisurely put himself at the head of the party, and moved off towards Salisbury. The deputy adjutant general, and Brigade Major Davidson, took the route to Camden, in order to direct all they might meet, to file off towards Salisbury. The small parties that had attached themselves to Colonel Gunby and Colonel Howard, were met near town, and an express was sent to Major Anderson who had, to no purpose, spent some time in endeavours to bring off some waggons, which had escaped beyond the pursuit of the enemy, and were left without horses. By noon a very lengthy line of march, occupied the road from Charlotte to Salisbury. It consisted of the wretched remnant of the late southern army; a great number of distressed whig families, and the whole tribe of Catawba Indians (about three hundred in number, about fifty or sixty of whom were warriors, but indifferently armed); among the rest were six soldiers, who left the hospital with other convalescents; they had all suffered in Buford's unfortunate affair, and had but two sound arms among them, indeed, four of them had *not* one arm among them; and two only an arm a piece; each of them had one linen garment. Those officers and men, who were recently wounded, and had resolution to undertake the fatigue, were differently transported; some in waggons, some in litters, and some on horseback—their sufferings were indiscribable. The distresses of the women and children, who fled from Charlotte and its neighbourhood. The nakedness of the Indians, and the number of their infants and aged persons, and the disorder of the whole line of march, conspired to render it a scene too picturesque and complicated for description. A just representation would exhibt an image of compound wretchedness—care, anxiety, pain, poverty, hurry, confusion, humiliation and dejection, would be characteristic traits in the mortifying picture.

The inhabitants, who had fled with their families, soon began to disperse, and take refuge among their friends in the interior of the country. The Catawbas had a district of country assigned them for hunting grounds in North Carolina. Brigadier General Smallwood continued the march of the regular infantry to Salisbury, and arrived the third day after. Armand's legion proceeded, as they threatened, when it was resolved to evacuate Charlotte: "If," said one of the officers, "you will make de retreat, we will retreat faster dan you!"—they proceeded to Hillsborough. The fertility of the country between Charlotte and Salisbury—the hospitality and benevolence of the inhabitants—and the numbers of their habitations on the route, afforded, in many instances, that

relief which was requisite to preserve life; besides, a liberal supply of provisions for all this cavalcade.

It is not known, whether, if the Americans had not evacuated Charlotte, Lord Cornwallis would not have made it an object to have dispossessed them; but, as it was, his lordship contented himself, with having defeated the southern army—driven it out of South Carolina—and cut up the only detachment respectable enough to afford a head to which the patriots of the country might assemble. His lordship certainly gave the world another instance in proof of the assertion, that it is not every general, upon whom fortune bestows her favours, who knows how to avail himself of all the advantages which are presented to him. Victory is not always attended, perhaps never, with all the superiority it seems to bestow. The British army retired to Camden.

So unexpected an event gave the poor Americans time to breathe. General Smallwood halted his party at Salisbury—selected about one hundred and fifty effective men—and sent the remainder, perhaps fifty or sixty more, over the Yadkin River, with the waggons, women, &c. The effectives he officered according to his pleasure, and permitted the field officers, particularly those who had not formerly belonged to his brigade, to proceed to Hillsborough.—Hall, Williams and Howard, were of the number, who availed themselves, at their leisure, of this permission. At Salisbury, one hundred and twenty or thirty miles from the scene of the late action, Swallwood took time to dictate those letters which he addressed to Congress, and in which, he intimated the great difficulties he had encountered, and the exertions he had made to save a remnant of General Gates' army. Letters which, with the aid of those he addressed to his friends in power, procured him, it was generally believed in the line, the rank of *major* general in the army of the United States; and which, probably, promoted the resolution of Congress, directing an inquiry into the conduct of General Gates. But, many of the officers wrote to their friends from Salisbury, and being chagrined and mortified at not overtaking their commanding general in so long a retreat, expressed themselves with great disgust and freedom.

Major Anderson, who casually heard of the retreat of the detachment that had surprised Sumpter, proceeded to Charlotte, where he found the militia inspirited by a change of circumstances, disposed to organize themselves, and form such corps as might protect the country from the incursions of the enemy, which might be expected from Camden. They requested the major to remain at Charlotte, and through him, invited General Smallwood to return, importuning him, and even offering him the chief command of all the militia of Mecklenburg—General Caswell, their countryman, having, as they alleged, abandoned them even before the expiration of the three days, in which he had ordered them to assemble at Charlotte.

General Smallwood, however, declined the honour of this invitation: and sent orders to Major Anderson, to join him, without delay, at Salisbury. And, in order that these instructions might not be dispensed with on any pretence whatever, Lieutenant Colonel Ford, the particular friend of Anderson, was charged with them, and with directions to expedite the march of the party. The order was executed, and the mortified militia, were left to depend upon their own exertions, and their own fortitude; which, notwithstanding the discouragements they had met with, did not fail. They assembled—formed themselves into small partisan corps—and actually combated successfully, the first detachments of the enemy that came afterwards into their country. These are facts which entitle the patriots of Mecklenburg and Waxsaws, to a whole page of eulogium, in the best history that shall record the circumstances of the revolution.

The unfortunate General Gates, at Hillsborough, where the assembly of the state had convened, hearing from the officers who arrived there, that the disasters of the army were not so completely ruinous as he had at first apprehended, applied himself assiduously to the legislature for the supplies necessary

to re-equip the regular troops. But what supplies, or rather the quantum, that would be requisite, the general could not ascertain, having received no returns, or reports, of any kind, from General Smallwood, who seemed to assume the command of the army.

In order, therefore, to obtain the requisite information, and to decide, at once, the doubt about command, General Gates wrote explicitly to General Smallwood, and ordered him to pass the Yadkin River with all the men under his command, and to proceed on the direct route to Hillsborough. This order had been anticipated. It was received by General Smallwood, after he had passed the Yadkin and was on his march to Guilford Court House, on the route directed. At Guilford, the troops were halted for refreshment; and, as there was a great plenty of provisions in the neighbourhood, General Smallwood, without regarding the instructions he had received from General Gates, wrote to *the assembly of the state*, intimating that, with *their* approbation, he would continue there until other arrangements should be resolved on. The assembly, properly, declined interfering in matters which might involve a question of authority between two continental officers, and referred the proposition of General Smallwood to General Gates. General Gates did not entirely disapprove of the execution of the proposition; but, in his letter to General Smallwood, he required, that certain returns, &c. should be forwarded to him without delay; and gave such explicit intimations, that he was not disposed to relinquish his command of the southern army, as to induce General Swallwood to suspend, for the present, his hopes of succeeding thereto. He, therefore, marched immediatety to Hillsborough, where he arrived with the tattered remains of the army, early in the month of September. Thus ended the campaign of 1780.

A Narrative of Events relative to the Southern Army, subsequent to the arrival of General Gates' broken battalions at Hillsborough, 1780.

Hillsborough had been a place of rendezvous for all the militia raised in the interior of North Carolina; and a stage of refreshment for all the troops which had marched from the northward to succour Charleston, or re-enforce the southern army; consequently, the resources of the country had been generally collected and applied. What remained, did not afford an ample supply even for the fugitives of the late army: which were now collected in the town, and were cantoned, some in the houses of the inhabitants, and some in tents pitched near the court house, where the assembly of the state were convened. The assembly saw and regretted the wants of the troops, and did all that was then practicable, for their relief. A comfortable supply of fresh meat, corn-meal, and wheat flour, was procured for the hospital; and the rest of the men were subsisted by provisions furnished by state commissaries, in part, and partly by the old expedient of collecting by detachments—an expedient which gave great umbrage to the country.

At this time Lord Cornwallis was, with the principal part of his army, at Camden, where his own wounded, and those of the American army were very differently treated.

The worse than savage system of severity, suggested by the malice of the king's minister, or conceived by the malignity of the king himself, which had been so fatally practised upon the prisoners in New York and Philadelphia, was now practised with equal barbarity on the prisoners taken in the southern department. Every where they were treated with cruel neglect, or insolent severity. The difference of climates made some difference in consequences.

The same treatment, or rather worse, was suffered by the inhabitants of the country who had ever been in arms, or were even suspected of disloyalty; some who were accused of having received protections, and violated the conditions, were hung *without any form of trial*. Prompt punishments, for supposed crimes, were inflicted at the will of superior officers in the different British garrisons, and every measure was adopted, which the arrogance of power could devise, to subjugate the

minds, as well as the privileges of the people. The want of energy in the union of the United States, and the imbecility of the states themselves, gave great latitude to the effect of the British measures. Their emisaries were in all parts of the country, and were but too successful in the lower counties of North Carolina, where the inhabitants, except in and near the sea-port towns, began to be generally disaffected to the American cause. Even in Chatham county, a considerable body took arms and threatened to disperse the assembly of the state from Hillsborough; indeed so serious was the alarm upon this occasion, that to guard against a surprise of the town, on a night when the insurgents were confidently expected, all the troops were kept under arms the whole night; as no arrangement had yet taken place, General Gates desired Colonel Williams to command them. The inhabitants were ordered to arm, and even the members of the assembly thought it incumbent on them, to arm themselves also. The following fact may illustrate their character, as well for patriotism as soldiership.

It was requested that a regular officer would lend his assistance in arranging the militia. The members of the assembly were collected near the court house, (the seat of government) and were arming themselves when the officer arrived; who, taking them for the militia who stood in need of an adjutant, began the exercise of that office, and marshalled them in a manner which showed no respect for them as legislators. No exception, however, was taken to the conduct of the officer. The circumstance was mentioned afterwards, only as one of these ludicrous incidents (and there were many) which occurred during the night of the alarm. Although the alarm proved false, it proved no less certainly, that the enterprise might have been effected by a few brave men, even on that very night; the hurry and confusion which it occasioned, discovered the expediency of re-establishing order among the troops; and every other man seemed to feel the obligation of giving his assistance as well to provide for present necessities, as against future contingencies. Influenced by motives not to be disregarded, the government of North Carolina soon began to exert all its powers. The second class of the militia were ordered to assemble immediately—commissaries, quarter masters and agents, with extensive powers, were appointed to procure every article requisite for another campaign—and, for want of funds, (for the paper money of the United States was now depreciated below calculation) these officers were authorized to take, on the account of government, all military stores, arms, provisions, clothing, &c. that were to be found, and to grant receipts or certificates for the same.

Notwithstanding that the disasters of the southern army, and a sense of common danger, had, seemingly, obliterated all recollection of former differences and animosities among the officers of the regular corps, it ought not to be dissembled, that such were among the causes which, for a little time, postponed the new organization of the troops.

What cause General Gates had to apprehend the being superceeded in the command of the southern army, may be conjectured by those who have a knowledge of facts; but, what reason General Smallwood could have, to hope to become his successor, none who are not grossly imposed on, can possibly imagine.

The misunderstanding between these two officers was never, I believe, avowed; but, as Gates reassumed his command, Smallwood retired from it.

General Gist was not ambitious of the command of men so circumstanced; and, in fact, many other officers wished for an opportunity of returning home without a laurel, or a scar.

A board of officers, convened by order of General Gates, determined, that all the effective men should be formed into two battalions, constituting one regiment, to be completely officered, and provided for in the best possible manner that circumstances would admit—the sick and convalescent

were to remain—but, all the invalids were to be sent home—and the supernumerary officers were to repair to their respective states, to assist in the recruting service.

The command of the new formed regiment was given to Colonel Williams and Lieutenant Colonel Howard; Majors Anderson and Hardman, commanded the battalions.

No sooner were these officers invested with command, than they began to restore order and discipline among the troops; and the colonel, who was inspector of the Maryland division of the army of the United States, (comprehending the quota of Delaware also) demanded a general order before any of the officers should depart, for the most correct returns that could be made, under present circumstances, accounting as well for the men as for their arms, accoutrements, &c. &c. The latter part of the order could not be complied with, in any satisfactory degree; but, after some time, the officers, by comparing notes, and recollecting circumstances, rendered returns, from which the following abstracts were taken:

TOTAL *of Maryland troops*:—Three colonels, four lieutenant colonels, five majors, thirty-eight captains, fifty subalterns, twenty-four staff officers, eighty-five non-commissioned officers, sixty-two musicians, and seven hundred and eighty-one rank and file.

The numbers which were *killed, captured* and *missing*, since the last muster, could not, with any accuracy, be ascertained. The aggregate was, three lieutenant colonels, two majors, fifteen captains, thirteen subalterns, two staff officers, fifty-two non-commissioned officers, thirty-four musicians, and seven hundred and eleven rank and file. These, at least a very great majority of these, and all of them for aught I know, fell in the field, or into the hands of the enemy, on the fatal 16th of August. It is extremely probable, that the number killed much exceeded the number taken prisoners.

The *Delaware* regiment being mustered, the return stood thus:

Four captains, seven subalterns, three staff officers, nineteen non-commissioned officers, eleven musicians, and one hundred and forty-five rank and file, in actual service, &c. &c. &c. Eleven commissioned officers, and thirty-six privates of the Delaware regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy.

These details may not be unessential to those who have been concerned in the affairs of the late campaign; and may give satisfaction to those of my friends, who may wish, hereafter, to have a true knowledge of circumstances.

The inhabitants of Hillsborough soon began to experience and complain of the inconvenience of having soldiers billetted among them; and the officers were equally sensible of the difficulty of restraining the licentiousness of the soldiers, when not immediately under their observation. Williams, therefore, drew his regiment out of town, distributing the few tents he had among the several companies. He encamped on a vacant farm, or rather, in the woodland belonging to it, and covered his men with wigwams, made of fence rails, poles, and corn tops, regularly disposed. The tents were chiefly occupied by the officers; but, as they were all much worn, wigwams, were soon preferred, on account of their being much warmer.

The usual camp-guards and centinels being posted, no person could come into, or go out of camp without a permit. Parade duties were regularly attended, as well by officers as soldiers, and discipline, not only began to be perfectly restored, but even gave an air of stability and confidence to the regiment, which all their rags could not disguise. In this encampment no circumstance of want or distress, was admitted as an excuse for relaxing from the strictest discipline, to which the soldiers the more cheerfully submitted, as they saw their officers constantly occupied in procuring for them whatever was attainable in their situation.

Absolutely without pay; almost destitute of clothing; often with only a half ration, and never with a whole one (without substituting one article for another,) not a soldier was heard to murmur, after the third or fourth day of their being encamped. Instead of meeting and confering in small sullen squads, as they had formerly done, they filled up the intervals from duty, with manly exercises and field sports: in short the officers had very soon, the entire confidence of the men, who divested themselves of all unnecessary care, and devoted themselves to duty and pastime, within the limits assigned them.

The docility and contentment of the troops were the more extraordinary, as they were not unfrequently reminded, (when permitted to go into the country,) how differently the British troops were provided for.

The article of rum, the most desirable refreshment to soldiers, was mentioned among other inducements for them to desert; but, so great was their fidelity to the cause, or so strong their attachment to their fellow sufferers and soldiers, that they not only rejected the most flattering propositions to go over to the enemy, but they absolutely brought some of the most bold and importunate incendiaries into camp, who were delivered to the civil authority, and some of them punished.

If any of my friends should inquire why I descend to particulars, so minute and unimportant—I answer, that I am not writing a history of the revolution, nor of the proceedings of government; and that it is *not* unimportant for any officer to observe every incident in the life and conduct of a soldier, which may, in any degree, serve to illustrate his disposition. The general characteristic of a corps should never be mistaken, by the commanding officer especially. Misunderstandings often arise from it; and the consequences are usually what might be expected—unfavorable both to officers and men.

The legion commanded by Armand was, on the 8th of September, sent to forage, and make cantonments in Warren County, from whence Armand went to Philadelphia, and never returned.

General Gates did not conceal his opinion, that he held cavalry in no estimation in the southern field. If he judged by the conduct of the legion, he ought to have confined his opinion to that corps particularly—for subsequent experience has evinced, that no opinion could have been more erroneous.

Two brass field-pieces, which General Gates had left under a small guard at Buffalo Ford, for want of horses, the first day of his march after taking the command, were brought to camp with a few iron pieces picked up at Hillsborough, and formed a little park in the centre of the ragged regiment of Maryland and Delaware troops, which constituted *the southern army*, until the 16th of September, when Colonel Buford arrived from Virginia with the mangled remains of his unfortunate regiment, re-enforced by about two hundred raw recruits, all of them in a ragged condition; uniforms and other clothing, were to be sent after them, but never arrived.

About the same time, a small detachment of Virginia militia, arrived without even arms.

On the 18th, the relicts of Porterfield's corps, about fifty effective men, arrived under the command of Captain Drew, and joined Buford. Thus the remainder of those corps, which had been recently cut to pieces, without being recruited, or refurnished with clothing, camp equipage, &c. necessary for a campaign, were hastily assembled to form the head of an army, to act against their conquerors.

The body of the proposed army, was to consist of militia—the second class principally of those very militia, who had so shamefully abandoned some of these same regulars at Camden, but a few weeks before.

Confident hopes were, notwithstanding, entertained that the interior of the two Carolinas, might be defended from the ravages of the enemy, until Congress might gain time and find means to do something more effectual.

The officers and the men began to recover their usual spirits.

Brigadier General Smallwood, weary of waiting events at obscure quarters, and dissatisfied (as every officer of *real merit, naturally* is) of rank without command in time of war. Suggested that as there were two nominal regiments, and a company of artillery encamped, a nominal brigade might be formed, of which he claimed the command, and was gratified. Captain Anthony Singleton of Virginia, commanded the artillery.

About this time, Colonel Morgan of Virginia, whose heroic conduct under General Montgomery at Quebec, General Gates at Saratoga, and other meritorious actions, will secure him an honourable page in the history of the war in the north, arrived at camp, without command, and with only two or three young gentlemen attending him.

The perfect security which Lord Cornwallis imagined resulted to his posts, and to the communications between them; and the presumption, that all the lower part of the country was in a state of absolute subjection and tranquillity, in consequence of his extraordinary, not to say accidental success, induced him to send a small guard from Camden, to convey one hundred and fifty of his prisoners, principally regulars, to Charleston.

Colonel Marion of South Carolina, who has been mentioned in the previous part of these narratives, and who ought always to be mentioned with respect, had been stimulating his countrymen to act in concert with General Gates, until after the unfortunate 16th of August, when he and his followers were obliged to secret themselves in the swamps and deserts which intersect a considerable part of the lower country. From one of these hiding places, Marion suddenly fell upon the British guard, surprised, and made the whole of them prisoners. He paroled the officers, and took a list of the privates to be exchanged. The American soldiers he sent off, with proper guides, to Wilmington—having first distributed among them the arms of their captors. A circumstance so honourable for a small squad of militia, particularly for their commanding officer, ought long to be remembered with admiration. Marion and his men retook to the swamps.

On report, in camp, of this fortunate event, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Ford, who had not availed himself of the permission for supernumeraries to return home, went to Wilmington to meet the released captives, and to conduct them to camp; but, as they had been subject to very little, or no control, after their releasement, being without any of their own officers, and doubting of the existence of any considerably body of their fellow soldiers, many of them repaired home with all the expedition they could make. Colonel Ford did not recover more than about one half of the number released by Marion; and these, from their sufferings in captivity, their long and circuitous march from Camden to Wilmington, and thence by Cross Creek to Hillsborough, and their want of almost all the necessaries of life, were very little fit for service.

While the American troops were collecting at Hillsborough, measures were taken by the state of North Carolina, to expedite the embodying of the second class of their militia.

To intimidate the people from complying with the requisitions of Government—to collect forage and provisions—and probably with an expectation of striking terror through the country, Lord Cornwallis moved from Camden, (in October) with a considerable body of troops, lightly equipped, which he led immediately to the town of Charlotte, and from thence, manœuvred about the country as far north as Phifer's Mills. But, although his lordship could, and would go where he pleased, he found himself much less at ease in this part of the country, than in any other situation he had experienced. The militia of Mecklenburg, and of Roan, the most inflexible whigs in the whole

state, were continually in his presence. He could make no movement without being observed—no negligence could be committed on *his* part, of which *they* did not take advantage. Major Davie, with his mounted volunteers, equipped as dragoons, sometimes intercepted his convoys of provisions—sometimes disturbed his pickets—and even once or twice, insulted the van of his army on its march.

These, however, were feeble and ineffectual resistances; his lordship could "go where he pleased."

This incursion of his lordship into the strongest part of the state, stimulated the exertions of the legislature, in measures to organize and equip their militia for the field. They began to rendezvous in considerable numbers at Salisbury. Smallwood was complimented with a request of the executive, to take the command of them, Caswell's confidence in the courage of his countrymen not being yet restored; and it was presumed that the militia would act with more subordination, and perhaps, with more bravery under a continental general, than under one of their own neighbours.

After making some conditions, about horses for himself and his suite, the general accepted the honour.

At the same time, it was contemplated to send forward as many of the regular troops, as could be tolerably equipped for service; and it fortunately happened that, at that time, the state agents had forwarded to Hillsborough, a small supply of coarse clothing and other articles convenient for the purpose.

General Gates ordered a committee to attend to the equitable distribution of these stores, among the regular corps. But first, an appropriation was to be made for equipping four companies of light infantry, to be drafted from the regiments, and destined to form a part of the corps, to be sent in advance.

The execution of this part of the plan, commenced on the 19th of October, the day the clothing arrived, and was very soon completed. The four companies of infantry were formed into one battalion, the command of which was obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Howard. About the 2d of November, Lieutenant Colonels White and Washington, came to camp with a very few effectives, of the first and third regiments of dragoons, which had also been surprised, routed, defeated and cut to pieces the preceeding spring. White had leave to go to Philadelphia, and Washington remained in command of the remnants of both corps, consisting of sixty or seventy effectives.

These corps joined the light infantry on their march towards Charlotte. A small corps of riflemen (say 60) under Major Rose, had also joined the light infantry at Hillsborough. The gallant Colonel Morgan, then took the command of all the light troops, and proceeded with them towards Charlotte. He found the militia under Smallwood, advanced as far as the Old Trading Ford on the Yadkin River, seven miles from Salisbury, in safety. Lord Cornwallis, without any known adequate cause, thought proper to retire through Charlotte, cross the Wateree River, and encamp at Winnsborough. It is not probable, that he was deceived by any exaggerated account of the new levied militia; nor is it probable, that he had any fears from the relics of the corps he had so recently cut to pieces. His lordship had been fatigued by the insolence of the volunteers, and chose to retire to a camp of repose.

Colonel Williams succeeded General Smallwood in the command of the brigade of continental troops. The diminution of its numbers, by the draft of four companies of light infantry was, in part, restored by the arrival of recruits from Maryland and Virginia. These were constantly at the drill. A laboratory was erected, and employed mending arms; and the residue of the clothing, &c. was distributed. Each man in the brigade was supplied with one new shirt, a short coat, a pair of woollen overalls, a pair of shoes, and a hat or a cap. The dividend of blankets was very inadequate to the occasion—they were apportioned to the companies; and every other practicable

provision was made to prepare the brigade for the field. The officers exerted themselves, and the soldiers were emulous who should be the first in readiness to march. Even the convalescents were impatient of being left behind—so generally had the martial spirit revived in the soldiery.

The brigade marched on the second day of November, immediately after the light dragoons, with two brass field-pieces, some ammunition-waggons, and a small train of baggage. They followed the rout of the light infantry to Charlotte, where they encamped.

The militia under Smallwood, had, apparently, taken a permanent position at Providence, about fourteen miles south of Charlotte; and Morgan, now *brigadier general*, was itinerant with his infantry about the Wateree.

Lord Cornwallis continued with the principal part of his forces at Winnsborough, and kept up the garrisons of Camden and Clermont.

Such were the relative situations of the armies, when General Greene arrived at Charlotte the 4th of December, 1780.

Charlotte.—When General Gates had reviewed, and contemplated his situation at Charlotte, he considered it the most eligible place to encamp for the winter, with the principal part of his army. The light troops were to keep the field, and to act as an advance-guard. With this view, he ordered preparations to be made for building huts, and directed General Morgan to make a foraging excursion towards Camden. On the very day of General Greene's arrival, and after he had assumed the command of the army, Morgan reported that he had made a tour into the country, in the vicinity of Camden, but found the cattle were taken off, and so little grain or forage left, as to make it scarcely worth the fatigue of the troops; but, that, fortunately, an event had taken place, which made some compensation for their toil.

Mr. Rugely, proprietor of the farm called Clermont, had obtained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the British army, and had obtained that of major for his son-in-law; these two officers, with about one hundred British troops and new levies, occupied a large log barn (the old council chamber) which they fortified by a slight entrenchment and a line of abbatis, so as to render it impregnable to small arms. This post was on the left of Morgan's route, as he returned from foraging—but too near to Camden for him to risk any thing like a siege or blockade. It was suggested that the cavalry might go and reconnoitre it—Washington, pleased with the idea, approached so near, as to discover that the enemy had discovered him and were intimidated. He humourously ordered his men to plant the trunk of an old pine tree, in the manner of a field-piece, pointing towards the garrison—at the same time, dismounting some of his men to appear as infantry, and displaying his cavalry to the best advantage, he sent a corporal of dragoons to summon the commanding officer to an *immediate* surrender. The order was executed with so firm a manner, that Colonel Rugely did not hesitate to comply *instantly*; and the whole garrison marched out prisoners of war.

The corporal was made a sergeant of dragoons—the old fort was set on fire; and Washington retired with his prisoners without exchanging a shot.

Soldiers, like sailors, have always a little superstition about them.

Although neither General Gates nor General Greene, could be considered as having any agency in this little successful affair, it was regarded by some, and even mentioned, as a presage of the future good fortune which the army would derive from the genius of the latter. But I have superceeded my old friend rather abruptly, and with almost as little ceremony, as it was directed by congress. As I approach the close of this narrative I assume the epistolary style, in which I intend to make all my future remarks, as they may thus be more easily transcribed for communication.

The letters which were addressed to congress, respecting the overthrow of his whole army, were so vague and unsatisfactory; and others which were written, were so disengenous, that it was con-

ceived by congress absolutely requisite to have a full inquiry into the circumstances of the campaign and conduct of the commanding officer.

General Washington, was requested to nominate an officer to supercede General Gates, and it was resolved that a court of inquiry should be held, of which major general the Baron Steuben was appointed president. General Greene, whom General Washington distinguished by an election to the command of the southern army, arrived as before observed, at head quarters the 4th of December 1780 with full powers.

A manly resignation marked the conduct of General Gates on the arrival of his successor, whom he received at head quarters with that liberal and gentlemanly air which was habitual to him.

General Greene observed a plain, candid, respectful manner, neither betraying compassion nor the want of it—nothing like the pride of official consequence even *seemed*. In short, the officers who were present, had an elegant lesson of propriety exhibited on a most delicate and interesting occasion.

General Greene was announced to the army as commanding officer, by General Gates; and the same day General Greene addressed the army, in which address, he paid General Gates the compliment of confirming all his standing orders.

The detention of the Baron Steuben in Virginia, and no major general being present, or authorized to serve in his stead, made it impracticable to hold the court of inquiry at this time or place. General Gates, therefore, with the approbation of General Greene, repaired to Philadelphia, in order to meet the charges and to counteract the calumnies against him.

I cannot conclude this narrative without remarking, that a soldier's fame is always precarious during his life. If General Gates had fallen at the commencement of the action of Camden, who would not have acceded to the opinion, that the disasters of the day were owing principally to that circumstance? The laurels of Saratoga would have been ever green on his tomb, and history would have exulted in the merits of the hero.

What difference, in point of *real merit*, would there have been, (or could there be) between falling by an early, accidental shot, or submitting to the irresistible impulse of the militia, who went like a torrent from the field, forcing almost every thing before them? And yet, what a difference in the public opinion!! Instead of praises, panegeric, and monumental honours, he was censured, calumniated, and even condemned, unheard.

The severity of this treatment was aggravated by a recent event, which was carefully kept from his knowledge while in camp, but which too soon overwhelmed him in distress. His only son, an elegant young man, well educated, and just entering into active scenes of life, was suddenly cut off by the stroke of death.

None but an unfortunate soldier, and a father left childless, could assimulate his feelings, to those of this unhappy gentleman—yet many sympahtized with him, remembered his former public services, wished for the return of tranquillity to his afflicted mind, and hoped, even for a restoration of his honours.

General Greene took great pains to collect the best information relative to the circumstances of the late campaign; and his communications to influential characters, finally determined congress to rescined their resolution respecting General Gates, and to restore him to his command in the northern army.

APPENDIX C.

(See page 471.)

ON THE ABORIGINES OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

THIS unhappy race of beings, were still numerous and warlike, and they had strong reasons for attaching themselves to the royal cause. At the commencement of the settlement of the Southern Colonies, their numbers, from the Cape Fear River to the Gulf of Florida, must have been great. A mild climate, abundance of game, and great facility in obtaining fish and oysters, had spread them along the sea coast in innumerable villages. To this day the heaps of shells, and fields strewed with their fragments (broken small for want of iron instruments to open them) attest, both the antiquity and numbers of the aborigines. And the accounts of Varazani and Jean Ribaut, as well as of the early English colonists, all concur in representing the population of this coast, as very considerable. It is probable that an accumulation of population in this region, is, in some measure, attributable to the conquests of the Six Nations. Those Nimrods of their time, had extended their dominion along the foot of the mountains, as far as the head waters of the Savannah River, and down the Cape Fear to its mouth. A colony of the Senecas, one of the Six Nations, was found upon the former stream, and of the Tuscaroras, another member of the confederacy of the Six Nations at the mouth of the latter. The powerful nation of the Caltapows, now called Catawbas, and for merly Katarbas, was probably the barrier against their progress down the streams, lying south of the Cape Fear. This nation was attacked by a war-party from the Six Nations, on the principles of immemorial hostility as low down as within the memory of persons still living. And the nations inhabiting the coast of South Carolina, never acknowledged themselves, in any respect a dependant people.*

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*The following anecdote illustrates the manners of a people, exhibiting many peculiar and striking characteristics. It never has been before committed to paper; but, is related from the testimony of an eye witness, of perfect respectability, who communicated it to the author.

The Catawbas inhabit a territory of ten miles square, included within the bounds of South Carolina. All the other Indian natives having retired before the whites, and the settlements of the colonists having spread near a thousand miles between them and their hereditary enemy, the Catawbas had lived many years in the most undisturbed tranquillity: and, of consequence, had lost much of their warlike character, besides being reduced, comparatively, to a handful. Thus circumstanced, about the year seventy, they were suddenly invaded by a very superior enemy, a war-party of the Six Nations; a number were scalped, and the rest driven for shelter into the town of Camden, about thirty or forty miles distant from their settlement. Great alarm was spread through the country by an inroad so entirely unlooked for, but the people of the vicinity promptly collected, and joining the Indians, advanced to attack the invaders. The latter were easily repulsed—a few were killed—and one war-

A short time prior to the settlement of Charleston, the numbers of the natives, had been greatly reduced by the small pox. This disease was communicated from Virginia, and the erratic habits

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rior, a very handsome young man, was made prisoner, conveyed to the Catawba encampment, and put in charge of the old men and women, whilst the warriors were following the trace of their enemy.

One of the women, who had lost a relative, immediately adopted the prisoner; and on the return of the chiefs, he was found quietly inhabiting her wigwam, seemingly as little occupied about ulterior possibilities, as any individual in the nation. But, a council of chiefs being called, it was decided that, according to immemorial usage, the prisoner must die in torments—that their children may not degenerate from the virtues of their ancestors. The prisoner was accordingly ordered to prepare himself for such an exhibition on a certain day; and the decree having got abroad, a number of the whites, whose curiosity got the better of better feelings, attended to witness this national *auto da fe*. The poor fellow awaited the day in perfect tranquillity, keeping count, inthe ndian mode, with a bundle of small sticks, one of which was removed every evening. When but one remained, he sedulously decorated himself for the sacrifice, in all "the pomp and circumstance" of an Indian warrior—one of the most hideous exhibitions that human invention can combine!

On the appointed day and hour, he left his wigwam, and with a firm step, and composed countenance—not a muscle expressing a care or apprehension—advanced to the public square, where every thing was in preparation, to recieve him, *secundum mores majorum*. The stake—the fire—the faggots, and lightwood splinters, were all in readiness; and the children, male and female, in concentric circles, arranged according to size, surrounded the stake. The warriors were variously disposed of, as the constitutional actors in the diabolical exhibition

But, the prisoner came not alone—his patroness followed behind him, and he moved forward, equally unconscious of her views and her presence. But, her right hand, wrapped beneath her blanket, held the instrument of his deliverance; and the moment he entered the circle, her tomahawk sunk deeply into the back of his head, and disappointed his tormentors. No one murmured at the disappointment, for this also was according to acknowledged principles—it was the last solemn act of friendship, that one Indian could perform for another.

The subsequent conduct of these wretched beings, scarcely admits of relation; but, a council was immediately held to determine the *mores majorum*, or, international law, on this new state of facts; and, the heart of the victim being taken from his body, was divided into small pieces, and distributed among the children. We will spare the reader the disgusting recital of what followed.

This curious peculiarity among the aborigines of North America, of passing by adoption from one nation to another, and more especially, the absolute moral and physical transmigration consequent upon it, will appear as incredible to many readers, as the passive acquiescence of prisoners made in war, to the dreadful torments to which they were liable to be subjected. Yet, they are both supported by the authority of every writer who has attempted to delineate their character; and by many well attested narratives, transmitted under circumstances which leave no cause to suspect their authenticity. Charlevoix relates one very curious instance of the kind, which occurred in Canada; and, in all the early and very minute narratives which we have received from the first settlers of the colonies, we find signal instances of an apparent transfer of even feelings and interets consequent upon being made prisoner.

It would be difficult to name the folly which has not been made the national point of honour among rude and barbarous nations; or, perhaps, it would not be too much to add, among many nations considerably advanced in civilization. In the present instance, we find the opinions and customs of the savage of North America, not differing very widely from those of the highly civilized Roman. The latter had their laws of adoption; and the citizen who was made prisoner in war, was held during his captivity, to be *civiliter mortuus*. The right asserted by both, to dispose of the life or liberty of the prisoner at pleasure, naturally led to the identification of the consequences of death and captivity. And the warlike habits and policy of both, may have introduced doctrines which were calculated to make death more tolerable than submission to an enemy. With the savages of North America, this notion is pushed to such an extreme, that the man who submits to be made prisoner, can only atone to his disgraced family and nation, by submitting to torture. Their constancy, in this respect, is unparalleled in the history of man. And such is the contempt of death, which their whole education is calculated to cherish, that it ceases to be a punishment. Maiming, beating, and even putting to death the dearest objects of natural affection, are resorted to in their civil policy, to prevent crime. The taking of life is most generally delegated to the "Avenger of Blood;" until the crimes of the whole nation are washed away, in the annual jubilee.

of the hunter, extended its ravages over the whole country. The mortality was dreadful, and the only remedy known to these simple sons of the forest (that of sweating in an oven, constructed of earth or stones, and then plunging into a river) contributed not a little to increase the destruction of human life. Yet it was but little worse than the treatment prescribed at the sametime, by the disciples of Galen and Hypocrites. This depopulation was rapidly hastened by their connexion with the whites; as additional cause and motives were furnished for hostility, by the new wants and new habits then introduced among them.

At first, the animals of the forest were pursued only for food and clothing. For these purposes a moderate district of country, would supply the necessary consumption, whilst the toil in the pursuit, was greatly enhanced by the defectiveness of the only weapons then known to them. But when skins became an article of commerce, and the means of procuring intoxicating liquors, blankets and fire arms, the cupidity of the savage could not be confined to his own hunting grounds, or the fruits of the chase. Anxious to make experiment of his new weapons on man, he possessed himself of the articles of commerce by violence, whilst he triumphed in the temporary enjoyment of his newly acquired superiority. New broils ensued; retaliation was provoked; the hunting grounds of neighbouring nations invaded; and universal war and bloodshed ensued. The natural effects of intemperance and the frequent repetiton of the ravages of the small pox, combined to hasten the dimunition of their numbers; and *famine* also now found its way into the country.

The Indian was not at that time the degraded being that he is at present. All the early visitors of this coast, acknowledged that they found the natives civil, respectful and hospitable. They lived in comparative plenty, evey where cultivating maize and pulse, which, until the introduction of domestic animals was easily done without fencing. It is even asserted, that they had then among them an art since altogether lost, that of weaving cloth. Jean Ribaut found them in possession of it in the neighbourhood of Beaufort, whether of their own manufactuing, or how obtained, is not mentioned. They may have obtained it from Mexico. The Natchez Nation is known to have emigrated from that country, or furnished inhabitants to it.

At that time, the fruits of the toil of the hunter, were faithfully brought home to add to the comforts of his family; whilst the women and children attended to the labours of the field. This is a literal compliance, with the contract of marriage, symbolically entered into by the sexes. The woman presents an ear of corn, and the man a piece of venison. Whilst they remained uncorrupted, there was a scrupulous attention paid to social duties. But, the case was soon altered upon their connexion with the whites. The man consumed the fruits of the chase, in the purchase of his favourite beverage; and even the women would expend the fruits of their labours in the gratification of the same pestiferous habit, whilst their children were left to starve and die; or were, at length, sold to obtain these gratifications. A total depravity of character was the necessary consequence of contracting such habits; and a check to the natural increase of the species, could not but ensue from their general prevalence, and the difficulty of subsistence consequent upon it.

Another and most fatal cause of this depopulation was, the practice of reducing Indians to a state of slavery; a practice which, it is believed, has prevailed in every colony from north to south, with the exception of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.

In South Carolina, it certainly did prevail on a very extensive scale. The proprietors repeatedly affected to express great disgust at this practice, and to discourage it; but, it is demonstrable, that the principle was introduced by themselves; nor was the practice, for many years, discountenanced. They made provision in their fundamental constitutions, for the introduction of negro slaves into their colonies; and what are the grounds upon which that measure was justified?—saving the prisoner from being sacrificed, and forcing him to a country illumined by the light of the gospel!

These specious reasons were too applicable to the case of the Indians, not to be greedily seized upon by the Colonists. Thus, we find, that as early as 1680, West, twice appointed governor, is charged with dealing largely in Indian slaves. James Moore, also another governor, is said to have stocked his plantation with Indian slaves in 1700, in an expedition, which he commanded against the Indians. Several of the proprietor's deputies and councellors, also, were convicted of the same offence at that time, and degraded for it.* An extensive trade, it seems, was then carried on between Carolina and Barbados, in the sale of Indian slaves; and as Yeomans, the second governor of the province, opened that commerce with Barbadoes, it is not improbable that he first originated this nefarious traffic. The subjects of it, were either taken in war by the colonists themselves; or kidnapped or purchased from Indians, who were encouraged to procure them by arms or stratagem. How prone is the human mind, to deceive itself by sophistry and casuistry! Were these unhappy men to receive instruction from the lives of their enslavers? Could they respect the God of the colonists? or, was it a favour conferred on the children, to save them from the tomahawk, when their parents had been sacrificed to it, in order to take the children captive!

This is the great and true cause why the native Indian has become the irreconcilable enemy of the North American colonists. Death he does not fear—all other ills he may be reconciled to bear; but, he who deprives him or his offspring, of the rights of ranging the forest, free as the air he breathes, or compels him to submit to the disgrace of labour, (for in his estimation, it is degrading to the warrior) wounds the most sensible nerve in his system—it is national insult—individual degradation. And hence, that people never have been, and perhaps never will be, willing to receive instruction from the inhabitants of the states. Their national animosities are faithfully transmitted through their women, and are among the first lessons inculcated on the infant mind. It is more than probable also, that the same cause produced those hereditary animosities which existed among the native tribes. We have the evidence of Laudonniere, who succeeded Ribaut in the French attempt at colonizing this country, for asserting, that it was the national practice, in his time, to put the men to death, and make slaves of the women and children of their enemies. Whether the present practice of murdering and scalping indiscriminately, has in any measure resulted from the extinction of the trade in Indian slaves, is not easily determined. But, the colonists made slaves of the men also; and of many who were kidnapped, not taken in war; and this was in the view of the Indian, an intolerable aggravation of the offence. Add to this cause, the continual advances by conquest or purchases that the colonists had been making upon them for near one hundred years back; and the continual deceptions and impositions the Indians sustain from the traders who go among them, and it is not to be wondered at that they were hostile to the colonists.

Several circumstances contributed to attach them to the royal government. When the revolution took place in 1719, the colonists advanced their arch enemy, James Moore, to the governor's chair, in which he was superceded by Nicholson, as royal governor. The latter gentleman paid particular attention to the interests of the Indians. And, by the establishment of an Indian agent, whose duty it was to watch over their interests and protect them from impositions, whilst he also gratified them with the distribution of annual presents in the name of the king; they were taught to look up to the king as their protector, while they regarded the colonists as their natural enemies.

John Stewart was the Indian agent at the commencement of the revolution; and his influence was successfully employed in bringing upon the back settlements of the colony, a most murderous invasion in the year 1775. It was made, as has been noticed, in concert with the attack upon

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* Oldmixon, vol. 1st p. 310.

Fort Moultrie in that year; and in one night, near four hundred men, women and children, sunk under the tomahawk. But, the unfortunate beings were made to pay dearly in the sequel, for listening to their savage employers. They were pursued by the militia, under Colonel Williamson of South, and Colonel Rutherford of North Carolina; many of them were destroyed, and their country, for several hundred miles, made desolate. This chastisement kept them quiet for several years; nor did they again recommence their ravages until about the period of General Greene's arrival in South Carolina. Yet, parties of them were made use of by Colonel Provost, Colonel Brown, and other British commanders. With the exception of the Catawbas, they had now been driven far from the principal theatre of the war, but were decidedly attached to the royal cause, and so will always be to the nation that will give them the most rum and gunpowder. The poor remains of the Catawbas, (their wide extended domain) now reduced to ten miles square, on the borders of North and South Carolina, had taken up arms in the American favour, and shared the fortune of Gates; but, the powerful and hostile nations beyond the mountains, frequently repeated their bloody inroads, in small parties along the frontier, and kept the militia always on the alert, to guard their scattered habitations from sudden incursions.

END OF VOLUME FIRST.

ERRATA TO VOL. 1st.

PAGE.	LINE.			
	36	of Preface, expunge (.) after *monarchy.*		
3	24	*for* nerve,	*read*	nerves.
3	32	· implements,	··	implement.
6	1	·· is,	··	are
35	17	·· apprehensions,	··	apprehension.
59	36	· writer,	··	author.
68	28	·· reliquæ,	··	reliquiæ.
82	21	·· eastward,	··	westward.
85	7	·· east,	··	right.
189	2	·· *destruction,*	··	*reduction.*
199	17	·· support,	··	supports.
206	6	·· learned,	··	*not* learned.
209	8	·· appear,	··	appears.
210	31	·· known,	··	*well* known.
239	14	·· perfas et nefas	··	*per fas et nefas.*
251	3	·· them,	··	whom.
253	22		··	*was* before *passed.*
275	3		··	*as* after *well*
284	3	*(et passim) read* Sumter *for* Sumpter.		

PAGE	LINE.			
289	2	insert *two most,* before *southern.*		
319	6	*for* Americans,	*read*	American.
358	28	·· him,	··	them.
360	26	·· plan,	··	place.
374	33	after *hare,*	··	*been.*
399	33	·· Davie,	··	Davies.
425	21	·· exhilirating,	··	exhilarating
426	21	insert (.) after field.		
437	30	·· Carolinas,	*read*	Carolinians.
446	27	· to,	··	of.
459	1	·· *preserve,*	··	persevere.
479	37	·· 1665,	··	1565.
480	23	·· but,	··	not
482	1	·· sepulchre,	··	sepulture.
485	13	·· constitute,	·	contribute.
491	5	·· *effort,*	·	*escort.*
499	39	omit, *at Charlotte.*		
510	35	·· assimulate,	*read*	assimilate.

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